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INTRODUCTION 
The  Ninth  Report  of  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  contains: 
1.  The  synopsis  of  the  activities  of  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  and  its Working 
Parties  for  1970,  which  this  year  contains  a  special heading  covering the  Conferences 
organized  to publicize  the  results  obtained  from its work. 
2.  A recapitulation  of  the  accident  statistics for  the years  1958  to  1971,  with  comments 
on  their trend  and  a  survey  of  the  statistics collected  in  accordance  with  the  new 
extended  scheme. 
3.  A study  of  the  manner  in which  the  Recommendations  of  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health 
Commission  have  been  implemented. 
The  items  listed on  the preceding  page  have  been  relegated  to  the  annex,  and 
comprise  - apart  from  the  conventional  information  regarding  the  detailed statistics -
the  terms  of  reference  and  the  composition  of  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  and 
its Working  Parties,  the  text  of  the  Recommendations,  Reports  and  Opinions  approved  by 
the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  in  1971. 9 
SECTION  I 
ACTIVITIES  OF  THE  MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH  COMMISSION 
The  activities  of  the  Commission  can  be  summed  up  as  follows. 
In  1971,  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  held  two  meetings  preceded by 
two  meetings  of  the  Restricted  Committee;  the  Working Parties  and  their Sub-committees 
held  31  meetings,  two  of which  can be  considered  as  information  conferences  organized by 
the  Secretariat of  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission.  The  overall total of meetings 
was  therefore  37  (49  in  1970).  This  appreciable  reduction  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the 
Secretariat  lost  two  staff. 
The  breakdown  of  the  meetings  and  the  Working Parties  and  their Sub-committees 
is  as  follows: 
Rescue  arrangements,  Mine  Fires  of  Underground  Combustion 
(2  plenary  meetings,  the  others  restricted): 
Rescue  arrangements: 
Ventilation Sub-committee: 
Fire-resistant  fluids  Sub-committee: 
Winding  and  guide  ropes: 
Electricity: 
(2  plenary meetings,  the  others  restricted) 
Explosive  dusts: 
Joint  accident  statistics: 
Health: 
Psychological  and  sociological  factors  affecting safety: 
(Conference) 
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During  this  reporting year,  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission was  able 
to bring  to  fruition  certain work,  with  the  consequent  approval  of  8  Recommendations, 
expert  reports  or  general  reports  which  are  reproduced  as  annexes  as  set out  in the  list 
on  page  5. 
These  are: 
(i)  in  the electricity sector: 
(a)  an  expert  report  on  the  disturbances  due  to  the salt pastes  and  powders  used  to 
immobilize  the  dust  (Annex  IX), 
(b)  a  report  dealing with  the  comparison of  the  safety measures  in respect  of 
electric trolley locomotives  and  in particular in respect  of  the possibility of 
reducing  the  frequency  of  contact  sparks  (Annex  X),  (these  terms  of reference 
have  been  extended:  see  Section "Electricity"  and  Annex  II), 
(c)  a  report  on  the  penetration of  lightning into  underground workings  (Annex XI), 10 
(ii)  in  the  rescue  sector: 
(a)  a  summary  table  of  regulations  and  directives  in  respect  of  rescue  operations 
in mines  (Annex  VI), 
(b)  the  Eighth  Report  on  the  Organization  of  Rescue  Arrangements  (Annex  VII). 
(iii)  in  the fires and  underground  combustion  sector: 
the  Fourth  Report  on  specifications  for  non-flammable  liquids  (separate  reprint). 
(IV)  in  the  accident statistics sector: 
a  Recommendation  relative  to  an  extension of  the  intake  of  statistics  (Annex  IV). 
The  terms  of  reference  of  this  group  have  been  supplemented by  a  mathematical-
statistical survey  and  an  assessment  of  the  differences  between  the  rates  of 
incidence.  (See  Chapter  on  Statistics  and  terms  of  reference  in  Annex  III). 
(V)  in the  Human  Factors  sector: 
a  motion  regarding  Community  safety  campaigns  in  coal-mines  (see  Annex  XII). 
At  its meeting  of  26  March  1971,  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  approved 
the  proposals  of  the  Restricted  Committee  of  the  12  November  1970  in respect  of  the  new 
working  objectives.  It also modified  the  old  terms  of  reference  of  the  Working  Parties 
(see  Annex  III)  and  set  up  three  new  Working  Parties:  "Strata Control  and  Supports", 
"Mechanism",  and  "Ventilation  and  Firedamp". 
The  establishment  of  these Working Parties meets  the  desire  expressed by  the 
European  Parliament  and  takes  account  of  the  following  important  factors: 
(i)  increasing degree  of  concentration  and  mechanization of  the workings:  this  is what 
gave  rise  to  the Working  Party  on "Ventilation and  Firedamp", 
(ii)  lessons  to be  drawn  from  the statistics:  an  increasing number  of  serious  lnJuries 
resulting  from mechanization;  this  gave  rise  to  the  "Mechanization"  Working  Party; 
the  high  incidence  of  accidents  due  to  roof  falls  (40%  of  fatalities),  which  gave 
rise  to  the  Working Party  on  "Strata Control  and  Supports",  this being  also  justi-
fied  by  the  increasing  frequency  of  major  roof  falls  due  to  the  increase  in working 
depth. 
The  basic principles  of  these  terms  of  reference,  which will need  to be  more 
precisely  formulated  by  the  new  Working Parties,  are  also  produced  in  Annex  II.  Authority 
was  also  given  to  study  the  medical  factors  in  connection with health,  including  the 
environmental  factors:  noise,  vibration,  heat,  light etc.  as  well  as  the  safety  factors  in 
respect  of  the  employment  of  foreign  workers.  Work  on  these  items  has  not  yet begun,  by 
reason  of  the  staffing situation of  the  Secretariat. 
In  respect  of  the  propagation of  the  data  obtained,  the  Secretariat of  the  Mines 
Safety  Commission  has  organized  certain  information  and  study  conferences. 
On  12,  13  and  14  October  1971,  a  Conference  of  this  type  was  organized  in Saar-
brucken  (Saar  coalfield)  and  attended  by  220  mining  engineers  from  the  Community  countries 
and  the  United  Kingdom. 
On  27  and  28  October  1971,  a  Conference was  held  at  Houthalen  (Campine  Coal-
field)  for  60  union  safety delegates  from  the  CISL  and  CMT  organizations. 
The  synoptic  report  on  these  Conferences  is  given  in the  section on "Publicizing 
the  results  of  the  work  of  the Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission". 
The  members  of  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission were  also  invited  to  attend 
information  Conferences  on  the  control  of  the  emission  of  methane  and  the  improvement  of 
mine  climate,  he.ld  in Luxembourg  on  24  and  25  February  1971.  These  conferences  assisted 
the  new  Working  Party  on  "Ventilation and  Firedamp",  inter alia,  in  defining  the basic 
principles  of  its  terms  of  reference. 11 
Finally,  reference must  also be  made  to  the  Conference  on  Community  safety 
campaigns  held  on  June  1971  in Luxembourg,  attended by  60  safety  campaign specialists. 
These  experts  exchanged  views  on  the  results  of  their experience  in  this  field,  with  a 
view  to  organizing similar  campaigns  - the first  of  which  was  put  under  way  in the  Ruhr 
at  the  end  of  1971  with  financial  support  form  the  Community  - the  desirability  of  such 
campaigns  had  already  been expressed  in  the motion  referred to  above  made  by  the  Mines 
Safety  and  Health  Commission  (see  Section  I  H,  page  24). 
Among  the  meetings  which  fall  outside  the  framework  of  the  Working  Parties 
and  particularly of  the  group  of  experts  on  stabilization of ventilation,  reference  should 
be  made  in particular  to  an  international meeting  regarding  management  of ventilation in 
a  mine  in the  event  of  fire;  this meeting  was  held  in Brussels  on  1  October  1971  at  the 
School  of  Public Health  of  the  University  of  Louvain,  a  computer  being made  available  for 
the  Conference  (see  Section I  A).  This  is  also mentioned  under  Section  III  (Publicizing 
the  results  of  the  work  of  the Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission). 
The  accident  list includes  collective accidents,  i.e.  more  than  five  fatalities 
or  serious  casualties,  discussed  on  page  22,  and  accidents  resulting in incapacity 
to  work,  which  are  listed by  coalfield  in  Annex  1;  of  these  accidents  those  causing  death 
or  over  56  days  of  incapacity  are  also  the  subject  of  a  summary  report  and  a  commentary 
on  their  frequency  trend,  to  be  found  in Section III,  page  28. 
Briefly,  3  collective  accidents  caused  the  death  of  20  persons,  the  causes  being 
an  outburst  of  C02  and  two  falls  of  rock. 
In  absolute  figures  serious  casualties  and  fatalities  are  decreasing  - 182 
fatalities  compared  with  188  in 1970,  and  6,429  serious  casualties  compared with  6  580  in 
1970.  The  rate  of  these  accidents  per million working hours  can  be  regarded  as  practically 
stationary.  It was  0.440  in  1971  compared  with  0.429  in 1970,  which  is  a  statistically 
insignificant increaseof  2.6  %,  following  a  regular  decrease  since  1958  (0.610);  the  rate 
of  serious  casualties  was  15  088  compared with  15  022·  in 1970.  It was  13  551  in 1958  and 
15  160  in  1969. 
Production in the  E.E.C.  collieries  continued  to  decrease;  it went  down  from 
170  355  m metric  tons  in  1970  to  164  970  m metric  tons  in 1971,  which  is  a  decrease  of 
3.2  %.  The  number  of  hours  worked  fell  from  438  m to  414  m,  which  is  a  decrease  of  5.5  %. 
The  number  of  registered workers  in 1971  was  315  900  (220  900  underground  and  95  000  on 
the  surface)  compared  with  330  800  in  1971  (233  500  underground  and  97  300  on  the  surface). 
To  complete  these  data  supplied  by  the  Energy  Directorate of  the  Statistical Office,  it 
should be  mentioned  that  coal  stocks  went  up  from  10  275  000  metric  tons  at  the  end  of 
1970  to  12  853  000  at  the  end  of  1971,  while  stocks  of  coke  from  the  coking plants,  whose 
production went  from  70  228  000  metric  tons  in 1970  to  65  682  000  tons  in  1971,  went  up  by 
1  294  000  metric  tons  to  7  001  000  metric  tons. 
Finally,  industrial relations were  disrupted  only  in  Belgium,  where  a  practically 
general strike  lasted  9  to  10  days. 12 
I  - TECHNICAL  PROBLEMS 
A.  Rescue  arrangements,  mine  fires,  underground  combustion 
The  Working  Party held  three Plenary Meetings,  on  26  February  1971  and  7  June 
1971,  with  two  Restricted Meetings,  the  first  of  which  was  devoted  to  preparations  for 
the  international  study  conference  for  mining  engineers  held  in Saarbrucken  on  12,  13 
and  14  October  1971  under  the  aegis  of  the  Working  Party  (see  Section III below),  and 
the  second  on  24  Septemher  1971  to  review  its  terms  of  reference  and draw  up  a  new  list 
of  priorities.  The  Sub-committee  on  "Rescue  Arrangements"  met  on  9  and  10  November  1971 
at  the  "Coordinatiecentrum Reddingswezen"  at Hasselt  (Belgium),  while  the  Sub-committee 
of  ventilation experts  met  seven  times,  and  the  Sub-committee  on  Non-Flammable  Fluids 
three  times.  The  activities  of  this  group  thus  totalled fifteen meetings. 
(a)  The  Working  Party was  able  to  complete: 
1.  The  Fourth  Report  on  the  specifications  and  test  conditions  for  Non-Flammable 
Fluids 
Having  been  approved  by  the  Working  Party  on  26  February  1971,  and  approved  by 
the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  on  25  March  1971,  this  Report  of  the  com-
mittee  of  experts  was  issued  as  a  separate  reprint.  Because it was  given  a  spe-
cific distribution  at  that  time,  it is not  reproduced  as  an  Annex  to  the  present 
Report.  This  Report  replaces  the  Third  Report  which  dates  from  1967,  and  takes 
into  account  the  experience  gained since  that  time  by  the  research  institutes 
and  in the  manufacture  and  use  of  these  fluids. 
The  changes  introduced have  already  been  mentioned  in  th Eighth  Report,  on 
page  12.  These  are: 
(i)  the  criteria of  assessment  and  the various  methods  of test  for  the  Second 
Flammability Test  by  determining  the  propagation  of  a  flame  in  a  coal/oil 
mixture.  In order  to  avoid  any  scatter between  the  results  obtained,  the 
research  institutes  jointly carried out  a  large  number  of  new  tests,  and 
have  arrived  at  comparable  results,  after they  had  developed  a  more  pre-
cise  formulation  of  this  criterion. 
(ii)  in addition,  the  threshold  of  propagation has  been  raised,  without  affec-
ting  the  significance in respect  of  safety  of  this  criterion; 
(iii)  in  the  statement  of  the  criterion with  regard  to  protection  against wear, 
the  four-ball  test, which  gives  results  which  are  not  always  reproducible, 
has  been  supplemented  by  a  test with  the  Vickers  type  paddle  pump,  which 
gives  a  closer  approximation  to  reality.  It must,  however,  be  pointed  out 
that  these  two  tests  are  not  as  yet  sufficient by  themselves  to  describe 
the  very  complex  phenomenon  of wear,  and  that  they  should  therefore be 
treated until  further  information  is  available  as  being only  experimental 
in nature; 
(iv)  the  health  criteria have  been  modified  only  in  respect  of  method.  Here 
too,  the  new  criteria applied  are  not  final  and will need  to be  supplement-
ed  later. 
In  approving  the  Fourth  Report,  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  requested 
that  this  document  should  be  distributed  to  all persons  and  organizations  (of 
whom  there were  very  many)  who  received  the  Third  Report. 
The  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission was  also  concerned with  the  major  problem 
of  recognition  on  the  Community  level  of  the  approval  certificates  issued by 
the  research  institutes,  since  the  consequence  of  this  would  be  that  a  product 
which  had  been  tested  and  certificated by  the  competent  authority  for  underground 13 
use  in  one  country  in  the  Community  would be  accepted,  without  further  examina-
tion,  by  the  competent  authorities  of  another  country.  The  Mines  Safety  and 
Health  Commission  shares  the  Working Party's  view  that  this  reciprocal  recogni-
tion  should be  effective when  the  product  in question was  without  any  shadow 
of  doubt  identical  in  each  country,  and  the  Commission  further decided  that 
the  covering letter sent  out with  the  Fourth  Report  to  the  responsible author-
ities  should  mention  this  desideratum.  The  group  of experts  has  been  charged 
with  finding methods  which  would  make  it possible  to  identify  the product 
clearly in respect  of its  chemical  components,  since this is  a  major  problem 
especially  from  the health point  of  view. 
2.  The  synoptic  table of  the  regulations  and  directives  in respect  of rescue  in 
mines  (Annex  VI) 
The  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  adopted  on  26  March  1971  this  synoptic 
table which  was  prepared by  its Secretariat  to  meet  a  request  of  the European 
Parliament. 
The  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  has  observed  that  the organization of 
rescue  arrangements  in the  Community  countries  and  in the  United  Kingdom  does 
not  exhibit  any  important  differences,  and  that  the  rare points  of difference 
are  attributable  to  local  conditions.  The  Commission  therefore  adopted  the 
view  put  forward  by  the  Working  Party,  namely  that  any  comparative  study  and 
detailed evaluation  of  the  provisions  in this  connection were  unnecessary. 
The  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  decided that  this  synoptic table  should 
immediately be distributed  for  information purposes  to  the  Mines  Inspectorates 
and  to  all interested parties  and  organizations. 
3.  List of  specialists  in drilling and  of  the  rescue  apparatus  available in the 
Community:  situation as  at  1  January  1971 
This  list, also prepared by  the  Secretariat at  the  request  of  the  European 
Parliament,  was  approved  by  the  Commission  on  26  March  1971.  It had  already 
been  reproduced  in Annex  III of  the  Eighth  Report.  This  list should be brought 
up-to-date at  regular intervals,  particularly once  Community  research  into  the 
techniques  of drilling rescue holes  has  been  completed,  this work  having been 
referred to  the  Commission  itself by  the Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission. 
The  state  reached by  the work  in this  sector is briefly covered below under 
the heading  "Rescue  by  means  of boreholes". 
4.  Eighth  Report  of  the  Working  Party for  the  organization  of  rescue  arrangements 
for  1969/1970  (Annex  VII) 
In point  of  fact,  this bi-annual  report  prepared by  the Secretariat  in  1971  was 
approved by  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  in  1972  (24  January  1972). 
Taking  into  account  the  period  covered  by  this  report  (1969  to  1970),  the Mines 
Safety  and  Health  Commission  decided  to  annex it to  the  Ninth  Report  to ensure 
that it received  a  wide  distribution  in  as  short  a  time  as  possible. 
This  Report,  laid  out  to the  usual pattern which  is normal within the  framework 
of  the  general  terms  of  reference  of  the  Working  Party  (see  Annex  III),  contains 
not  only  the  classical statistical information regarding  the  organization and 
activities  of  the  Rescue  Centres,  but  also  comprises  two  annexes,  one  on  the 
state of  the  work  being  carried  on  by  the  Rescue  Centres  and  subsidized by  the 
Commission  at fue  request  of  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  in respect  of 
the detection  of  trapped miners  and  their rescue  by means  of  large boreholes, 
and  the  other  dealing with  a  closed-circuit  type  of breathing apparatus  with 
recent  improvements. 14 
(b)  In  addition,  the Working Party  and  its  Sub-committees  have  continued  the work 
envisaged  in their own  terms  of  reference,  these having been  reviewed -with the 
other terms  of  reference - by  the Restricted  Committee  on  23  November  1970  and 
approved  by  the Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  on  26  ~arch 1971  and  reworked 
by  the  Working  Party  on  9  and  10  January  1971  (see  new  text  reproduced  as  Annex 
III). 
Special mention  should be  made  of  the  following  problems: 
1.  Fire  in shafts 
This  problem was  deleted  in the  reworked  terms  of  reference,  since it was  con-
sidered to have  been  fully  dealt with.  What  is  involved  is  the  series  of modifi-
cations  to be  made  to  the  Recommendation  of  the Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commis-
sion  of  20  April  1960,  in  respect  to  fire-fighting measures  by  spraying in the 
event  of  fires  in shafts,  these  modifications  having been  found  necessary  as  a 
result  of  tests  carried out  in abandoned  shafts. 
The  major points  of  these  modifications have  already been  listed in  the Eighth 
Report,  on  page  11.  The  draft,  which  was  prepared by  a  group  of experts, was 
not  approved  by  the Working  Party at its meeting of  26  February  1971,  since  they 
considered  further  amendments  to be necessary.  It was  only possible  to  present 
these  amendments  again to  the  Working  Party in  1972  (10  March  1972)  and  the 
draft  modifications  were  adopted  by  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  only 
on  11  July  1972.  They  will  be  incorporated  in  the  Tenth  Report. 
In essence  they  cover: 
(i)  a  correction  to  the  nomogram  attached  to  the directives,  to  allow  for  the 
observed  fact  that  the  aeromotor  force  produced by  the  fall of  the  spraying 
water  is  from  10  to  30%  lower  than  the values  shown  on  the nomogram; 
(ii)  an  increase  in the  number  of  extinguishing devices,  brought  about  by  install-
ing  such  devices  at each shaft  landing in the  main  shafts  together with 
devices  making it possible - in  the  event  of  a  fire  in a  downcast  shaft 
above  a  given  horizon  - to  slow  down  the  reversed  and  smoke-laden air  cur-
rent  in  the  main  intake  airways  on  that  horizon. 
2.  Fire-resistant  fluids 
At  its meeting  of  5  October  1971,  the  group  of experts  examined  the  request  by 
the Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission with  regard to the  mutual  recognition of 
inspection certificates  and  attestations  of  certification.  While  recognizing 
the  cogency  of  this  request,  the  group  of  experts  considered that in pratical 
terms  it was  premature,  at  least if applied generally.  In point  of  fact,  major 
differences  had  been  found  in the  results  obtained  in  Germany  and  in France  in 
the  thermal  decomposition tests  applied to  anhydrous  fluids  (type  B);  investiga-
tions  were  carried out  in  1972  with  a  view  to  selecting strictly identical test 
apparatus  and  methods.  The  group  of  experts  did,  however,  examine  the possible 
methods  of  achieving this  mutual  recognition  - in particular in respect  of  the 
problem of  the  analysis  certificates  intended  to  indicate  the  precise  chemical 
composition of  the  product,  and  especially of  the  additives it contains  - in 
order  to be  completely sure  of  the  identity  of  the  product  without  the necessity 
for  revelation  of  any  of  the  secrets  of  its manufacture. 
The  group  of experts  examined  the  results  of  the  questionnaire  regarding possible 
disturbances  occasioned by  the  use  of hydraulic  fluids  of  type  D.  The  experts 
observed  that  the  fluids  in question had  already been  used  for  considerable 
periods  of  time,  (7  years  in the  Ruhr),  that  they were  being  consumed  in increas-
ing quantities  (150  000  kg  in  1970)  and  that  further  increases  could be expected 
:by  reason of  the  present  trend in mechanization.  Nevertheless,  the  experts  did 
not  consider  that  they were  able  to  give  a  final  judgment, but  they  did note 
that,  in  the present state of  knowledge  in respect  of  acute  toxicity  (lesions  of 15 
the  eyes,  of  the  skin or irritation of  the mucous  surfaces)  provided  that cer-
tain conditions  and  rules were  observed.  Nevertheless,  certain investigations 
carried out  by  the  medical  experts  - in particular at  the Pharmacological  In-
stitute of  the University  of  Hamburg  - raised  the question of  chronic  toxicity 
(in particular as  a  result of  deposition in  the  fatty tissues  of  the human  body) 
of  certain chlorinated diphenyl  products;  this  is  a  problem which will  be  exam-
ined  during  1972.  · 
3.  Rescue  by  means  of  large boreholes 
The  Working  Party  took  note  of  the  results  of  the  Community  research  carried out 
by  CERCHAR  and  the  Steinkohlenbergbauverein at  the  suggestion of  the Mines  Safety 
and  Health Commission  in  1968.  Community  financial  aid was  granted  in  1969  for 
a  period  of  two  years.  The  work  carried out  in Lorraine is reported  on  in Annex 
VII  (Eighth  Report  of  the  organization of  rescue  arrangements  for  the years  1969 
and  1970). 
Since  that  time,  the work  has  progressed  as  follows: 
(i)  the  detection of  trapped  miners  can be  carried out  from  a  distance of  150 
metres  with  an  accuracy  of  2  to  3  metres,  and  the  presence  of  trapped 
miners  (without  precise  localization)  can  be  observed at  a  distance  of 
300  metres, 
(ii)  the  first  communication with  the  trapped miners  has  now  been  developed: 
this  is  achieved  by  two  small-diameter holes,  one  for  a  telephone  link 
and  the other  for  passing  supplies, 
(iii)  the  rescue  procedure  using  large boreholes  has  been  dealt with  in  a  film. 
Two  trials were  carried out,  one  at  an  angle  of  45°  and  the  other at  820. 
On  the  latter test, with  a  hole  80  metres  long  and  610  millimetres  in 
diameter,  the  total  time  taken  to drill  the  hole  was  254  hours.  Other 
research work will still be  required  to  reduce  this  time  by  at  least  one-
third.  The  Working  Party  requested  that  financial  aid  should  be  granted 
to  this  supplementary  research  programme.  1) 
4.  Stabilization of  ventilation in  the  event  of  a  fire 
After  seven meetings,  the  experts have  completed  the  study  of  the  problem of 
ventilation  in  the  event  of  a  fire arising  in  a  descensionally ventilated  airway, 
but  they were  not  able  to  complete  work  on  the  problem of  the  stability of 
ventilation in diagonal  ventilation airways  (termi of  reference  Dl  and  2  in An-
nex  VII). 
The  Working  Party also met,  with  a  larger number  of  delegates  than  usual,  at  the 
University  of Louvain  (see  Section II below)  under  the  heading  "Publicizing  the 
results  of  the work  of  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission". 
5.  The  Working  Party also  discussed,  in  accordance with  its  term of  reference  A3, 
the  case  of  the  reopening  of  a  large district damaged  by  fire  at  the  Gneisenau 
pit at  Dortmund;  in  accordance  with  its  term of  reference  B 2b,  it further  noted 
the  experience  gained  in  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  in using  the  CO  self-
rescuer  of  the  Drager  810  type. 
Finally,  a  restricted  group  of  experts  met  on  24  September  1972  to  review  the 
complete  list of  terms  of  reference,  bringing  each  point up-to-date,  in order 
to  study  the way  in which  the  work  already  carried out  is  to  be  continued,  how 
the  new  terms  of  reference  should  be  fulfilled  and  the priorities  for  these 
items  established. 
1)  This  additional  financial  aid has  been  granted. 16 
B.  Winding  and  guide  ropes 
The  Working  Party met  twice  in plenary  session,  on  19  January  and  16  September 
1971. 
(a)  The  Working  Party  came  to  a  conclusion  in respect  of  the  research  project  dealing 
with  points  6  and  7  of  its  terms  of  reference  (Annex  III).  This  covers  a: 
"Project  for  Community  research  into  premature  fatigue  of  the winding  ropes  in 
heavily-loaded  shafts
11
• 
At  its meeting  of  19  January  1972,  the  Working  Party  took  note  of  the  observa-
tions  made  in  the  Ruhr,  the  Saar  and  in Lorraine which  indicate  that  a  large  pro-
portion  of  the  main  shaft winding  cables  (60%  in  the  Ruhr)  does  not  achieve  the 
planned  utilization life of  two  years,  the  average  effective life in heavily-loaded 
pits  being  9  to  12  months. 
The  Working  Party  examined  the  causes  of  this  premature  fatigue,  which  takes 
place with  unexpected  rapidity,  and  which  n0t  only  imposes  early  replacement  of 
the  cables  - a  factor with  an  appreciable  economic  significance  - but  above  all 
raises  the  problem of  a  gap  in the  safety  inspection of  the  cables.  The  Working 
Party discussed  the  causes  of  this  premature  fatigue  on  the  basis  of  an  investiga-
tion  carried  out  by  the Westfalische  Berggewerkschaftskasse  at  Bochum;  this  report 
indicates  that,  on  the  one  hand,  the  mechanical,  dynamic  and  geometrical  stresses 
on  the  cables  are  far  greater  in  the  shafts which  transport  a  high  output  and  are 
at  great  depth,  and  on  the  other hand,  that  there  are  problems  arising  in  connec-
tion with  the  manufacture  of  the  cables,  namely  that  the  cable-making  process  has 
been  speeded  up  and  that new  types  of  cables  are being  made  (steel-cored  cables). 
The  Working  Party requested  the  director of  the  above-named  institute  to  prepare 
a  draft  research  programme  to  cover  the  new  risks  which  have  thus  been  revealed. 
This  draft  was  studied  on  16  September  1971.  It  envisages  systematic  dynamic  and 
geometric  investigations  of  the  existing  cables,  with  the  special  equipment  which 
the  institute has  available,  in order  to  develop  a  new  design of  cable  or  to  arrive 
at  improvements  in  the  structure and  manufacture  of  cables,  in order  to  make  them 
better suited  to  the  present  working  conditions. 
With  the  unanimous  agreement  of  its members  -representing the  Governments,  the 
employers  and  the workers  - the  Working  Party  reached  the  conclusion  that  this  re-
search  is necessary  to  ensure  safety  in  coal-mines,  and  has  requested  the  Mines 
Safety  and  Health  Commission  to  propose  - in virtue of Article  5  of  its  terms  of 
reference  - that  the  Commission  itself should  as  rapidly  as  possible  grant  financial 
aid  to  this  Community  research  programme.  1) 
(b)  In  addition,  the  Working  Party  continued  the  study  of  the  following  problems: 
(i)  in  accordance with  its  term  of  reference  2:  the  formulation  of  directives  to 
achieve  standard  safety provisions  in respect  of  suspension gear.  These 
directives will  be  concluded  in 1972. 
(ii)  in  accordance with  its  term of  reference  8:  discussion of  accidents  which 
occured  on  haulage  cables  in  roadways,  to  the  balance-rope  attachments,  cases 
of  breakage  of  rope  cores  in Lang  semi-balanced  ropes. 
(iii)  in  accordance with  its  term of  reference  1:  due  note  was  taken  of  the  new 
developments  in Great  Britain  in respect  of  the  remote  control  of  transport 
equipment  using  cables  and  the  protection of  winding  ropes  by  means  of  a 
dynamometer. 
(1)  This  proposal was  made  before  the  Commission  in Brussels  by  the  Mines  Safety  and 
Health  Commission  (at  the  session of 24  January  1971)~  and the  Commission  decided 
to  approve  holding measures  until  the  results of the  research become  available. 17 
(iv)  in accordance with its  term of  reference  7:  a  discussion of  the modifications 
of  the mining  regulations  in  respect  of  the  utilization of  winding  and  haulage 
ropes  in the  British mining  industry,  1)  as  well  as  of  a  report  covering  the 
main  characteristics  of  winding  ropes  in  the  Ruhr  mines. 
One  of  the  members  has  requested  an  investigation to  develop  a  formula  or 
a  single  index making  it possible  to  give  a  standard  assessment  of winding 
ropes  in terms  of  their conditions  of  use  and  the  work  performed. 
C.  Electricity 
The  Working  Party met  twice  in plenary session  on  23  April  and  8  October  1971, 
and  four  times  in restricted session. 
(a)  The  Working  Party was  able  to  finish  its work  on  the  following  three  terms  of  ref-
erence,  after  a  period  of  work  covering  several  years. 
1.  Expert  report  on  the  subject  of  the  disturbing effects  on  underground  electrical 
equipment  of  salt pastes  and  powders  used  to  immobilize  coal  dust 
The  Working  Party on  electricity finished  this  expert  report  at  its plenary 
session  of  23  April  1971,  and  the  Mines  Safety and  Health Commission  approved 
it on  29  June  1971.  It is  reproduced  as  Annex  IX  of  this report. 
The  origin of  this  term of  reference,  dating  from  1966,  is  connected with  the 
catastrophe at Luisenthal  and  the  development,  by  the  German  mines  inspectorate 
authorities,  of  the  salt paste  and  powder  method  as  a  means  of  combatting  coal 
dust  explosions. 
Having  made  use  of  the  results  of  a  large  number  of  observations,  trials  and 
practical  experiments  - summarized  in  the  Report  and  listed  in  the  bibliography 
reproduced  as  an  annex  - the  Working  Party  sought  to  identify and  enumerate  the 
measures  which  make  is possible  to  moderate  the  disturbing effects resulting 
from  the  use  of  salt pastes  and  powders  on  electrical  equipment.  The  Working 
Party reached  the  conclusion  that  the  restrictions  imposed  by  these measures 
should  not  constitute a  hindrance  to  applying  them,  to  the  extent  that  this  method 
offers  definite advantages  in providing protection against  dust  explosions.  The 
Working  Party has  therefore declared  its view  solely in respect  of  the  effects 
of  the  method  on  electrical  equipment,  and  not  on  the  value  of  the  method  itself 
during dust  explosions;  in consequence,  new  doubt  could  be  thrown  on  these 
conclusions  if other methods  were  to  be  found  equally efficacious  in  the  future. 
The  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  authorized  the  Working  Party  on  "Flammable 
dusts"  to  investigate  this  question.  The  Commission  adopted  the  Report  in  the 
form  of  an  "expert  report"  and  not  as  a  "Recommendation",  because  the  conclusions 
cannot  be  incorporated  in  the  mining  regulations. 
It was  decided  to  send  this  expert  report  to  the  Governments  for  appropriate 
action,  as  well  as  to  the  employers'  and  workers'  associations. 
2.  Report  on  the  comparison of  safety measures  with  respect  to  underground  electric 
locomotives,  and  in particular  the  possibility of  reducing  the  frequency  of 
electric sparks  on  the  trolley wires. 
The  Working  Party  on  "Electricity"  terminated  this Report  at its plenary  session 
of  23  April  1971  and  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  approved  it on  29 
June  1971.  It  forms  Annex  X of  this Report. 
1)  It was  decided that  a  visit should be  made  to  Great  Britain early in  1972. 18 
This  particular authority takes  its or1g1n  from  an  incident  involving  a  firedamp 
explosion which  occured  in 1962  at  the Adolf  mine  in  the Aix-la-Chapelle  Coal-
field  .. 
The  Working Party enumerates  in its Report  the  current  prov1s1ons  in  the  Inter-
national Labour  Office Regulations  and  in the  regulations  of  the different 
Community  countries.  The  Working  Party did  not  consider it was  necessary  to 
make  a  synoptic  comparison of  these measures,  but has  summarized  them  in respect 
not only of  the  risk of  ignition of  firedamp  and  the  resulting fire risk,  but 
also in respect of  the  risk of electrocution.  The  Working  Party also  studied 
a  large mass  of  documents,  in particular dealing with  a  process  capable  of  sup-
pressing the  sparks.  The  Working  Party's view  is decidedly  that at  the  present 
moment  it is not  possible  to  eliminate with  complete  certainty  the  formation 
of  any  sparks  on  the  contact  lines  used  by  trolley  locomotives  and  that,  in 
consequence,  the  only measures  which  can  be  envisaged  as  means  of  avoiding 
the ignition of methane  are  concerned with ventilation and  working  techniques. 
The  Working Party made  a  synthetic compilation of measures  embodied  in the 
various sets of national  regulations  and  noted  that not all  the  measures  were 
used  in  the different countries. 
The  Mines  Safety and  Health Commission  instructed  the  new  Working  Party  on 
"Ventilation and  firedamp"  to  produce  a  uniform formulation  of  these ventilation 
and working precautions. 
Bearing in mind  the  conclusions  reached  by  the  Working  Party  and  the  trials 
carried out  in Provence with  the  financial  aid  of  the Community  on  a  linear 
induction motor,  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  instructed  the  Working 
Party on "Electricity" to: 
"Keep  a  close watch  on  techniques  for  the  total  suppression of  sparks occurring 
in electric traction systems  (excluding motors  supplied  from  accumulators)  and 
in particular  to  take note of  the  new  linear motor  method  for  propelling  'trains' 
of  conveyor  pans." 
Finally,  it was  decided  to  distribute this  Report  to  the  Governments  and  to  the 
employers'  and  workers'  organizations. 
3.  Opinion  and  conclusions  on  voltage  surges  caused  by  lightning 
The  Working  Party adopted  this Report  at its plenary  session of  8  October  1971. 
Although  only approved  by  the  Mines  Safety and  Health Commission  in  1972  (24 
January  1972),  it is  reproduced  as  Annex  XI  in this  Report,  thus  giving it  the 
widest  possible distribution in the  shortest possible  time. 
The  origin of  this  item was  an  explosion of  firedamp  and  dust  which  occured  in 
1963  at  the Mainsforth Pit  in Great  Britain,  happily without  any  victims. 
The  Report  lists  the  documents  studied  in  the bibliography,  in  connection with 
a  number  of  discussions;  some  of  the  material  comes  from Eastern countries  (it 
is  also  available  in  French and  in German). 
According  to  the  point at  the  surface where  the  lightning strikes  and  the  path 
followed  by  the  lightning  in penetrating into  the  underground  workings,  the 
Report  envisages  various  measures  to moderate  the  effects  of  the  voltage  surges 
and  stray currents  which  can  occur  underground  and  which  involve risks  of 
firedamp  ignition,  fire,  premature  initiation of detonators  and  various  distur-
bances  to  the working  operations  underground. 
The  Working  Party did  not  study very deeply  the  recent hypothesis  advanced  by 
the  Geological  Institute of  Zagreb  regarding  the  propagation of  energy  from 
lightning by  electromagnetic waves,  because  this hypothesis  does  not  introduce 
any  precautions  other  than  those which  follow  from  the  currently-accepted 
hypotheses. 19 
The  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  considered at its meeting  of  24  January 
1972  that  this  opinion  report  could  not  be  treated as  the basis  for  a  Recommen-
dation because  the majority of  the  measures  proposed  are  governed,  as  to  their 
application,  by  local  conditions  and  cannot  be  transferred without modification 
into  the  national  regulations.  Moreover,  the  investigation of  this  problem has 
clearly  shown  that it is not  so  important  in  the  deep  coal-mines  of  Western 
Europe  as  it is  in the  iron mines  or  in other metalliferous mines  and  underground 
quarries worked  at shallow depths  or  from drifts. 
The  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  adopted  this  op1n1on  report  and  decided 
to  send  it out  - for  appropriate  use  according  to  the  circumstances  - to  the 
Mines  Inspectorates  and  to  all  interested circles  in the mining  industry,  as  well 
as  to  other  sectors  of  the  extractive  industries  whose  activities  are  regulated 
by  the  same  Mines  Inspectorates. 
(b)  The  Working  Party  on  "Electricity" has  moreover  made  progress  in the  examination 
of  its  terms  of  reference  covering  the  following  items:  No.  4,  study of  the  consti-
tution of high-tension cables  (1  000  to  6  000  volts)  used  underground  as  well  as 
the  protective devices  used  on  these  cables;  No.  6,  periodic  report  on  the  trends 
in  the  operation of  circuit-breakers  and  oil contacters  in  firedamp  atmospheres; 
and  No.  3,  measures  to  be  taken when  the  necessity arises  of  carrying out work  on 
electrical  equipment  under  voltage. 
D.  Flammable  dusts 
This  Working  Party met  twice  in plenary session,  the  first  time  at  Dortmund  on 
19  and  20  April  1971  and  the  second  on  6  October  1971. 
In  the  course  of  these  two  meetings,  the  Working  Party continued its work  on 
the neutralization of  dust  and  on  dust  barriers,  these  two  items  being  the  main  themes 
of  its  terms  of  reference  (see  Annex  III). 
At  Dortmund,  the  Working  Party visited  the  Tremonia  experimental mine,  and  took 
note  of  the  trials carried out with  the  financial  support  of  the  Commission  of  the 
European  Communities.  These  were  trials on  dust  binding carried out  in  a  section of 
roadway neutralized by  salt pastes  and  powders;  the  length of  the  zone  is varied  to 
see  to  what  extent  this  treatment  can  stop  an  explosion.  The  neutralizing agents, 
salt pastes  and  powders,  have  been  subjected  to  laboratory tests  to  determine  their 
neutralizing  power.  The  Working  Party also  took note  of  the  trials,  carried  out  . 
with  financial  support  of  the  Community,  on  the  corrosion effects  in electrical equip-
ment  caused  by  the  salt pastes  and  powders;  these effects  can  be  reduced  by  precautions 
during  the  application of  the  method  and  by  suitable maintenance  (see  Cl  above).  The 
Working  Party also visited a  roadway  fitted with wide-action water barriers  (three 
polystyrol  troughs  with  lids,  containing  30  litres, set every  3  metres).  Finally,  the 
Working  Party was  able  to  see  an  experimental  dust  explosion of  average  force,  stopped 
at  a  distance  of  200  metres  by means  of  a  concentrated water barrier  triggered  by  an 
infra-red detector. 
The  visit  to  the  experimental  mine  was  supplemented  by  underground  visits  in 
two  mines  belonging  to  the  Bergbau  AG  Dortmund:  the Minister  Stein Pit, which  uses 
the  salt paste method  (a  solution of  CaCl2  or  of MgCl2)  by  means  of  pipelines  under 
pressure  (20  kilometres  of  line have  been  laid);  and  the  Gneisenau Pit, which  uses 
the wide-action water barrier and  the  salt  powder  method  (81  to  85%  CaCl2,  3%  wetting 
agent,  water  of  crystallization). 
During  the  meeting of  6  October  1971,  the  Working  Party dealt with  the  following 
items: 
1.  The  Working  Party  took note  of  the  "Opinion of  the  Working  Party  on  'Electricity' 
with  regard  to  the disturbing  ~ffects on  electrical equipment  resulting  from  the 
use  of  salt pastes  and  powders  used  to  fix  coal  dust". 20 
As  indicated  in Section C above,  this  investigation had  been  asked  for  by  the 
Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  on  29  June  1971.  The  Working  Party  "Flammable 
dust"  therefore  examined  this  document  in respect of  the  efficaciousness  of  the 
method  in  suppressing dust,  this  aspect  not  being within  the  responsibility of  the 
Working  Party  on  "Electricity". 
The  Working  Party made  full  use  of  the  results  of  the visit referred  to  above 
to  West  Germany  and  of  the  experience  obtained  in that  country,  where  current  annual 
consumption  is  30  000  tonnes  of paste,  7  500  tonnes  of  powder  and  4  500  tonnes  of 
flakes. 
Taking  into account  the  places  where  the  salt method  cannot  be  applied,  such 
as  faces,  loading  points,  roofs  in monorail  roadways,  as  well  as  the disadvantages 
of  this  method  which  have  in particular been  underlined  in  the  conclusions  of  the 
Report  of  the  Working  Party  on  "Electricity",  the  Working  Party  on  "Flammable  dust" 
reached  the  conclusion that  the  method  using  salt pastes,  powders  and  flakes  is  an 
effective method  in the  prevention of  dust  explosions,  and  should  be  used  in as-
sociation with  the  other methods,  such  as  those  which  suppress  the  dust  at  source 
and  with safety barriers. 
2.  The  Working  Party continued  the  assessment  of  the  results  of  its visit to  Germany 
by  examining  the  points  in which  the  water barriers are  superior  to  the  dust 
barriers,  as  well  as  the  superiority of  the wide-action barriers  over  the  concentrat-
ed  barriers. 
Without  wishing  to  impose  on  the collieries a  particular  type  of  safety barrier, 
the  Working  Party decided  to  present  to  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  a 
report  on  safety barriers,  and  the draft  of  this  document  will  be  examined  at  the 
next meeting. 
3.  Finally,  the  Working  Party  took  note  of  the  partial  results  from  the  trials and 
investigations carried  out  with  Community  financial  aid  on  triggered  safety barriers; 
these  trials are still under  way. 
E.  Joint  accident  statistics 
The  Working  Party met  on  11  ~1arch  1971  and  was  able  to  complete  its work  within 
the  framework  of its  term of  reference  1)  by  presenting  to  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health 
Commission  a  "Report  and  a  Recommendation  regarding  the  presentation of  joint statis-
tics relating  to  the  victims  of  underground  accidents,  in accordance  with  Community 
definitions."  The  Working  Party  proposed  a  revision of  its  terms  of  reference  in  respect 
to  the mathematical/statistical  study of  the  incidence  of accidents. 
The  Mines  Safety and  Health  Commission  adopted  this  document.  (See  Annex  V). 
In addition,  the Mines  Safety and  Health  Commission  gave  new  terms  of  reference 
to  the  Working  Party,  as  follows: 
"In order  to  make  it possible  for  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  to  reach, 
if possible,  conclusions  regarding  the  presentation of  the  accidents,  the  rate 
of  incidence  of  underground  accidents  in  Community  coal-mines  should  be  examined 
with  the  following  aims  in mind: 
1.  Establishment  of  the  appropriate mathematical/statistical  systems; 
2.  By  means  of  the  methods  referred  to  above,  to  assess  the  differences  in  the 
rates  of  incidence  in chronological  order,  as  well  as  the  differences  from 
one  country  to  another  or  from  one  coalfield  to  another." 
1)  See  Annex III. 21 
Annex  V comprises  a  Report  and  a  Recommendation,  as  well  as  the  new  tables  of 
statistics in their final  form. 
The  Report  contains  a  chronogical  survey which  recalls 
(i)  the  initial mandate  given by  the  1957  Safety Conference  to  a  group  of experts, 
in order  to  establish a  simplified statistical  framework  as  the basis of a 
standard  statistical  system  for  the  entire Community, 
(ii)  in accordance with  this  framework,  the  statistical information presented since 
1958,  classifying under  12  headings  the  underground  accidents  - either fatal 
or  giving rise  to more  than  8  weeks  incapacity, 
(iii)  the differences  observed  subsequently  in the  rates  of  incidence  in the different 
countries  and  the  new  mandate  of  the Mines  Safety and  Health  Commission with a 
view  to  establishing,  on  the  one  hand,  if these differences  are  significant 
indications  of  a  different  level  of  safety practice,  and,  on  the other hand, 
to  extend  the statistical data, 
(iv)  the  tasks  delegated  to  the  Working  Party  to meet  the  requirements  of  this 
mandate. 
The  Annex  also  contains: 
(i)  an  analysis  of  the  distortions which  are,  in point  of  fact,  only slight,  and 
which  have  existed  since  the  setting up  of  the  joint statistical presentation 
in  1958,  and  which  therefore  give rise  to  systematic errors which  do  not affect 
the  chonological  comparability of  the  statistics  for  a  given country and  for 
the  Community.  These  distortions  are  due  to  a  certain extent  to  the classifica-
tion of  one  and  the  same  accident  under  different headings; 
(ii)  the  new  proposals  made  by  the  Working  Party  in respect of  the  accidents  report-
ed,  which  have  been  extended  to  injured  persons  rendered  incapable  of work  for 
more  than  four  days  or  over.  On  this  point,  the  Working  Party expressed reser-
vations  regarding  accidents  involving  less  than  21  days  incapacity,  since  their 
frequency  can  depend  to  an  important  extent  on  factors  quite  unconnected with 
safety and  accident  prevention,  all of  which  is  liable  to  lead  to  wrong  con-
clusions  being  drawn  when  the  frequency  figures  for  this  category are being 
compared. 
These  proposals  go  on  to classify  the  accidents  in accordance with  their causes 
which,  to make  it possible  to  compare  them  with  the  preceding statistics, have  been 
distributed  in accordance with  the  same  12  causes  listed  in  the outline  table of  1958, 
but with  sub-division of  certain headings  and  a  more  precise explanation of  what  these 
headings  of  causes  cover,  to  eliminate or  to  considerably reduce  the  observed distor-
tions. 
Finally,  there  is  the  proposed  extension  of  the distribution of accidents  under 
location of  injury  (in 9  headings)  and  under  nature  of  injury  (under  8  headings);  this 
is based  on  the  ILO  classification,  but with major  redistribution and  rearrangement. 
The  Report  also mentions  the  results of  a  test carried out with  the  new  layout 
proposed  for  1969;  the  results of  test were  considered  to  be  satisfactory. 
Lastly,  the  Report  proposes  re-formulation of  the mandate  of  the Working  Party 
from  the  viewpoint  of  the  search for  a  "level  of  safety". 
The  Recommendation  attached  to  the  Report  (Annex  V)  calls for  presentation of 
the  lists of  victims  of  accidents  by  coalfield,  starting with  1971,  in four  tables 
grouped  by definitions,  w~ich are  explained  in notes.  ~ 22 
F.  Investigation of  the  accidents 
In  1971,  3  group  accidents  were  reported  to  the  Mines  Safety and  Health  Com-
mission. 
These  were: 
(a)  Accident  at  the  Houilleres  du  Dauphine,  La  Mure,  4  May  1971 
Instantaneous  outburst  of  C02  - 8  fatalities 
A financial  grant  of  24  000  French  francs  was  made  to  the  families  of  the 
victims,  and  the  Secretary of  the Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  attended  the 
funeral. 
A first  report  from  the  French  Government  representative was  received  too  late 
to  be  examined  by  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission. 
The  main  circumstances  of  this  accident  can  be  summarized  as  follows: 
An  instantaneous  outburst  occurred  at  a  depth  of  350  metres  in  a  working  which 
was  being  started-up;  the  outburst  expelled  some  500  t  of  coal  and  a  large quantity 
of  C02,  and  caused  the  death  of  8  workmen,  four  of  them  being buried  in  the  coal 
and  four  suffocated  by  the  C02;  four  other workmen,  also  severely affected  by  the 
C02,were  rapidly revived  by  the  rescuers. 
In  the  district  in question,  work  had  begun  on  winning  an  anthracite  seam 
ranging  from  10  to  20  metres  in  thickness,  with  a  dip  from  45  to  800;  at this point 
the  seam  was  in  the  shape  of  a  dome,  an  unusual  occurence.  Working  is  carried  on 
there  by  a  method  which  has  been  proven  in another district  for  working  the  same 
dome  structure:  this  is working with bunker-withdrawal  of  the  coal  from  below, 
starting  from  a  series  of  parallel  roadways  of  4  m2  cross-section,  at  intervals  of 
8  metres  and  rising at  an  angle  of  24°;  these  roadways  run  out  of  the  horizontal 
rock-drift  driven  in  the  floor  of  the  seam  and  entering  the  seam  to  allow  the  coal 
to  be  withdrawn  from  below. 
Driving  these  roadways  and  opening-up  the  seam  is carried out  by  a  conventional 
method,  approved  by  the  chief mining  engineer:  heading  in  the  rock,  preceded  by 
exploratory boreholes  to  determine  the  position of  the  seam;  once  these  boreholes 
have  reached  the  coal,  a  separating wall  of  rock  of  sufficient  strength is main-
tained,  the  seam  being  finally  exposed  by  a  special  shotfiring method,  comprising 
one  round  to  bring down  the  rock wall  and  an  inducer  round  of  longer  shotholes  to 
shake  up  the  seam  and  to  induce  &t  that  moment  the  occurence  of  any  instantaneous 
outburst  which  might  have  been  threatening,  no  workmen  being  present.  Driving  in 
the  coal  is  carried  out  in accordance with  the  working  plans,  either with  inducer 
shotfiring or with  free  shotfiring,  in accordance  with  indexing  of  the  seam  based 
on  tests  carried  out  by  the  Service  d'Etude  (Research  Department)  of  the  Houilleres 
du  Dauphine. 
Nine  roadways  had  already been  driven  to  expose  the  seam:  the  shotfiring had 
been  followed  by  six  instantaneous  outbursts  (the whole district being  evacuated), 
five  of  these  outbursts  during  exposure  of  the  seam  and  one  when  winning  the  seam. 
The  instantaneous  outburst which  occured  on  4  May  1971  occured  in another  road-
way,  which  had  exposed  the  seam  on  30  April,  using  the  conventional  shotfiring 
method  described  above,  without  having  caused  either an  instantaneous  outburst  or 
any  seismic  disturbance which  could  be  detected  by  recording  apparatus.  The  face 
of  the  working  had  penetrated  one  metre  into  the  seam.  A free  round  was  subsequent-
ly carried  out  to  bring  down  the  coal  (using half-second delay detonators),  the 
working  being  evacuated;  this  was  done  with  the  approval  of  the  Service d'Etude, 
at  the  end  of  the  first shift on  the  4th of  May,  without  any  seismic  disturbance 23 
which  could  be  recorded.  The  instantaneous  outburst  took  place  3  hours  later, when 
two  workmen  were  loading  the  coal  brought  down;  the  other six victims were  working 
in neighbouring  roadways. 
The  enquiry at national  level  threw up  certain  improvements  to be made  to  the 
method  (which  is  to  be maintained)  particularly in respect  of  the  information 
required  for  the  Service d'Etude  to  index  the working  more  precisely. 
(b)  Accident  at  Hanover  2/S  pit of  the  Ruhrkohle  AG  at  Bochum-Hordel,  4  May  1971 
Rock-burst  - 6  fatalities 
This  accident  occurred  on  the  same  afternoon as  the  previous  accident. 
A financial  grant  of  13  200  DM  was  made  to  the  families  of  the victims. 
The  enquiry has  not  yet been  completed,  and  no  final  report  has  therefore been 
submitted  to  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission. 
The  circumstances  may  briefly be  described  as  follows. 
A rock-burst  occurred  in  a  winning  working  in the  Roettgersbank  seam,  on  the 
950  metre  horizon,  causing  collapse of  the  lower  section of  the  face  over  a  length 
of  40  metres  and  burying  7  workmen,  one  of  whom  was  recovered,  only slightly injured, 
by  the  rescue workers. 
The  seam  is  from  1.20  to  1.50 metres  thfck  and  dips  at between  50  and  sso.  The 
oblique  face  is  180  metres  long  and  is  worked  by  pneumatic  picks.  A fault  with  a 
throw  of  3.7 metres  cuts  across  this  face  some  40  metres  from  the  bottom  road.  It 
is  the  lower  part  of  this  face  which  collapsed  abruptly,  probably  as  a  result of 
the  release  of  the  strains which  had  accumulated  in  that  area. 
The  enquiry has not  yet been  completed;  it is  particularly directed  towards 
determining  the  observance  or  otherwise  of  the  safety precautions  laid  down  by 
the  Chief  Mines  Inspectorate Office at Dortmund  to  establish  the  existence of  a 
risk of  a  rock-burst  by  means  of  small-diameter boreholes,  with  a  view  to  the  pos-
sible reduction of  excessive  strains  by  means  of  large-diameter  boreholes.  This 
question will  be  investigated  by  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  in  1972, 
at  the  same  time  as  the  next  accident  described. 
(c)  Accident  at  the  Ewald  1-7  colliery at  the  Ruhrkohle  AG  at Herten,  14  December  1971 
Rock-burst  - 6  fatalities 
A grant  of  16  000  DM  has  been  made  to  the  families  of  the  victims.  The  Secretary 
and  another  member  of  the  Secretariat visited the  accident  area  on  22  December  1971. 
The  circumstances  of  this  accident  can be briefly summarized  as  follows: 
11  men  were  working  in  a  rise-drift being driven  in  a  seam  2  metres  thick,  dipping 
at  5g  (5.5°  approx.),  at  a  depth  of  950  metres.  The  rise-drift had  been  advanced 
20  metres  to  the  east of  the  boundary  qf  a  working  in the  same  seam which  had  been 
abandoned  in 1970;  it had~reached the  length of  63.5  metres  at  the  moment  when  the 
accident  occurred.  The  coal  in the  west  safety pillar abruptly  flowed  into  the  rise-
drift,  burying  or  trapping  11  workmen;  one  of  them managed  to  free  himself,  another 
was  freed  by  the  rescue  workers  who  subsequently  recovered  6  bodies.  The  three men 
working  at  the  face  of  the  rise-drift were  rescued  a  day  later,  because  the  upper 
one-third of  the drift had  remained  partly unblocked  and  the  compressed-air  line, 
although  displaced,  was  still supplying air. 
The  presumed  causes  are  the  presence  in the  roof  of  an  overlying  bed  of  sand-
stone  some  20  metres  thick  and  the  accumulation of  stresses  - caused  by  the  ribside 
of  a  working  in the  same  seam  - at  the  boundary  between  a  caved  area  and  a  pneu-
matically  stowed  area  in  a  seam  some  25  metres  above,  with  some  effects  also  from 
an  overlying pillar left standing  in a  seam 69  metres  above  the  point. 24 
The  enquiry  is still going  on  to  determine  the  way  in which  the  relaxation and 
exploratory drillings  laid down  in the  directives  of  the  Dortmund  Chief Mines 
Inspectorate,  already mentioned  above,  1)  have  been  carried out. 
G.  Health 
The  Working Party did  not  hold  a  single Plenary Session;  there was  a  meeting 
of  a  group  of  experts  on  24  March  1971  to  finalize  the draft  schedule  of  dust  levels. 
An  expert  report  intended  to  encourage  collaboration between  the  machine 
manufacturers,  the  mine  managements  and  the  research  departments  at  the  stage  of  design-
ing  and  manufacturing  the  winning  and  heading  machines  was  approved  by  the  Mines  Safety 
and  Health  Commission  on  26  June  1970  (Annex  VIII  of  the  8th Report).  Since  no  regula-
tion provisions  exist  on  this  point,  the  expert  report  envisaged  the  preparation of  a 
type  schedule  for  use  of  managements  to  enable  them  to  formulate,  for  presentation 
to  the manufacturers,  the  desiderata  in respect  of  dust  production. 
A restricted  group  of  experts  prepared  on  24  March  1971  a  draft of  such  a 
specification schedule,  but  since  no  plenary  session of  the  Working  Party was  possible 
in 1971,  this  schedule  has  not  yet  been  approved. 
The  specification schedule  is  topical  because  of  the  increase  in dust  levels 
in the workings  brought  about  by  further mechanization,  since  the  machines  were  not 
provided  at  the  design  stage with  adequate  means  for  suppressing  a  prohibitive  degree 
of  dust  production,  and  the  dust-suppression  systems  added  by  the  users  are  frequently 
no  more  than  part,ial palliatives. 
The  directives  contained  in this  draft  are therefore formulated  to  draw attention 
to  the minimal  requirements  to  be  imposed  upon  the designers;  it is  not  intended  that 
certification procedures  should  be  introduced  immediately  for  the  machines,  nor  that 
threshold  levels  of  respirable dust  be  laid  down,  but  rather  to  define  the  technical 
conditions  requisite  to maintain  the  atmosphere  in the  workings  constantly in  an 
acceptable  condition.  These  measures  cover  cutter-loaders  and  ploughs  in coal-winding 
workings  and  also  comprise  suggestions  for  new  lines  of  research  in this  field;  the 
rules  also  cover  the modern  types  of  roadway-heading  machine  and  propose  special 
technical  measures  in respect  of  the  ventilation of  these working-points. 
H.  Psychological  and  sociological  factors  affecting safety 
This  Working  Party met  in Luxembourg  on  1  June  1971;  this  was  a  meeting  attended 
by  a  large  number  of delegates  and  took  the  form  of  a  colloquium on  the  Community 
safety  campaigns  in  coal-mines,  in accordance with  the  first point  of  its  terms  of 
reference  (see  Annex  III):  Safety Campaigns. 
These  safety  campaigns  were  the  subje~t of  a  motion  of  the  Mines  Safty  and 
Health  Commission  taken at its  session of  25  March  1971  (see  Annex  XII). 
One  of  these  campaigns,  on  the  subject  of  "Continuous  transport  systems",  has 
,been  in preparation  in  the  Ruhr  since  the  end  of  1971,  and  was  supported  by  financial 
- aid  from  the  Community. 
In  respect  to  the  second  point  of  the  terms  of  reference  (dealing with  the 
measures  to  be  taken  in  setting on  foreign  workers  to  ensure  that  they work  in properly 
safe  conditions),  several  delegations  sent  in their  con~fibutions  to  a  Recommendation 
which  is  being  prepared. 
1)  On  24  January  1972.5  the  MiH-es  Safety  and  HetJ.'l"th  Co-ss~n  i~struct~d the  new  Working 
Party  on  "Supports  and strata control" to carry  out a  study of rock-bursts  as  a  matter 
of urgency. 25 
1.  Motion  by  the  Mines  Safety and  Health  Commission  in  respect  of  Community  safety 
campaigns  in  coal-mines 
This  motion,  reproduced  in Annex  XII,  expresses  the  decision of  the  Mines  Safety 
and  Health  Commission  to  promote  the  organization of  safety campaigns  in the  various 
Community  coalfields  and  requests  the  Commission  in Brussels  to  grant  financial  aid 
to  these  campaigns,  to  cover  part  of  the  expense  thereof.  The  first  campaign will 
be  carried out  in all  the  coalfields,  each  in turn,  during  the  next  three  years,  on 
the  selected  subject  of  continuous  transport  systems. 
By  reason of  the  restriction of  the  competence  of  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health 
Commission  to  coal-mines,  this  financial  grant  can  at  present  be  made  only  for  the 
coal-mines,  although  two  delegations  have  requested  that metalliferous  mines  inter-
ested in this  campaign  theme  should  be  allowed  to  participate. 
On  this  point,  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission  decided  to  study  in a 
future  meeting  the  question of  extending  the  field  of  competence  of  the  Commission 
to  the  other extractive industries. 
The  chairman of  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  decided  that  a  sum  of 
500  000  Bfr.  be  set  aside  from  the  budget  of  the  Commission  for  the  campaign  which 
has  been  organized  in the  Ruhr;  this  has  now  been  done. 
In addition,  a  supplementary budget  has  been  requested  for  the  years  1972  and 
1973. 
2.  Colloquium  on  the  Community  safety campaigns 
A  total  of  60  experts,  including  the members  of  the  Working  Party,  took  part 
in this  colloquium,  the  purpose of  which  was  two-fold:  firstly,  to  inform  the 
authorities  responsible  for  carrying  out  the  Community  campaign  on  the  national 
level  of  the  objectives  of  this  campaign  and  of  the  progress  of  the  preparatory 
work  carried  out  by  the  Working  Party,  and  secondly,  to  initiate an  extensive  ex-
change  of  information  and  data  obtained during  past  campaigns  in the  coalfields 
or  individual  mines  of  the  Community  and  of  the  United  Kingdom. 
The  exchange  of  views  at  the  colloquium was  set off by  the  presentation of 
papers  by  experts  from  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  in connection with  the 
preparation and  carrying  out  of  the  campaign  on  "Movement  of workers  in the  mine" 
which  had  been  initiated early in 1971  in  the  Ruhr  coalfield by  the  Bochum  regional 
office of  the  Bergbau-Berufsgenossenschaft with  the  aid of  the  mining  companies 
of  the  Ruhr,  the various  features  of  this  campaign having  already been brought 
into  line with  the  principles  worked  out  by  the  Working  Party and  its experts  in 
respect  of  safety  campaigns  in general. 
During  the  discussion,  other contributions  were  made  which  made  it clear  that 
other  themes  and  other patterns  of  action  could  be  selected  by  certain coalfields 
in the  next  few  years. 
3.  Setting  on  foreign workers 
The  contributions  made  by  the  delegations  regarding  the  recru~t~ng, welcoming, 
job-training and  language  instruction affecting the  safety of  the  new  foreign 
workers  have  not  yet  been  studied. 
Since  certain data were  not  available,  the various  delegations  have  not  yet 
been  able  to  prepare  the  statistics of  accidents  for  which  they  have  been  asked, 
separating  foreign  workers  from native workers,  this having  been  suggested  in order 
to  assess  the  relative  incidence  of  accidents  to  foreign workers. 26 
·SECTION  II 
INFORMATION  AND  STUDY  CONFERENCES,  COLLOQUIA,  TO 
MAKE  KNOWN  THE  WORK  OF  THE  MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH  COMMISSION 
Four  meetings,  occupying  a  total  of  seven  days,  were  held  in  1971  with  the 
intention not  only  of making  known  the  results  of  the  work  of  the Mines  Safety  and  Health 
Commission,  but  also  to  obtain  from  the  participants -senior officials, members  of  the 
workers'  specialist associations  or scientific experts  - information  regarding  the  future 
lines  to be  followed  by  the work  undertaken by  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission. 
One  of  these meetings,  the  colloquium of  1  June  1971  on  safety  campaigns,  has 
already been  summarized  in B  2  above,  since it falls  more  directly within  the  field  of 
activity of  one  Working Party. 
A brief report  of  the  aims  and  achievements  of  the  three  other meetings  is 
given  below. 
Colloquium on Ventilation Measures  in 
the Event  of  a  Mine  Fire,  Brussels,  1  October  1971 
The  practical  conclusions  regarding  the  stabilization of ventilation in  the 
case of  an  ascensionally-ventilated  road,  adopted  by  the Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission 
in  1969  (Annex  III to  the  Sixth Report),  raised certain reservations  in  the  minds  of  some 
ventilation experts  at  the  Steinkohlenbergbauverein  in  regard  to  their practical utility; 
the  employment  of  the  theory of  ventilation stabilization seems  unnecessary  to  certain 
experts  who  claim to  be  able  to  solve  these  problems  by  means  of  computers,  which  are 
after all now  in wide  use. 
Two  meetings  have  already been  held at Merlebach  and  at Essen,  between  the  ex-
perts  of  the Ventilation Sub-Committee  and  the  German  experts  referred  to  above. 
At  the  third meeting,  held  on  the  premises  of  the University  of  Louvain  in 
Brussels,  there were  also present members  of  the  Mines  Inspectorate,  university professors 
and  other ventilation experts. 
The  meeting  began  by  recalling  the  essential  points  of  the  Budryk  theory  and 
the way  of  adapting  the  computer  calculation methods  of ventilation for  the  particular 
case  of mine  fires. 
As  an  example  of  an  application,  the  ventilation data  for  a  large  Ruhr  colliery 
had  been put  in the memory  of  a  computer,  and  a  fire was  simulated at  one  point  in that 
mine.  The  computer was  then  interrogated  as  to  the  steps  to  be  taken  to  stabilize the 
ventilation,  using  the  Budryk  theory.  This  demonstration  showed  the  complementarity  of 
the  two  competing methods.  Moreover,  the  Budryk  method  as  envisaged  by  the  Mines  Safety 
and  Health  Commission  is  essential  to  achieve  rational  and  rapid  solutions  to  the  problem 
of stabilizing ventilation in  the  event  of  ~ fire,  in  cases  where  the  mine  itself does 
not  have  a  computer  available. 
Information  and  Study  Conference  on  Problems  on  Mine  Safety 
Saarbrucken,  12,  13  and  14  October  1971 
This  conference was  organized  by  the  Saarbergwerke  and  the  Secretariat of  the 
Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  with  the  financial  support  of  the  Community.  There were 
220  participants,  110  being mining  engineers,  colliery managers  or  safety officers,  together 
with  the members  of  the  Mines  Safety and  Health  Commission  from  Germany  and  France,  the 
members  of  the Working Party  on  "Rescue  arrangements,  mine  fires  and  underground  combustion", 
as well  as  experts  in the  prevention of  underground  fires  of  the  Community  and  the  United 
Kingdom. 27 
The  proceedings  of  this  Conference were  collected  and  printed by  the  services 
of  the  Directorate-General  for  "Propagation of  knowledge". 
The  aim of  this  conference was,  on  the  one  hand.  to  inform  the  engineers  res-
ponsible  for  making  use  of  the  work  of  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  and,  on  the 
other hand,  to  initiate, with  the  experts  and  the  members  of  the  Working Party  on  "Mine 
fires  and  underground  combustion",  an  exchange  of  experience  in respect  of mine-fire 
prevention,  a  subject which  had  been  given priority among  the  various  tasks  of  this  Wor-
king Party,  with  a  view  to  getting  the results  of  their work  applied  in the  field. 
The  first  day  of  the  information conference was  devoted  to  papers  by  the  respon-
sible Minister  for  the  Saar  and  officials  of  the  Saarbergwerke  on  the  situation of  the 
Saar  in  the  Saar-Lorraine-Luxembourg  triangle  and  on  the  results  of  the  rationalization 
carried out  in  the  Saar  collieries.  A member  of  the  Secretariat  of  the Mines  Safety  and 
Health  Commission  presented  a  historical  sketch  of  the  European  Communities  and  of  the 
Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission,  describing its  structure  and  its activities, parti-
cularly  in the  field  of  human  factors. 
The  Secretary of  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  followed  this  by  pre-
senting,  on  the  basis  of  the  Eighth Report,  the  activity of  each  of  the  Working Parties 
and  in particular  the  work  now  in hand  or being prepared,  the  latter referring  to  the 
work  of  the  three  new  Working Parties  for:  "Supports  and  strata control",  "Ventilation 
and  firedamp"  and  "Mechanization".  The  broad outline of  these  terms  of  reference  was 
discussed,  together with  the  new  terms  of  reference  for  the  "Health"  Working Party;  sugges-
tions  which  might  help in deciding  future  lines  of  activity were  also 
The  second  day  was  devoted  to  nine  papers  by  experts  on  the  problems  of  prevent-
ing  underground  fires  and  on  certain aspects  of  firefighting procedures.  In  respect  of  the 
former,  the  papers  read dealt  only with  proven methods;  these  included  detection  of  stray 
currents,  their neutralization by  means  of  pressures  and  sealing  roadway  walls,  early de-
tection of  fires  by  the  presence  of  carbon monoxide  and,  in certain instances,  by  the 
Infrared  thermometer,  as  well  as  the  assessment  of  the  degree  of  development  of  a  fire  by 
the  Graham  index.  As  far  as  firefighting was  concerned,  the  papers  dealt with  the  deter-
mination of  the  explosiveness  of  the  fumes,  and  certain actual  examples  of ventilation 
stabilization by  means  of  the  Budryk  theory,  as  recommended  by  the  Mines  Safety  and 
Health  Commission  - with  or without  the  use  of  a  computer. 
These  papers  were  subsequently  discussed. 
The  third day  gave  the  participants  the  opportunity  to visit one  of  five  modern 
Saar  mines. 
Information Conference  for  Union Delegates, 
Houthalen,  27  and  28  October  1971 
This  conference was  organized  by  the  union  organizations  CISL  and  CMT  with  the 
cooperation of  the  Secretariat  of  the Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  and  the  financial 
aid  of  the  Community. 
Sixty delegates  concerned with  safety matters  from  the  Community  countries  took 
part. 
Papers,  followed  by  discussions,  were  read  by  experts  on  the  latest  results  of 
epidemiological  research  into  pneumoconiosis  and  on  the  state of  research  into  flame-proof 
clothing  and  the  rescue  of  trapped miners  by  large boreholes;  the  members  of  the  Secreta-
riat  of  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  presented  the  Recommendations  of  the  Com-
mission  in  the  field  of  technical  measures  of  dust  suppression,  the  organization of  rescue 
arrangements  in the  Community  countries  and  in the  United  Kingdom,  the  organization of 
safety campaigns,  the  use  of  safety barriers  and  hygroscopic salts  as  a  precaution against 
dust  explosions. 
A hot  mine  with  a  high  degree  of mechanization of  operations  the  Campine  coal-
field was  visited,  together  with  the  Lanacken Medical  Institute,  the  Rescue  Station Coordin-
ation Centre at  Hasselt  and  the  Institut d'Hygiene  des  Mines  at  Hasselt. 28 
SECTION  III 
JOINT  ACCIDENT  STATISTICS 
As  mentioned  on  pp.  20  ff., the  statistical  return relating  to  the  victims  of 
underground  accidents  has  been  enlarged:  the  new  tables  have  been  relegated  to  Annex  1. 
Tables  la and  lb  give  the distribution of  underground  accident victims  by  cause,  site 
and  period of  incapacity,  la in absolute  figures  and  lb  in  frequency  rates.  Causes  I  to 
XII  of  the  former  tables  have  been  retained  for  purposes  of  chronological  comparison of 
serious  casualties  (more  than  56  days  incapacity)  and  fatalities with  preceding years.  The 
sites are  subdivided  into  4  categories,  and  the  period  of  incapacity of  the  injured  into 
3  categories,  4  to  20  days,  21  to  56  days  and  longer  than  56  days. 
Tables  2a  and  2b  give,  in absolute  figures  and  frequency  rates  respectively, 
the distribution of  underground  accident  victims  according  to  the  seat  of  the  injuries 
(9  categories),  the  nature  of  the  injuries  (8  categories)  and  the  period  of  incapacity 
(2  categories;  over  56  days  and killed). 
This  return has  been  made  on  a  trial basis  for  1971,  by  coalfield,  with are-
capitulation by  countries.  It is  incomplete  for  Belgium,  and  has  not  therefore  been  re-
capitulated at  Community  level. 
Data  have  been  extracted  from  these  tables  to  enable  completion of  the  recapi-
tulatory Tables  from  1958  concerning  deaths  and  serious injuries.  These  Tables  appear  in 
section III,  arranged  in  the  same  manner. 
The  comments  on  the  trends  of  the  accident  rates,  (fatal  and  serious)  should 
still be  read with  the  same  reservations  as  before,  pending  the  results  of  the  mathematic-
al  and  statistical study which  the  Joint Accidents  Statistics Working  Party has  been 
instructed  to  prepare.  Thus  the  rates  should  not  be  compared  according  to  their actual 
magnitudes,  but  a  certain margin  or  confidence  interval  should  be  allowed. 
As  in previous  reports  we  shall  first  examine  the  recapitulatory  Table D,  and 
the  graphs  I  and  K showing  the  rates  of  serious  and  fatal  accidents  in the  context  of 
production  and  o.m.s .. 
Community  production  in  1971  was  164,  910  m.  metric  tons  compared  with  170,355m. 
metric  tons  in 1970.  Thus  there  is  a  drop  of  5,445m.  tons,  or  3.2%  (compared  with  3.6% 
in  1970). 
The  number  of  hours  worked  was  414m.  compared  with  438m.  in  1970,  which  is  a 
decrease  of  24m.  or  5,5%  (8%  in 1970). 
In absolute  figures  the  number  of fatalities  was  182,  compared  with  188  in 
1970,  or  a  drop  of  3%,  while  the  number  of serious  casualties was  6,294  compared with 
6580  in 1970,  or  a  drop  of  5%.  For  comparison,  the  figures  per million  tons  are  as  follows: 
the  number  of  fatalities  remained  at  1.10,  or  the  same  rate as  in  1970  (higher  than  3  in 
1958)  and  the  number  of  serious  casualties  went  down  from  38.63  in  1970  to  37.89  in  1971. 
Let  us  next  examine  the  number  of  fatalities per million working  hours  (Tables 
B,  D and  graph),  which  is  more  meaningful  from  the  safety point  of  view. 
The  rate of  frequency  of  fatal  accidents  was  0.440  in  1971  compared  with  0.429 
in  1970,  an  increase  of  2,6%  which  can still be  regarded  as  part of  a  levelling-off after 
the  constant  decline  observed  since  1958. 
The  accidents  listed against  casues  I  to V were  responsible  for  80%  of  the  total 
fatalities,  broken  down  as  follows:  -cause  I  (falls  of  ground)  - 30%  compared  with  31% 
in  1970;  causes  II  and  II  (haulage  and  transport  and  movement  of personnel)  - 33%  compared 
with  40%  in 1970,  and  causes  IV  and  V  (machines,  tools  and  falling  objects)  - 16%  compared 
with  12%  in 1970. 29 
Taking  into  account  on  the  one hand  the relatively high  number  of  accidents 
appearing  this  year  under  XII  (other causes),  and  on  the  other hand  the  possible transfer 
of  accidents  from  one  heading  to  another  consequent  on  the  revision  of  the definitions, 
the  only  conclusion which  can  be  drawn  from  a  comparison  of  the  figures  is  that  the  totals 
are more  or  less  unchanged. 
The  number  of  serious  casualties  per million working hours  is  shown  in table A 
and  graph  F.  The  rate  of  frequency  of  15,088 after rising  to  the highest  rate of  15,160 
in  1969,  levels  off after that  date. 
Headings  I  to  V comprise  96%  of  the  serious  casualties,  divided  up  (as  in other 
years)  into  3  almost  equal  parts:  -heading  no.  I  (falls  of  ground)  - 27%,  headings  II  and 
III  (haulage  and  transport  and  movement  of personnel)  - 33%,  and  headings  IV  and  V  (rna-
chines,  tools  and  falling objects)  - 36%. 
Falls  of  ground  continue  to  be  the  main  source  of accidents;  their  frequency  rate 
of  4  109  is  substantielly the  same  as  in 1970. Germany 
C  A  U  S  E 
(1958-1964) 
1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1958  1959  1960 
l) Falls of  ground  4.843  4.779  4.886  4.797  4.682  4.663  4.894  5.911  4.294  4,324 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  2.550 2.569  2.445  2.458  2.501  2.433  2.385  4.132  2.979 2. 709 
3)  Movement  of personnel  2,497 2,463  2.348  2.512  2.608  2.646  2,744  1.354  0.998  1,008 
4)  Machinery,  handling of  tools  and 
0,920  0.867  1.046  1.213  1.242  2,804  2.085  2.386  supports  0.767  0.914 
5)  Falling ObJects  2.537  2.719  2.738  2.945  3.077 3.038 3.242  0.414  0.371  0.354 
6)  Explosives  0.015  0.011  0,010  0.009  0.008  0.006  0,006  0.02  0.007  0,032 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp or  coal 
0.002  0.123  0.010  dust  0,011  0.016  - - - - -
8)  Sudden  outbursts of  firedamp, 
0.011  suffocation !Jy  natural  gases  - - - - - - - - -
9)  Underground  combustion and  fires  - - 0.003  0.002  - - - - - -
10)  Inrushes of  water  0.004  :..  - - - 0.004  - - - -
11)  Electricity  0.010 0.014  0.012  0.014  0.006  0.012  0.009  0.011  - 0.016 
12)  Other  Causes  0.487  0.522  0.457  0.503  0.488  0.473  0.477  0.260  0.255  0,260 
TOTAL  13.721  4.007  13.819  4.109 14.539  4.499 14.999 14.924  10.989  11.089 
(1965-1971)  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971  1965  1966  1967 
1)  Falls of  ground  4.732  1.721  4.524  4.618  4.736 4,321  4,154  3. 574  3.568  3.85C 
$ 
2)  Haulage  and transport  2.411  2.067 1.913  1.994  2.195 2,007  1. 724  2.866  3.269 2.960 
3)  Movement  of personnel  3.032  2,852  2. 974  3.30C  3.399 3,370 3, 246  o. 771  0.936  0.903 
4)  Machinery,  handling of  tools  and 
supports  1.234  1 .244  1.124  1.396 1.291  1,382 1.597  2.126  2.146  2.265 
5)  Falling objects  3.344 3.272  3.642  3. 773 4,036  4,166 
3,313 
0.292  0.349  0.459 
6)  Explosives  0.005  0.005  0.017  0.011 0,007  0,008  - - 0.013  0.056 
7)  Explosion of  firedamp  or coal  0-011  0.013  - o. 001 0,004  - 0.012  0.031  - -
dust 
B)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp,  0.005  - 0  003  - - - - - 0.013  -
suffocation by  natural  gases 
9)  Underground  combustion and  fires  - - - 0.004  - - - 0.021  - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - - - - - - - - -
11)  Electricity  0.002  O.OlO 0.006  O.Oll 0,026 0,012  0.008  0.01C  0.013  -
12)  Other  Causes  0"351  0.111  0.396  0,429 0,402 0,532  0,632  0.333  0.362  0.278 
TOTAL  15-133 14.598 14.599 15.540  16 ,09E 15,798 14,886  0.024 10.669  10.771 
(1)  Including Provence as  from  1970. 
Belgium 
1961  1962 
4.071  4.439 
2. 77C  3,331 
1.062  1,136 
2.097  2,461 
0.301  0.445 
0,018  -
- -
- -
- -
- 0,010 
0.018  0.010 
0.301  0.351 
10.638 12.161 
1968  1969 
3.676 5,075 
3.220 3,169 
1.122 1.186 
1.903 2,353 
0.358 1,244 
0.049  -
- 0,019 
- -
- -
- -
0.016 0,019 
0.228 0,175 
10.572  ~3,24C 
1963 
4.432 
3,565 
1.066 
2.414 
0,547 
0,019 
-
-
-
-
0.009 
0,198 
A.  Comparati~e Table  of 
numbers  of  persons  incapacitated by  underground accidents 
for  eight  wee~s or  longer 
years  1958-1971 
per  '000,000 man-hours 
France  (1) 
1964  1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1958  1959 
4.417  5.027  4.665  4.774  4.416  L222  4.177 4.308  1.355 1.378 
3.419 1.980 1.695  1.920 2,106 2,196  2.364 2,278  1.335  0.984 
0,961  1.505 1,118  2.873  2.334 a  ,458  2,368,2.383  0.668  0.394 
2.31C  0,914  1,022  1.621  2.523 2.991  3.096 3.042  1,169 0.984 
0.397  1.890 2.187 1.893  2,292  ~.073 2.278 2,074  1.169 1.698 
0.018  0.043  0,051  0.031  0,017 0.051  0,009  0.013  0.167  -
0,009  0.047  0.088  - - 0.004  - - - -
- 0.004  - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - 0.018  - -
- 0.014  - 0.004  0.029 0.004  0.014  0.009  - -
0.268  2.956  2.768 0.793  0.362 0.240 0.354  0.227  0.334  0.591 
2.250 1,799  4.380 3.594 13.909  14.079  14.239 IW. 66C  4.347  6.197 6.299 
1970  1971  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971  1965  1966 
4,673  3,989  3.941  3.927 3.634 4.16  4.044  3,761 3,721  5. 572  6.36( 
3,018 3,365  2.153  1,858 1.918  1.94€ 1,556  1,666 1.959  - 0,707 
1,144  1,496  2,087  2.239 2.174  2.81." 3.226 3,372 3_.667  - 0.707 
1,801  2,469  2,272  2.639 2.773  3,01€ 3,070 3,332 2.373  7.164  7.067 
1,242 1,870  1. 839  1.785 2.114  2.386 2,537  2,515 4,566  0.796  -
- 0,025  0.037  0.010 0.011  - 0,050 0,016  - - -
- - - 0.029  - - - 0,087  - - -
- - - - 0.005  - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - -
- 0,025  - 0.005  - 0.006  - 0,032  - - -
- - 0.014  - 0.005  0.006 0.014 0,024  0,009  - -
0,195  0_.324  0.174  0.200 0.185  0,233 0,291 0,294  0,314  1.592  3,36C 
12,097  13,563 ]2 .517  12.692 12.819  14. 57C  l.788  5,099 16,609 115.124 ~.201 
Italie  Netherlands  Community 
1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964 
1,808  - 0.792  0.366  0,893  1,326 1.464  1.305  1.82~  2,238  1.742 2,017  4.846  4.49(  4.571  4.434  4.387  4.337  4,509 
1,205  0.676 1.847 1,465 1.787  1.511  1.562  1.898  1.92  2,590 1.826 1.952  2.602  2.347  2.310 2.371  2.521  2.520 2.346 
1.005  1.578 1,056  0.732  1,787  0,324  0.386  0.187  0,51~  0,580 0.630 0.472  2.003  1.823  2.185  2,185  2.282  2.261  2.326 
0,603  0,902  1.584 1.465 3.127  0,617  0,402  0,780  0.91~  1.015  1.050 1.094 1.098  1.064  1.264 1.423  1.712  1.818 1.848 
1.808  2.029 2.375  3,296  3.574  0,401  0,515  0.492  0.8H  0,642  0.630 0.923  1.962  2,161  2.105 2.353  2.375  2.406  2.442 
- 0.225  - 0.366  - - - - - - - 0.021  0.023  0.02(  0,017 0.012  0.018  0.010 0,011 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 0,017  0.03C  0.010 0.001  0,071  0.006  0.001 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 0.002  - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0,002  0,001  - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - 0.002  - - - 0.001  0.002  0.003 
- - - - - - - - - 0.021  - 0.021  0.010 o.om  0,010 0.018  0.007  0.012  0.008 
0.603  0.451  - - - 0.262  0.161  0,390 0.21<  0,497  0.147 0,129  0.985  1 .01  ~  0.513  0.428  0.404  0.390 0.364 
7,032  5,861  7,654  7,690 ll,l68  4.441  4.490  5,051  6.2U  7.583  6.025 6.629  3.551  2,954 12.986 !J3.227 13,781 13.781 l3. 861 
1967  1968  1969  1970  1971  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971 
5,580 0,812  3.656  - 5,958  1.923  1,688  2.466  2.45( 2.  737  2,634  2,528  4.215  4,186'  4.060 4,261 4,492  4,135 4.109 
0,797  0.812  - - 3,404  2.808  2.621  1.866 2.40  2.562  2, 634  1,820  2.416  2,173  2.037 2.139 2,118  2.016  1.953 
1.594  0.812 1.462  - 1,702  0.774  0.605  0.766  1.16( 1.165  0,905 0,404  2.364  2.32(  2.354  2.795 3.023  3,084 3.117 
3.552  7.304 8.043  6,896  2.553  1.282  2,066  0,833  1.03  1.689  1.894  3,033  1.773  1.815  1.790 1.945 1.865  2.011  1.876 
6.377 6.493 3.656  - 1,702  0.862  0,958  0,866  1.59( 1,106  0,659  1, 213  2.415  2.362  2.638 2.858 3,185 3.308  3.506 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 0.013  0.007  0.019 0.015 0,019 0,011  0.002 
- - - - - 0,011  0.016  0.002 0,004 0,025  0.007  - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - 0.002  0.001  0.003  - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - 0.002  - - 0,002  - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 0.001  - 0.002  - 0,009  0,002 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 0.006  0.001  0.005 0,010 0,021 0,014  0.007 
3.189 0,812  - 5,172  0,851  o.os8 0,353  0,700 0.30  0,116 0,165  0,202  0.289  0.354  0.337 0.341 0.333  0,434  0.509 
31.089  ~7.043  ~6  .81~  2,068  6,17C  7.737  8.291  7.497  8.93~ 9.375  8,891  9,201 ltJ. 506  13,242 13.246  ~4.370  ~5.16T5,04,  15,088 Germany 
C  A  U  S  E 
(1958-1964) 
1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1958  1959 
1)  Falls of  ground  0.268  0.290 0.263  0.216  0,280 0.26C  0.20C  0.223  0,213 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  0.179  0.169  0.182  0.196  0.149  0.178  0,30C  0,101  0,124 
3)  Movement  of personnel  0,094  0.097  0.07C  0.086  0.059  0.089  0,071  0.011  0,027 
4)  Machinery,  handling of  tools and  0.010 0.027  supports  0,012  0.027  0.037 0,019  0.028 0,005  0,014 
5)  Falling objects  0.065  0.041  0,039  0.065  0.094  0.072  0,054  0,016  -
6)  Explosives  0.009  0.003  0.003  - 0.004  - 0.002  Q-,011  0,014 
7)  Explosives of  firedamp  or  coal  0,011  0,012  - - 0.660 0.002  0,002  - - dusts 
8)  Sudden  outbursts of  firedamp,  0.005  0.003  0.002  0.004  0,002  - - 0.016  0.014 
suffocation by  natural  gases 
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - 0.003  - 0.002  - 0.006  0.009  - 0.007 
10)  Inrushes  of  water  - 0.003  0.002  - - 0.004  - 0.011  -
11)  Electricity  0.022  0.008  0.002  0.005  0.010 0.002  0.004  0,021  -
2)  Other  causes  0.025  0.025  0.036  0.049  0.049  0.025  0.01  0.005  -
TOTAL  0.687 0.680 0.611  0.651  1.344  0.657  o. 58?  0.42(  0.413 
(1965-1971)  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971  1965  1966 
1)  Falls of  ground  0.184  0.197  0.206  0.148  0,192 0.113 0.147  0,239  0,324 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  0.191  0.175  0,150  0,126  0,143 0.128  0.103  0.166  0.187 
3)  Movement  of  personnel  0.070 0.094  0.076  0.079  0,056 0.058  0.032  0.011  0.025 
4)  Machinery,  handling of  tools  and 
0.020  0,034 0.031  0.032  0.052  0.025  supports  0.025  0.030  0.014 
I 
5)  Falling objects  0.058  0.048  0.063  0.051  0.049 0.035  0,047  - -
- - 6)  Explosives  - - - 0.004  - - -
coal  - 0_.008  7)  Explosives of  firedamp  or  0.061  0.011  0.019  0.056  - - -
dust 
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp,  0,002  0,002  0.007  - 0,004  - 0.008  0.041  0.013 
suffocation by  natural  gases 
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  0.005  - - -
~  - - 0.011  -
10)  Inrushes  of water  - - - - - 0.012  - - -
11)  Electricity  0.005  - 0.003  0.004  0.004 0.004  - 0.011  -
12)  Other  causes  0.023  0.027  0.017  0.022  0,022 0.027  0.083  - 0.013 
TOTAL  0. 582  0.629  0.542  0.509 0,504  0.408 0.460  0.542  0.587 
'1)  Including Provence  as  from  1970. 
Belgium 
1960  1961  1962 
0,299  0.266  0.246 
0.157  0.168 0.142 
0,008  0.035 0.010 
0,016  0.027 0.047 
0,008  - 0.010 
- - -
0.016  - -
- - 0.047 
- - -
- 0.044 0.047 
0.024  - -
0,008  0,009 0.019 
0,536  0.549 0.568 
1967  1968  1969 
0,264  0.179 0,214 
0.180  0,114 0.017 
- 0.033  -
0.028  0,065  -
- 0.016  -
- 0.016  -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
0.014  0.033 0.019 
0.042  - -
0.528  0.456 0.330 
B.  Underground accidents resulting in death within eight weeks 
years  1958-1971 
per  '000,000 man-hours 
France  (l) 
1963  1964  1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1958  1959 
0.264 0.222  0.235  0,192  0.186  0.219 :).167 0,120 0,127  0.167  -
0,245 0,166  0,115  0.085  0.082  0.122 ),077  0.121  0.141  - 0,197 
0,057 0,028  0,007 0.018  0.027 0.008 0,043  0.009  0.009  - -
- 0.018  0.018  0,040 0.016  0,008 0,030 0,009  0,036  - -
0.019  0.018  0.025 0.007  0,004  0.011 0.030 0,009  0.018  - 0.197 
- - - 0,026  - - - 0,005  0.005  0,501  -
- - 0,115  0.121  - - 0,004  - - - -
- - 0.043  0.026  0.019  0.004  - 0.019  0.009  0,167  -
- - - - - - - - - - -
0.019  - - - - 0.004  - - - - -
0.009  0.009  - 0.011  0.012  - 0.009  0.024  - - -
0.028 0.009  0.036 0.029  0.008  - 0.009  0.014 0.014  - -
i 
0.641  0.471  0.594 0.555  0,354 o. 3821  0,369  0.330 0.359  0,835  0.394 
I 
1970  1971  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971  1965  1966 
0.26810.100  0.164 0,214  0.159  0.17~ 0.149  0.143 o, 117  - -
0.170  0.125  0.052  0,126  0.088 0.101 0,186  0.127 0,108  - -
- 0.049  0.042  0.024  0.016  0.02~ 0,014  0.016 0,072  - -
- 0,025  0.006  0.027  0.009 0.015  0.016  - 0.032  - -
- - 0.019 0,015  0.011  0.031 0,014  0.016 0.045  - -
- - 0.018  0.009  0.005  0.005  0.006  - 0,008  - -
- - - 0.155  0.127  - - 0,038  - - -
- 0_.025  - 0,005  0.027  O.OH 0.007  - 0,072  - -
- - - - - - - - - - -
- - 0.005  - 0.005  - - 0.016  - - -
0.024  - 0.010  0,007  - - - - - - -
'"' 
- - - 0.005  0.005  - 0;007  - 0.009  - -
0.462  0_.324  0.455 0.419  0.332  0,403 0,384  0.484  0.468  - -
Italy  Netherlands  Community 
1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964 
0.201  0.225  - 0.366  - 0,262  0.064  0,034  0.114  0,062  0,084  0,043  0.253  0.242  0.235  0,217  0.234  0.217  0.175 
- - - - - 0.077 0.145  0.067 0.095  0.062  0,105  0,172  0.147 0.141 0.146  0.168  0,124  0.167 0.178 
- - - - - - - 0.057 0.063  0.047 0,056  0.045  0.060 0.045  - - - - -
0.028  - - - - - 0,015  0,016  - - 0.041  - - o.ou  0.012  0.021  0.037  0.013  0.030 
- - - - - - 0,016  - - - - 0,043  0.045  0.027 0.024  0.041  0.062  0.046 0.037 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 0.009  O.OlC  0.002  - 0.002  0.001 0.002 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 0,032  0.036 0,002  - 0,375  0.001  o.ool 
- - - - - 0.016  O,OlC  0.006  0.003  0,007 0.005 0.002  - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 0,003  - 0.001  - 0.003  0.005 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 0,002  0,002  0.001  0.006  0,005  0.005  -
- - - - - - - - O.OH  - - - 0,016  0,007  0.007  0.004  0.008  0,008  O.Oo:l 
- - - - - - - 0.017  - - - - 0.023  0.021  0,024  0,029 0,032  0,021  0,014 
0.201  0,225  - 0.366  - 0.355 0.241  0.119  0.22~  0,166  0,189 0.258  0.610 0.59C  0.507  0.546  0.932  0.547 0.492 
1967  1968  1969  1970  1971  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971  1965  1966  1967  19&8  1969  1970  1971 
- - - - - 0.044  0.050 0.100 0.172 0,058  0.08210.101  0.177  0.208  0.192  0.160 0.176  0.135  0.133 
- - 0,08€  0.16C  0.104  0.797  - - 0.177 0,126  - - 0.165  - 0.149  0.128  0.115 0,145  0.132 
-
- - - - - - - - 0,058  - - 0,051  0.06C  0.044  0.054 0,038  0.039  0.043 
-
0.797  - - 0.022  - 0,024  0.023  0.024  0.017 0,023  0.027  0.029  - - - 0,067  - 0,117  -
- - - - - - - 0.04~  - - - 0.037  0.03C  0.036  0.040 0.031  0.025  0.041 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 0,002  0.00  0.002  0.006  - 0.002  0,005 
- - 0.005  - - 0.03(  0.037  - - - - - - - - 0.053  - 0.044  - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - 0,006  0.004 0.012  0.006 0.004  - 0.027 
- - - - - - - - - - - 0,005  - - - - - -
-
- - - - - - - - - - - 0.001  - 0.002  - - 0.011  -
- - 0,006  0.004  - - - - - - - - - - - 0.004  0.003  0,004  0.006 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 0.013  0.011  0,015  0.012 0,015  0.016  0.053 
1.594  0  - - - 0,243  0,176  0.167 0,30  0.233 0.247 O,lOl  0,522  0,53€  0.457  0.46C 0.438 0.429  0.440 !  •'  I C  A  U  S  E 
(1960-1965)  1960  1961 
Germany 
1962  1963  1964  1965  1960  1961 
Belgium 
C.  Comparative Table of underground  group  accidents  (see  (1)  below) 
years  1960-1971 
France  (l)  Italy 
1962  1963  1964  1965  1960  1961  1962  1$3  1964  1965  1960  1961  1962  1963 
Netherlands  Community 
1964  1965  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965 
NabNabNa  Nab  Nab Nab Nab Nab Nab  N  a  Na.bNabNabNa  NabNtbNabNabNabNabNabNabNabNabNabl'labNabNabNabNabNabNabNabNabNa.bNab 
1)  Falls of  ground 
2)  Haulage  and  transport 
3)  Movement  of  personnel 
4)  Machinery,  handling of  tools and 
supports 
5)  Falling objects 
6)  Explosives 
7)  Explosions of  firedamp or coal 
dust 
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp 
suffocation by  natural  gases 
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires 
10)  Inrushes of water 
11)  Electricity 
12)  Other  causes 
TOTAL 
2  2  10- 6 
- - - - - - 3  62f33s 
2  2  10  4  63fw 
1966  1967  1968 
2  5  14 
- 11  4  8  - -
2  5  14  1  4  8 
1969  1970  1971  1966  1967 
- 11  2  6  -
- - - - - - 2  - 33-
2  6 
1968  1969 
1-
-I_ 
I_ 
I 
2  I 
33- i-
1970  1971  1966 
1  7  6  2  2  10 1  7  3  3  18 
I·  2  5  14 
-1-
-I-
_I_ 
I 
-I- -I- 3  623313  - - - - - - 3  4  41! 
7  1j·  6  -I- 2  2  10 1  7  6  65353  -12  5  14 3  4  41 
1967  1968  1969  1970  1971  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971 
(1966-1971) 
Nab Nab  Nab  II  a  b  Nab Nab Nab  N  a  b
1 N  a  b  Nab Nab  Nab Nla  b  N  aibiN  a  b  Nab Nab Nab Nab  Nab  Nab Nab  Nab Nab Nab  N  a.  b  Nab  II  a  b  Nab Nab Nab Nab Nab Nab Nab Nab 
1)  Falls of  ground 
2)  Haulage  and  transport 
3)  Movement  of  personnel 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools and 
supports 
5)  Falling objects 
6)  Explosives 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or coal 
dust 
B)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation  by  natural gases 
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires 
10)  Inrushes  of water 
11)  Electricity 
12)  Other causes 
TOTAL 
2  5  21  - - - 1  17 
-
2  5  21  l  17 
(1)  Accidents  involving more  than  five  casualities of  type  (a), 
(N)  Number  of  group accidents. 
- 2  12 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  te resume  work  below  ground  for  at least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks, 
(1)  Including Provence as  from  1970. 
_,_ 
6  6 
5  - 1  5 
1  6  - - - 1  1116 - -31121---11-17--- 11116---
1  - 8  -
- l-
6 
i 
2  11  8  3  1121  17 2  11  1  1116 3  - 20 37 
D.  RECAPITULATION:  COMMUNITY  OVERALL 
Serious in- Fatal- Serious 
Under- Million  juries  (4)  Fatal- Serious  in-
Extrac- ities  injuries 
ground  man- Fatal- (disable- ities  juries  (4) 
Year  tion  per  per  m. 
( l)  o.m.s.  hours  ·i  ties  ment  for  per  per  m. 
(kg.)  worked  8  weeks  m, tons  tons  m.  man- man-
or  over)  hours  hours 
1958  252.278  1,634  1.260  770  17,074  3.052  67.68  0.610  13.551 
1959  240.602  1,788  1.122  622  141539  2.585  60.43  0.590  12.950 
1960  239.967  1,958  1.037  526  13,459  2.192  56.09  0.507  12,986 
1961  235.848  2,100  962  527  12' 720  2.235  53.93  0.548  13.227 
1962  233.233  2,229  901  840(2  12,418  3.602(2)  53.24  0.932(2)  13.781 
541(3  2.320(3)  0.600(3) 
1963  229~769 2,331  849  465  11,686  2.024  50.86  0.547  13.761 
1964  235,007  2,395  841  411  11,726  1. 749  49.89  0.493  13.860 
1965  224.249 2,461  784  410  10r595  1.828  47.25  0.522  13.506 
1966  210.189  2,611  698  374  97247  1.779  43.99  0.536  13.242 
1967  189.484 2,824  587  269  7,781  1.420  41.06  0.457  13.246 
1968  181. 170  3,065  522  240  7,501  1.326  41.44  0.460  14.370 
1969  176,900 3,265  476  209  7,222  1,181  40.82  0.438  15.160 
1970  170.355  3,442  438  188  6,591  1.104  38.69  0.429  15.047 
1971  164  910  3  514  414  182  6  249  1,104  37.89  0.440  15.088 
(l)  Net  extraction,  slurry  and  dust. 
(2)  Incl.  Luisenthal  explosion. 
(3)  Excl.  Luisenthal  explosion. 
(4)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  for  at  least eight  weeks. GRAPHS 
OF FATAL AND SERIOUS CASUALTIES 
IN COMMUNITY COALMINES 1) 
KEY 
to Roman figures in Graphs 
Falls of ground 
II  Haulage and transport 
Ill  Movement of personnel 
IV  Machinery, handling of tools and supports 
V  Falling objects 
VI  Explosives 
VII  Explosions of firedamp or coal dust 
VIII  Sudden outbursts of firedamp, suffocation by natural gases 
IX  Fires and uderground combustion 
X  Inrushes of water 
XI  Electricity 
XII  Other causes 
(I) Casualties were unable to resume work for at least eight weeks. Per '000 000 man-hours 
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SECTION  IV 
IMPLEMENTATION  OF  THE  COMMISSION•s  RECOMMENDATIONS 
Annex  VIII  sets  out  the  recommendations,  notices,  op1n1ons  and  directives  which 
the  Commission  has  worked  out with  a  view  to  the  improvement  of  safety  and  health  in coal-
mines,  and  which  have  been  communicated  to  the  governments  concerned  for  further  action. 
They  are  classified according  to  the  2-yearly periods  in which  the  recommenda-
tions,  notices,  directives  etc.  were  issued.  Every  two  years  the  governments  are  invited 
to  inform  the  Commission  how  they have  followed  them  up;  the  situation described  in the 
present  report  is  as  at  1st January  1972. 
With  regard  to  the  preceding  2-yearly period,  the  governments  have  again  amended 
their regulations  concerning  the  24  provisions  laid  down  in  the  Commission's  recommenda-
tions,  so  that  it can  be  said  that  these  recommendations  are  being  followed  to  a  very 
large  extent. 
In  the  sphere  of  human  factors,  the  Commission  issued  two  recommendations  in 
1970  concerning  the  campaign  against  dusts,  and  the  organisation of  the  departments 
responsible  for  keeping  a  check  on  dusty  conditions,  and  these  were  published  in its 
8th  Report:  all  the  governments  have  provisions  in their regulations  which  conform  to 
the  Commission's  recommendations. ANNEXES 57 
LIST  OF  ANNEXES 
1.  Common  statistical summary  of  underground  accidents  at mines  in  1971 
(Annex  I) 
2.  Decision of  9  July,  1967  concerning  the  terms  of  reference  and  rules  of 
procedure  of  the  Mines  Safety Commission  (Annex  II) 
3.  Terms  of  reference  of  the  various  Working  Parties  of  the Mines  Safety  and 
Health Commission  (Annex  III) 
~.  Composition of  the Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  and  its Working  Parties 
(Annex  IV) 
5.  Report  and  Recommendations  on  the  preparation of  common  statistics on victims  of 
accidents  underground,  in accordance with  Community  Definitions  (Annex  V) 
6.  Summary  Table  of regulations  and  directives  regarding  rescue  operations  in mines 
(Annex  VI) 
7.  Eighth  Report  of  the  "Mine  Rescue  and  Mine  Fires"  Working  Party  concerning  the 
organisation of  the  Mines  Rescue  Service  for  1969/70  (Annex  VII) 
8.  Implementation of  Recommendations  of  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission 
(Annex  VIII) 
9.  Policy  statement  on  the deleterious  effects  of  dust-binding processes  using 
saline pastes  and  powders  upon  electrical plant  underground  (Annex  IX) 
10.  Comparison  of  safety provisions  concerning electric trolley  locomotives  underground 
and,  in particular,  possibilities of  reducing  thE~  incidence  of  trolley sparks 
(Annex  X) 
11.  Report  and  conclusions  on  overvoltages  caused  by  lightning  (Annex  XI) 
12.  Motion  by  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  on  the  subject  of  campaigns  to 
promote  safety  in mines  (Annex  XII) 
13.  Bibliography of  the  work  of  the Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  (Annex  XIII) 
Have  bee~  --rinted  separately  : 
- Fourth  Report  on  specifications  and  testing conditions  relating  to  fire-resistant 
fluids  used  for  power  transmission 
Usual  accidents  involving  intermediate  connexions  and  rope  joints  and  experience 
relating  to  rope  counter balancing  in multi-rope winding  installations 
(Report  by  the  Rope  Testing Office,  Bochum) COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  1971 
ANNEX  I MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  ACCIDENT  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  CAUSE  AND  SITE 
OF  ACCIDENT  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
Common  Statistics  on  victims 
of accidents  underground  in  coal mines  (absolute  figures) 
COUNTRY  :  Germany 
COAL-FIELD  :  Land  North  Rhine/Westphalie 
SITE  OF  THE  ACCIDENT  Production  faces 
Headings  excluding 
shafts  and  staple-pits  Shafts  and staple-pits 
1  2  3 
~ 
4  to  21  to  Fatal  4  to  21  to  Fatal  4  to  21  to  Fatal  4  to 
20  56  >56  acci- total  20  56  >56  a.cci- total  20  56  >s6  acci- total  20 
days  days  days  dents  days  days  days  dents  days  days  days  dents  days  c 
(3}  (3}  {3)  (3}  (3}  (3}  (3}  (3}  (3)  (3} 
I.  FALLS  OF  GROUNDS  AJID  ROCKS  4662  2325  645  19  7651  2353  961  269  13  3596  38  19  12  - 69  26 
I I.  TRANSPORT,  TOTAL  44  50  41  I  5  140  518  491  275  14  1298  79  75  45  3  202  9 
a)  Continuous  Transport 
~  31 
39  38  5  113  173  145  52  1  371  2  4  2  I  - 8  4 
b)  Discontinuous  Transport  i  13  11  3  - 27  345  346  223  13  927  77  71  43  3  194  5 
III.  FALLS  AND  MOVEMENT  OF  THE  VICTIM,  I 
TOTAL  1241 
I  829  178  5  2253  3846  2351  505  2  6704  361  262  85  1  709  156 
a)  while  moving  about  the  mine  79  43  I  11  - 133  718  376 I  103  - 1197  56  44  11  1  112  12 
b)  in  the  course  of other  activities  1162  786  167  5  2120  3128  1975  402  2  5507  305  218  74  - 597  I  144  I 
IV.  MACHINES,  TOOLS  &\"D  SUPPORTS 
I  ,  .. 
993  l  I 40  TOTAL  880  212  I  3  2441  609  308  73  3  33  17  2  - 52 
------ T- --
34 l  I 
631 
a)  Machines  70  54  2 
I 
160  32  26  2  123  - - - - -
I 
2 
f-- I  l 
I 
b)  Tools 
i 
384  231  48  - I  663  5461  275  i  47  I  1 
i  869  I  33  17  2  - 52  38  I  I  I 
i  I 
-----1-----t--
c)  Supports  912  575  130  I  1  I  1618  - 1  - - 1  - - - - - -
v.  FALLS  OF  OBJECTS  2625  1497  418  5  4545  2552  1316  361  6  4235  I  147  86  I  32  1  266  114 
VI.  EXPLOSIVES  - 2  - - I  2  1  - - - 1  I - - - - -
I  - ! 
~-VII. 
I  I  IGNITIONS  OR  EXPLOSIO:-<S  I 
I  OF  FIREDA.'IP  A.'lD  COAL  DUST  - - - - - - - 3  2  5  - - - - - -
VIII.  ~~i~~~!iio~F  o~A~~I~~;~~~G~~A;~~~~~  I 
RAL  GASES  (C02 ,  CH4 ,  CO,  H2S),  I  - - - - - - - - 2  2  - - - - - - TOTAL 
I 
a)  Outbursts  of Gas  - - - - - - - - - - I - - - - - - I 
b)  De-oxygenation  and  Poisoning 
by  natural Gases  - - - - - - - - 2  2  - - - - - -
IX.  HEATINGS  OR  FIRES  - 1  - - 1  - - - - - - - - - - -
,.-. 
X.  INRUSHES  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
I 
XI.  ELECTRICITY  - - - - - 6  12  1  - 19  - - - - - -
XII.  OTHER  CAUSES  110  58  29  6  203  280  171  75  14  540  25  20  10  1  56  18 
TOTAL  0048  5622  1523  43  1723~  0165  5610  1562  56  17393  683  479  186  6  1354  363 
11! Nwnber>  of houl'B  wor-ked  by  pit staff and errpZoyees  of aont:ractor>  fi.rme  who  beLong  to a  im:nsr-8 7  soa&.aZ  tnsu:ranC<~  sohsme. 
(2!  Accidents  invoZving mol'S  than  five  casuaZties  (i.e.  who  either>  died or were  unabLe  to r1ewne  work  ~q~derground for at  !.east  eight weeks!. 
( 3}  CaZender>  days. 
Table  la 
YEAR  :  1971 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1}  :  226  679  307 
Total  of  Group 
Other  places  accidents  underground  accidents  (2} 
4  5  6 
21  to  Fatal  4  to  21  to  Fatal  56  Fatal 
56  >56  acci- total  20  56  )56  acci- total  1W 
acci- total 
days  days  dents  days  days  days  dents  dents 
(3}  (3}  (3}  (3}  (3} 
20  2  1  49  7079  3325  928  33  11365  - - -
2  6  - 17  650  618  367  22  1657  - - -
2  6  - 12  210  190  98  6  504  - - -
- - - 5  440  428  269  16  1153  - - -
98  18  - 272  5600  3540  786  8  9938  - - -
7  3  - 22  865  470  128  1  1464  - - -
91  15  - 250  4739  3070  658  7  8474  - - -
20  7  67  2048  1205  294  6  3553  - - - t-----t--- --
---~ -- -------- -- -- ----r  ----
2  - - 4  135  88  60  4  287  I  - - -
H 
: 
--;--
18  7  - 63  1001  541  104  1  1647  '  - - l  -
! 
- - - - 912  576  130  1  1619  - - -
58  15  - 187  5438  2957  826  12  9233  - - _::_J 
- - - - 1  2  - - 3  - - -
- - - - - - 3  2  5  - - -
- - - - - - - 2  2  - - -
- - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - 2  2  - - -
- - - - - 1  - - 1  - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - -
1  1  - 2  6  13  2  - 21  - - -
8  10  - 36  433  257  124  21  835  - 13  13 
207  59  1  630  121259  1918  3330  106  36613  - 13  13 MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common  Statistics  on  victims 
of  accidents  underground  in  coal mines 
SITE  OF  THE  ACCIDENT 
COUNTRY  :  Germany 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  ACCIDENT  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  CAUSE  AND  SITE 
OF  ACCIDENT  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(frequency  rates) 
COAL-FIELD  :  Land  North  Rhine/Westphalie 
Production  faces 
Headings  excluding 
shafts  and  staple-pits 
2 
Shafts  and  staple-pits 
YEAR:  1971 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  ( 1)  226  6 79  307 
Other  places 
Total  of 
accidents  underground 
Fatal  4  to  21  to  Fatal  4  to  21  to 
Table  lb 
56 
Group 
accidents  (2) 
~f  incapacity 
CAUSES  OF  ACCIDENTS-------------
4  to 
20 
days 
( J) 
2l to I  I  Fatal 
56  >56 I  acci- total 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
2  ~6  to I )  56  acci- total 
dentc; 
4  to 
20 
days 
(J) 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
)';6 
days 
(3) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total  20  56  :>56 
days 
(3) 
acci- total  20  56 
Fatal 
)56  acci-
days  dents 
(3) 
total  1W 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
days  days 
( 3)  I (3) 
days  days  dents 
(J)  (3) 
dents  days  days 
(3)  (3) 
days  days 
(3)  (3) 
T 
4,24  i 1,19  0,22  31,23  14,67  4,09  0,15  O,ll  0,09  0,01  50,13  0,06  15,86  0,17  0,08  0,05  0,30  0,38  20,57  10,26  2,85  0,08  33,75 
~---------------------------~--
I.  FALLS  OF  GROUNDS  &'ID  ROCKS 
2,29  2,1711,21  0,07  2,87  2,73  1,62  0,10  7,31  0,01  0,89  0,04  0,01  0,03  0,06  5,73  0,35  0,33  0,20  0,19  0,22  0,18  0,02  0,62  II.  TRANSPORT,  TOTAL 
I  1 
~o_,1_4-+_o_._17-+_o_._17-+_o_,o_2-+_o_._5o  __  ~o_._76_f~~-o._2_3-+----~l  _1_,6_4-+_o_,o_1~_o_,o_2_~_o_,o_l-+-----+-o_,04  ___  +-_o_,o_24-o_._o1  __  ~o_,o_34----+-o_._o5-4_o_._9_3+-o_._~-4  __  o._4_3+-o_,o_3-4 __  2_,2_2+----+----~---J 
b)  Discontinuous  Transport  l 0,06  I 0,05  0,01  0,12  1,52  1,53  I 0,98  0,06  l  4,09  0,34  0,31  0,19  0,01  0,86  0,02  0,02  1,94  1,89  1,19  0,07  5,09  I 
a)  Cont1nuous  Transport 
I  !I  I  ------t  I  I 
III.  ~~~~~AND ~O\iEMENT  OF  THE  VICTIM,  12,41  3,66  0,79  0,02 ~,94  6,97  1~  0,01  ~29,57  1,59  1,16  0,37  3,13  0,69  0,43  0,08  1,20  24,72  15,62  3,47  0,04  43,84  --+--
,------------- -------------
a)  while  moVing  about  the  mine  0,36  0,19  0,05  0,59  3,17  1,66  i 0,45  1  5,28  0,25  0,19  0,05  0,49  0,05  0,03  0,01  0,10  3,82  2,07  0,56  6,46 
~--~-----+----+----~----+- ~ 
! 
b)  in  the  course  of other activities  5,13  3,47  0,74  0,02  9,35  3,80  8,71  1,77  0,01  24,29  1,35  0,96  0,33  2,63  I  0,64  0,40  0,07  - 1,10  20,91  13,54  2,90  0,03  37,38  - i  - -
~---+----+----+----+-----~--+----+----+---~----+---~----~---+----+----r------------- ----~----~---4---~----+---~----+ 
IV.  MACHINES,  TOOLS  AND  SUPPORTS 
TOTAL  I 6,03  3,79  0,94  0,01  10,77  12,69  1,36  0,32  0,01  !  4,38  I 0,15  0,07  0,01  0,23  I  0,18  0,09  0,03  0,30  9,03  5,32  1,30  0,03  15,67  - I  - I 
I  ----,---- -r---- ---- --- -t- ' 
I,  '  I  ,271  - I  j 
11 
~-~·  ~~o·~~-o-,7-l-+-o-,2-8+-o-,l-4+o-,_l1~-o-,_M~-o-,5-4~----~--~----~--~----~~~~--o_,o_l~o-,_o_1~---~---~-o-,6-o~-o-,3-9~-o--,2-6~o-,o-2~--1~~~- 1 
1 
b)  Tools  1,69  1,02  0,21  j  - 12,92 
1
2,41  I  1,21  i 0,21  i  ,  3,83  I  0,15  0,07  0,01  0,23 
1  0,17  0,08  0,03  0,28  4,42  2,391  0,46  7,27[  - 1  - I  - _; 
I 
.  I  !  !  ----+---+-----+----+------+----+----+----r-------- I  I  l 
c)  Supports  4,02  2,54  0,57  j  1  7,14  - I  4,02  2,54  i  0,57  7,1~ 
1  1 
~-~'"'  ~-"'""'  -- r" ·"  '·'"  ,  ·"  i  "·" I'"·"'  '·"  '·" ,  ·"  "·"'  "·"  "·"  "·"  "·"  '·"  "·'"  "·"  "·"'  "·" "·, "·"'I '·"  "·"'  '"·"I  I 
I~--~E~~S-------~  0,01  1- ~O,M  ~--+----+---~----~~~----~--+----+---~-~----~-~~---~----+---4--o_,o_l+---+----4--0-P_1+----+----~---
! VII.  IC.NITIO~S  OR  EXPLOSI0:-.15  I  '  I  I 
I  OF  FIR!:DA.'IP  A.'lD  COAl  DLST  +---1  : - I  I 
r  VIII.  OU1BURSTsOF  (,As--:-~- \YGE~ATlL 1N,I  I  I  I 
0,01  0.01  0,01  0,01  0,02 
0,01  0,01  0,01 
0,02 
0,01 
I 
i 
1 
I 
l  I  a)  Outbur;ts  of  r;as 
1 
- - I  ~- I  -
~  m]~~~~o~~~.p~lt·  ..  J·::~_!~s;~f'·--~- - !  - I  ~-+-= 
I  i- I  ----~~---r----1---+----r---+---4----+---4----1-----r----r----~----t----t----t----~----t-----~--~--~----~--~----~---+--~ 
I 
b)  De-oxygenao on  .-lna  ?olsUnlng  1  I 
I  by  n al  ur  a 1  Gas c,  I  - - __:---+---=--t---=--+--=--t---=:_____+-~-t_:::_O,__::,  0~1+_:::_0,__::,  0~1-t-=----~-=--+-=----+--=---t---=--+--=---+----=--+---=-+---=-+------=--+________::__+---___:___--+---=--------i~O~,  0~14__::_o_>__::,  0:_:1~__::__~___::_~__::__j 
I 
~~-HEATINGS__:R_:~~:__  _________  ___j_ __  - __ +_·  __  +----+--~-----+-----J-----+-----J------f-------j------f-----t----+----+----+----i~--~-----jf-----+-----i----~--~-----l-------+-----l----------4------l----.J 
!  X  0  INRt:SHES  I 
~---------------
0,01  0,03  0,06  0,01  0,0'  0,08  0,03  0,05  i  XI.  ELECTRICITY 
~-----------------------------t----+----+----+----+----+---t----t----t----r----t----r----r----t----t----+-----+----+----+----+------+----+------+-----lf-----~-----lf-----~----+--~ 
I 
XII.  OTHER  CAUSES  0,49  0,26  0,13  0,03  0,90  1,24  0, 75  0,33  0,06  2,38  0,11  0,09  0,04  0,25  0,08  0,04  0,04  0,16  1,91  1,13  0,51  0,09  3,61  0,06  0,06 
I 
27,79  93,78  52,57  14,69  0,47  161,5  0,06  0,06  0,26  5,97  1,60  0,91  0,82  0,03  4,~  24,75  6,89  0,25  76,72  3,01  2,11  44,32  24,80  6, 72  0,19  76,03  TOTAL 
I  --~~~==~~~~---~~---~---~~---L--~---~~---~---L__L  ___  L____L~ 
(1)  Nwnber  of hours  worked by  pit staff and empZoyees  of contractor  fim~s who  belong to  a  miners' soaiaZ  insurance  scheme. 
(2)  Accidents  invoz,,ing more  than  five  casuaZties  (i.e.  who  either died or wer>£  unable  to resume work  underground  for  at:  least:  eight weeks). 
(3)  Calender  oo~~~.s~·--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------~ 
H MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common  Statistics  on  victims 
of  accidents  underground  in  coal  mines 
NATURE  OF  THE  INJURY 
Amputations 
and 
enucleations 
l 
~ 
COUNTRY :  Germany 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  LOCATION 
AND  NATURE  OF  IfiJURY  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(absolute  figures) 
COAL-FIELD  :  Land  North Rhine/Westphalie 
Fractures  Luxations, 
with  or without  twists  and 
dis location  sprains 
Concussion 
and  inter-
nal injury 
Open  wounds 
contusions 
and  muscular 
abrasions 
Burns  and  ! 
I  harmful effects 
ot electricity 
and  radiation 
Table  2a 
YEAR  :  1971 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1) :  226  679  307 
Poisoning  Multiple  injuries 
and  of those not  TOTAL 
suffocation  specified  (2) 
>  56  Fatal 
I  4  to  21  to 
PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
>  56  ! Fatal 
1 
days  · acci-: total 
(5)  ! dents : 
>  56  IF  a tal 
days 
1  acci-
(5)  dents 
>  56  Fatal  >  56  Fatal I  >  56  Fatal  >  56  Fatal  >  56  Fatal  20  56  >  56  Fatal 
total  days  acci- total  days  acci- total  II  days  acci- I  total  days  acci- total  days  acci- total  days  acci- total  acci- total 
(5)  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  dents  d7~;  d(~~  d7~~  dents 
LOCATION  OF  THE  INJURY 
I. He ad  and neck  3  I  65 
II. Eyes 
IX.  Not  specified 
TOTAL  107  265  2065  80  7020  183  2323  30  376  929 
(1)  N1unber  of how•s  worked by  pit staff and  emp~oyees of contractor firws  who  be~ong to a  miner's  sociaZ insurance  scheme. 
(~)  inclu1.ing complications. 
( 3!  The  shoulders  ,;md  the wrists  are  included under  "1.<pper  Zirrd>s ". 
(4)  The  hips  and  the  cmkles  are  included under  "Lower  1-imlos". 
2823  648  140  43  3654 
4767 
13  12  11  25 
26458  13  130  13  28  21259  11918  3330  106  36613 
(5)  wlender~da~y~s~·---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------_j 
H MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common  Statistics  on  victims 
of  accidents  underground  in  coal  mines 
NATURE  OF  THE  INJURY 
PERIOD  OF  IN CAPACITY 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Amputations 
and 
enucleations 
Fatal 
acci- total 
dents 
COUNTRY  :  Germany 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  LOCATION 
AND  NATURE  OF  INJURY  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(Frequency  rates) 
COAL-FIELD  :  Land North  Rhine/Westphalie 
Fractures 
with or without 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
dis location 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Luxations, 
twists  and 
sprains 
Fatal 
acci- total 
dents 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Concussion 
and  inter-
nal  injury 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
Open  wounds 
contusions 
and muscular 
abrasions 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Fatal 
acci- total 
dents 
Burns  and 
harmful effects 
of electricity 
and  radiation 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
YEAR  :  1971 
MAR-HOURS  WORKED  (1)  :  226  679  307 
Poisoning 
and 
suffocation 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
Multiple  injuries 
of  those not 
specified  (2) 
>  56  Fatal 
days  acci-
(5)  dents 
total 
4  to 
20 
days 
(5) 
Table  2b 
TOTAL 
21  to 
56 
days 
(5) 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
LOCATION  OF  THE  INJURY 
I.  Head  and  neck  _ l- ·  o.o.  '·"  o...  ....  _  '·"  '·" ,...  ....  '·"  o.o.  "·"  _  _  '·" ~~X _  12,45  2,86  0,62 
Fatal 
acci- total 
dents 
0,19  16,12 
f  ~,..  _  -~- Lt'·"-r~x _  i 
0
•
04 
, ... 
1 
-I  '·"~'·"I  _ I'·" V([X~V(xx ----+- __  +------+--
3
·-3()-+----+ 
0
•
31 
-----+---
0
•
21 
___  --f----
3
-= 
m. """'  I - ' - - 1  '·"  '·"' 1
1 
2,14  ,  o,o2 
1
;  - 0,22  o,o1  o,o3l:  o,38  0,28[  8,18 i 0,01  - [  0,11  - - - 6,26  3,76  0,90  0,11  11,04 
:  I  I  !  +-~~--,~~--+~--r-~~--~~~--+-~-+--c~4-~-4--+-~-+--~ 
14,46  4,87  1,69  - 21,03 
~---- .  II  I  I  :1  II  I  )(N[XJ;  I  I  !  XXX 
j  IV.  ~~~~~u~~:\he hands)  1  0,03  - :0,05  1,17  - j  2,22  0,10  I  - 1,27  I  0,40'1  - I  17,39  - 0,09  - - I  "'  i  .  '  i  I  :  I 
[  ~  ·::~::·~~'"'_t,,  -T,~r:-8~:B  ~  _:_:,_,: t--QN-~  ~·f-:>J~--.I*~r~~·r 1 -_:-:_:-+:+-- i:  -~-:  ~r-1,  -:_:-:._
1
-+:+--1
1  ~--~j-----+-I  :_.:_: k-Q---Jk-Q  __  """'*--,~  ...............  ~------:-+---·:-~~-o--_·_:  __ 
1
--t- +----::_~--.:_:~_-_,:_:-:_-:~-:_:-:_:-t--~-~-- 1  f....-::_.~--~: 
I  "'· ,~,  I  o,o;  - I'·"'  ,,.,,  - '·"  '·"  - '·"  ~)<!><J  _____ -'11'-----+i  _o_._42--ll __  -+
1 _9_,8_7-+
1 -o_,O_l-+---t-0-,0-5--Ixf----IV('---J-~--'l-----+-----l--+--8-,4-l+--5,_7_0+-2-,_02--+--f-l-6-,l-3.....j 
VIII.  Multiple  locations  0,01  0,01  0,34  0,09  0,74  0,01  0,06  0,01  ~  0,10  0,13 
!  '·" '·"  o,o>  o,o; lXV([>(  o,m  '·" 
0,04  2,28  1,44  0,52  0,12  4,37 
IX.  Not  specified 
TOTAL  0,47  1,17  9,11  0,35  30,97  0,81  10,25  0,13  0,04  1,66  4,10  0,02  16,71  0,06  0,01  0,57 
(1)  Nwnber  of hours  worked by pit staff and emptoyeea of contractor fi:rms  who  belong to  a  miner 'a  sociat insU!'ance  scheme. 
(2)  including complications. 
(3)  The  shoulders  and  the wrists are induded under  "upper  Ziros". 
(4)  The  hips  and the  ankles  are  inctuded under  "Lower  limbs". 
(5)  Calender  days. 
0,02  0,06  0,05  0,05  0,04  0,02  0,11 
0,02  0,06  0,01  0,02  0,12  93,78  52,57  14,69  0,47  161,51 
H MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common  Statistics  on  victims 
of accidents  underground  in  coal mines 
SITE  OF  THE  ACCIDENT 
::::s::::_  c 
I,  FALLS  OF  GROUNDS  AND  ROCKS 
II,  TRANSPORT,  TOTAL 
a)  Continuous  Transport 
b)  Discontinuous  Transport 
III.  FALLS  AND  MOVEMENT  OF  THE  VICTIM, 
TOTAL 
a)  while  moving  about  the  mine 
b)  tn  the  course  of other activities 
IV.  MACHINES,  TOOLS  AND  SUPPORTS 
TOTAL 
I  a)  Machines 
I 
b)  Tools 
c)  Supports 
V.  FALLS  OF  OBJECTS 
VI.  EXPLOSIVES 
f---
VII.  IGNITIONS  OR  EXPLOSIONS 
OF  FIREDAMP  AND  COAL  DUST 
I 
I 
! 
VI I I,  ~~~~~~!~~O~F  O~A~~I~~~~~~G~~A~!~~:l 
RAL  GASES  (C02,  CH4,  CO,  HzS), 
f---- TOTAL 
a)  Outbursts  of Gas 
b)  De-oxygenation  and  Poisoning 
by  natural Gases 
IX,  HEAriNGS  OR  FIRES 
--
X,  INRUSHES 
XI.  ELECTRICITY 
Xll,  OTHER  CAUSES 
TOTAL 
COUNTRY  :  Germany 
COAL-FIElD  :  Saar 
Production  faces 
1 
4  to  21  to  Fatal 
20  56  >56  acci-
days  days  days  dents 
(3)  (3)  (3) 
538  355  123  2 
20  18  5  -
15  14  5  -
5  4  - -
39  24  4  -
12  6  1  -
27  18  3  -
270  246  63  1 
34  B  5  -
24  26  5  -
! 
212  187  53  1 
2  5  3  -
134  68  19  -
1003  716  217  3 
total 
1018 
43 
34 
9 
67 
19 
48 
580 
72 
55 
453 
10 
I 
221 
1939 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  ACCIDENT  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  CAUSE  AND  SITE 
OF  ACCIDENT  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(absolute  figures) 
Headings  excluding 
shafts  and  staple-pits  Shafts  and  staple-pits 
2  3 
4  to  21  to  Fatal  4  to  21  to  Fatal  4  to 
20  56  >56  acci- total  20  56  >56  acci- total  20 
days  days  days  dents  days  days  days  dents  days 
(3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3) 
219  128  45  1  393  3  9  - 1  13  1 
71  87  50  4  212  11  10  12  - 33  -
24  32  13  - 69  2  1  1  - 4  -
47  55  37  4  143  9  9  11  - 29  -
145  112  27  - 284  1  1  - - 2  -
6  3  - - 9  1  1  - - 2  -
139  109  27  - 275  - - - - - -
174  113  38  1  326  14  4  7  - 25  -
37  12  11  - 60  1  1  3  - 5  -
48[  29  13  1  91  4  3  - - 7  -
89  72  14  - 175  9  - 4  - 13  -
6  17  4  - 27  - 1  1  - 2  -
72  37  14  - 123  8  4  1  - 13  -
687  494  178  6  1365  37  29  21  l  88  1 
(1)  Nwnber  of hours  worked by  pit staff and  smployees  of oontroator firms  who  belong to  a mln,irs'  soa~.al 1-nsuranae  sahemfi. 
(2)  Aeaidents  involving more  than  five  aaeualties  (i.e.  who  either died or wsre  unable  to resume  work  una.rground for at  least llight weeks). 
( 3)  Calender  days, 
Table  la 
YEAR  :  1971 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1)  25  052  272 
Total of  Group 
Other places  accidents  underground  accidents  (2) 
4  5  6 
21  to  Fatal  4  to  21  to  Fatal  56  Fatal 
56  >56  acci- total  20  56  )56  acci- total  1W 
acci- total 
days  days  dents  days  days  days  dents  dents 
(3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3) 
- - - 1  7614  92  168  4  1425 
1  - - 1  1021  16  67  4  289 
1  - - 1  41  48  19  - 108 
- - - - 61  68  48  4  181 
- - - - 185  137  31  - 353 
- - - - 19  10  l  - 30 
- - - - 166  127  30  - 323 
- - - 458  363  108  2  931  --t----r----- ----t------ ---t---~  ----
H  - - - - 72  46  19  - 137 
- - - - 76  58  18  1  153 
- - - - 310  259  71  1  641 
- - - - 8  23  8  - 39  _J 
1  1  - 2  214  110  35  - 359 
2  1  - 4  1728  1241  417  10  3396 MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Conmon  Statistics on  victims 
of accidents  underground  in  coal  mines 
SITE  OF  THE  ACCIDENT 
~of  incapacity 
CAUSES  OF  ACCIDENTS-------------
COUNTRY  :  Germany 
COAL-FIELD  :  Saar 
Production  faces 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
21  to I 
56  >56 
days  days 
(3)  (3) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  ACCIDENT  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  CAUSE  AND  SITE 
OF  ACCIDENT  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(frequency  rates) 
Headings  excluding 
shafts  and staple-pits 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
2 
). 56 
days 
(3) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
Shafts  and staple-pits 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
>56 
days 
(3) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
I •  FALLS  OF  GROUNDS  AND  ROCKS  21,47  14,17  4,91  0,08  40,63  8,74  5,11  1,80  0,04  15,69  0,12  0,36  0,04  0,52  0,04 
I I.  TRANSPORT,  TOTAL 
a)  Continuous  Transport 
b)  Discontinuous  Transport 
III. FALLS  AND  MOVEMENT  OF  THE  VICTIM, 
TOTAL 
a)  while  moving  about  the  mine 
0,80  0,  72  0,20 
0,60  0,56  0,20 
0,20  0,16 
1,55  0,96  0,16 
0,48  0,24  0,04 
b)  in  the  course  of other  activities  1,08  0,72  0,12 
IV.  MACHINES,  TOOLS  AND  SUPPORTS 
1,72  2,83  3,47  2,00  0,16  8,46  0,44  0,40  0,48  1,32 
1,36  0,96  1,28  0,51  2, 75  0,08  0,04  0,04  0,16 
0,36  1,88  2,19  1,48  0,16  5,71  0,36  0,36  0,44  1,16 
2,67  5, 79  4,47  1,08  11,34  0,04  0,04  0,08 
0, 76  0,24  0,12  0,36  0,04  0,04  0,08 
1,92  5,55  4,35  1,08  10,98 
Table  lb 
YEAR  :  1971 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1):  Z5  052  272 
Other  p1 aces 
Total of 
accidents  underground 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
0,04 
0,04 
)56 
days 
(3) 
Fatal 
acci- total 
dents 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
)56 
days 
(3) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
0,04  30,38  19,64  6,7(  0,16  56,8~ 
0,04  4,07  4,63  2,68  0,16  11,54 
0,04  1,64  1,91  0,76  4,31 
2,43  2,71  1,92  0,16  7',22 
7,38  5,47  1,24  14,09 
0,  76  0,40  0,04  1,20 
6,62  5,07  1,20  12,89 
56 
~w 
Group 
accidents  (2) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
TOTAL  10,78  9,82  2,51  0,04  23,15  6,94  4,51  1,52  0,04  13,01  0,56  0,16  0,28  1,00  18,28  14,49  4,31  0,08  37,16 
~-~~------------------~----+----+----4----+----4-----t---+----+----+----t----t----t----t----i----t---~------r---~~--~---+----~-~---~-- -+----4----+------r----
1  a)  Machines 
b)  Tools 
c)  Supports 
V.  FALLS  OF  OBJECTS 
VI.  EXPLOSIVES 
,  VII.  IGNITIONS  OR  EXPLOSIONS 
t  " "~'- ~' ""  '"" 
VIII.  OUTBURSTS  OF  GAS,  DE-OXYGENATION, 
SUFFOCATION  OR  POISONING  BY  NATU-
RAL  GASES  (C02,  CH4,  CO,  H2S), 
1,36  1,31  0,20  2,87  1,47  0,48  0,44 
1,04  0,20  2,20  1,91  1,16  0,52 
8,46  7,46  2,12  0,04  18,08  3,56  2,87  0,56 
f----1--
0,08  0,20  i  0,12  0,40  0,24  0,68  0,16 
2,39  0,04  0,04  0,12  0,20  2,87  1,84  0, 76  5,47 
0,04  3,63  0,16  0,12  0,28  3,03  2,32  0,72  0,04  6,11 
6,99  0,36  0,16  0,52  12,38  10,34  2,83  0,04  25,59 
1,08  0,04  0,04  0,08  0,32  0,92  0,32  1,56 
rmAL  ---+----+----+----+----+----~---+----+----+----~---+----~--~----+----+----+---~----~--~----+---~----+----+----~---+----~--~--~----~ 
a)  Outbursts  of Gas 
b)  De-oxygenation  and  Poisoning 
by  natural  Gases 
IX.  HEAriNGS  OR  FIRES 
~·------------------------+---~---4---~~--+---·~--~---+--~----r---+---~---r--~----r---~---+--~----r---t---~---r---+---+----t---+---~--~---i 
X.  INRUSHES 
XI.  ELECTRICITY 
XII.  OTHER  CAUSES  5,35  2,71  0,76  8,82  2,87  1,48  0,56  4,91  0,32  0,16  0,04  0,52  0,04  0,04  0,08  8,54  4,39  1,40  14,33 
TOTAL  40,04  ~8,58  8,66  0,12  77,40  27,42  19,73  7,11  0,24  154,49  1,47  1,16  0,84  0,04  3,51  0,04  0,08  0,04  0,16  68,97  49,54  15,65  0,40  136,56 
(1)  NWTU:>er  of hours  worked by  pit staff and errployees  of oontroetor f1-rms  who  belon(J  to a lrriners'  soeial  insuranee  seheme. 
(2)  Aeeidents  involving more  than  five  easualties  (i.e.  who  either died or were  unable  to reswne  work  underground  for at  least eight weeks). 
{3)  Calender~~®~s~·----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------J 
H MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common  Statistics on  victims 
of  accidents  underground  in  coal  mines 
NATURE  OF  THF  INJURY  I 
Amputations 
and 
enucleations 
! 
COUNTRY  :  Germany 
COAL-FIELD  :  Saar 
Fractures 
with  or  without 
dis location 
Luxations, 
twists  and 
sprains 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  LOCATION 
AND  NATURE  OF  INJURY  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(absolute  figures} 
Concussion 
and  inter-
nal  injury 
Open  wounds 
contusions 
and  muscular 
abrasions 
Burns  and 
harmful effects 
of electricity 
and  radiation 
Table  2a 
YEAR  :  1971 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  ( 1) :  25  052  272 
Poisoning  Multiple  injuries 
and  of  those not  TOTAL 
suffocation  specified  (2) 
>  56  Fatal 
PER 1  OD  OF  IN CAPAC lTY 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Fatal! 
' acci-
1 
total 
dents 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total  days  acci- total 
(5)  dents 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
4  to 
20 
days 
(5) 
21  to 
56 
days 
(5) 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
LOCATION  OF  TilE  INJURY 
I. Head  and  neck 
VIII.  Multiple  locations  22 
IX.  Not  specified 
TOTAL  17  17  92  100  274 
(1)  Nwnber  of hours  worked by pit staff and errptoyees of contractor firms  who  betong to a  miner's  sociaL insurance  scheme. 
(2)  including corrplications. 
(3)  The  shoulders  and  the wrists are  induded under  "upper  limbs", 
(4)  The  hips  and the  ankLes  are inctuded under  "Lower  limbs". 
(5)  Calender  days, 
438  114  25 
275 
I 
20  20  1728  1241  417 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
582 
349 
10  3396 
H 0 
•  •  '  "  ..  ;  : ,',,  '• ,I, I  I  l  ••: f"'  ~ ..  ~ \1 t; 1  'I, 
0l  1  10  :' ;  ',:  I  •  ! 
1 
, I  ,  0  0  ,  I  , 
MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common  Statistics on  victims 
of  accidents  underground  in  coal  mines 
NATURE  OF  THE  INJURY 
PERIOD  OF  IN CAPACITY 
LOCATION  OF  THE  INJURY 
I.  Head  and neck 
>  56 
days 
(5} 
Amputations 
and 
enuc:leations 
Fatal 
acci- total 
dents 
1-
COUNTRY  :  Germany 
COAL-FIELD  :  Saar 
Fractures 
with  or without 
dis location 
>  56 
days 
(5} 
0,24 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
0,20  0,44 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
1 r' ,i..;,'..C !.! .~  ~~ \\  ..  ;.  ~_ .. -.. 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  LOCATION 
AND  NATURE  OF  INJURY  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
Luxations, 
twists  and 
sprains 
Fatal 
acci- total 
dents 
(Frequency rates) 
Concussion 
and  inter-
nal  injury 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
0,12  0,12 
Open  wounds 
contusions 
and muscular 
abrasions 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
0,64 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
0,64 
Burns  and 
harmful effects 
of electricity 
and  radiation 
>  56 
days 
(5} 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
Table  2b 
YEAR:  1971 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1)  :  2.5  0  .52  272 
Poisoning 
and 
suffocation 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
XXX 
Multiple  injuries 
of those not 
specified  (2) 
>  56  Fatal 
days  acci-
(5)  dents 
total 
4  to 
20 
days 
(5) 
TOTAL 
21  to 
56 
days 
(5) 
>  .56 
days 
(5) 
- 17,48  4,.5.5  1,00 
Fatal 
acci- total 
dents 
0,20  23,23 
~  ~~~::AA - ---~ f  r- ~~~~XfXk<-_-4  --:.~+-,  .:.-+-- 0  -::~+-- .. -+-
36 
--+:  -.:,-+-.  _--+-:  +--I  :  --+--~~~c--------l--~---+---:::+--:-+-:---j.:  -::::--+-:·~.::  -::::+-- ..  oo--+-:-::----j: 
VII.  Feet  0,08  0,08 
0,40  0,40  -t\t\N .. , - .. , ---X[XX 
VIII.  Multiple  locations  0,04  0,04  0,88  0,88 
IX.  Not  specified 
TOTAL  0,68  - 0,68  3,67  0,32  3,99  0,24  0,24  0,32 0,04  0,36  10,94  0,04  10,98  -
(1)  Nwnber  of hours  worked by  pit staff and employees  of contractor fil'T7!8  who  belong to a  miner's social insurance  scheme. 
(2)  including complications. 
(3)  The  shoulders  and the wrists  al'e  included under  "upper  limbs". 
(4)  The  hips  and the  ankles  are included under  "Lower  limbs". 
(5)  Calender  days. 
0,16  0,16  8,02  3,87  2,04  - 13,93 
- .5,19  4,91  2,03  - 12,13 
0,08  0,08  8,18  6,07  0,96  0,04  1.5,25 
0,04  0,08  0,12 
0,80  - 0,80  68,97  49,54  16,65  0,40 136,56 
H MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Conmon  Statistics  on  victims 
of accidents  undergroW!d  in coal mines 
COUNTRY  :  Germany 
COAL-FIElD  :  Total 
SITE  OF  THE  ACCIDENT  Production  faces 
~of  incapacity 
CAUSES  OF  ACCIDENTS~ 
I.  FALLS  OF  GROUNDS  AND  ROCKS 
I I.  TRANSPORT,  TOTAL 
a)  Continuous  Transport 
b)  Discontinuous  Transport 
III.  FALLS  AND  MOVEMENT  OF  THE  VICTIM, 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
5200 
64 
46 
18 
TOTAL  1280 
a)  while  moving  about  the  mine  91 
b)  in  the  course  of  other  activities  1189 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
>56 
days 
(3) 
2680  768 
68  46 
53  43 
15 
853  182 
49  12 
804  170 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
21 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  ACCIDENT  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  CAUSE  AND  SITE 
OF  ACCIDENT  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(absolute  figures) 
Headings  excluding 
shafts  and staple-pits 
total 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
)  56 
days 
(3) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
8669  2572  1089  314  14  3989  41 
183  589  578  325  18  1510  90 
147  197  177  65  440 
36  392  401  260  17  1070  86 
2320  3991  2463  532  6988  362 
152  724  379  103  1206  57 
2168  3267  2084  429  5782  305 
Shafts  and  staple-pits 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
28 
85 
80 
.Z63 
45 
218 
.>s6 
days 
(3) 
12 
57 
3  I 
54 
85 
11 
74 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
82 
235 
12 
223 
711 
114 
597 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
27 
156 
12 
144 
IV.  MACHINES,  TOOLS  AND  SUPPORTS 
TOTAL  1636  1106  275  3021  783  421  111  1319  47  21  77  40 
Table  la 
YEAR:  1971 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1)  :  251  731  579 
Other  places 
Total of 
accidents  Wlderground 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
20 
98 
91 
20 
:>s6 
days 
(3) 
18 
15 
Fatal 
acci- total 
dents 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
)56 
days 
(3) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
50  7840  3817  1096  37 
18  752  734  434  26 
13  251  238  117 
501  496  317  20 
272  5789  3677  817 
22  884  480  129 
250  4905  3197  688 
total 
11790 I 
1946 
612 
1334 
10291 
1494 
8797 
6 7  2506  1568  402  8  4484 
56 
1W 
Group 
accidents  (2) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
---------------------------~---+----+----+----+-----~--+----+----+---~----+---~----~---+----+----~----~---~----+----- ---------~----+------~-~----~---
1  104  100  183 
18 
87  39  232  44  37  a)  Machines  207  134  79  424 
! 
63  1077  599  122  1800 
---r------
b)  Tools 
I 
408  257  53  I  718  5941  304'  60 I  960  37  20  59  38 
,-----+----+-~~-----+---~---4----+----+----~---+-----+-----4----+---~----~----r---~---~-----+----+----4----+----4----+----+---~--~ 
f  1124  762  183  I  2011  c)  Supports  89  73  14  176  13  1222  835  201  2260 
V.  FALLS  OF  OBJECTS  2627  1502  421  4555  2558  1333  365  4262  147  87  33  268  114  58  15  187  5446  2980  834  12  9272 
VI.  EXPLOSIVES 
----------------------+--~----~--+---+----+--~---+---+---+--~--~~--~--4---4-----+--~--~~--~--~--+---+---~--~---+---+---+---4--~ 
VII.  IGNITIONS  OR  EXPLOSIONS 
t  ~  "~"'"" "'" '~' '"" 
VIII.  OUTBURSTS  OF  GAS,  DE-OXYGENATION, 
SUFFOCATION  OR  POISONING  BY  NATU-
RAL  GASES  (C02,  CH 4,  CO,  H2S), 
TOTAL  ---~----f----f----f----+----~---f----f----f----~---T----t---~----f----+----f----4-----4----4----f----4----f---~----~---+----~--~----~--~ 
a)  Outbursts  of Gas 
b)  De-oxygenation  and  Poisoning 
by  natural  Gases 
IX.  HEAriNGS  OR  FIRES 
~·------------------------+---~--~----r---+----+--~--~--~r---~--1----r---+----r---+----r---+--~r---~--+---~--~---4---4----+---+---~--~--~ 
X.  INRUSHES 
XI.  ELECTRICITY  12  19  13  21 
XII.  OTHER  CAUSES  244  126  48  424  352  208  89  14  663  33  24  11  69  18  11  38  647  367  159  21  1194  13  13 
TOTAL  11051  6338  1740  46  19175  10852  6104  1740  62  18758  720  508  207  1442  364  209  60  634  22987  13159  3747  116  40009  13  13 
(1)  Nuniber  of houre  worked by  pit staff and empZoyees  of aont:ructor  fil'ms  who  beZong to a  rrriner.~s:-;,-s::o:-:m.7·a:;z-~:::·n:::s7::Ul'an=ae=-':-sch=eme=-.'-------'-------'------'------'--------'-----'----_.__----.J._---L  ____  _j__  __  _L  ____  .L_  __  -L  ____  L_  __  __L  __  --1 
(2)  Accidents  invoZving moro  than  five  casuaLties  (i.e.  who  either died or wero  unabZe  to reswne work  undel'f!l'Ound  for at  Zeast  eight weeks). 
(3)  CaZender~~~~,s~·----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------~ 
H Year:  1971 
Country:  Belgium  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDE~TS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  South 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
~tan- as  under  (a) 
C  A  U  s  E  Disable-
Fatal- hours  per million 
ities  man-hours 
ments  as  as  under  worked  (to  third 
under  (a)  (b)  decimal 
below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  124  2  7,665 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  71  3  4,389 
3)  Movement  of  personnel  44  1  2,720 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports  69  0  4,265 
5)  Falling objects  39  0  2,411 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  1  0  0,062 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or coal 
dust  0  0  -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  0  1  -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  0  0  -
10)  Inrushes of water  1  0  0,062 
11)  Electricity  0  0  0 
12)  Other  causes  11  0  0,680 
TOTAL  360  7  16.176.328  22,254 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  at  least  eight  weeks. 
(b)  Casualties  died within eight weeks, 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than  five  casualties of  types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of 
fatalities 
as  under  (b) 
per  million 
man-hours 
(to  third 
decimal 
place 
0,124 
0,185 
0,062 
0,062 
0,433 
Group  accidents 
as  under  (c)  below 
~umber  Number  Number  of  dis- of  ablements  of  fatal-
acci- under  ities as 
dents  as  under  (b)  (a) 
H 
....... 
N Year:  ] 971 
Country:  belgium  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDE~TS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Eainaut 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
!llan- as  under  (a) 
C  A  U  s  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per  million 
ities  man-hours  ments  as  under  worked  (to  third  under  (a)  as 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  84  2  7,637 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  48  - 4,364 
3)  Movement  of  personnel  27  1  2,455 
4)  Machinery,  handling of  tools 
and  supports  53  0  4,819 
5)  Falling objects  26  0  2,364 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  1  0  0,091 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or  coal 
dust  0  0  -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  0  0  -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  0  0  -
10)  Inrushes of water  0  0  -
11)  Electricity  0  0  -
12)  Other  causes  10  0  0,909 
TOTAL  249  3  10·998.696  22,639 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  at  least eight  weeks. 
(b)  Casualties  died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than  five  casualties of  types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as  under  (b) 
per  million 
~umber  Number  Number  man-hours  of  dis-
(to third  of  ablements  of  fatal-
acci- ities  decimal  under  as 
dents  as  under  (b)  place  (a) 
0,182 
-
0,091 
0,273 
H Year:  1971 
Country:  Belgium  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDE~TS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Liege 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per  million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as  under  (to  third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
l)  Falls of  ground  40  0  6,797 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  23  3  3,908 
3)  Movement  of  personnel  17  0  2,880 
4)  Machinery,  handling of  tools 
and  supports  16  0  2,718 
5)  Falling objects  13  0  2,209 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  0  0  -
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or  coal 
dust  0  0  -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  0  1  -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  0  0  -
10)  Inrushes  of water  1  0  0,170 
ll)  Electricity  0  0 
12)  Other  causes  1  0  0,170 
TOTAL  111  4  5.885.208  18,860 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  at  least eight  weeks. 
(b)  Casualties  died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than  five  casualties of  types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as  under  (b) 
per million 
~umber  Number  Number  man-hours  of  of  dis- of  fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities as  decimal  as  under 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
-
0,579 
0,193 
0,772 
H Year: 
Country: 
1971 
Belgium  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDE~TS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field:  Carnpine 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
~tan- as  under  (a) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as  under  (to  third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  36  2  1,504 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  64  2  2,674 
3)  Movement  of  personnel  16  1  0,669 
4)  Machinery,  handling of  tools 
and  supports  30  1  1,253 
5)  Falling objects  36  0  1,504 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  0  0  -
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or coal 
dust  0  0  -
8)  Sudden outbur5ts  of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  0  0  -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  0  0  -
10)  Inrushes of water  0  0  -
11)  Electricity  0  0  -
12)  Other  causes  2  0  0,084 
TOTAL  184  6  23.932.498  7,688 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  b~low ground  for  at  least  eight  weeks. 
(b)  Casualties  died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than  five  casualties of  types  (a)  and/or  (b), 
Number  of  Group  accidents 
fatalities  as  under  (c)  below 
as  under  (b) 
per  million  Number  Number  Number 
man-hours  of  of  dis- of  fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities as  decimal  as  under 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0,084 
O,o84 
0,042 
0,042 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0,252 
H Year:  1971 
Country:  Belgium  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDE~TS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES  Coal-field: the  Kingdom 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C  A  u  s  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per  million 
ities  man-hours  ments  as  as  under  worked  (to  third  under  (a)  (b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  160  4  3,989 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  135  5  3,365 
3)  Movement  of  personnel  60  2  1,496 
4)  Machinery,  hundling of tools 
and  supports  99  1  2,469 
5)  Falling objects  75  0  1,870 
6)  Explosives  and  fumes  1  0  0,025 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or  coal 
dust  0  0  -
8)  Sudden  outburs~s of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  0  1  -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  0  0  -
10)  Inrushes  of  wate~  1  0  0,025 
11)  Electricity  0  0  -
12)  Other  causes  13  0  0,324 
TOTAL  544  13  40.108.826  13,563 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  at  least  eight  weekso 
(b)  Casualties  died within eight  weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than  five  casualties of  types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of 
fatalities 
as  under  (b) 
per million 
man-hours 
(to  third 
decimal 
place 
0,100 
0,125 
0,049 
0,025 
0,025 
0,324 
Group  accidents 
as  under  (c)  below 
Number  Number  Number  of  dis- of  ablements  of  fatal-
acci- under  ities as 
dents  as  under  (b)  (a) 
H MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common  Statistics  on  victims 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  ACCIDENT  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  CAUSE  AND  SITE 
OF  ACCIDENT  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY  Table  la 
of accidents  underground  in coal mines  (absolute  figures) 
SITE  OF  THE  ACCIDENT 
I.  FALLS  OF  GROUNDS  AND  ROCKS 
II.  TRANSPORT,  TOTAL 
a)  Continuous  Transport 
b)  Discontinuous  Transport 
II  I.  FALLS  AND  MOVEMENT  OF  THE  VICTIM, 
TOTAL 
a)  whtle  moving  about  the  mine 
b)  tn  the  course  of other  acti vi ttes 
IV.  MACHINES,  TOOLS  AND  SUPPORTS 
TOTAL 
COUNTRY 
COAL-FIELD 
Belgium 
Production  faces 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
4342 
330 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
654 
51 
I 
- I 
>56 
days 
(3) 
147 
17 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
5147 
398 
Headings  excluding 
shafts  and  staple-pits 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
). 56 
days 
(3) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
335  42  12  389 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
59 
12 
Shafts  and staple-pits 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
10 
>5& 
days 
(3) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
70 
16 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
YEAR:  1971 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1) :  40  126  690 
Other  places 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
:>56 
days 
(3) 
Fatal 
acci- total 
dents 
Total of 
accidents  underground 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
4736  706 
985  266 
429  121 
556  145 
1115  171 
1974  395 
)56 
days 
(3) 
160 
135 
57 
78 
60 
78 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
5606 
1391 
609 
782 
1348 
2448 
56 
1W 
Group 
accidents  (2) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
I - -~-------------~-~-------+--+----j-~-+----j~----+-----1--+----j,--+----l,----+--+--+~----lr~~---+----l---+---l---+--r---- - -- - -~--t--- --- t---
!  a)  Machines  228  77  19  325 
1048  224 
- I  I  - 802  698  94  10 
49  1326  I -
b)  Tools 
1- -
I 
I  -
c)  Supports 
v_._F_A-LL_s_OF--O-BJ_E_CI-·s---------~---~~~~--+--~-+--~--+----l~-+----l~-+-~~--~--+~---+-----lr--~-r--t---+--+----r--t-
2
-
07
-
3
+-
4
-
0
-
1
~-
9
-
6
~--~
2
-
5
-
70
4--~--+~~~ 
_vi,  EXPLOSIVES 
t  VII.  IGNITIONS  OR  EXPLOSIONS 
~  "' n~M"'  AAO  C~C """ 
vm.  ~~i;~~!~io~Fo~A;OI~~;~~~G~~A~~~~:j  -
RAL  GASES  (C02 ,  CH 4 ,  CO,  H2S), 
1 
-----~T~OT~A~L--------------------+----4---~+-----4---~-----+---+----~---+----+---~----+----+----~---i----~--~r----r-----lr---~-----l----+-----4----+----~----+----+----~--~ 
a)  Outbursts  of Gas 
b)  De-oxygenation  and  Poisoning 
by  natural  Gases 
IX.  HEAriNGS  OR  FIRES 
X.  INRUSHES 
XI.  ELECTRICITY 
XII.  OTHER  CAUSES 
TOTAL 
I 
- I 
(1)  Nwnber  of hours  worked by pit staff and er>pZoyees  of contractor ['1-rms  who  belong to a -;m_n-ers  1  social  insurance  scheme. 
(2)  Accide>Zts  i.nvolvmg more  than  five  casualties  (i.e.  who  either died or were  unable  to reswne  work  under(fl'ound  for at  l.east  eight weeks). 
385  52  14  451 
11374  1993  545  13  13825 
(3)  Calender  00~'~8~·--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------__J 
H . :.  ; '-, ', ' .  ~--~. 
MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common  Statistics  on  victims 
of  accidents  Wl.derground  in  coal mines 
S ITE  OF  THE  ACCIDENT 
~ 
c 
I.  FALLS  OF  GROUNDS  AND  ROCKS 
I I.  TRANSPORT,  TOTAL 
a)  Continuous  Transport 
b)  Discontinuous  Transport 
III.  FALLS  AND  MOVEMENT  OF  THE  VICTIM, 
TOTAL 
a)  \o.'hi le  moving  about  the  mine 
b)  in  the  course  of other activities 
IV.  MACHINES,  TOOLS  AND  SUPPORTS 
TOTAL 
a)  Machines 
b)  Tools 
c)  Supports 
V.  FALLS  OF  OBJECTS 
VI.  EXPLOSIVES 
,  VII.  IGNITIONS  OR  EXPLOSIONS 
~  ""~-..,  '~' '"" 
VIII.  OUTBURSTS  OF  GAS,  DE-OXYGENATION, 
SUFFOCATION  OR  POISONING  BY  NATU-
RAL  GASES  (C02 ,  CH4,  CO,  HzS), 
TOTAL 
a)  Outbursts  of Gas 
b)  De-oxygenation  and  Poisoning 
by  natural  Gases 
IX.  HEATINGS  OR  FIRES 
COUNTRY  :  Belgium 
COAL-FIELD 
Production  faces 
4  to  21  to  Fatal 
20  56  >56  acci-
days  days  days  dents 
(3)  (3)  (3) 
108,2  16,3  3,1  0,1 
8,2  1,3  0,4 
4  to 
total  20 
days 
(J) 
..·.  ,• 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  ACCIDENT  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  CAUSE  AND  SITE 
OF  ACCIDENT  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(frequency  rates) 
Headings  exc1 uding 
shafts  and staple-pits 
21  to  Fatal 
56  >56  acci- total 
days  days  dents 
(J)  (3) 
Shafts  and  s tap 1e-pi  ts 
4  to  21  to  Fatal 
20  56  .>;6  acci-
days  days  days  dents 
(3)  (3)  (J) 
4  to 
total  20 
days 
(3) 
128,3  8,3  1,0  0,3  9,6  1,5  0,2  0,0  1,  7 
0,1  0,0  0,0  0,2 
9,9  0,3  0,0  0,0  0,4 
YEAR:  1971 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1): 40  126  640 
Other  places 
21  to  Fatal  4  to 
56  )56  acci- total  20 
days  days  dents  days 
(3)  (3)  (3) 
111,0 
24,5 
10,7 
13,8 
27,8 
49,2 
--
5,7 
17,4 
26 '1 
51,7 
0,0 
Table  lb 
Total of 
accidents  underground 
21  to  Fatal 
56  )56  acci- total 
days  days  dents 
(3)  (3) 
17,6  4,0  0,1  139,7 
6,6  3,4  0,1  34,6 
3,0  1,4  0,0  15,1 
3,6  2,0  0,1  19,5 
4,3  1,5  0,0  33,6 
4'' 
0,0  61,0 
-
,5  0,0  8,1 
2,3·  0,2  19,9 
5,6  1, 3  0,0  33,0 
10,0  2,4  64,1 
0,0  0,0 
0,0  0,0 
Group 
accidents  (2) 
56  Fatal 
ms  acci- total 
dents 
------- r-----
~-----------------------------~---+----+----+----+----~~--~---+----~---r----~---r--~r----r----r----+----+---~----+----r----+---~----+----r----~---r--~----4---~ 
X.  INRUSHES  0,0  0,0  0,0  0,1 
XI.  ELECTRICITY  0,0  0,0  0,0 
XII.  OTHER  CAUSES  9,6  1,3  0,3  11,2 
TOTAL  281,0  49,7  3,6  0,3  344,6 
(1)  Nwnber  of hours  worked by  pit staff and  errp~oyees of aontr><wtor  fil'ms  who  be~ong to a  rrriners 1  soaia~ insurance  scheme. 
(2)  Accidents involving more  than  five  casualties  (i.e.  who  eithero died oro  were  unable  to roesume  work  underoground  foro  at  least eight weeks). 
(3)  Calender._~_&&~··~·--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------~ 
H 
1-' 
CXl MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common  Statistics  on  victims 
of  accidents  underground  in  coal  mines 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  LOCATION 
AND  NATURE  OF  INJURY  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(absolute  figures) 
YEAR  :  1971  COUNTRY  :  Belgium 
COAL-FIELD  MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1):  40  126  640 
NATURE  OF  THE  INJURY 
PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
LOCATION  OF  THE  INJURY 
Amputations 
and 
enucleations 
I  I 
>  56  1  Fatal 1 
days  1  acci-; total 
(5)  ! dents  1 
'  ; 
Fractures  Luxations,  Concussion 
with  or  without  twists  and  and  inter-
dis location  sprains  nal injury 
>  56  !Fatal 
days  1 acci- total  days  acci- total  days  acci- total 
(5}  l  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  dents 
Fatal  Fatal  >  56  >  56 
Open  wounds 
contusions 
and  muscular 
abrasions 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Fatal I 
acci- I total 
dents 
Burns  and 
harmful effects 
of electricity 
and  radiation 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Fatal 
acci- total 
dents 
Poisoning 
and 
suffocation 
>  56  Fatal 
days 
(5) 
acci- total 
dents 
:  ~  I  I  NIVI\/ 
f  :L~::.~· "'''  ' ': I '  ~  I - - : V\V\V\ 
Multiple  injuries 
of  those not 
specified  (2) 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
11 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
11 
4  to 
20 
days 
(5) 
Table  2a 
TOTAL 
21  to 
56 
days 
(5) 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
45 
14 
Fatal 
acci- total 
dents 
51 
14 
I  I  i  I  i 
-1~--~--+----r--t---r--+-----r------ -
!  I  - I  - I  3 7  - 37  - I  - - - I  - - 20  i  2  I 22  I  - - I  -
~-- I 
1 ---t--- I  I!  I  : 
65  68 
72  ~-I-V.--~~-~~~-~~u~t:'~gst~he-ha-n~ds)-+-1~ 1 ~  __ ~  _____  --_~:--~-- j '' t -1-'J -~~~~ -~  "  ~  -" ' - ! '  Xk\[X_+-- 7  +---- _  -~ 
1
__  _ _  t~-'~ 
!  '· ''"''  I  "  - "  "'  I - I "' I '  - 1  '  :  ])<J>< "  · -I "  - - - lXlX[><  n  - n  "'  - m 
>----V-1-~.- L-o-~wer  -limb~s  -~tl  3  i  rl-+-i - +  i -:I rvi  !  !  I  MVV-J------+-+-- -r---r----r-------- -~ 
-- --- f-----
(excluding feet)  (4) 
1 
- :  3  6
8 
1 
- 68  5  - 5  J/\1  64  ~  - i 64  i  1  - I  1  V\1/\/\  19  1  20  160  1  161 
~  ,  , -I  ,  ,  " t- " , _  r--2-+-X-,  -rX----r-XJ-*
1
-24--+
1
-_--+I-24--+- 1 - ~_  +---_  +---_  +V<--TX---*[><-----}-5  +------_ t------5  +--+-----+--1-01-+------+-101------l 
r_______c  -- I  '  !  1\/xx 
- - I  - 1  - 1  - - - j\ 
VII.  Feet 
I 
! 
VIII.  Multiple  locations 
[_IX.  Not-specified  -+-IX-r--'f~[><---f-----X--f-----f--~X----'f-[><-+-----+--'XX----+-------'IXf----+-XX--'f-----TXX-+-X--'t--t-----+-- - +----+-- 1-+-----tl -+-- --+----+----+--+---+---+-----11 
1 
~ "  T'  i  '"  ' i  m 
TOTAL  10  10  222 
(1)  Nwnber  of hours  worked by  pit staff and employees  of contractor  firms  who  bdong to a  miner's social insurance  scheme. 
(2)  including complications. 
(3)  The  shoulders  and  the wrists are  included under  "upper  limbs". 
(4)  The  hips  and the  ankles  are included under  "tower  limbs". 
(5)  Catender  days, 
226  62  64  685  13  698 
H MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common  Statistics  on  victims 
of  accidents  underground in  coal  mines 
NATURE  OF  THE  INJURY 
PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Amputations 
and 
enucleations 
Fatal 
acci- i  total 
dents 
COUNTRY  :  Belgium 
COAL-FIELD 
Fractures 
with or without 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
dis location 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  LOCATION 
AND  NATURE  OF  INJURY  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
Luxation&, 
twists  and 
sprains 
Fatal 
acci-1 total 
dents 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
(Frequency  rates) 
Concussion 
and inter-
nal injury 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
Open  wound& 
contusion• 
and muscular 
lbrasiona 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Fatal 
acci- I total 
dents 
Burns  and 
harmful effects 
of electricity 
and  radiation 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
YEAR  :  1971 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (l):  40  126  640 
Poisoning 
and 
suffocation 
> 56 
days 
(5) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
Multiple  injuries 
of  those not 
specified  (2) 
>  561 Fatal 
days  acci-
(5)  dents 
total 
LOCATION  OF  THE  INJURY 
I.  Head  and  neck  ~  I  ~ I  ~  I  o  ••  I  o  ••  I o  •• I o.o  I  ~  I o.o I o.o I  ~  I o.o I  o •• I 
0+·· I  ~  I  ~  I ~  ~~  o.o 
0,0 
4  to 
20 
days 
(5) 
Tlble  2b 
TOTAL 
21  to 
56 
days 
(5) 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
1,1 
Fatal 
acci-1 total 
dents 
o,2  I  1,3 
~·  II. Eye~•  - - I  j_~  I  ~  ~  ~  0,0  0,0  ~  I  ~  I 
0
'' I  ~ J  :_ 
I  I  j  I  I 
I  I 
I  II  1 .  Trunk  -
1 
- - 0,  9  i  - - - - -
I  1 
I 
~  I  I 
I  .  I  IV.  Upper  lunbs 
~ 
(excluding  the  hands)  0,0  - ,  0,0  0,9  - 0,9  - - 0,6  0,0  - 1  0,0  I  J\  I  }\  I  J\  I  0,2  I  - I  0,2  I  I  1,8 I  - I  1,8 
(3J  I  , 
1  ,  ...  ,.  r-~  ~Fl~.l  ~  ,_,  I··· I I I M;  ~ -+----+- ,  +~ 
,  -t-r-
l 
VI.  Lower  limbs  I 
(excluding  feet)  (4 )  0,1  - I  0,1  J.,7  - 1,7  - 1,6  0,0  - 0,0 
VII.  Feet  0,0  0,0  1 '7  1, 7  0,0  I  o..  I  ~  ~  I -
VIII.  Multiple  locations  0,0  o,o I  o,o  0,0  0,0  0,0  :  ~  r o.o  I  ~  I  ~  I ~  tx1X1X 
IX.  Not  specified 
TOTAL  0,5  o,o I  o,6  9'  1  0,1  9,3  I  o,2  0,2  0,0  o,o  I  5,5 
(1)  Nwnber>  of hour>s  wor>ked  by  pit staff and empLoyees of contructor>  fii'mB  who  beLong  to a  miner>
1s  sociaL inaur>ance  scheme. 
(2)  incLuding compLications. 
(3)  The  shouZder>s  and  the  wl'ists  are  included wulsr>  "upper>  Limbs". 
(4)  The  hips  and the  ankLes  ar>e  incLuded under>  "Lower>  Limbs". 
(5)  Calender>  days. 
o,o  I  o,o 
0,1  1  5,6  0,0  - '  0,0  o,o  I  o,o 
0,3  5,6  - '  5,6 
0,5  4,0  o,o  I  4,o 
0,1  2,5  - '  2,5 
0,0  o,o  I  o,o 
- ·  o,o  I  o,1 
1,6  o,o I  1,6  11,0 I  o,3  I 17,3 
H 
N 
0 MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
C(l.IMISSION 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  ACCIDENT  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  CAUSE  AND  SITE 
OF  ACCIDENT  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY  Table  la 
Corranon  Statistics  on  victims 
of accidents  underground in  coal mines 
SITE  OF  THE  ACCIDENT 
I,  FALLS  OF  GROUNDS  AND  ROCKS 
II.  TRANSPORT,  TOTAL 
a)  Continuous  Transport 
b)  Discontinuous  Transport 
III.  FALLS  AND  MOVEMENT  OF  THE  VICTIM, 
TOTAL 
a)  while  moving  about  the  mine 
b)  1n  the  course  of  other  activities 
IV.  MACHINES,  TOOLS  AND  SUPPORTS 
COUNTRY  :  FRANCE 
COAL-FIElD  :  NORD/PAS-DE-CALAIS 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
1568 
33 
13 
20 
248 
204 
44 
756 
Production  faces 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
471 
25 
15 
10 
107 
83 
24 
241 
>56 
days 
(3) 
165 
11 
37 
34 
60 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
2211 
71 
37 
34 
392 
321 
71 
1059 
(absolute  figures) 
Headings  excluding 
shafts  and  staple-pits 
2 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
>56 
days 
(3) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
542  179  52  774 
89  56  23  168 
14  12  26 
75  44  23  142 
281  131  i  35  447 
223  91  27  341 
58  40  106 
337  117  27  481 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
23 
23 
33 
30 
Shafts  and  staple-pits 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
10 
10 
23 
18 
). 56 
days 
(3) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
I  -
total 
39 
39 
63 
49 
14 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
226 
142 
10 
132 
379 
297 
82 
YEAR:  1971 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1):  64  242  008 
Other places 
4 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
>56 
days 
(3) 
Fatal 
acci- total 
dents 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
69  12  308  2341 
93  37  279  287 
24  37 
86  31  255  250 
164  64  608  941 
118  47  463  754 
46  17  145  187 
Total  of 
accidents  underground 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
720 
184 
34 
150 
425 
310 
115 
)56 
days 
(3) 
231 
77 
14 
63 
139 
109 
30 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
3301 
557 
87 
470 
1510 
1174 
336 
14  276  116  23  - 415  1375  479  113  2  1969 
56  m· 
Group 
accidents  (2) 
6 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
TOTAL 
f----------------------+---+---+--~--~---+--+---+---r-~--~---+--~---+---
1 
---1------f--------- --~  -~----1---- ------+-----+------ -----f-
a)  Machines  52  27  89  49  18  10  77  23  12  42  124  59  28  211 
~--+--+---+--+---~-+---+--+--~--+--~--t---+---+---4----4---r--4----~--~----r--+---4---~-4--~---~--J 
I
I!  219  84  10  I  - I  313  146 I  47  8  I  - i  201  4  1  - - 5  107 
10  I 
b)  Tools  36  145  476  168  20  664 
---+---+----~-~---4--~--t---~-~--~-~r--,_---~----t--------~~-~-~~--+---+---~--+-~--~-~--~---4-~ 
485  13o  40  I  2  657  142  52  9  - zo3  2  2  2  - 6  146  c)  Supports 
V.  FALLS  OF  OBJECTS 
VI.  EXPLOSIVES 
~;~I-.-~GNITIONS  OR  EXPLOSIONS  j 
I 
OF  FIREDAMP  AND  COAL  DUST  i 
VIII.  OUTBURSTS  OF  GAS,  DE-OXYGENATION ,I 
SUFFOCATION  OR  POISONING  BY  NATU~~ 
a)  Outbursts  of Gas 
960  420  107  1487  535  195  61  792  24  15  47  I 
I 
I 
I 
68 
574  280 
14  228  77 5  252  65  1094 
75  932  2093  910  251  3258 
r 
~~A~ASES (COz,  CH4,  CO,  HzS),  I 
~--~---+----~--4---~~~----+---~---+----~--+---~----~--+----+----~--4---~---+----+---4----+---+----+-
b)  De-oxygenation  and  Poisoning 
by  natural  Gases  ~---+----+----+----+-----~--+----+----+---~----+---~----~---+----+----4----4---~----4----+----4----+----4---~----+---~----~--~---~ 
IX.  HEAriNGS  OR  FIRES 
~-------------------------4----+--~----~--+----+---+--~----~--+---~--~---+----+---+---~---4----~--+---+---~---+----~--~--+---4---~---+--~ 
X.  INRUSHES 
XI.  ELECTRICITY 
XI I.  OTHER  CAUSES  176  18  201  114  17  10  141  13  21  88  27  l  118  391  69  21  481 
TOTAL  3747  1283  387  11  5428  1901  695  208  2806  107  61  23  195  1697  751  214  12  2674  7452  2790  832  29  11103 
# 
(1)  Nwnbe-r  of hou-rs  worked by  pit staff and enpZoyees of oontrocto-r  fH>rrlB  who  beZong  to  a  mine-rs'  soaiaZ  insurance  scheme. 
(2)  Accidents  invoZving moi'e  than  five  casuaZties  (i.e.  who  either died or weN  unabZe  to -reswne  work  unde-rground  for at  Zeast  eight weeks). 
(3)  Cal-ender  oo~>u~,s~·--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------__j 
H MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common  Statistics  on  victims 
of accidents  wderground  in  coal mines 
SITE  OF  THE  ACCIDENT 
~ 
c 
I. FALLS  OF  GROUNDS  AND  ROCKS 
I I.  TRANSPORT,  TOTAL 
a)  Continuous  Transport 
b)  Discontinuous  Transport 
III.  FALLS  AND  MOVEMENT  OF  THE  VICTIM, 
TOTAL 
a)  while  moving  about  the  mine 
b)  in  the  course  of other activities 
IV.  MACHINES,  TOOLS  AND  SUPPORTS 
TOTAL 
I  a)  Machines 
COUNTRY  :  FRANCE 
COAL-FIElD  :  NORD  I  PAS-DE-CALAIS 
Production  faces 
1 
4  to  21  to  Fatal 
20  56  >56  acci- total 
days  days  days  dents 
(3)  (3)  (3) 
24,408  7,332  2,568  0,109  34,417 
0,514  0,389  0,171  0,031  1,105 
0,202  0,233  0,125  0,016  0,576 
0,312  0,156  0,046  0,015  0,529 
3,860  1,666  0,576  - 6,102 
3,176  1,292  0,529  - 4,997 
0,684  0,374  0,047  - 1,105 
11,768  3,752  0,934  0,031  16,485 
0,809  0,420  0,156  - 1,385 
b)  Tools  I  3,409  1,308  0,156  - 4,873 
c)  Supports  7,550  2,024  0,622  0,031  10,227 
v.  FALLS  OF  OBJECTS  14,943  6,538  1,666  - 23,147 
VI.  EXPLOSIVES 
i 
.  VII.  IGNITIONS  OR  EXPLOSIONS 
t  "  "~""" ""' "'" '"" 
0,016  - - - 0,016 
VIII.  OUTBURSTS  OF  GAS,  DE-OXYGENATION, 
SUFFOCATION  OR  POISONING  BY  NATU-
RAL  GASES  (C02,  CH4,  CO,  H2S),  0,016  - - - 0,016 
TOTAL 
a)  Outbursts of Gas 
b)  De-oxygenation  and  Poisoning  0,016  - - - 0,016 
by  natural Gases 
I  IX.  HEAriNGS  OR  FIRES 
I 
~ ' 
INRUSHES  0,016  0,015  - - 0,031 
XI.  ELECTRICITY  0,047  - - - 0,047 
XII.  OTHER  CAUSES  2,740  0,280  0,109  - 3,129 
TOTAL  58,328  1~972  6,024  0,171  84,495 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  ACCIDENT  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  CAUSE  ANfl  SITE 
OF  ACCIDENT  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(frequency rates) 
Headings  excluding 
shafts  and  staple-pits  Shafts  and  staple-pits 
2  3 
4  to  21  to  Fatal  4  to  21  to  Fatal  4  to 
20  56  )56  acci- total  20  56  >s6  acci- total  20 
days  days  days  dents  days  days  days  dents  days 
(3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (J)  (3) 
8,437  2,786  0,809 0,016  12,048  0,078  0,016  0,031  - 0,125  3,518 
1,385  0,872  0,358  - 2,615  0,358  0,156  0,093  - 0,607  2,210 
0,218  0,187  - - 0,405  - - - - - 0,156 
1,167  0,685  0,358  - 2,210 0,358  0,156  0,093  - 0,607  2,054 
4,374  2,039  0,545  - 6,958  0,514  0,358  0,047  0,062  0,981  5  899 
3,471  1,417  0,420  - 5,308  0,467  0,280  0,016  - 0,763  4,623 
0,903  0,622  0,125  - 1,650 0,047  0,078  0,031  0,062  0,218  1,276 
5,246  1,821  0,420  - 7,487  0,093  0,078  0,047  - 0,218  4,296 
---
0,763  0,280  0,156  - 1,199  - 0,031  0,015  - o,046  I  o,358 
2,273  0,7321  0,124  - 3,129  0,062  0,016  - - 0,078  1,665 
2,210  0,809  0,140  - 3,159  0,031  0,031  0,032  - 0,094  2,273 
8,328  3,035  0,949 0,016  12,328  0,374  0,233  0,125  - 0,732  8,935 
0,015  - - - 0,015 
0,124 
0,124 
0,015  - - - 0,015  0,047 
0,016  - - - 0,016  0,047  - - - 0,047  0,015 
1.775  0,265  0,155  - 2,195  0,202  0,109  0,016  - 0,327  1,369 
2~591 10,818  3,236  0,032  43,677  1,666  0,950  0,359  0,062  3,037  26,413 
(1)  Nwrber of hours worked by pit staff and errpZoyees  of aontroctor firms  who  belong to  a  rrrinere'  soeiaZ  insurance  scheme. 
(2)  Accidents  invoZving more  than  five  COBuaZties  (i.e.  who  either died or were  unabZe  to reswne work  underground for at  least eight weeks). 
( 3)  Caumder days. 
YEAR  :  1971 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1):  64  242  008 
Other places 
4 
21  to  Fatal  4  to 
56  >56  acci- total  20 
days  days  dents  days 
(3)  (3)  (3) 
1,074  0,186 0,016  4,794  ~6,441 
1,448  0,576 0,109  4,343  4,467 
0,109  0,093 0,016  0,374  0,576 
1,339  0,483 0,093  3,969  3,891 
2  553  0  996  0  016  9  464  4  647 
1,836  0,732  0,016  7,207  1,737 
0,717  0,264  - 2,257  2,910 
1,806  0,358  - 6,460 21,403 
~- ------
0,188  0,109  - 0,655  1,930 
0,560  0,031  - 2,256  7,409 
1,058  0,218  - 3,549  2,064 
4,359  1,167  0,046  14,507  32,580 
-
0,031 
- - 0,124  0,140 
- - - 0,124  0,140 
-
0,016  - - 0,063  0,078 
0,016  - - 0,031  0,125 
0,420  0,047  - 1,836  6,086 
11,692  3,330  0,187  41,622  11~998 
Table  lb 
Total of  Group 
accidents  underground  accidents  (2) 
5  6 
21  to  Fatal  56  Fatal 
56  )56  acci- total  ?W 
acci- total 
days  days  dents  dents 
(3)  (3) 
11,208  3,594  0,141  51,38~ 
2,865  1,198  0,140  8,67( 
0,529 0,218  0,032  1,35~ 
2,336  0,980  0,108  7 ,31~ 
6  616  2  164  0  078  235m 
4,825  1,697  0,016  18,275 
I 
1,  791  0,467  0,062  5,23( 
7,457  1,759  0,031  30,65( 
---- --- -~  !---- ----
0,919 0,436  - 3,28 
2,616 0,311  - 10,33  --r-
3,922 1,012  0,031  17,02  i 
14,165  3,907  0,062  50,71  I 
: 
- - - - i 
- - - 0,03 
- - - 0,14 
- - - 0,14< 
- - - -
0,031  - - 0,10 
0,016  - - 0,14 
1,074 0,327  - 7,48 
43,432  1~49  0,452  72Jl31  . 
: 
H 
N 
N MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common  Statistics  on  victims 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  Of  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  LOCATION 
AND  NATURE  OF  INJURY  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
of  accidents  Wldergrowtd  in  coal  mines  (absolute  figures) 
COUNTRY  :  FRANCE 
COAL-FIELD :  N<llll/PAS-DE-CALAIS 
Amputations  Fractures  Luxations,  Concussion 
and  with  or  without  twists  and  and  inter-
NATURE  OF  THE  INJURY 
enucleations  dis location  sprains  nal injury 
PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
Fatal  >  56  1  Fatal I 
days  iacci- total  days  acci- total  days  acci- total  days  acci- total 
(5}  dents I  (5}  dents  (5}  dents  (5}  dents 
Fatal  Fatal  >  56  >  56  >  56 
LOCATION  OF  THE  INJURY 
I.  Head  and  neck 
Open  wounds 
contusions 
and  muscular 
abrasions 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Fatal I 
acci- I total 
dents 
Burns  and 
harmful effects 
of electricity 
and  radiation 
>  56 
days 
(5} 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
YEAR:  1971 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1)  :  64  242  008 
Poisoning 
and 
suffocation 
>  56 
days 
(5} 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
Multiple  injuries 
of  those not 
specified  (2} 
8 
>  56 
days 
(5} 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
4  to 
20 
days 
(5} 
510 
Table  2a 
TOTAL 
21  to 
56 
days 
(5) 
93 
>  56  Fatal 
days  acci- total 
(5}  dents 
26  5  634 
I  rr  .,..~- _
1  ~-i  -l(~~---'1'---t>(--+---+--+------t------t--
10 
-+--
1
-+--
0 
I 
1
---t------:-t-----{- ~~~~  :  ~~-----------ik--~--:l--- ~--Jc------- 15 2  ---t----+------+2  -----+--529--+-----+15  13-- ______  : 
1  rrL ,_,  -
1 
- !  - I "  '  I "  1  rr  i - rr  4  I '  w  "  -
1 
"  I - V\V\V\  '  "  '"  m  I  "  u  "" 
I  !  I  )<1Xl)<J  I  1  I  - !  1  V(~V(  10  - 10  --+---+-----t---
1 
IV.  Upper  limbs  1  - 'i  1  !I  56  - II  56  5  I  - 5  I  1,
1 
1'  34  - 34  I'  987  196  107  - 1290 
(excluding  the  hands) 
(3}  +--f---- f------
12681  262  1  4119 
I  - ~~- - [X---1rc---t><_____,~[X----23-- f----- ----+------+-----f---------- ---
l 
VI.  Lower  llmbs  I  1  - I  1  1101  - 101  29  - 29  80  I  - 80  !  - 23  1127  500  234  - 1861 
(excluding  feet)  (4}  i  I  i 
i  I 
- I  ,  ,  - , 
4 
- --
4  --f-X---1[X~---~N:~~~l 6~,  --~- 1- 6 ~~-~--~-~---~[X-~-----r-t><:~[X~~,-_--~---=~-=~  :609~3=05  -~7~2  _--~--+--f----~98E 
VII.  Feet 
VIII.  Multiple  locations  12  15  ,  ,  !  - ,  - - - t><V([XI .,  , , 
IX.  Not  specified 
TOTAL  40  40  412  421  50  so  10  252 
(l!  Nwrber  of houl'B  worked  by  pit staff and empLoyees  of contractor  j'irme  who  belong to a  miner's sociaZ insurance  scheme. 
(2}  including compUoations. 
( J)  The  shou Zdel'B  and  the w:rists  al'll  inoZuded undsr  "upper  tirri:Js ". 
(4)  The  hips  and  the  ani<Zes  are included undsr  "Lower  Zirri:Js". 
(5)  Cal.endsr  da.Jis. 
254  71  10  d1 
27~  90  37  10  41E 
7452  2790  832  29  11103 
H MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common  Statistics on  victims 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  LOCATION 
AND  NATURE  OF  INJURY  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
of  accidents  underground in  coal  mines  (Frequency rates) 
NATURE  OF  THE  INJURY 
PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
LOCATION  OF  THE  INJURY 
I.  Head  and  neck 
I 
I 
r  ----
'  i 
! 
III. 
VIII.  Multiple  locations 
IX.  Not  specified 
COUNTRY  :  FRANCE 
COAL-FIELD  :  NORD/PAS-DE-CALAIS 
Amputations  Fractures  Luxations,  Concussion  Open  wounds  Burns  and 
contusions  harmful  effects 
and  with  or without  twists  and  and  inter- and muscular  of electricity 
abrasions  and  radiation 
enucleation&  dis location  sprains  nal  injury 
l  2  3  4  5  6 
>  56  Fatal  >  56  Fatal  >  56  Fatal  >  56  Fatal  >  56  >  56  I Fatal I 
days  lacci-' total  days  acci- total  days  acci- total  days  acci- total  days  acci- total  days 
(5)  dents I  (5)  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  dents  (5) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
i 
!-
[\XXXXXXXXXX~XXX 
Table  2b 
YEAR:  1971 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1):  64  242  008 
Poisoning 
and 
suffocation 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
Multiple  injuries 
of  those not 
specified  (2) 
8 
>  56  Fatal 
days  acci-
(5)  dents 
total 
4  to 
20 
days 
{5) 
TOTAL 
21  to 
56 
days 
(5) 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
0,046  7,939  1,446  0,404 0,076 
0,156115,364  3,051  1,665  -
- ~.J,~,: "·"' '·"' "'" 
- 0,031  0,031  - 0,01  - 0,031 
total 
0,869 
20,080 
64,117 
6,476 
0,047 
TOTAL  0,623  - 0,623  6,414  0,140  6,554  0,777  0,777  0,062  0,093  0,155  3,922  0,032  3,954  0,046  0,046  - 0,031  0,031  1,105  0,156  1,261  15,99f  43,432  12,949  0,452  172,83 
(1)  NwrU:!ero  of hour-s  worked by  pit staff and employees of controctor firms  who  betong  to  a  miner's sociat insurance  Boheme. 
(2)  including compLications. 
( J)  The  shoulders  and  the wrists  are  inctuded under  "upper  tirrbs ". 
(4)  The  hips  and the  anktes  are included under  "Lower- timbs". 
(5)  Catendero  days. 
H MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Coum>on  Statistics  on  victims 
of  accidents  underground  in  coal mines 
SITE  OF  THE  ACCIDENT 
I. FALLS  OF  GROUNDS  AND  ROCKS 
II.  TRANSPORT,  TOTAL 
a)  Continuous  Transport 
b)  Discontinuous  Transport 
COUNTRY:  FRANCE 
COAL-FIELD  :  LORRAINE 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
349 
39 
i  23 
16 
Production  faces 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
293 
34 
26 
>56 
days 
(3) 
103 
29 
20 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
747 
102 
69 
33 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  ACCIDENT  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  CAUSE  AND  SITE 
OF  ACCIDENT  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(absolute  figures) 
Headings  excluding 
shafts  and  staple-pits 
2 
4  to  121  to 
20  '  56 
days  days 
)  56 
days 
(3) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
(3)  (3) 
81  67  20  168 
15 
11 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
Shafts  and  staple-pits 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
>56 
days 
(3) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
19 
19 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
22 
18 
II  I.  FALLS  AND  MOVEMENT  OF  THE  VICTIM'  I  ' 
TOTAL  445  I  374  84  1  904  79  I  81  I  16  178  12  25  182 
154  10  21  158 
Table  la 
YEAR:  1971 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1):  24  173  728 
Other places 
4 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
42 
11 
31 
172 
148 
)  56 
days 
(3) 
23 
14 
68 
54 
Fatal 
acci- total 
dents 
12 
88 
24 
64 
422 
360 
Total of 
accidents  underground 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
438  363 
74  87 
28  38 
46  49 
713  639 
)56 
days 
(3) 
124 
62 
31 
31 
174 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
928 
224 
97 
127 
1529 
56 
?W 
Group 
accidents  (2) 
6 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
622  563  ~hi  le  moving  about  the  mine  391  332  72  - 795  68  I  73  I  13 
I
I  b)  in  the  course  of other act  i vi tiesl----54-+--4-2-+--12-+-1-+--1-09-+-1-1-+  jl_s_+--3-+-2-t---2-4-+-2  -t---2  -+-----+----+--4·--+'-2-4  ----1-2-4-1--1-4--ll-__  - -+-6-2  -+---91-+-7-6--+-2-9----t--3--t---19-9----t---+-----+-
1 _l 
I  IV'  ~;~~NES, TOOLS  AND  SUPPORTS  195  93  33  !  - 321  51  115  7  - 73  2  - 1  - 3  41  23  4  1  69  289  131  45  1  466  -~ 
1330  145 
I --- --
16
1  - --c-- -- - --+-------- ---- ----- - --- i  I 
j  a)  Machines  ~  24  69  13  5  5  - i  23  1  - - - 1  8  5  1  1  15  51  34  22  1  108 
1
/_  ----r-~ 
I 
b)  Tools  ,  155  56  15  1.  - 226  34  110  1  2  I  - !  46  I  1  - 1  - 2  33  13  3  - 49  223  79  21  - 323  [I 
11  j 
!---~--,_  --r--~-----+--+--4-----+~--t'--+---+--+---------- ---~----1---r---l--+----1---+----l--+----+--t----+--~-~ 
~
:; ,, '"'"'"  '  "  "  ,  !  - I "  ,  - - - ,  - - - - - - ,  - - ,  "  "  ,  - "  }  -~ 
FALLS  OF  OBJECTS  255  195  68  1  519  34  36  6  - 76  3  2  1  - 6  72  69  31  - 172  364  302  106  1  773  I  ! _J 
I.  EXPLOSIVES  - - i  - - I  - - - - - - - - - - - !  - - - 1  1  - - - l  1  ji  I  v;;-I~~~~o~;~~~~~---r---r-----+--+--~--4---~--t--~---lr---r---lr--~~r---+--t----+l,--+---1--+ 
~  OF  FIREDA."1P  AND  COAL  DUST  I 
VIII.  OUTBURSTS  OF  GAS,  DE-OXYGENATION,  I  ~~ 
I 
SUFFOCATION  OR  POISONING  BY  NATU- I 
I 
RAL  GASES  (C02,  CH4,  CO,  H2S), 
1
1 
TOTAL 
a)  Outbursts  of Gas 
~ 
r-----r--
b)  De-oxygenation  and  Poisoning 
by  natural  Gases 
IX,  HEAriNGS  OR  FIRES  1  1 
I  X.  INRUSHES 
I  XI.  ELECTRICITY 
9  1  10 
I  '''· =~~  ''"'~ES~---------------1-3_~_
6 
___  l_oo_
1
:  ____  3_1:  ____  ~  ____  2_6_:_: __  2_5_: ___  2~_
2 
_____  :_4 ____  :  _____  51_:  ___  2_: ____  2_: ____  1_: ______  ~  ____  5_: ___  3_:_: ___  3_1_: ____  13_: _____  ~  ____  7:_:  ____  19_:_: __  1_54_
1
: ____  5_1:  ____  1_: ___  3_9_::  ______________  ~  (1)  NW'lber  of hours  worked by pit staff and errpLoyees  of contn:wtor  firms  who  beLong to  a  rmn-ers;J',----s;;-;o;-;;m~·a;;,z-,_;;;·n;-;;s~uran;;:;;;:;-ce-;;;;--~sah;;;;-;;eme;;;;;-.L---___J_ __  _L_  _  ____t_ ____  __l__  _  ____l __  _.~__.  _  ___J_ __  _.~__.  _  ___L __  __L_ _  ___L __  _L_  _  ___L __  L__  _  ___!__~ 
(2)  Accidents  involving more  than  five  casuaLties  (i.e.  who  either died or were  unabLe  to resume  work  underground for at  least eight weeks). 
( 3)  Ccllender  days. 
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Common  Statistics  on  victims 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  ACCIDENT  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  CAUSE  AND  SITE 
OF  ACCIDENT  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
of  accidents  underground  in  coal  mines  (frequency  rates) 
COUNTRY  :  FRANCE 
...........  --l-f ~ 
COAL-FlEW  :  LORRAINE 
SITE  OF  THE  ACCIDENT  Production  faces 
Headings  excluding 
shafts  and  staple-pits  Shafts  and  staple-pits 
1  2  3 
........ ~ 
4  to  21  to I  Fatal  -
4  to  21  to  Fatal 
t:":i 
4  to  21  to  Fatal  4  to 
20  56  >56  acci- total  20  56  >56  acci- 20  56  ). )1,  acci- total  20 
days  days  days  dents  days  days  days  dents  days  days  days  dents  days  c 
(3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (~)  (3) 
I.  FALLS  OF  GROUNDS  AND  ROCKS  14,437  12,120  4,261  0,083  30,901  3,351  2,772  0,827  - 6,950  0,041  - - - 0,041  0,290 
I I.  TRA.'ISPORT,  TOTAL  1,613  1,407  1,199  - 4,219  0,290 0,124  0,207  - 0,621  0,248  0,331  0,207  - 0,786  0,910 
a)  Continuous  Transport  0,951  1,076  0,827  - 2,854  0,041  0,042  0,083  - 0,166  - - - I  - - 0,166 
b)  Discontinuous  Transport  0,662  0,331  0,372  - 1,365 0,249  0,082  0,124  - 0,455  0,248  0,331  0,207  - 0,786  '0,744 
II  I.  FALLS  AND  MOVEMENT  OF  THE  VICTIM, 
18,408  15,471  3,475  0,042  37,396 3,268  3,350  0,662  0,083  7,363  0,290  0,496  0,248  - 1,034  7,529  TOTAL 
~----------
a)  while  moving  about  the  mine  16,174  3,735  2,978  - 32,887  2,813  3,019  0,538  - 6,370  0,207  0,414  0,248  - 0,869  6,536 
b)  in  the  course  of other  activities  2,234  1,736  0,497  0,042  4,509  0,455  0,331  0,124  0,083  0,993  0,083  0,082  - - 0,165  10,993 
IV.  MACHINES,  TOOLS  AND  SUPPORTS 
TOTAL  8,067  3,847  1,365  - 13,279  2,110 0,620  0,290  - 3,020  0,082  - 0,042  - 0,124  1,696 
I  - --
I  a)  Machines  1,200  0,992  0,662  - 2,854 0,53810,207  i  0,207  0,952  0,041  - - - 0,041  0,331  I  -
: 
0,413  I  0,0831  i  0,042 
b)  Tools 
1  6,412  2,317  0,620  - 9,34911,407  - 1,903  0,041  - - 0,083  1,365 
c)  Supports  0,455  0,538  0,083  - 1,076 0,465  - - - 0,165  - - - - - -
v.  FALLS  OF  OBJECTS  10,549  8,067  2,813  0,041  21,470 1,406  1,490  0,248  - 3,144  0,124  0,08310,041  - 0,248  2,978 
i 
VI.  EXPLOSIVES  - - - - I  - - - - - - - - - - - I  -
I  VII.  IGNITIONS  OR  EXPLOSIONS  I  I 
~  "  ,~,<~  ~' '~' '""  j  I 
VIII.  OUTBURSTS  OF  GAS,  DE-OXYGENATION,: 
I  SUFFOCATION  OR  POISONING  BY  NATU-, 
I 
RAL  GASES  (C02,  CH4,  CO,  H2S),  i  TOTAL 
a)  Outbursts  of  Gas  I 
i  I 
i 
I 
b)  De-oxygenat1on  and  Poisoning  ! 
by  natural  Gases  I 
IX.  HEAriNGS  OR  FIRES  0,041  0,042  - - 0,083  0,331 
1---
X.  INRUSHES 
XI.  ELECTRICITY 
XII.  OTHER  CAUSES  0,662  0,496  0,083  - 1,241  0,207  0,082  - - 0,289  0,083  0,041  0,041  - 0,165  0,496 
TOTAL  53'  777  41(+50  13,196  0,166  108,589  10,632  8,438  2,234  0,083  21,387  0,868  0,951  0,579  - 2,398  4,230 
(1)  Nwnber  of hours wo1•ked  by pit staff and errpZoyees  of cumtroctor  f~l'TTIS  who  beZong to  a  miners 1  sociaZ  insUl'Clnce  scheme. 
(2)  Accidents  invoZving more  than  five  "asuaZties  (i.e.  who  either died or were  unabZe  to resume work  underground for at  l-east  eight weeks). 
(3)  Cal-ender  days. 
Table  lb 
YEAR:  1971 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1):  24  173  728 
Total  of  Group 
Other  places  accidents  underground  accidents  (2) 
4  5  6. 
21  to  Fatal  4  to  21  to  Fatal  56  Fatal 
56  )  56  acci- total  20  56  )56  acci- total  1W 
acci- total 
days  days  dents  days  days  days  dents  dents 
(3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3) 
0,123  0,041  0,042  0,496  8,119  15,015 5,129  0,125  38,38S 
1,738  0,951  0,041  3,640  3,061  3,600 2,564  0,041  9,26 
0,454  0,372  - 0,992  1,158  1,572  1,282  - 4,01  I 
1,284  0,579  0,041  2,648  1,903  2,028  1,282  0,041  5,25 
I 
7,115  2,813  - 17,457  9,495  26,432  7,198  0,125  63,25 
···~ 
6,122  2,234  - 14,892  ~5,  730  23,290  5,998  - 55,011 
2,565  3,765  3,142  1,200  0,125  8,23 
I 
0,993  0,579  -
0,951  0,166 0,041  2,854  1,955  5,418  1,863  0,041  19,27 
j 
----t----------t----t---- ·---j----- ---t----t-
0,207  0,042  0,041  0,621  2,110  1,406  0,911  0,041  4,461 
13,36! 
I 
0,537  0,124  - 2,026  9,225  3,267  0,869  - I 
0,207  - - 0,207  0,620  0,745  0,083  - 1,441 
2·,855  1,282  - 7,115  15,057  12,495  4,384  0,041  31,97 
- - 0,041  0,041  - - - 0,041  0,04  I 
I  i 
I 
! 
0,331  0,372  0,042  0,41 
0,125  0,124  - 0,745  1,448  0,744 0,248  - 2,440 
12,907  5,377  0,165  32,679  79,507  63,746  21,386  0,414  65p53  . MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Couunon  Statistics  on  victims 
of  accidents  underground  in  coal  mines 
NATURE  OF  THE  INJURY 
PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
LOCATION  OF  THE  INJURY 
I  ~  L  '••• ••• ooo• 
~  n. ,,., 
Amputations 
and 
enucleations 
>  56  !!  Fat~ll 
days 
1  ace~- 1 total 
(5)  i dents  ~ 
I 
i 
r 
~  --~--- ------------+----
I 
I 
!----
III. Trunk 
IV.  Upper  limbs 
(excluding  the  hands) 
(.3) 
VIII.  Multiple 
IX.  Not  specified 
TOTAL  19  20 
COUNTRY  :  France 
COAL-FIELD:  Lorraine 
Fractures  Luxations, 
with  or without  twists  anrl 
>  56 
days 
(5} 
257 
dis location 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
263 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
44 
sprains 
Fatal 
acci- total 
dents 
44 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  LOCATION 
AND  NATURE  OF  INJURY  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
(absolute  figures) 
Concussion 
and  inter-
nal injury 
Open  wounds 
contusions 
and  muscular 
abrasions 
Fatal I  1  >  561 Fat~l I 
acci-,  total  days 
1 
acc>-1  total 
dents  (5)  dents 
164  164 
Burns  and 
harmful  effects 
of electricity 
and  radiation 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
(1)  Number  of hours  worked by pit staff and empLoyees  of contractor firms  who  beLong to a  miner's  soaiaL  insurance  scheme. 
(2)  inC!Luding  compHC!ations. 
(3)  The  shouLders  and  the wrists  are  incLuded under  "upper  Limbs". 
(4)  The  hips  and  the  ankLes  are  incLuded under  "Lower  Limbs". 
(5)  CaLender  days. 
Table  2a 
YEAR:  1971 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1)  24  173  728 
Poisoning 
and 
suffocation 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
Multiple  injuries 
of  those not 
specified  (2) 
>  56  Fatal 
days  acci-
(5)  dents 
31 
total 
34 
TOTAL 
4  to 
20 
days 
(5) 
203 
192 
71 
22 
21  to 
56 
days 
(5) 
133 
44 
73 
11 
1922  1541 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
33 
30 
517 
Fatal 
acci- total 
dents 
375 
242 
177 
33 
10  3990 
H 
N  ..._, MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common  Statistics on  victims 
of  accidents  underground  in  coal  mines 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  LOCATION 
AND  NATURE  OF  INJURY  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(Frequency  rates) 
Table  2b 
YEAR  :  1971  COUNTRY  :  FRANCE 
COAL-FIELD  :  LORRAINE  MAN-HOURS  WORICED  (1):  24  173  728 
NATURE  OF  THE  INJURY 
PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
LOCATION  OF  THE  INJURY 
I. Head  and  neck 
Amputations 
and 
enucleations 
i 
Fractures  Luxations • 
with  or without  twists  and 
dis location  sprains 
Concussion 
and  inter-
nal injury 
Open  wounds 
contusions 
and muscular 
abrasions 
Burns  and 
harmful effects 
of electricity 
and  radiation 
Poisoning 
and 
suffocation 
>  56  I  Fatal  >  56  Fatal  I >  56  Fatal I  >  56  I Fatal I  >  56  Fatal  >  56  Fatal 
days  acci- total  days  acci- total  days  acci- total  days  acci- total  days  acci- total  total 
(5)  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  dents 
_  _  1  _  0,290  0,166  0,456  _  _  _  0,083  _  0,083  0,952  _  0,952  _  _ 
Multiple  injuries 
of  those  not 
specified  (2) 
TOTAL 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Fatal 
acci-1 total 
dents 
n .•  ,..  J. L  - .... ,  .... ,  ~  .. ,  .. '·'"  ~··'~F:t r·n 
"'·  '•~•  I  i  -~  - :  - o,,.o I  o,,.o  o,o" I •·'" n,,oo "·"' L"' I  •·"'' I"·"' 
,:-:::.  ,;~,  __ -~j-.  i  I  I  I  -+ - -I ---1  . - -+---
18,822  ~~~:ludln-g~~~ands)~  0~04~ ~~--T-0~04~0,952  - j_:~9:+  0~207 ~  ~TI  0~07'  - 0,455  j  - - _  _  6,205,  1,82~t:-- _ 
I  I  I  "l•  I  I  J  ,  .. :_ __ _r·  ··"i '·"' - I :,  •. ,]~  :  0,207  _  _ __  :·372 17,043 18,2L _  4~.897 
'  i  ' 
I  VI.  Lower  llmbs  !  I  I 
I 
(excluding  feet)  (4)  10,041  0,041  2,316  - 2,316  0,745  - 1  - 1- I 0,497 ll2,534ll0,631 I 5,2121  - l28,3n 
I  I  ' 
L.----
1  on. ,,.,  0,,,!  0,,,. '·"'  _  '·"'  '·"''  - o,m  I  - · 
VIII.  Multiple  locations  o,041 1  o,04ll o,331  1 o,o83l  o,414l  o,l24 •  - 0,124•  -
IX,  Not  specified 
TOTAL  o,786  1 o,04ll  o,827llo,63ll o,249l  10,a8o1  1,82o •  - 1,8201  0,083•  - 0,083  16,784 
(lJ  Nwnbel'  of haul's  wol'ked by pit staff and empLoyees  of contl'actol' firms  who  beZong  to  a  minel''s  sociaZ insUl'ance  scheme. 
(2)  including complications. 
(3)  The  shouZdel'S  and  the wl'ists  al'e  included undel'  "uppel'  limbs". 
(4)  The  hips  and the  ankZes  al'e  included undel'  "Lowel'  limbs". 
(5)  Cawndel'  days. 
- 0,  7861  - -
6, 784 
0,041 i 7,4461  5,8741  2,109'  - 15,429 
2,9371  3,o2o 1 1,2411 o,l24l  7,322 
0,9101  0,455'  - 1,365 
1,28210,1241  1,406l79,507l63,746l21,386l  0,414ll65p53 
H 
N 
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COMMISSION 
Common  Statistics  on  victims 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  ACCIDENT  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  CAUSE  AND  SITE 
OF  ACCIDENT  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY  Table  la 
of  accidents  underground  in  coal mines  (absolute  figures) 
SITE  OF  THE  ACCIDENT 
I.  FALLS  OF  GROUNDS  AND  ROCKS 
COUNTRY:  FRANCE 
COAL-FIELD:  CENTRE-MIDI 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
151 
Production  faces 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
92 
>56 
days 
(3) 
38 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
282 
Headings  excluding 
shafts  and  staple-pits 
2 
4  to  121  to 
20  56  >56 
days 
(3) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
days  days 
(3)  (3) 
65  55  1  9  129 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
Shafts  and staple-pits 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
>56 
days 
(3) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
51 
YEAR:  1971 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1):  22  845  488 
Other  places 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
45 
>56 
days 
(3) 
12 
Fatal 
acci- total 
dents 
108 
Total of 
accidents  underground 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
)56 
days 
(3) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
268  192  59  520 
56 
1W 
Group 
accidents  (2) 
6 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
I II.  TR&~SPORT,  TOTAL  -------------+---26  __  +-_2_4-+  __  2_3-+'-----+-_7_3  __  ~_4-+---7-+  __  3  __  +-_1  __  ~_1_5-+  __  2  __  +-s---r--3--+-----+-_13  __  4-_66  __  4-_6_4  __  ~_5o~~l--4--r_sr~  ___  9s~_r_o_3_,  __  7_9-+  __  2  __  4-_2_B_2+----+----+---~ 
I  a)  Cont~nuous Transport 
1  20 
I 
b)  fusc=twoo~ hans~tt~  il----6~~:~~~6~:~~~~4~:~~-~~:~~~16~~:~~1-+-t-----~~--2---~~--1==:===8=:==2==:=-~8~~~~~3~~~-~~-~~~--~_3_--~-_:_o~--~~--_:~~~ 
18  19  57  16  59  49  38  36  17  26 
122  49  65  43  159 
II  I.  FALLS  AND  ~OVE~NT OF  THE  VICTIM.  !  I  I  •  I 
TOTAL  i  62  42  1  16  - 120  33  1  23  i  14  - 10  9  3  2  - 14  234  172  63 -+----+---4_69-+  __  3_3_s-+_24_o  ___  l--9_5--+------1---67_3+------+----+----
--:-~h~l:-:vtng about  the  mine  l  39  30  I  12  - 81  251  10  :  11  -
1  46  6  1  2  - 9  151  107  39  - 297  221  I  148  64  - 433 
b)  tn  the  course  of  other  acti  vi  tiesl-~--23_-_-l-l------l-2~:~~~4~:~~-~~~~~~3-9_-_++----~8---l+----1~3~~~~3--~:~~-~~:~~-2-4~:~~-3-----t+----2~~:~~--:_-:_-_--_-_-l:_-_-5_-_-:l_  ~8-~----+-----~-5--+-f-----~-4---~-- ~-~  --~~-2- -+--3-1-+--------+---2-4--0+----1--~+-= 
_To~~~  -------+--16_5  __  +-_11_3-+--4-7  I  - 325  1  53  43  12  -
1 
108  j  5  2  - - 7  _
1
17_1- --~48  47  - _  3_6~ _394  ___  306  106_  __- 806__  (  I 
IV.  MACHI~ES.  TOOLS  AND  SUPPORTS  'I  I  t  I 
a)  Machine~---------- .  11  9  8  !  - \
1
1 
28 1  5  ~~I  7  2  - I  14  1  - - - l  ii  18  13  13  - 44  35  29  23  - ~  I  I 
I  ~h~  ~,--"--+--2-7~~---8
4 ~-----
4
; __  8_1  __  ~~--n~l--r-9~i--3--+l--~--~~~~~4~3~::~_-2:~~~-l==:l'=~--~--~~  :-~~::-~~~~a ~~ •  i  I 
I  c)  Supports  ~-08·----+---77--4----3-1  ~;--~~~-~  17  7  - 51  2  1  ~-- ---- --:  1~0- -~:- 20  - ~:-- 197  168  58  I  -i  423 I  J 
I \v'I  ..  ~A~~o~~usJ~l-s  -------------~~- 11-88·1---_  -1;_- -_1_2_4~:~~-4-5~:~~-~~:~~~3~50~~:~~7-7_  --++  -_  --4~3~:~-2-6~~:~~-~~:~-1-4~6~:~~~14~~:~~8~~: 
1
i  ~~----_-I:_-_--_-_  ++-_22  126~- _2_o_1_-+ __  8_o-+-----~-55_4-+--53_9-+-382  1s1  - 1012J  I __J 
I  EXPLOSIVES  - 1  ;  - - l  1  - 2  - 1  3  I  - - - - - I  - I - - - - - 3  - 1  4  !  I 
I  VII.  IGNI~llJ;~; EXPLOSIO!'>S  :  --~f-----1---~~--+----~r----~~  ___  _,------+,----~--~f--- ---t ---r  ~~  I 
I  OF  FIREDA_'-\P  AND  COAL  DUST  - - - - - - - - - - - - - _- il  -_  ---_--1------ll------+-------+-----~----+-----i-----~---if----+-----l-------i! 
l
r VIII.  Ot:TBt:Rsrs  OF  GAS,  DE-OXYGDIATION.  1  1  1 
SUFFOCATION  OR  POISONING  BY  NATU- - - - - - - 5  I  - 8  13  I  - - - - - - 5  - 8  13  - 8  I 
[-
1 
~~A~AsEs (co2,  cH 4,  co,  HzSl. 
1 
1  - 1  - : 
8 
I 
I  a)  Outbursts  of Gas  ~:-----+-----+~----+-----+------r----+---5-+l,  __  ---+--8--~-l-3-+~-----~----+----~!-----+-_- __  ,__-----t-------1------l------+--_  I -_--+---5-+----~-8--+---1-3+-----+---8-~:  --8~ 
I 
b)  De-oxygen att  on  and  Poison ingl- ~~  ----~----l-------l-------l--------1---~-----+!  -----+----+------+----+------+-----+-----+-----+-'' ---+--- -1----if----l----i----l------l------+---------l-------+-----------+-----+---~  by  natural Gases  ·-
1  IX.  HEATI}IGS  OR  FIRES 
r-~ 
I  X.  INRUSHES  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1  - - 1 
l------------------+-~--~--+---+---+--~-+--+--+--~--~-+--~~---+--~-4~~--~-+--+-~~~--+--+---+---+--~ 
I  XI.  ELECTRICITY 
I 
!  XII.  OTHER  CAUSES 
I 
TOIAL 
33 
618 
10 
407  172 
46  19  21 
1198  251  180  64  10  505 
57  11  73  113  25  147 
35  23  64  847  648  257  1754  1751  1258  499  13  3521 
i  (1)  N:.ff'll1er  of hours  7.JOY'ked  by pit staff and e"f?loyees of contractor  firms  who  belong to  Ci-rrr:t.n8PLs''_s_o_jml,-,a"'l-,_~.n-s.Luran  __  ce__J_sc'h-e-me-.L-----'-----L-----'-----___L_--____l __  ___L__-L __  ___L__-L __  ___L_ __  __L  ____  L.:'~__L---L_--_j_  _  __J 
(2)  Accidents  involving more  than  five  casuaLties  (i.e.  who  either died or were  unahle  to  reswne  work  underground  for at  least eight weeks). 
(3)  wlender ®~$~·--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------~ 
H MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Conunon  Statistics  on  victims 
of  accidents  underground  in  coal mines 
SITE  OF  THE  ACCIDENT 
~f  incapacity 
CAUSES  OF  ACCIDENTS-------------
I.  FALLS  OF  GROUNDS  AND  ROCKS 
II.  TRANSPORT,  TOTAL 
a)  Continuous  Transport 
COUNTRY  :  FRANCE 
COAL-FIELD  :  CENTRE-MIDI 
Production  faces 
21  to I 
56  >56 
days  days 
(3)  (3) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
utI  AILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  ACCIDENT  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  CAUSE  AND  SITE 
OF  ACCIDENT  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(frequency  rates) 
Headings  excluding 
shafts  and  staple-pits 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
)  56 
days 
(3) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
Shafts  and staple-pits 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
.>56 
days 
(3) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
YEAR  :  1971 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1):  22  845  488 
Other  places 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
;.s6 
days 
(3} 
Fatal 
acci- total 
dents 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
Total of 
accidents  underground 
Table  lb 
56  21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
)56 
days 
(3) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total  1W 
6,610  4,027  1,663  0,044  12,344  2,845  2,407  0,394  5,646  0,044  0,044  2,232  1,970  0,525  - 4,727  1,731  8,404  2,582  0,044  22,76 
1,138  1,051  1,007  - 3,196  0,175  0,306  0,131  0,044  0,656  0,088  0,350  0,131  0,569  2,889  2,801  2,189  0,044  7,923  4,290  4,508  3,458  0,088  12,341 
0,875  0,  788  0,832  - 2,495  0,131  0,131  0,044  0,306  - 1,138  0,744  0,700  - 2,582  2,145  1,663  1,576  5,38 
Group 
accidents  (2) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
b)  Discontinuous  Transport  0,263  0,263  0,175  - o, 701  0,044  0,175  0,088  f-----t 
0,044 0,350  0,088  0,350  0,131  0,569  1,751  2,057  1,488 0,044  5,340  2,145  2,845  1,882  0,088  6,96( 
~----+---~---+--~----
III.  FALLS  AND  MOVEMENT  OF  THE  VICTIM,  I 
TOTAL  2,714  1,838  0,700  - 5,252  1,446!  1,006:  0,613  3,064  0,394  0,131  0,088  0,613  10,243  7,529  2,757- 20,529  4,795  10,505  4,158  29,45f 
! 
a)  while  moving  about  the  mine  1,  707  1,331  0,525  - 2' 013  0, 263  o, 044  0,088  0,394  6,609  4,684  1,707- 13,000  9,673  6,478  2,801  18,95  3,545  1,094  0,4381  0,481 
b)  in  the  course  of  0 the r  activit  ies._1_,  o_o_7 +-0-,  5-2-5 +-0-,  1-7-5 +-----+-1  ·-7-07-+0-,  3-5-0+-0-,  5-6-9+-0-,1-3-1+---+1-·_o5_o-+o-,_1_31-+0-,_08_8-+--+---+-o,_2_19--r:  _3_,_6-33+-2-·-8-45-t--1  ·-0-50+----t-7-,  5-2-8-t-5-,1-2-1+-4-·.  o_2_7+1_._35_7___._ __  +1-o_._5o-+--f------t-l 
IV.  MACHINEs'  TOOLS  AND  SUPPORTS  \1  l  I 
___  To_T  __  A_L ____________  -+_7_,2_2_2+-4_,9_4_6+-2-,o-5_7+----+-1-4,_2_2_6t-2-,3-2_o+-1-,8-8_2+-
1 o_,5_2_5+---+4_,_7_27-+o_,_2_19-+o_._o_88-+--+----+-o  __  '_3_~  __  61
_~4!l5  6,478  _2  __  ._o_5_7t------+1_6_,o  ___  2  __  o  17,246  ~,39~  4~~4~  __  35,28C  _  _ _  _  ,
1
: 
a)  Mach1nes  I  0,481  0,394  0,350  - 1,225 0,219  0,306  0,088  I 0,613  0,044  - 0,044  •  0,788  0,569  0,569  - 1,926  1,532  1,269  1,006  3,800 
i  ---+---t---~--4---~---+---~--J 
i 2,013  1,182  0,350  - 3,545  0,919  0,8321\  0,131  11,882  0,088  0,044  0,131  4,071  2,714  0,613  - 7,398  7,091  4,771  1,094  112,95~  I  I  b)  Tools 
I  I 
1  I 
l  I , ::,::,::,::,," 
o,131  I  2,626  3,195  o,875  - 4,  727  3,370  1,357  - 9,454 1,182  0,744  0,306  2,232  0,088  0,044  6,697  8,623  7,354  2,539  18,51 
I  0,9o3  11,687  '9,061  3,502  - 7 '923  5,428  1,970  - 15,321  3,370  1,882  1,138  6,390  0,613  0,350  22,250  23,593  16,721  6,610  46,92 
I  VI.  EXPLOSIVES  I  - 0,044  - 0,044  0,088  - 0,044  0,131  - 0,131  0,044  0,17  t.  I  VII.  IGNITio~s  oR  EXPLo--s-I-~---s--------~~,----+----+----+----+-----t----+----+----+----t-----+----t-----+----T----r-----+I-----T----1----T-----+----T----+----+---,~---+----~--~---41----~ 
~  ~  "''~~  ~OCMC  0.'<  j - ~-
VIII.  OUTHURSTS  OF  GAS,  DE-OXYGENATION ,I  [' 
SUFFOCATION  OR  POISONING  BY  NATU~~ 
RAL  GASES  (C02,  CH4,  CO,  H2S),  :  - 0,219  - 0,35(  0,569  -
TOTAL  I 
a)  Outbursts  of Gas 
b)  De-oxygenation  and  Poisoning 
by  natural  Gases 
IX.  HEAriNGS  OR  FIRES 
i  - 0,219  - 0,35C  o,569 I-
I 
0,219  0,350  0,56  o,350- o·,-350 
0,219  0,350  0,56  0,350  0,350 
~---------------------------~-----t-----t-----t-----t------t--~~---t---~~--+---~----+----T-----t---_,-----t-----t-----+----t----~----t----~--~~--+----4----+----+----+---~ 
f ___  x_._I_N_Ru_s_H_Es-------------------t-----+-o-,o-44-+-----+----+-o_._o_44-t----t-----+----t---_,-----t---_,----4-----t-----t-----+----+----+----+----t-----+----~o-,o-4_4t----1-----~o-,_o_441----4----+---~ 
XI.  ELECTRICITY  0,044  0,044  0,044  - 0,131  0,044  0,044 0,044  0,131 
XI I.  OTHER  CAUSES  1  ;444  0, 438  0,131  - 2,013  0,832  0,088  - 0,919  0,175  0,088  0,044  0,306  2,495  0,481  0,17  0,044  3,195  4,946  1,094 0,350  0,041  6,434 
TOTAL  27,051  17,815  7,529  o,o44  52,439  1q987  7,879  2,8o1  o,43a  22,105  1,532  1,001  o,263  2,801  37,075  28,364  11,24  0,088  76,776  76,645  55,065  2\842  0,56\154}-22  0,350  0,350 
(1)  Nwnbel'  of houl's  WOI'ked  by pit staff and errrptoyees  of controctol' [noms  who  belong to  a  miners 1  social  insurance  scheme. 
(2)  Accidents  involving mOI'e  than  five  casualties  (i.e.  who  eithel' died OI'  weJ>e  unahte  to  I'eswne  WOI'k  undel'gl'Ound  [01' at  /.east  eight weeks). 
(3)  ~/.endei'&&~~·s·~--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------~ 
H 
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c MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common  Statistics  on  victims 
of  accidents  underground  in coal  mines 
NATURE  OF  THE  INJURY 
PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
LOCATION  OF  THE  INJURY 
I. Head  and neck 
Amputations 
and 
enucleations 
>  56  I  Fat~l I 
days  I  acct- .
1 
total 
(5)  I  dents j 
COUNTRY  :  FRANCE 
COAL-FIELD  :  CENTRE-MIDI 
Fractures  Luxations, 
with  or without  twists  and 
dis location  sprains 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  LOCATION 
AND  NATURE  OF  INJURY  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(absolute  figures) 
Concussion 
and  inter-
nal injury 
Open  wounds 
contusions 
and muscular 
abrasions 
Fatal I 
Burns  and 
harmful effects 
of electricity 
and  radiation 
Fatal  >  56 
days 
(5) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
acci- I total 
dents 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
acci- total 
dents 
3 
YEAR;  1971 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  ( 1)  22  845  488 
Poisoning  Multiple  injuries 
and  of those not 
suffocation  specified  (2) 
>  56  Fatal  >  56  Fatal 
acci-
dents 
days 
(5) 
acci- total 
dents 
days 
(5) 
total 
4  to 
20 
days 
(5) 
117 
156 
Table  2a 
TOTAL 
21  to 
56 
days 
(5) 
44 
13 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
10 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
172 
174 
1 
- 16  - _  1  1  _  1  270  221  82  1  574 
--------+---~--~--~--~--~--+---+---+---+-~r-~~--~~--~~---r---r---r---r-~-~r--;r-~~-1--~r-~--~--~--~--~---+---
IV.  Upper  limbs 
(excluding the  hands) 
(3)  l  _  i  _  1  _ 1  ..  + _-·-+--14  _  +---'  ~  ~ ,  V<~  .  1  _  . _  _  1  _ X  [X  x~+--2  ---+-------+ _2  -+-15-0---+ 
I  '· ·~"  ml·  - :1~  i  :,- - "  '  I - ' X[>t<J"  I - I  "  1 - 1 XXX " 
12  424 
l
i  VI.  Lower  hmbs  T  +---_--+---II  -----+-----1  32  -- ~~3:--::- -_  32 -XV(X 48  - I  48  I  - - - xxx--+----6  +------+-- 6--+-------+--318 
(excluding feet)  (4)  I 
l 
1  XV(XI  w  I  - w  - - - XXX 
VII.  Feet  36  36 
~~~13  ~1~3  ~5~1--- 3  4  11!  _  11  ___ XXX 
VIII.  Multiple  locations  - - - - 5  -
IX.  Not  specified 
TOTAL  18  18  207  207  90  90  10  147 
(1}  Nwnber  of hours  worked  by  pit staff and  B~rPLoyees of contractor firme  who  beZong  to a  rm:ner's  eociaZ insurance  scheme, 
(2)  incLuding  CO"Pliaations. 
(3)  The  shouLders  and  the wrists aN incZudsd under  "upper  Urrbe", 
(4)  The  hips  and  the  ankles  are  incLuded under  "Lower  limbs". 
(5)  Ca~nder days. 
147 
187 
112 
17 
31  31  1751 
96  27  273 
427  158  1009 
246  119  683 
136  63  386 
64  32  211 
11  39 
1258  499  13  3521 
H MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Co1111110n  Statistics on  victims 
of  accidents  underground  in  coal mines 
NATURE  OF  THE  INJURY 
PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Amputations 
and 
enucleation& 
Fatal 
acci- total 
dents 
COUNTRY:  PRANCE 
COAL-FIELD:  CEN'l'RE-MIDI 
Fractures  Luxations, 
DETAILED  BREAKD~N OF  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  LOCATION 
AND  NATURE  OF  INJURY  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(Frequency rates) 
Concussion 
with or without  twists  and  and inter-
Open  wounds 
contusions 
and muscular 
abrasions 
Bums  and 
harmful  effects 
of electricity 
and  radiation 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
dis location 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
sprains 
Fatal 
acci- total 
dents 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
nal  injury 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Fatal 
acci- total 
dents 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
YEA!l:  1971 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1):  22  845  488 
Poisoning 
and 
suffocation 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
Multiple  injuries 
of  those not 
specified  (2, 
>  56  Fatal 
days  acci- total 
(5)  dents-
4  to 
20 
days 
(5} 
Table  2b 
TOTAL 
21  to 
56 
days 
(5) 
> 56 
days 
(5} 
Fatal 
acci- total 
dents 
-X'XX-
LOCATION  OF  THE  INJURY 
- 5,121  1,926  0,438  0,044  7,529  0,263  0,044  0,044  0,263  0,131  0,044  - 0,044  - 0,131  - I.  Head  and neck 
I  ::,·::~  - ~+--r- r-~~~--- ~~-,91------'o  t----:-.1--+7~  -o,-o44-+--0,1-l9-+:-::-~+---+-:-::~-
1 
+-----+----t~-:--+~-x-Q-l-----~------,r-::~-sel-:--t-::-~-+l-::-:~+--:::-::+:-:~-
1
:+-o-,04-4t----1:-:::---4: 
i  N. ~~::~:~·"·  '~'''  1- :- i- ~r., o,m  - J~1JO,m i- o,m  ~[>([>(·'" - 0,350  - - I_  ~XX 
0,088  - 0,088  6,566  4,202  1,182  - 11,950 
~  J-o.m i  -- r~."~  '~" 1  - I  ,,m~  -•• :,~:-tl-~~o--.-13--l----K--~--~[X;..-_:~[X---4--l-,5-3-2  +-----if----l-,-53-2--+-0-,-044-+---+-0-,0-4-4*X-----ll--[X-------Jx[---_-_--_-~~---o~.-5-2"5~----~-0-,_5--25~1~8-~~-5-9+-1-8-,6-9-l+-6-,  9-l-61----+-44-·--1-166 
~  --· --r-t- rv  rv 
"'  1 o  ....  - !  0,04411,401  _  1,401  1,401  - 1,401 V\I><[X  1,101!  _  1,101  _  - _  IAI)<[)(  o,,.  _  0,1., "·"' ...  , ..  ,,109  _  ...... 
I  V.  Hands 
t-----------
i 
L 
VI.  Lower  limbs 
(excluding feet) 
!  __ :n- t ~-131  1,,.  -
VIII.  Multiple  locations  _  _  - 0,569  -
1,576  0,044  VII.  Feet 
0,04  0,131  0,175  0,481  0,219  0,569  0,219 
IX.  Not  specified 
TOTAL  0,  788  - 0,788  9,061  - 9,061  3,939  3,939  0,21  0,219  0,438  6,434 
(1)  Nwrd:>er  of houre  ZJOrked  by  pit staff and eT7{)Loyees  of contractor firms  who  beLong  to a  miner's sociaL insUl'<li'ICe  scheme. 
(2)  inoZuding cOT7{)tications. 
(3)  The  shouZders  and  the wrists are  incLuded under  "upper  Urrbs". 
(4)  The  hips  and  the  ankles  are  incLuded under  "Lower  Limbs". 
(5)  Calender days. 
0,13  0,131  8,185  5,953  2,758  - 16,896 
0,481  0,081  0,088  4,902  2,801  1,401  0,131  9,236 
0,350  0,350  0,13  - 0,131  0,744  0,481  0,131  0,35C  1,707 
6,434  0,044  - 0,044  - 0,35C  0,350  1,35  1,357 76,645  55,065  21,842  0,561154,122 
H 
w 
N MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common  Statistics on  victims 
of accidents  underground  in  coal mines 
SITE  OF  THE  ACCIDENT 
~ 
c 
I. FALLS  OF  GROUNDS  AND  ROCKS 
II.  TRANSPORT,  TOTAL 
a)  Continuous  Transport 
b)  Discontinuous  Transport 
III.  FALLS  AND  MOVEMENT  OF  THE  VICTIM, 
TOTAL 
a)  while  moving  about  the  mine 
b)  in  the  course  of other activities 
IV.  MACHINES,  TOULS  AND  SUPPORTS 
TOTAL 
I  a)  Machines  i 
COUNTRY  :  France 
COAL-FIEUl  : 
Production  faces 
1 
4  to  21  to  Fatal 
20  56  >56  acci-
days  days  days  dents 
(3)  (3)  (3) 
2068  856  3o6  10 
98  83  63  2 
56  59  47  l 
42  24  16  1 
755  523  137  1 
634  445  ll8  -
121  78  19  1 
1ll6  447  140  2 
92  60  34  -
b)  Tools  L 
420  218  32  :  -
I 
c)  Supports  604  220  73  2 
v.  FALLS  OF  OBJECTS  1396  739  220  1 
VI.  EXPLOSIVES  - l  - -
f----
VII.  IGNITIONS  OR  EXPLOSIONS  t  0, n~- AAO  OMC '"" 
!  1  - - -
VIII.  OUTBURSTS  OF  GAS,  DE-OXYGENATION~~ 
SUFFOCATION  OR  POISONING  BY  NATU~i 
RAL  GASES  (C02,  CH4,  CO,  H2S),  1  - - -
TOTAL 
a)  Outbursts  of Gas  - - - -
b)  De-oxygenation  and  Poisoning 
by natural Gases  1  - - -
IX.  HEATINGS  OR  FIRES  l  l  - -
,___ 
X.  INRUSHES  l  2  - -
XI.  ELECTRICITY  3  - - -
XII.  OTHER  CAUSES  225  40  12  -
TOTAL  5665  2692  878  16 
total 
3240 
246 
163 
83 
1416 
ll97 
219 
1705 
186 
620 
899 
2356 
I  1 
1 
1 
-
1 
2 
3 
3 
277 
9251 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  ACCIDENT  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  CAUSE  AND  SITE 
OF  ACCIDENT  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(absolute  figures) 
Headings  excluding 
Shafts  shafts  and staple-pits  and staple-pits 
2  3 
4  to  21  to  Fatal  4  to  21  to  Fatal  4  to 
20  56  ). 56  acci- total  20  56  .>56  acci- total  20 
days  days  days  dents  days  days  days  dents  days 
(3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3) 
688  301  81  l  1071  7  l  2  - 10  284 
100  66  31  l  198  31  26  14  - 7l  230 
18  16  3  - 37  - - - - - 40 
82  50  28  l  161  31  26  14  ~  1l  190 
393  235  I  65  2  695  49  38  11  4  102  795 
316  114  51  - 541  41  29  9  - 79  606 
77  61  14  2  154  8  9  2  4  23  189 
441  175  46  - 662  13  7  4  - 24  488 
67  30  17  - 114  2  2  1  - 5  49 
201  I  76  13 
!  - 290  7  2  1  - 10  233 
173  69  16  - 258  4  3  2  - 9  206 
646  274  93  1  1014  41  25  9  - 75  913 
- 2  - l  3  - - - - - -
1  - - - 1  - - - - - -
- 5  - 8  13  - - - - - 8 
- 5  - 8  13  - - - - - -
I  - - - - - - - - - - 8 
- - - - - - - - - - 8 
1  - - - 1  - - - - - 3 
1  - - - 1  3  - - - 3  2 
138  21  10  - 169  19  10  3  - 32  157 
2409  1079  326  14  3828  163  107  43  4  317  2888 
(1)  Number  of hours  worked by pit staff and errployees of contractor  f"-rms  who  belong to a  miners' social  insurance  scheme. 
(i.e.  who  either died or were  !Mable  to resume  work  W'!dergroW'!d  for at  l-east  eignt weeks).  (2)  Accidents involving more  than  five  casualties 
( 3)  Cal-ender  days. 
Table  la 
YEAR  :  1971 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1)  lll 261  224 
Total of  Group 
Other places  accidents  underground  accidents  (2) 
4  5  6 
21  to  Fatal  4  to  21  to  Fatal  56  Fatal 
56  )  56  acci- total  20  56  )56  acci- total  ?W 
acci- total 
days  days  dents  days  days  days  dents  dents 
(3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3) 
ll7  25  2  428  3047  1275  414  13  4149 
199  llO  9  548  459  374  218  12  1063 
35  31  1  107  114  llO  81  2  307 
164  79  8  441  345  264  137  10  756 
508  195  1  1499  1992  1304  408  8  3712 
373  140  l  ll20  1597  1021  318  1  2937 
135  55  - 379  395  283  90  7  775 
287  74  1  850  2058  916  264  3  3241 
f-----+----+--- --- 1--------
30  21  l  101  210  122  73  l  406  H 
111  19  - 363  861  356  66  - 1283 
146  34  - 386  987  438  125  2  1552 
556  186  3  1658  2996  1594  508  5  5103 
- - l  1  - 3  - 2  5 
- - - - 2  - - - 2 
- - - 8  9  5  - 8  22  - 8  8 
- - - - - 5  - 8  13  - 8  8 
- - - 8  9  - - - 9 
- - - 8  9  1  - - 10 
l  - - 4  5  3  - - 8 
2  l  - 5  9  2  1  - 12 
41  10  l  209  539  112  35  l  687 
1711  601  18  5218  lll2'  5589  1848  52  18614  - 8  8  . .• ...  ·.:.··'',  ,,  ' 
····'.'  ,, \. 
MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common  Statistics  on  victims 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  DF  ACCIDENT  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  CAUSE  AND  SITE 
OF  ACCIDENT  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
of accidents  underground  in  coal  mines  (frequency  rates) 
SITE  OF  THE  ACCIDENT 
~ 
s 
I.  FALLS  OF  GROUNDS  AND  ROCKS 
II.  TRANSPORT,  TOTAL 
a)  Continuous  Transport 
b)  Discontinuous  Transport 
Ill.  FALLS  AND  MOVEMENT  OF  THE  VICTIM, 
TOTAL 
1---
a)  wh~  le  moving  about  the  mine 
b)  ~n  the  course  of other  activities 
IV.  MACHINES,  TOOLS  AND  SUPPORTS 
TOTAL 
I 
I 
I 
a)  Machines 
: 
b)  Tools 
i 
I 
c)  Supports 
v.  FALLS  OF  OBJECTS 
VI.  EXPLOSIVES 
COUNTRY:  FRANCE 
COAL-FIELD 
Production  faces 
l 
4  to  21  to I  Fatal 
20  56  >56  acci-
days  days  days  dents 
(3)  (3)  (3) 
18,586 7,694  2,750  0,090 
0,881  0,746  0,566  0,018 
0,503 0,530  0,422  0,009 
0,377  0,216  0,144  0,009 
6,786  4,701  1, 231  0,009 
5,698  3,999  1,060  -
1,087  0,701  0,171  0,009 
10,030 4,017  1,258  0,018 
0,827  0,539  0,306  -
3,775  1,959  0,288  -
5,429  1,977  0,656  0,018 
12,547  6,642  1,977  0,009 
- 0,009  - -
VII.  IG~ITIONS  OR  EXPLOSIONS  i 0,009  ~  OF  FIREDAMP  AND  COAL  DUST  - - -
VIII.  OUTBURSTS  OF  GAS,  DE-OXYGENATION ,I 
I 
SUFFOCATION  OR  POISONI~G BY  NATU-~ 
~~A~ASES (COz,  CH4,  CO,  HzS),  !  0,009  - -
a)  Outbursts  of  Gas  - - - -
b)  De-oxygenation  and  Poisoning  0,009  - - -
by  natural  Gases 
IX.  HEAriNGS  OR  FIRES  0,009 0,009  - -
--
X.  INRUSHES  0,009 0,018  - -
XI.  ELECTRICITY  0,027  - - -
XII.  OTHER  CAUSES  2,022 0,359  0,108  -
TOTAL  50,916  24J.95  7,891  0,144 
I 
I 
Headings  excluding 
shafts  and  staple-pits  Shafts 
2 
4  to  21  to  Fatal  4  to  21  to 
total  20  56  >56  acci- total  20  56 
days  days  days  dents  days  days 
(J)  (J)  (J)  (3)  (J) 
29,120  6,184  2,705  0,728  0,009  9,625  0,063 0,009 
2,211  0,899 0,593  0,279  0,009  1,779  0,279 0,234 
1,465  0,162 0,144  0,027  - 0,333  - -
0,746  0,737  0,449  0,252  0,009  1,447  0,279  0,234 
12,726  3,532  2,112  0,584  0,018  6,246  0,440 0,342 
10,758  2,840 1,564  0,458  - 4,862  0,368  0,261 
1,968  0,692  0,548  0,126  0,018  1,384  0,072  0,081 
15; 324  3,964 1,573  0,413  - 5,950  0,117  0,063 
1,672  0,602 0,270  0,153  - 1,025  0,018  0,018 
5,572  1,805  o,683  I o,111  - 2,606  0,063 0,018 
8,080  1,555  0,620  0,144  - 2,319  0,036 0,027 
21,175  5,806  2,463  0,836  0,009  9,113  0,368  0,225 
0,009  - 0,018  - 0,009  0,027  - -
0,009  0,009  - - - 0,009  - -
0,009  - 0,045  - 0,072  0,117  - -
- - '0,045  - 0,072  0,117  - -
0,009  - - - - - - -
0,018  - - - - - - -
0,027  o,oo~  - - - 0,009  - -
0,027  0,00!  - - - 0,009  0,027 ·-
2,490  1,24<  0,189  0,090  - 1,519  0,171  0,090 
83,146  21,65  9,697  2,930 0,126  34,405  1,465 0,962 
(1)  NWli!er  of hours •wrked by  pit staff and errpLoyees  of aontroctor fiiW18  OJho  beLong to  a  miners' sociaL  insurance  scheme. 
and staple-pits 
3 
Fatal  4  to 
>56  acci- total  20 
days  dents  days 
(3)  (3) 
0,018  - 0,090  2,552 
0,126  - 0,638  2,067 
- - - 0,360 
0,126  - 0,638  1,708 
0,099  0,036  0,917  7,145 
0,081  - 0,710  5,447 
0,018  0,036  0,207  11,699 
0,036  - 0,216J4,386 
1--
0,009  - 0,045  '  0,440 
0,009  - 0,090  2,094 
0,018  - 0,081  1,851 
0,081  - 0,674  8,205 
- - - -
- - - -
- - - 0,072 
- - - -
- - - 0,072 
- - - 0,072 
- - - 0,027 
- - 0,027  0,018 
0,027  - 0,288  1,411 
0,386  0,036  2,849  25,956 
(2)  Accidents  involving moPe  than  five  casWlZties  (i.e,  who  either died or OJel'e  unabLe  to Pesume  OJOrk  underground  for at  least eight weeks). 
( 3)  Calender  days. 
Table  lb 
YEAR:  1971 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1) :  111  261  224 
Total of  Group 
Other  places  accidents  underground  accidents  (2) 
4  5  6 
21  to  Fatal  4  to  21  to  Fatal  56  Fatal 
56  ). 56  acci- total  20  56  )56  acci- total  1W 
acci- total 
days  days  dents  days  days  days  dents  dents 
(3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3) 
1,051  0,225  0,018  3,847  27 '386  11,459  3,721  0,117  142,683 
1,788  0,989  0,081  4,925  4,125  3,361  1,959 0,108  9,554 
0,314  0,279  0,009  0,962  1,025  0,989  0,728  0,018  2,759 
1,474  0,710  0,072  3,964  3,101  2,373  1,231 0,090  6,795 
4,566  1,753  0,009  13,472  17 '903  11,720 3,667  0,072  33,362 
3,352  1,258  0,009  10,066  14,353  9,176  2,858  0,009  26' 397 
1,213  0,494  3,406  3,55(  2,543  0,809  0,063  6,965 
I 
2,579  0,665  0,009  7,640  18,497  8,233  2,373  0,027  29,129 
I  f-- --t----- -----t------ ---r--- -- -- t----
0,270  0,189  0,009  0,908  1,88  1,096 0,656 0,009  3,649 
I 
H 
0,998  0,171  - 3,262  7,731  3,20(  0,593  - 11,531 
1,312  0,306  - 3,469  8,87  3,937  1,123  0,018  13,949 
• 4,997  1,672  0,027  14,901  26,92  14,321  4,565  0,045  45,865 
- - 0,009  0,009  - 0,027  - 0,018  0,045 
- - - - 0,01!  - - - 0,018 
- - - 0,072  0,08  0,04  - 0,072  0,198  - 0,072 0,072 
- - - - - 0,04  - 0,072  0,117  - 0,072  0,072 
- - - 0,072  0,08  - - - 0,08 
- - - 0,072  0,08  0,00!  - - 0,09( 
0,009  - - 0,036  0,04  0,02  - - 0,07 
0,018  0,009  - 0,045  0,08  0,01  o,oo~  - 0,10E 
0,368  0,090 0,009  1,878  4,84  1,00  0,31<  0,009  6,17~ 
15,378  5,402 0,162  46,89S  99,98  50,23  16,60!  0,467  167,29(  - 0,072  0,072 
, HINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Co111110n  Statistics on  victims 
of  accidents  ~mdergro~md in  coal  mines 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  LOCATION 
AND  NATURE  OF  INJURY  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(absolute  figures) 
Table  2a 
YEAR  :  1971  COUNTRY  :  FRANCE 
COAL-FIELD  MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1)  111  261  224 
NATURE  OF  THE  INJURY 
PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
LOCATION  OF  THE  INJURY 
I.  He ad  and  neck 
Amputations 
and 
enucleations 
>  56 I  Fat~l I 
days  acc1- j  total 
(5)  dents I 
I 
I 
- I  -
Fractures 
with  or without 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
20 
dis location 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
28 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Luxations, 
twists  and 
sprains 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Concussion 
and  inter-
nal injury 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
Open  wounds 
contusions 
and muscular 
abrasions 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Fatal! 
acci-1 total 
dents · 
42  1  43 
Burns  and 
harmful effects 
of electricity 
and  radiation 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
Poisoning  Multiple  injuries 
and  of  those not 
suffocation  specified  (2) 
>  56  Fatal  >  56  Fatal 
acci-
dents 
days 
(5) 
acci- total 
dents 
XXX 
days 
(5) 
total 
~-~-·,.·  -~J~-t~_Xk\X~[X ---"  -"I'  - ' XXX 
L  m. •~•  - i - I - I "  '  !  "  ~  j  - ~  '  '  "  "  j  - "  '  - - I - XXX " 
22 
16 
TOTAL 
4  to  21  to 
20  56 
days  days 
(5)  (5) 
830  270 
877  72 
1370  834 
1398  442 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
69 
24 
206 
178 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
12 
13 
total 
1181 
973 
2423 
2018  I w. """' "~'  I  j  I  ~~~  X\lifV~  I  XXX 
~ '..0""'"' "'  '~'''  '  - I  '  ·  "  - "  "  - "  N\  "  I - "  '  - '  " 
1 
.•  ::.  -~-= L-r~ +  =·  ~r.  .. T. ~~ :  A--+-IXJ------l~~~-~57---+-i-1  -+-1-58  +--2-+---+---2  -+-x------l-x--x  ~ 
--------+----+··---~---4----+---~ 
l
.r---"· ,_, ""'"  - - ·--~-+-- --~M\11\!1  "'i  !I  II  - ''""'"""' '"'' '"  ' - '  "'  - "'  " -" ~  -'  "'  - -[>([)([>( " 
VII.  Feet  124  124 
VIII.  Multiple  locations  33  38 
IX.  Not  specified 
TOTAL  77  77  876  15  891  184  184  11  11  22  563 
(1)  Nwnber  of houre  worked by  pit staff and empl.oyees  of contractor firma  iJho  belong to a  miner's social insurance scheme. 
(2)  including complications. 
(3)  The  shoulders and the Ulrists  are  included under  "upper  lirtbs". 
~!~  ~:~~~~  J:~/he ankles are included unde,.  "LoiJer  limbs". 
17 
10  10 
565  10  10  133 
- 24  3424  2136  604  6165 
- 41  1748  1003  479  3230 
- 4  976  583  186  1745 
7  24  462  227  99  16  804 
40  22  10  75 
13  146  11125  5589  1848  52  18614 
H 
w 
\.J1 MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common  Statiltica en victiu 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  LOCATION 
ANO  NATURE  OF  INJURY  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
of  accidents  underarcund  in  coal minu  (Frequency  rates) 
NATURE  OF  THE  INJURY 
PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
COUNTRY  :  FRANCE 
COAL-FIELD 
Amputations  Fractures  Luxaticna,  Open  wounds  Bums  and 
contusion•  harmful affects 
Concusaicn 
and  with  or without  twists  and  and  inter- and  muscular  of electricity 
abrasions  and  radiation 
enucleation&  dislocation  sprains  nal  injury 
1  2  3  5  6 
> 56  Fatal  > 56  >  56  I Fat~l I  >  56  Fatal  >  56  Fatal  >  56  Fatal 
days 
1
.  accl-~ total  days  acci- total  days  acci- total  days  acci- total  days  acci- total  days 
(5)  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  dents  (5) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
YEAR  :  1971 
MAN-HOUllS  WORKED  (l):  lll 261  224 
Poiaonina 
and 
suffocation 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
7 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
Multiple  injuries 
of  thou not 
specified  (8) 
8 
>  56  Fatal 
days  acci-
(5)  dents 
total 
4  to 
20 
days 
(5) 
Tlbla  2b 
TOTAL 
21  to 
56 
days 
(5) 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Fatal 
acci- total 
dents 
LOCATION  OF  THE  INJURY 
I.  Head  and  neck  _ i _  I _  '·"' '·"' '·"'  0,009  0,009  '·'" '·"' ,,,,  '·"' 0,009  ,....  _  _  _  rxJXIX  ,.,  .. ,.,. ,.,. ,  .... ,  ... ,  ,,.,,  ,.,.. "·"' 
I  n. ''''  - 1- - ~~t><  --- o,m  - o,m j 
0
•
009l  -
0
•
009t><XV( '·"' -
0,054  7,882  0,647  0,216  8,745 
~  :  .. -:~,--- -~-- ~--1- - i  :.:,  0 • 0 ~' i  ~'" i  o.:::  - '·"'  '·"''·~'I o,m  '·"'! - o,m ! - - ] - [X[>(t>< o,m '·'"  '·"'_~:" '·'" '·"' o,m ,,: 
~ "  ~:::;,![;::• "' "''''' I '·''"'  - II '·"'I'·'" -I'·'"  o,m I - o,m~  '·"'I- o,m I  0,009
1 
- I  '·"'~XX  o,044  - o,044  '•"' '·"'  >,400  _  '"·"' 
1-,:~. ------n; '·'"i  F"t" t-t.~r:r- L.oo. ~  .... 1..+.,  '·"· - :'·''"><XX~·"· - '·"·  j,.,~. "·"· ,  ....  o.009 ,: 
:  -r-r  1  II  T  IV  1  '  M  +  - ·  --
1  "· ~;.![;::·,.,., "'  ~  '·"'  - I'·'" '·'"' - '·"' I  o,no  - o,no~  '·'"! - i  '·'" I - - - ~'·'"I  ~  '·'" "·"' '·"' '·"''  - "·"'  I"' ""  i '·'"I -I'·'" I'·"'  - '·"
4 
'·"'  - '·'"~~)<]  '·""l - 0,404 I - - - t><~~  0,0~ "'" '·"' '·'""  ,,-6-72-+----~+-1-5,-68---l 
l  -~-~~-rr,  --r--r--r--r~~><~~~~~~~~--~~--~~--~~~~~ 
VIII.  Multiple  locations  - - - 0,296  0,045  0,341  0,072  - 0,072  0,009  0,027  0,036  0,359  - 0,359  - - - V\V\ 0,453  0,063  0,216  4,152  2,040  0,889  0,144  7,22 
IX.  Not  specified  XXXXXXXXXV(XXXV(X-
TOTAL  0,692  - 0,692  7,873  0,135  8,008  1,654  1,654  0,099 0,099  0,198  5,060 0,018  5,078  0,036 
(1)  Nwnber  of hours  worked by pit staff and empLoyees  of contractor  fii'T118  who  beLong  to a  miner's  sociaL insurance  scheme. 
(2)  including compLications. 
(3)  The  shoulders  and  the wrists are  incLuded under  "upper  Uni>s". 
(4)  The  hips  and the  ankLes  are  included under  "Lower  limbs". 
(5)  Calender  days. 
0,090  0,090  0,027  - 0,027  0,359  0,198  0,027  0,090  0,67 
0,036  - 0,090  0,090  1,195  0,117  1,312 99,980 50,233 16,609  0,467  167,290 
H MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Cotmnon  Statistics  on  victims 
of  accidents  1.mderground  in  coal  mines 
SITE  OF  THE  ACCIDENT 
COUNTRY  :  Italy 
COAL-FIELD  :  Sulcis 
Production  faces 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  ACCIDENT  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  CAUSE  AND  SITE 
OF  ACCIDENT  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(absolute  figures) 
Headings  excluding 
shafts  and  staple-pits  Shafts  and  staple-pits 
(1)  Nwriler  of hours  worked by  pit staff and errployees  of contn:wtor  f'Lrms  who  belong to a  miners' soaial insurance  scheme. 
(2)  Accidents  involving more  than  five  casualties  (i.e.  who  either died or were  unable  to reswne  work  underground for at  least eight weeks). 
YEAR  :  1971 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1):  1  174  922 
Other  places 
Total of 
accidents  underground 
Table  la 
Group 
accidents  (2) 
(3)  Catender_~~w~,s~·----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------~ MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common  Statistics  on  victims 
of  accidents  underground  in  coal  mines 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  LOCATION 
AND  NATURE  OF  INJURY  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(absolute  figures) 
YEAR  :  1971  COUNTRY  :  Italy 
COAL-FIELD  :  Sulcis  MAN-HOURS  WORKED  ( 1)  l  174  922 
I 
NATURE  OF  THE  INJURY 
PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
LOCATION  OF  THE  INJURY 
I,  Head  and  neck 
Amputations 
and 
enucleations 
>  56  I  Fat~l  ~ 
days  1  acc1- , total 
(5)  I dents I 
Fractures 
with  or without 
dis location 
>  561Fatal 
days 
1  acci- total 
(5)  dents 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Luxations, 
twists  and 
sprains 
Fatal 
acci- total 
dents 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Concussion 
and  inter-
nal injury 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
Open  wounds 
contusions 
and  muscular 
abrasions 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Fatal 
acci- total 
dents 
Burns  and 
harmful effects 
of electricity 
and  radiation 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
Poisoning 
and 
suffocation 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
I  IX~~ 
i  I  3  3 
~· g~es~  _I_ jj  __ IX~V(Q<X  ~~~,!  XX[X[><[X[X 
:  I  r-\.  i  I ~~  I  i 
m. ''='  I  i  I  I  I  j  I  !  !  < 
i  I  1  I 
Multiple  injuries 
of  those not 
specified  (2) 
8 
>  56  Fatal 
days  acci-
(5)  dents 
total 
I
!  IV,  Upper  limbs 
(exclud1ng  the  hands) 
(3) 
1- !  I  I  I  [><  i  XXV( 
I  I  I  I  1  I  1 
!  I  I 
r--~--- ______________ ,  _____ _ 
I 
I  V.  Hands 
4  to 
20 
days 
(5) 
30 
32 
33 
Table  2a 
TOTAL 
21  to 
56 
days 
(5) 
12 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Fatal 
acci- total 
dents 
15 
31 
----
44 
38 
----~-~----~--~ 
33  150 
I 
I 
L
l  VI.  Lower  limbs 
(excluding  feet)  (4 I 
r  - ~ , ~- 1  , 1 -, -r~~  +  -:j~l-------+-----+ 4 
-------+--
1 
,---+------+----+------*X,-----~~-+--+------ -- -- ~10-~  -
1  ,  r-~-~-- t  ,~-:  ~  , ! 
1 
, 
1 
X~[X~  -~--+--57  +--1.--1---5 -~-~: 
I  VII.  Feet 
I  Nl([X  I  I  l><t><l< 
f----VIII-.  Mu-ltip-le  1-ocat-ions-+---+--+--+------lf-----+--+--+-----+-----f-~  '  '  [\[><[X 
IX.  Not  specified 
TOTAL  15 
(1)  Nwnber  uf hours  worked by pit staff and  emp~oyees of contractor firms  who  be~ong to  a  miner's  socia~ insurance  scheme, 
(2)  including complications. 
(3)  The  shoulders  and  the wrists are  incLuded under  "upper  lirrbs". 
(4)  The  hips  and the  ank~es are  included under  "Lower  limbs". 
(5)  Calender  days. 
15 
30  15  45 
10  15 
311  86  19  - 416 
H MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  LOCATION 
AND  NATURE  OF  INJURY  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
Common  Statistics on  victims 
of  accidents  underground  in  coal  mines 
Amputations 
1 
and 
NATURE  OF  THE  INJURY 
enucleations 
1 
Fatal\  >  56 
PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY  days  acci- j total 
(5)  dents i 
LOCATION  OF  THE  INJURY  I 
I 
I.  Head  and  neck 
COUNTRY  :  Italy 
COAL-FIELD  :  Sulcis 
Fractures  Lux.ations, 
with  or without  twists  and 
dis location  sprains 
2  3 
>  56  Fatal  >  56  Fatal 
days  acci- total  days  acci- total 
(5)  dents  (5)  dents 
II. Eyes 
--l--~ X  ~  t>\ ~ 
----- -+-- .. --
III. Trunk  I 
i 
I 
IV.  Upper  limbs  · 
I 
(exclud1ng  the  hands) 
(3)  ---------------+---
-------- --------f.-----
V.  Hands 
-+-
1  1  2  2 
I 
f----
VI.  Lower  limbs  I 
(excluding  feet)  (4) 
I 
! 
VII.  Feet  I 
VIII.  Multiple  locations 
IX.  Not  specified  X  t>< t>< X  t>< [X X  ~  X 
TOTAL  1  1  2  2 
(Frequency  rates) 
Concussion  Open  wounds 
contusions 
and  inter- and muscular 
abrasions 
nal  injury 
4  5 
Fatal  >  56  Fatal  >  56 
days  acci- total  days  acci- total 
(5)  dents  (5)  dents 
3  3 
I 
I  I 
~  X  ~ 
1  1 
X  [X  V< 
I 
3  3 
~  [X  [X 
4 
I 
4 
i 
I 
I 
[X  [X [X 
I 
I 
! 
1  1 
X  X  V< X  [X [X 
12  12 
(1)  Nwnber  of houre  worked by  pit staff and  e~Loyees of contractor firma  who  beLong  to a  miner's  sociaL insurance  scheme. 
( 2)  incLuding  co~  Lications. 
(3)  The  shouLders  and  the wrists are  incLuded under  "upper  Urri>s". 
(4)  The  hips  and  the  ankLes  are  incLuded under  "Lo!Jer  Limbs". 
(5)  CaLender  days. 
Burns  and 
harmful  effects 
of electricity 
and  radiation 
6 
>  56  Fatal 
days  acci- total 
(5)  dents 
I 
I 
i 
I 
I 
Table  2b 
YEAR  :  1971 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1):  1  174  922 
Poisoning  Multiple  injuries 
and  of  those not  TOTAL 
suffocation  specified  (2) 
7  8  9 
Fatal  >  56  Fatal 
4  to  21  to  Fatal  >  56  20  56  >  56 
days  acci- total  days  acci- total 
days  days  days  acci- total 
(5)  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  (5)  (5)  dents 
~  ~  ~ 
8  3  3  14 
t>< ~  t>< 
25  1  - - 26 
X  [X [X 
27  10  - - 37 
X  X  t>< 
28  3  1  - 32 
H 
X  [X X 
94  28  6  - 128 
[X  [X  [X 
49  13  4  - 66 
[X  [X [X 
25  13  - - 38 
X  X  [X 
1  1  9  2  2  13 
1  1  265  73  16  - 354 MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  ACCIDENT  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  CAUSE  AND  SITE 
OF  ACCIDENT  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY  Table  lb 
Common  Statistics  on  victims 
of accidents  underground  in  coal  mines  (frequency  rates) 
COUNTRY  Netherlands  YEAR  :  1971 
COAL-FIELD  South-Limbourg  MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1)  9.890  552 
SITE  OF  THE  ACCIDENT  Production  faces 
Headings  excluding 
shafts  and  staple-pits  Shafts  and staple-pits  Other  places 
Total of 
accidents  underground 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
>56 
days 
(3) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
)  56 
days 
(3) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
I. FALLS  OF  GROUNDS  AND  ROCKS  32,657  4,449  2,325  0,101  39,533  3,235  0,506  0,101  -
II.  TRA.'ISPORT,  TOTAL  1,011  0,303  0,202  1,517  0,101  0,101  -
a)  Continuous  Transport  0, 910  0,303  0,101  1,314  0,101 
b)  Discont1nuous  Transport  0,101  0,101  0,202  0,101  -
II  I.  FALLS  AND  MOVEMENT  OF  THE  VICTIM, 
TOTAL  2, 528  0, 202  2, 730  1,618  0,101  0,101  -
a)  while  moving  about  the  mine 
b)  in  the  course  of other activities  2,528  0,202  2,730  1,618  0,101  0,101  -
IV.  MACHINES,  TOOLS  AND  SUPPORTS 
41,656  2,427  0,910 
total 
3,842 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
0,202  0,404 0,101 
0,101 
0,101  0,404  0,101 
1,820  0,10 
1,820  0,10 
3,337  0,30 
>56 
days 
(3) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
)56 
days 
(3) 
3,438  0,708  0,101 
0,506  7,280  2,528  1,517 
3,741  0,809  0,506 
0,506  3,539  1,719  1,011 
0,101  10,313  2,325  0,303 
3,943  1,011  0,101 
0,101  6,370  1,314  0,202 
Fatal 
acci- total 
dents 
4  to 
20 
days 
(3) 
21  to 
56 
days 
(3) 
)56 
days 
{3) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
4,246  9,330  5,662  2,528 0,101  47,62 
- 11,324  8,796  2,932  1,820  - 13'  548 
5,055  4,752  1,112  0,607  - 6,47 
6,269  4,044  1,820  1,213  - 7,07 
- 12,942  4,559  2,629  0,404  - 17,59 
5,055  3,943  1,011  0,101  - 5,05 
7,886  10,616  1,618  0,30  12,53 
0,303  10,920  2,629  0,708  - 14,256  6,003  10,515  3,03  59,55  TOTAL 
-------------------------4----~----~--~----~---1----~---r----r---~----r---~---1-----r----~-----------~--------- -----~----+------------+----+-----
32,355  6,976  2,325 
a)  Machines  0,809  0,404  0,404 
b)  Tools 
1  6,168  o,1o8  o,3o3 
c)  Supports  25,378  5,864  1,618 
V.  FALLS  OF  OBJECTS  4,954  1,112  0,101 
---
VI.  EXPLOSIVES 
IGNITIONS  OR  EXPLOSIONS  , 
OF  FIREDA."1P  AND  COAL  DUST  i -
OUTBURSTS  OF  GAS,  DE -OXYGENATION ,j 
SUFFOCATION  OR  POISONING  BY  NATU-~ 
a)  Outbursts  of Gas 
b)  De-oxygenation  and  Poisoning 
1,618 
7,179  1,618  0,9101  -
32,860  0,809 
6,168  0,910  0,202  0,101  -
I  -
0,910  0,202  1,112  1,719  0,404  0,60  2,73( 
2,528  0,30  0,303  8,594  2,224  0,202  - 11,021  16,683  3,842  0,506  - 21,03( 
0,809  1,415  0,404  0,303  2,123  27,602  6,269  1,92  35,79 
1,213  0,20  0,101  0,303  8,493  '3,438  1,011  - 12,942  14,559  4,853  1,21  20,62E 
56 
rw 
Group 
accidents  (2) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
- --f.---~ -- - ---- 1 
I 
J 
r 
~ai:A~ASES  (C02'  CH4,  co,  H2S)'  I 
by  natural Gases  ~~-+----+----+----+-----r---+----+----+---~----+---~----r----+----+----+----+----1----+----+----+----+----+---~----+---~----~--4----~ 
IX.  HEATINGS  OR  FIRES 
I  X.  INRUSHES 
1-----------------------+--~--~--~----~--+---~--r---r---~--t---r---t---+---+---~--~---r---r--~---+--~---+--~---+--~--~--~--~ 
XI.  ELECTRICITY 
XII.  OTHER  CAUSES  6,774  1,314  8,089  1,415  0,202  1,618  0,80  0,809  0,908  1,112  0,20  - 11,223  18,907  2,629  Q,20li  - 21,73 
TOTAL  80,279  4,357  4,954  0,101  99,691  9,706  1,921  0,404  - 2,032  1,82C  0,202  2,022  50,351  12,739  3,842  - 66,933  42,15  29,22(  9,201 0,101  80,67 
(1)  Nwribel'  of haul's  wopked by pit staff and errployees  of contru.ctor  fil'fflB  who  belong to  a  rrdnel';;s<~ 1~s;;::o;-;;<n7:·a::'il~-z.::·n::B7:Ul':::an;:-c:::e:-'::-sc::;:h:;;:eme=-'.c__ __  _L  ____  ,__  __  ___._ ____  _L_  __  __._ ____  _L_  __  _L  ____  J..._ __  _L  ____  L_  __  _i_  ____  ~~__l_--_jl__  __  _L_  __  -1 
(2)  Accidents involving moPe  than  five  casualties  (i.e,  who  eithel' died Ol'  were  unable  to Pesume  WOl'k  undePgPound  foP at  least eight weeks). 
(3)  Calendel'  oo~w~t·~·--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------__j 
H MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common  Statistics  on  victims 
of  accidents  underground in  coal  mines 
COUNTRY  Netherlands 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  LOCATION 
AND  NATURE  OF  INJURY  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(absolute  figures) 
YEAR:  1971 
COAL-FIELD  South-Limbourg  MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1):  9  890 552 
Amputations 
and 
NATURE  OF  THE  INJURY 
enucleations 
PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
>  56 I  Fat~l I 
(5)  dents 
Fractures 
with  or without 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
dis location 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Luxations, 
twists  and 
sprains 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Concussion 
and  inter-
nal  injury 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
Open  wounds 
contusions 
and muscular 
abrasions 
Burns  and 
harmful effects 
of electricity 
and  radiation 
>  56  Fatal  >  56 
Poisoning 
and 
suffocation 
>  56  Fatal 
days  acci- total  days 
(5)  dents  (5) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total  days  acci- total 
(5)  dents 
days  laccl-~total 
LOCATION  OF  THE  INJURY 
I. Head  and  neck  -i-1- '- 4---'- ',
1
- 4-- -~ 
I  I  I 
r
iV •  ~~~~~u~~:s  the  hands)  - I  - 1  - l  5 
r  3;  I  ~  ! 
----------T- ·.~:--+---+----
''""''  i,i-1'1"  -- r-t-
VI.  Lower  limbs 
(excluding  feet)  (4)  14 
Multiple  injuries 
of those not 
specified  (2) 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
Table  2a 
TOTAL 
4  to  21  to 
20  56 
days  days 
(5)  (5) 
141  14 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
11 
36 
Fatal 
acci- total 
dents 
- 166 
- 139 
- 784 
VII.  Feet  12  12  _ XD<4------"'~I----+--- l _--+-_  +---+-1  _  -+--- _ ---f-----l:Xl><~t><------:j.---+--+-------+--- 134--1------+63  ---~----12  _ ---l--------l209 
~-,---XX[>< 
VIII.  Multiple  locations 
IX.  Not  specified 
TOTAL  58  58  27 
(1)  Nwnber  of houre  worked by pit staff and eT/f)Zoyees  of contractor firms  who  belong to a  miner's social insu.rance  scheme. 
(2)  including compZieations. 
(3)  The  shoulders and  the wrists are  inaluded under  "upper  limbs". 
(4)  The  hips  and the  ankles  are ineluded under  "Lower  limbs". 
(5)  Calender days. 
11  2  - 15 
27  1406  289  91  1787 
H MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common  Statistics  on  victims 
of  accidents  underground  in  coal  mines 
COUNTRY  Netherlands 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  LOCATION 
ANO  NATURE  OF  INJURY  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(Frequency  rates) 
Table  2b 
YEAR  :  1971 
COAL-FIELD  South  Limbourg  MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1)  9  890  552 
NATURE  OF  THE  INJURY 
PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
LOCATION  OF  THE  INJURY 
I.  Head  and  neck 
II.  Eyes 
Amputations  Fractures  Luxations, 
and  with  or without  twists  and 
enucleations  dislocation  sprains 
>  56  Fatal I 
days  acci-~total  days  acci- total  days  acci- total 
(5)  dents  (5)  dents  (5)  dents 
Fatal  Fatal  >  56  >  56  >  56 
days 
(5) 
Concussion 
and  inter-
nal  injury 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
Open  wounds 
contusions 
and  muscular 
abrasions 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
Bums  and 
harmful effects 
of electricity 
and  radiation 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
Poisoning 
and 
suffocation 
>  56  Fatal 
days 
(5) 
acci- total 
dents 
I - 1- ! - '·"'  - '""'  - - - '·"'  - '·'"  '·'"'  - '·'"'  - - - XXX 
Multiple  injuries 
of  those not 
specified  (2) 
>  56  Fatal 
days  acci-
(5)  dents 
total 
TOTAL 
>  56  Fatal 
4  to 
20 
days 
(5) 
21  to 
56 
days 
(5) 
days  acci- total 
(5)  dents 
4,256  1,415  1,112  - 16'  784 
9,100  0,101  0,101  - 9,302  i - : - 1- ;<xtxi><JX[X --- '·"'i - '·"'1- I  - - XXX 
III.--T-r--u-n-k -----r----r- I  o.:.-_--~,-0-,1-01---11~--f-1  --~_'-_--~-----tJ----r-----+--O-,l-0--t,l-----t-O-,l-O--t,!- ... ---t-_---t!---TIX----,J;[X-----J;-X--+-----t---t--_  -t-6-,-87-St-0-,8-0-9+-1  0_,2_0_2+------ 7,8~ 
f-----IV--.-~-~~-~~-ud- 1 ~-:-st-he-ha-nd-s)-+~~---~i  ----~  ---'-0-,5-06--+-------t-0-,5-06---t-i  ---+~---- -~  0,<0,1  - O,W>i  - - I - X[XXr  - - - • 
12,133  1,315  0,607  14,054 
+--------------------------+-------,---+-- ~---- - ___  ,  ___ +- ><J[Xl[xj  :  -+-----11-----jxf-----~xf---------, <--x-- ~----t---+-----11---+---1------+----+----1 
i  I  il  I  I  I  i  I  I  I 
V.  Hands  0,202  - i 0,202  i  2,123  i  - 2,123  I  - i  - I  - ~  1,315~~  - f  1,3151  - - - - - - 60,260  15,368  3,640  - 79,267  ---t  I  r-~--t-j-------+----*-~'----~1---*---+---4j--+---l-+---+-----l:- --J--- 1-- ---t----+---+------+---+----- __ 
----~~~~---t~---+---+!  ---+~  1-,4-16+-------t-1-,4-16+
1 
_0,1-01+ 1 --_t--
1
1  0-,1-0lf-[>(----](-IJ-------i:[XJ;:----t---0-,60---t'i~----t-!_0_,60-+'l_---t----t-------i;-x----:if-~-----if-V(----:r---------t-----t-----j~-'4,_87-2+  _3,-640--t-2,--123+-----+3-0,6--!35 
i  - I'·"' - '·"'  - - -~XN  - 1- I  - ! - - - XXX 
VI.  Lower  limbs 
(exclud1ng  feet)  (4) 
VII.  Feet 
1-
~-V-II-I-.-~-l-tt-.p-~-~-9-t-io_n_s-+!I---+----+----+--O,-l-M+---~O-,-W-l+---~~--~t----~--f- _  ~~- ~~ ___ ~[>(~ 
IX.  Not  specified  XXXXX[>(Xt><XXXV(XXX 
TOTAL  0, 202  - 0,202  5,864  - 5,864  o, 101  - 0,101 0,303  - 0,303  2,730  -
(1)  Number>  of hours  wor>ked  by  pit staff and employees  of aontructor>  fi1'171S  who  belong to a  miner's soaial insurance  scheme, 
(2)  including complications. 
(3)  The  shoulder>s  and  the wrists  are  included under  "upper  Zirrbs". 
(4)  The  hips  and the  ankles  are inaluded under>  "Lower>  Zirrbs". 
(5)  Calender  days. 
2, 730  -
0,101  0,101 
- 0,101  0,101 
13,548  6,370  1,213  - 21,131 
1,112  0,202  0,202  - 1,517 
0,101  0,101 
- 142,156  29,220  9,200  0,101  18QP77 
H DECISION  (1) 
OF  9 JULY,  1957 
CONCERNING  THE  TERMS  OF  REFERENCE  AND  RULES 
OF  PROCEDURE  OF  THE  MINES  SAFETY  COMMISSION 
ANNEX  II 
(1)  See  ''JournaZ  offiaieZ de  Za  Communaute  europeenne  du  charbon et de  l 'aaier" no.  28  of 
the  31st August  195?. II,  3 
COUNCIL  OF  t1INISTERS 
DECISION 
of  9  July  1957 
concerning  the  terms  of  reference  and  rules 
of  procedure  of  the Mines  Safety Commission 
Having  taken note  of  the  Recommendations  adopted  by  the Conference 
on  Safety  in Coalmines  and  of  the  proposals  submitted by  the High Author-
ity in connection with  the Conference's final Reportt which  afford  a  working 
basis f\r  the  improvement  of  safety in coalmines,  and 
having  regard  to  their Decisions at  the  Council's  36th and  42th sessions 
on  September  6,  1956  and  on May  9  and  10,  1957t  setting up  the Mines  Safety 
Commission, 
THE  REPRESENTATIVES  OF  THE  GOVERNMENTS  OF  THE  MEMBER  STATES  MEETING 
AT  THE  SPECIAL  COUNCIL  OF  MINISTERS, 
- hereby  lay  down  that  the  terms  of  reference of  the  aforesaid Commission 
shall  be  as  follows~ 
1.  The  Commission  shall  follow  developments  regarding  safety  in coalmines,  including 
those  regarding  the  safety regulations  instituted by  the  public authoritiest  and 
assemble  the  necessary  information  concerning  progress  and  practical results ob-
tained,  more  especially in the matter  of  accident  prevention. 
To  secure  the  necessary  information,  the Commission  snail-apply  to  the  Governments 
concerned. 
The  Commission  shall evaluate  the  information in its possession and  submit  to  the 
Governments  proposals  for  the  improvement  of  safety in coalmines. 
2.  The  Commission  shall help  the  High Authority  to work  out  a  method  of  compiling 
intercomparable  accident statistics. 
3.  The  Commission  shall ensure  the  prompt  forwarding  to  the  quarters directly concerned 
(including  in particular mines  inspectorates  and  employers'  and  workers'  associa-
tions)  of  relevant  information assembled  by  it. 
4.  The  Commission  shall ascertain,  by  regular  contact with  the  Governments,  what  action 
is being  taken  to  implement  the  proposals  of  the  Conference  on  Safety  in Coalmines, 
and  such  proposals  as  it may  itself draw up. 
5.  The  Commission  shall propose  such  study  and  research as  it deems most indicated for 
the  improvement  of  safety, with notes  as  to  the way  in which  these  can best be ef-
fected. 
6.  The  Commission  shall facilitate  the  exchange  of  information and  experience  among 
persons  responsible for  safety matters,  and  propose  appropriate measures  for  this 
purpose  (e.g.  organization of  study  sessions,  establishment  of  documentation ser-
vices). 
7.  The  Commission  shall propose  appropriate measures  for  ensuring  the necessary liaison 
among  the  rescue  services  of  the  Community  countries. II,  4 
B.  The  Commission  shall submit annually to  the Council  of Ministers  and  the High Author-
ity a  Report  on its activities and  on developments  regarding safety in coalmines  in 
the different member  States.  In this connection,  il shall  in particular examine  the 
statistics compiled  on accidents  and  incidents  in coalmines. 
- The  Representatives of  the Governments  further  lay down  that  the rules 
of  procedure of  the Commission  shall be  those set forth in the Annex  to 
the present Decision. 
- The  Representatives of  the Governments  trust that  the  High Authority will 
arrange for  the Commission  to start work  at the earliest possible moment. 
This Decision was  adopted by  the Council at its forty-fourth session, 
on July 9,  1957. 
For  the Council, 
(sgd.)  J.  REY 
President. II,  5 
RULES  OF  PROCEDURE 
of  the Mines  Safety Commission 
CHAIRMAN 
Article 1 
The  Chairman  of  the Mines  Safety Commission  shall be  a  Member  of  the  High 
Authority  of  the  European Coal  and  Steel  Community. 
Article  2 
ANNEX 
The  Chairman shall conduct  the  work  of  the  Commission  in accordance with  these 
Rules  of  Procedure. 
MEMBERS 
Article  3 
The  Commission  shall consist  of  24  members  appointed  by  the  Governments;  each 
country  shall  have  four  members,  of  whom  two  shall be  representatives  of  that country's 
Governments.  one  of  the  employers  and  one  of  the workers. 
Each  Government  shall  send  in writing  to  the  Chairman  a  nominal  roll of  the 
members  appointed  by  it. It shall notify  the Chairman  of  all changes  in this. 
Each  Government  may  appoint  for  any particular meeting  of  the  Commission  one  or 
two  advisers,  whose  names  it shall  send  to  the Chairman. 
I~L.O~  PARTICIPATION 
Article 4 
Representatives  of  the  International  Labour  Organization shall be  invited  to 
attend  the  proceedings  of  the  Commission  in a  consultative  capacity. 
U.K.  PARTICIPATION 
Article 5 
Delegates  appointed  by  the  Government  of  the  United  Kingdom  may  attend  the  pro-
ceedings  of  the  Commission  as  observers. 
ORGANIZATION 
(a)  Restricted Committee 
Article  6 
A Restricted Committee  shall be  set up,  to  consist of  Governments  represent-
atives  on  the  Commission. II,  6 
Article 7 
The  Chairman  of  the Commission  shall act as  Chairman  of  the Restricted  Committee. 
Article 8 
The  function  of  the Restricted  Committee  shall be  to  ensure  permanent  liaison 
among  the  Governments  of  the member  States  and  between  them  and  the Commission,  more  espe-
cially for  the  purpose of  exchanging relevant  information.  The  Restricted  Committee  shall  see 
to  the preparation of  the Commission's  activities. 
Article  9 
The  Restricted Committee  shall  be  convened  by  the  Chairman. 
The  Chairman  shall be  required  to  convene  it when  asked  to  do  so  by  the  represent-
atives of  three or more  Governments. 
(b)  Working  Parties 
Article 10 
The  Commission  of  the Restricted  Committee  may  set up  Working  Parties of  experts 
to  consider  specific  technical matters. 
Article  11 
The  Working  Parties  shall decide  their  own  modus  operandi. 
Article  12 
The  Restricted  Committee  shall  be  given reports  by  the  Working  Parties  on  the 
results  of  their proceedings,  which it shall  submit  to  the  Commission with  the  comments 
of  its members. 
In  the  event  of  differences  of  op~n~on within  the  Working  Parties,  the views 
expressed  shall be  given,  together with  the  names  of  those  expressing  them. 
SECRETARIAT 
Article  13 
The  High Authority  shall  be  responsible for  the  secretarial arrangements  in 
connection with  the work  of  the Commission,  the Restricted Committee  and  the  Working 
Parties. 
These  arrangements  shall be  underthe charge  of  a  High Authority staff member 
appointed  to  act as  Secretary. 
All documents  shall be  in  the  tour official  languages  of  the  Community. II,  7 
WORKING  PROCEDURE 
Article  14 
The  Chairman  shall  fix  the  agenda  and  the  dates  of meetings  after consultation 
with  the  members  of  the Restricted Committee. 
Article 15 
The  Chairman  shall allow  to  speak  any  member  of  the  Commission,  representative 
of  the  International Labour  Organization or  United  Kingdom  observer  asking  to  do  so. 
The  Chairman  may  allow advisers  to  speak. 
Article 16 
The  members  of  the  High Authority  shall  have  the right  to  attend meetings  of  the 
Commission  and  of  the Restricted  Committee,  and  to  speak  there. 
The  Chairman  may  bring with him  advisers,  whom  he  may  allow  to  speak. 
Article  17 
Where  the  Commission  or  the Restricted  Committee  deems  it desirable  to  obtain 
information concerning  the various  aspects  of  safety  in coalmines,  it shall request  this 
from  the  Governments  of  the member  States. 
Article  18 
Sixteen members  shall constitute a  quorum.  Conclusions  shall  be  adopted  by major-
ity of  the members  present. 
Proposals  by  the  Commission  under  1,3  of  its terms  of  reference  shall,  however, 
require  a  vote  in favour  by  two-thirds  of  the members  present,  and  by  not  less  than thirteen 
members  in all. 
Any  dissenting op1n1ons  shall be  brought  to  the  attention of  the  Governments 
should  the  members  expressing  them  so  request. II,  8 
THE  COUNCIL 
DECISION  (1) 
of  March  11,  1965 
of  the Representatives  of  the  Governments 
of  the  Member  States  assembled  in  the  Special 
Council  of Ministers  to modify  the decision 
of  July  9,  1957 
concerning  the  terms  of  reference  and  rules 
of  procedure  of  the Mines  Safety Commission 
THE  REPRESENTATIVES  OF  THE  GOVERNMENTS  OF  THE  MEMBER  STATES  ASSEMBLED 
IN  THE  SPECIAL  COUNCIL  OF  MINISTERS  -
having  regard  to  the  dec~sion of  July  9,  1957  regarding  the  terms  of 
reference  and  rules  of  procedure  of  the Mines  Safety Commission,  and 
having  regard  to  the  High Authority's  proposal  of  January  7,  1964, 
and 
seeing  that  this decision  in no  way  affects Article  118  of  the Treaty 
setting up  the  European  Economic  Commununity, 
DECIDE: 
Article  1 
The  terms  of  reference of  the  Mines  Safety Commission  laid down  by  the  decision 
of  July  9,  1957  are replaced  by  the  provisions  in the  annex. 
Article  2 
The  prov~s~ons of Article  17  of  the  rules  of  procedure  annexed  to  the Decision 
of  July  9,  1957  are  replaced  by  the  following  provisions: 
"Should  the  Mines  Safety Commission  or  the Restricted  Committee  consider  it 
desirable  to  receive  information regarding  the various  fields  for  which  it is 
responsible,  it shall  apply  to  the  Governments  of  the member  States." 
This  decision was  adopted  by  the  Council  at  its one-hundredth  session,  on 
March  11,  1965. 
For  the Council 
(sgd.)  M.  MAURICE-BOKANOWSKI 
President 
(1)  See  "Journal officiel de  la  Communaute  europeenne  du  charbon  et de  Z'acier" no.  46 
of 22nd  March  1965. II,  9 
ANNEX 
TERMS  OF  REFERENCE  FOR  THE  MINES  SAFETY  COMMISSION 
1.  The  Commission  shall follow  developments  regarding  safety  and  measures  to  avoid  at work-
ing-points  conditions which  represent  a  danger  to health  in coalmines,  including  to  this 
end  the  safety regulations instituted by  the public authorities and  assemble  the  necessary 
information concerning progress  and  practical results obtained. 
To  secure  the necessary  information,  the  Commission  shall  apply  to  the  Governments  con-
cerned. 
The  Commission  shall evaluate  the  information  in its possession and  submit  to  the  Govern-
ments  proposals  for  the  improvement  of  safety  and  healthy conditions  in coalmines. 
2.  The  Commission  shall help  the  High  Authority  to  work  out  a  method  of  compiling  inter-
comparable  statistics on  accidents  and  damage  to health attributable  to vocational 
activities  in coalmines. 
3.  The  Commission  shall  ensure  the  prompt  forwarding  to  the  quarters directly concerned 
(including  in particular mines  inspectorates  and  employers'  and  workers'  associations) 
of relevant  information assembled  by  it. 
4.  The  Commission  shall ascertain,  by  regular  contact with  the  Governments,  what  action 
is being  taken  to  implement  the  proposals  of  the  Conference  on  Safety  in Coalmines, 
and  such proposals  as  it may  itself draw  up. 
5.  The  Commission  shall propose  such  study  and  research as  it deems  most  indicated  for 
the  improvement  of  safety,  and  of  healthy working  conditions  in coalmines,  with notes 
as  to  the way  in which  these  can be  effected. 
6.  The  Commission  shall facilitate  the  exchange  of  information and  experience  among  per-
sons  responsible for  safety matters  and  the maintenance  of  healthy working  conditions, 
and  propose  appropriate measures  for  this purpose  (e.g.  organization of  study sessions, 
establishment  of  documentation  services). 
7.  The  Commission  shall propose  appropriate measures  for  ensuring  the  necessary  liaison 
among  the  rescue  services  of  the  Community  countries. 
8.  The  Commission  shall  submit  annually  to  the Council  of Ministers  and  the  High Autority 
a  Report  on its activities and  on  developments  regarding  safety and  protection of  health 
in coalmines  in the different member  States.  In this connection,  it shall  in particular 
examine  the statistics compiled  in  these fields. TERMS  OF  REFERENCE  OF  THE  VARIOUS  WORKING  PARTIES 
OF  THE  MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH  COMMISSION 
Annex  III III,  3 
I  - Working  Party on Electrification - Chairman  Mr  Logelain 
Terms  of  reference 
1.  Comparing  adopted  safety and  accident  prevention provisions  relating to: 
(a)  electric  shock, 
(b)  fire hazard, 
(c)  explosion hazard. 
2.  Ascertaining  the present  pos1t1on  in Community  countries with  regard  to  safety 
regulations  on  underground  electrical networks  of  low  and  medium  voltage  (up 
to  1  100  V)  and  feeder  cables  for  movable  equipment,  with  due  regard  to  the 
specifications  for  the  said  cables. 
3.  Reporting  on  steps  to  be  taken when  work  has  to  be  carried out  on  electrical 
equipment  under  voltage. 
4.  Studying  the  construction of high-tension  cables  (of  up  to  6  000  V)  used  under-
ground,  and  protective equipment. 
5.  Study  of  the  problem of  stray currents. 
6.  Periodic  reports  on  oil-powered  contactors  used  in gassy  environments. 
7.  To  follow  the  development  of  techniques  designed  to  eliminate entirely the 
production of  sparks  on  electrical  contact  lines  (battery motors  excluded)  and 
in particular  to  take  note  of  the  new  technique  of  traction by  linear motors. 
8.  Investigation of  the  use  of  remote-control  circuits  in automated  mining  opera-
tions. 
II  -Working Party  on  Rescue  Arrangements,  Fires  and  Underground  Combustion-
Chair~an Mr  Coenders 
A.  General  terms  of  reference 
(Art.  7  of  the  Terms  of  Reference  of  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission) 
Exchange  of  experience  between  the  Community  countries  and  the  United  Kingdom 
on: 
1.  Rescue  operations  and  action against  spontaneous  combustion, heatings  and  fires 
on  the  occasion of  accidents  or  other  events  underground  requiring  the assis-
tence  of  rescue  teams,  from which  useful  lessons  have  been  learned; 
2.  Organization of  rescue  operations  underground  and  the  presentation of  reports 
every  two  years; 
3.  The  prevention of  spontaneous  combustion,  heatings  and  fire outbreaks  under-
ground,  the  fighting  and  control  of  spontaneous  combustion,  heatings  and 
fires,  and  reopening  sealed-off workings. 
B.  Special  terms  of  reference 
1.  Comparison  of practical  arrangements  of  rescue  operations  existing in the 
Community  countries  and  the  United  Kingdom  and  possibly  the drafting of  a 
standard plan of  pt·ocedure  for  the  Community  as  a  whole. III,  4 
2.  Exchange  of  experience  and  practical knowledge  in the  following  fields: 
(a)  methods  and  apparatus  for  the  early detection of  combustion,  heatings  and 
pit fires, 
(b)  CO  self-rescuers, 
(c)  Oxygen  deficiency warning  devices, 
(d)  Fires  in  long  plant) 
(e)  Sealing off  abandoned  workings, 
(f)  Specifications  and  testing conditions  for  fire-resistant  fluids  for 
mechanical  power  transmission, 
3.  Condensed  comparative  survey of  new  regulations  and  guidelines  promulgated 
by  the mining  authorities  of member  countries  and  the  United  Kingdom  on 
rescue  arrangements,  first  aid  and  fire  fighting  and  prevention. 
C.  Analysis  of  results  (partial or overall)  of  research projects  at  present  in 
progress  so  as  to: 
1.  Improve  borehole  rescue  techniquest 
2.  Define  the  standards  to  which  flameproof  clothing  should  conform. 
D.  Studies  to  be  completed  by  the  Groupe  of Experts  on  Budryk's  theory  on  the 
following  subjects: 
1.  Extent  of  instability of  diagonal  ventilation roadways, 
2.  Effects  of  a  fire  on workings  with  descensional ventilation, 
3.  Resources  to  be  applied  to  combat  the  danger  of  explosion during firefighting. 
III  - Working  Party  on  Winding  Ropes  and  Shaft  Guides:  Chairman Hr  Martens 
Terms  of  reference 
1.  Follow-up  of  progress  made  in the  testing of winding  ropes  by  means  of  appropri-
ate  instruments  in order  to  obtain information concerning  its application in 
the  mines  of  the  Community  and  the United  Kingdom. 
2.  Testing  of  couplings  for  circular  and  flattened winding  ropes. 
3.  Arrangements  for  the  installation and  inspection of  capels. 
4.  Testing  of  guides  for winding  cages  in drafts  and  guide  mechanismus  for  cable 
haulage  in  roadways. 
5.  Maintenance  required  to  ensure  safe operation of winding  ropes  and  balance  ropes. 
6.  Use  of  studies  on  the  dynamic  behaviour  of  shaft  and  roadway  ropes. 
7.  Exchange  of  views  on  the properties  operating  conditions  and  strength of 
winding  ropes  of particular interest. 
8.  Discussion  on  accidents  involving winding  and  hauling  ropes  and  their couplings, 
which  could  provide  new  info•mation. III,  5 
IV  - Working  Party  on  Mining  Accident  Statistics:  Chairman  Mr  Koch 
Terms  of  reference 
In order  to  enable  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  to  draw  conclusions  on 
accident  prevention,  the  frequency  or  underground  accidents  in  the  Community  coal 
mines  should  be  examined,  with  the  following  objectives: 
1.  To  decide  on  suitable mathematical  statistical system, 
2.  To  evaluate,  with  their aid,  chronological  differences  in  frequency  together 
with differences  from  country  to  country or coalfield  to  coalfield. 
V  - Working  Party  on  Combustible  Dusts:  Chairman  Mr  Cheradame 
Terms  of  reference 
Taking  into  account  the  mechanism of  dust  combustion  and  of  flame  propagation  and 
the  various  factors  which  may  influence this,  including  the  fact  that  methane  is 
frequently  involved  in this phenomenon,  the working  party is  instructed  to  carry out 
a  study  of precautions  against  dust  combustion,  in particular: 
a)  dust  neutralisation  (dust  control  in situ,  stone  dusting,  spraying,  dust 
fixation by  means  of  spreading salts  and  coagulating pastes,  etc.),  this  study 
to  include  the  comparative  analysis  of  the  regulations  and  instructions  applied 
in  the  Community  countries  and  the  United  Kingdom,  along with  the  methods  of 
application of  the  different  processes, 
b)  dust  barriers  of various  types  to  halt  dust  explosions,  mixed  dust-methane 
explosions  and  pure  methane  explosions. 
The  working  party may  make  any  suggestions  for  research work  considered necessary 
to  advance  the  knowledge  of  the  phenomena  studied and  to  promote  safety in  these 
fields. 
VI  - Working  Party  on  Health  in Coal  Mines:  Chairman  Mr  Vandenheuvel 
Studying,  from  the  standpoint  of  technical  prevention  and  industrial medicine,  the 
prevention of  environmental  risks  to  the health  of workers  in coal  mines. 
1.  General  directives  concerning dust  control  methods  where  coal  cutting and  getting 
and  roadway  drivage machinery  is  used. 
2.  Dust  measurement  (methods,  frequency,  measuring points,  conclusions  to  be  drawn 
etc.)  and  where  necessary establishing  a  scale of  comparison  of  the  various 
metpods  employed. 
3.  Est~blishment of  dustiness  thresholds.  Definition of  categories  of  permissible 
dustiness.  Steps  to  be  taken  when  faced  with various  categories  of dustiness. 
4.  Medical  problems: 
(a)  Among  the  medical  problems  involved  in  the  control  of  ambient  health hazards 
to  coal  mine  workers,  priority must  be  given  to  the  study  of  the  following 
factors: 
climate,  noise,  vibration,  lighting,  gas,  etc. 
(b)  The  Secretariat  is  to  be  instructed: 
(i)to set  up  a  medical  consultative  committee, 
(ii)comparison  of  the  provisions  in force  in  the  various  countries  concerning 
the  organisation of  company  medical  services:  selection and  training of 
doctors,  relations between medical  services  and  technical  departments  and 
a  list of  the  tasks  and  functions  of  industrial medicine, IIi,  6 
(iii) a  draft  scheme  to standardise  pre-recruitment medical  examinations, 
periodic  checks  and  checks  in special  instances, 
(IV)  a  draft  scheme  for  a  minimum  degree  of .standardisation in  the  detection 
of  disorders  and  in  the  radiological  supervision of workers  as  regards 
pneumoconiosis  prevention, 
(V)  a  draft  scheme  for  standards  and  criteria in workings  in which  miners 
already  suffering  from  a  deterior~tion in  pulmonary  function  do  not  run 
the  risk of  this  deterioration progressing further. 
VII  - Working  Party  on Effects  of Working  Time  on  Safety at Work,  especially in Diffi-
cult  or Unhealthy Conditions:  Chairman  Mr  Van  der  Hooft 
Terms  of  reference  (suspended): 
Number  of hours  worked  in wet  working  points.  Determining  in what  cases  a  working 
points  is  to  be  considered wet  and  the  precautions  to  be  taken. 
VIII  - Working  Party on Psychological  and  Sociological Factors  affecting  Safety: 
Chairman  Mr  Schnase 
Terms  of  reference 
1.  Community  safety  campaigns. 
2.  Recommendation  on  the  employment  of  foreign  and  young  workers. 
3.  Practical measures  for  the  prevention of  accidents,  taking  into  account 
psychological  and  sociological  factors. 
IX  - Working  Party  on  Ventilation  and  Mine  Gas  - Chairman  Mr  Knuttel 
The  Working  Party on  Ventilation  and  Mine  Gas  will  examine  general  problems  of 
ventilation,  particularly where  prevention of  firedamp  explosions  is  concerned  and 
other means  or measures  showed  be  applied  in order  to  suppress  or  control  firedamp. 
In addition to  the  study  of  firedamp  explosions  occuring  in  the  Community  and  the 
United  Kingdom,  attention will  also  be  devoted  to  usable  results  of  research  in 
the  field  of  firedamp  outbursts,  in  particular where  maximum  permissible  levels 
in ventilation air of  firedamp  and  other poisonous  gases  are  concerned,  and  the 
advance  estimation of  firedamp  emission before  a  working  is  started. 
Attention will  also  be  devoted  to  appropriate  speeds  for  the  flow  of  ventilation 
air,  measures  to  be  taken  in the  event  of  deceleration of  the  flow of air,  measures 
for  the  stabilization of ventilation and  the  means  and  procedures  for monitoring 
ventilation. 
Priority will  be  given  to  examination  of  the  procedures  for  a  possible raising, 
either  local  or  general,  of  the  maximum  permissble  firedamp  level  in ventilation 
air streams  from  1  to  1,50 or  2%,  and  measures  to  be  applied  in this  event  to 
ensure  at  least  equivalent  safety. 
X  - Working  Party on  "Mechanization"  - Chairman  Mr  Koch 
Taking  into  consideration current  techniques  in winning  and  roadway  driving, 
linings  and  roadway  conveyors,  the  working  party is  instructed  to  study partical 
ways  of  preventing  accidents  connected with mechanization. 
In particular,  it is  to: 
(a)  compile  a  schedule  for  machinery  manufacturers  of  the  m1n1mum  work  safety 
requirements  for  mechanical  protection of machines  and  equipment; III,  7 
(b)  study safety provisions  such  as:  visual  and  acoustic  signalling,  operating 
controls  and  in particular  the  ability to  stop machines  from  any  point  on  the 
face  or  roadway,  taking  account  of modern  means  of  telecommunication  and  remote 
control,  electrical protection of motors  in the  event of overloading or  jamming 
of  equipment,  lighting,  etc ... 
XI  - Working  Party on  "Roof  controls"  - Chairman Mr  Hubner 
The  Working  Party  is  instructed to  examine,  by  exchanging  experience  and  evaluating 
the  results  of  research,  whether it is possible to  draw up  measures  or practical 
directives  for  the prevention of  falls  of  ground,  taking  into  account  the  indi-
vidual  features  of  coal measures  and  workings. 
1.  In particular:  In  the interest of better roof  control,  particularly within the 
context  of  working  schedules,  it will  study 
(a)  general  measures  to be  taken  into  consideration in avoiding  falls  of  ground, 
in the  light of  the  type  of  measure  and  conditions  of working,  e.g.  sequence 
of  working  the  seams,  features  of  the working  areas  (length,  speed  of 
advance,  etc.),  type  and  characteristics of  the  lining; 
(b)  specific measures  to  deal with  individual difficulties which  may  or may  not 
foreseeably arise in the  long  term,  such  as  disturbance zones,  protective 
banks,  working  of  a  face  at  right-angles  to  the  end of  an old  seam,  etc •.. 
(c)  specific measures  to  be  taken when  starting off  a  face  in order to  prevent 
abrupt  subsidence of  the  roof. 
2.  It will  also  compare  m~n~ng regulations  on  linings  and  draw  up  minimum  roof 
control  requirements,  taking  into  account  the  characteristics of  the various 
faces  (overall  seam  thickness,  dip,  dead  rock  ... ) . COMPOSITION  OF  THE  MINES  SAFETY 
AND  HEALTH  COMMISSION  AND  ITS  WORKING  PARTIES 
(AS  AT  31.12.1971) 
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A.- MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH  COMMISSION 
FEDERAL  REPUBLIC  OF  GERMANY 
Government  Representatives 
Ministerialrat  W.  SCHNASE,  Referat  III A 1,  Bundesministerium fur Wirtschaft  und  Finanzen 
53  Bonn 
Dipl.-Ing.  A.  COENDERS,  Prasident  des  Landesoberbergamts  Nordrhein-Westfalen,  4600  Dortmund, 
Goebenstrasse  25 
Employers'  Representative 
Bergrat  a.D.  H.  ERNST,  Geschaftsfuhrer  des  Steinkohlenbergbauvereins,  43  Essen, 
Frillendorfer-Strasse  351_ 
Workers'  Representative 
E.  STEBEL,  Leiter des  Sachgebiets  Arbeitsschutz,  IG-Bergbau  und  Energie, 
4630  Bochum,  Alte Hattingerstrasse  19 
Technical  Advisers 
H.  BERG,  Ministerialrat,  Ministerium fur Wirtschaft,  Mittelstand und  Verkehr  des 
Landes  Nordrhein-Westfalen,  4  Dusseldorf,  Haroldstrasse  4 
Berghauptmann  K.  HUBNER,  Leiter des  Oberbergamts  fur  das  Saarland  und  das  Land  Rheinland-
Pfalz,  6600  Saarbrucken,  Am  Staden  17 
BELGIUM 
Government  Representatives 
A.  VANDENHEUVEL,  Directeur-generaal  van het  Mijnwezen,  Ministerie van  Economische  Zaken 
en Energie,  24-26,  rue  J.A.-Demot,  Bruxelles  4 
G.  LOGELAIN~ Directeur general  des  mines,  Ministere  des  affaires  economiques, 
24-26,  rue  J.A.-Demot,  Bruxelles  4 
Employers'  Representative 
A.  HAUSMAN,  Directeur  du  Centre  de  coordination  de  sauvetage  du  bassin  de  Campine, 
555,  Kemp is  che  Steemveg,  Kiewit-Hasselt 
Workers'  Representative 
J.  OLYSIAEGERS,  Secretaire national  de  la Centrale  syndicale  des  travailleurs  des  mines 
de  Belgique,  FGTB,  Koolmijnlaan  1,  Houthalen 
Technical  Advisers 
L.  BOULET,  Directeur  general  du  Fonds  national  de  retraite des  ouvriers mineurs, 
Ministere  du  travail et  de  la prevoyance  sociale,  6,  place  Stephanie,  Bruxelles 
E.  VANDENDRIESSCHE,  Secretaire general  de  la Centrale  des  francs-mineurs,  26-32, 
avenue  d'Auderghem,  Bruxelles  4 
FRANCE 
Government  Representatives 
L.  KOCH,  Ingenieur  en  chef  des  mines,  direction des  mines,  Ministere  de  l'industrie, 
99,  rue  de  Grenelle,  75-Paris  7e 
D.  PETIT 1Ingenieur des  mines,  direction des  mines,  Arrondissement  de  Metz, 
1,  rue  Eugene-Schneider,  57-Metz 
Employers'  Representative 
F.  POT,  Directeur general  des  services  techniques  des  Charbonnages  de  France, 
9,  avenue  Percier,  75-Paris  8e IV,  6 
Workers'  Representative 
L.  CHAUVEAU,  Federation nationale  des  syndicats  chretiens  des  mineurs,  8,  rue  de 
Navarre,  75-Paris  5e 
Technical  Advisers 
St.  NOWAK,  4,  rue  Charcot,  62-Lens 
ITALY 
Government  Representatives 
Dott.  A.  VENTURELLA,  Console d'Italia ad  Esch/Alzette,  Lussemburgo 
Dott.  ing.  M.  MARRA,  ispettore generale delle miniere,  ministero dell'industria e 
commercio,  via Veneto  33,  Roma 
Employers'  Representative 
Prof.  M.  CARTA,  Istituto arte mineraria della facolta d'ingegneria,  Piazza d'Armi, 
Cagliari  (Sardegna) 
Workers'  Representative 
Dott.  G.  CRAVIOTTO,  segretario generale della Federestrattive,  via Isonzo  42,  Roma 
Technical Adviser 
Dott.  C.  MICHELAZZI,  ispettore generale  del ministero del  lavoro  e  della previdenza 
sociale, via Flavia 6,  Roma 
LUXEMBOURG 
Government  Representative 
A.  SCHUSTER,  Ingenieur-directeur  du  travail et  des  mines,  inspection  du  travail et  des 
mines,  19,  av.  Gaston-Diderich,  Luxembourg 
Employers'  Representative 
R.  MAYER,  Ingenieur  de  securite a  l'ARBED,  78,  rue  du  Fosse,  Esch-sur-Alzette 
Workers'  Representative 
N.  PASCOLINI,  President  de  la delegation ouvriere  d'Arbed-Mines,  90,  rue  des  Fleurs, 
Schiff  lange 
NETHERLANDS 
Government  Representatives 
Ir.  A.H.W.  MARTENS,  inspecteur-generaal  der mijnen,  Staatstoezicht op  de  mijnen, 
Apollolaan 9,  Heerlen  (L.) 
Ir.  D.J.  KNUTTEL,  plaatsvervangend  inspecteur-generaal  der  mijne~ Staatstoezicht  op  de 
mijnen,  Apollolaan 9,  Heerlen  (L.) 
Employers'  Representative 
Ir.  G.B.  DEBETS,  directeur,  Oranje-Nassau Mijnen,  Heerlen  (L.) 
Workers'  Representative 
J.M.  WEIJERS,  Vice-voorzitter van  de  Nederlandse Katholieke Mijnwerkersbond, 
Seringenstraat 9,  Passart-Zuid 
Technical Adviser 
H.L.  GROND,  chef  van  de  veiligheidsdienst,  p/a Oranje-Nassau Mijnen,  Heerlen  (L.) 
UNITED  KINGDOM 
Government  Representative 
J.W.  CALDER  O.B.E.,  H.M.,  Chief  Inspector  of Mines  and  Quarries,  Department  of Trade 
and  Industry,  Thames  House  South,  Millbank,  London  S.W.l IV, 7 
J.R.  WILSON,  Assistant  Secretary,  Department  of  Trade  and  Industry,  Thames  House 
South,  Millbank,  London  S.W.l 
Employers'  Representative 
Dr.  H.L.  WILLET,  Deputy  Director-General  of  Production,  National  Coal  Board,  Hobart 
House,  Grosvenor Place,  London  S.W.l 
Workers'  Representative 
S.  SCHOFIELD,  Vice-President  of  the  National  Union  of  Mineworkers,  c/o Miners'  Offices 
Barnsley - Yorkshire 
INTERNATIONAL  LABOUR  ORGANISATION,  GENEVA 
A representative of  the  International  Labour  Office sitting as  an observer. 
B.- RESTRICTED  COMMITTEE 
The  Restricted  Committee  consists  of  the  Government  members  of  the  Mines  Safety  and 
Health  Commission. 
C.- WORKING  PARTIES  ON  TECHNICAL  QUESTIONS 
I.  Working  Party on  Electrification 
- Members  of  the  Working  Party 
GERMANY 
Oberbergamtsdirektor  W.  SCHOTTELNDREIER,  Landesoberbergamt  Nordrhein-Westfalen, 
46  Dortmund,  Goebenstrasse  25 
Dipl.-Ing.  L •. GEBHARDT,  Steinkohlenbergbauverein,  43  Essen,  Frillendorfer Strasse  351 
BELGIUM 
G.  LOGELAIN  (1),  Directeur general  des  mines,  Ministere  des  affaires  economiques, 
24-26,  rue  J.A.-Demot,  Bruxelles  4 
R.  STENUIT,  Directeur divisionnaire a !'Administration des  mines,  24-26,  rue  J.A.-Demot, 
Bruxelles  4 
G.J.A.  COOLS,  Inspecteur  general  des  mines  honoraire,  Eug.  Plasky Laan  75, 
B-1040  Brussel 
FRANCE 
N.  TRETIAKOW,  Ingenieur en  chef  au  service exploitation des  Charbonnages  de  France, 
9,  avenue  Percier,  75-Paris  Be 
F.  VIN,  Ministere  de  l'industrie, service de  l'hygiene et  de  la securite miniere, 
97,  rue  de  Grenelle,  75-Paris  7e 
ITALY  --- Dgtt.  ing.  C.  MACCIONI,  ENEL,  compartimento  Cagliari,  sett.  tecnico,  Piazza Deffenu  2, 
Cagliari 
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LUXEMBOURG 
R.  MAYER,  Ingenieur civil des  mines  a  l'ARBED,  78,  rue  du  Fosse,  Esch-sur-Alzette 
NETHERLANDS 
Ir.  E.A.  R.  HOEFNAGELS,  inspecteur der mijnen,  Staatstoezicht  op  de  mijnen,  Apollolaan 9, 
Heerlen  (L.) 
UNITED  KINGDOM 
S.  LUXMORE,  H.M.  Principal Electrical Inspector  of Mines  and  Quarries,  Thames  House 
South,  Millbank,  London  S.W.l 
R.  Hartill,  Chief Electrical Engineer,  National  Coal  Board,  The  Lodge,  South  Parade, 
Doncaster (Yorkshire) 
- Experts  on  cables  and  leads 
Dr.  J.  UELPENICH,  Land- und  Seekabelwerke,  Niehler Strasse 100,  50  Koln-Nippes 
H.  GOBBE,  Directeur a  la division  cablerie des  ACEC,  Charleroi 
M.  OSTY,  Directeur technique ala Societe  industrielle de  liaisons  electriques, 
64bis,  rue  de  Manceau,  75-Paris  8e 
M.  PAINDAVOINE,  Ingenieur  au  Cerchar,  60-Verneuil-en-Halatte 
Y.  EYRAUD,  Chef  du  laboratoire d'etudes  generales  des  Cables  de  Lyon,  170,  avenue 
Jean-Jaures,  69-Lyon 
Ir.  F.  GOEDBLOED,  Nederlandse Kabelfabriek,  Delft 
Ir.  W.L.  BAER,  N.V.  Hollandse Draad- en Kabelfabriek,  Amsterdam 
II.  Working  Party  on  Rescue  Arrangements  and  on  Fires  and  Underground  Combustion 
- Members  of  the  Working  Party 
GERMANY 
Ministerialdirigent Dr.-Ing.  K.  HELLER  (1),  Ministerium fur Wirtschaft, Mittelstand und 
Verkehr,  Land  Nordrhein-Westfalen,  4  Dusseldorf,  Haroldstrasse  4 
Dipl.-Ing.  E.  BREDENBRUCH,  Leiter der Hauptstelle  fur  das  Grubenrettungswesen  des  Steinkoh-
lenbergbauvereins,  43  Essen-Kray,  Schonscheidtstrasse  28 
Dipl.-Ing.  A.  SCHEWE,  Technischer Leiter der Hauptstelle  fur  das  Grubenrettungswesen  des 
Steinkohlenbergbauvereins,  43  Essen-Kray,  Schonscheidtstrasse  28 
K.  PALM,  Abteilungsdirektor,  Landesoberbergamt  Nordrhein-Westfalen,  4600  Dortmund,  Goeben-
strasse  25-27 
BELGIUM 
A.  VANDENHEUVEL,  Directeur general  des  mines,  Ministere  des  affaires  economiques,  24-26, 
rue  J.A.-Demot,  Bruxelles  4 
G.  LOGELAIN,  Inspecteur  general  des  mines,  Ministere  des  affaires  economiques, 
24-26,  rue  J.A.-Demot,  Bruxelles  4 
R.  STENUIT,  Directeur divisionnaire  a  !'Administration des  mines,  24-26,  rue  J.A.-Demot, 
Bruxelles  4 
L.  DE  CONINCK,  Directeur  du  Centre national belge  de  coordination  des  centrales  de  sauve-
t age,  17,  rue Puissant,  Charleroi 
A.  HAUSMANN,  Directeur du  Centre  de  coordination  de  sauvetage  du  bassin  de  Campine, 
Kempische  Steenweg  555,  Kiewitt-Hasselt 
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FRANCE 
R.  GRISARD,  Ingenieur des  mines,  Charbonnages  de  France,  9,  avenue  Percier, 
75-Paris  8e 
G.  ROGEZ,  Directeur  du  poste  central  de  secours  des  Mines  du  Nord  et  du  Pas-de-Calais, 
rue  Notre-Dame-de-Lorette,  62-Lens 
J.  CRETIN,  Ingenieur divisionnaire,  peste  central  de  secours,  Belle-Roche, 
57-Merlebach 
H.  BONARDOT,  Ingenieur en  chef,  Houilleres  du  bassin  de  la Loire,  9,  rue  Benoit  -
Charvet,  42-Saint-Etienne 
LUXEMBOURG 
R.  MAYER,  Ingenieur  de  securite a l'ARBED,  78,  rue  du  Fosse,  Esch-sur-Alzette 
ITALY 
Dr.  ing.  B.  ANEDDA,  ispettore  generale,  Pal  INA,  09016  Iglesias,  Cagliari 
Dott.  ing.  E.  ORRU,  direttore della miniera  di  Seruci,  casella postale  117, 
09013  Carbonia,  Cagliari 
NETHERLANDS 
Ir.  D.J.  KNUTTEL,  plaatsvervangend  inspecteur-generaal  der mijnen, Staatstoezicht op  de 
mijnen,  Apollolaan 9,  Heerlen  (L.) 
Prof.  dr.  W.  MAAS,  chef  van  de  veiligheidsdienst,  N.V.  Nederlandse  Staatsmijnen, 
Postbus  65,  Heerlen  (L.) 
H.L.  GROND,  chef  van  de  veiligheidsdienst,  p/a Oranje-Nassau Mijnen,  Heerlen  (L.) 
UNITED  KINGDOM 
Dr.  H.L.  WILLETT,  Deputy  Director-General  of  Production,  National  Coal  Board,  Hobart 
House,  Grosvenor Place,  London  S.W.l 
G.  MILLER,  Deputy  Chief  Inspector  of Mines  and  Quarries,  Department  of Trade  and  Industry, 
Thames  House  South,  Millbank,  London  S.W.l 
- Experts  o~ Aspects  of Fires  in Deep  Shafts 
GERMANY 
Dipl.-Ing.  E.  BREDENBRUCH,  Leiter  der Hauptstelle  fur  das  Grubenrettungswesen  des  Stein-
kohlenbergbauvereins,  43  Essen-Kray,  Schonscheidtstrasse  28 
Dr.  rer.  nat.  H.W.  THOENES,  Direktor,  Technischer tlberwachungsverein  e.V.,  43  Essen, 
Steubenstrasse  53 
Dipl.-Ing.  K.  GRUMBRECHT,  Abteilungsleiter,  Versuchsgrubengesellschaft  mbH,  46  Dortmund, 
Tremoniastrasse  13 
Prof.  Dr.  med.  MALORNY,  Direktor  des  Pharmakologischen  Instituts der Universitat  Hamburg, 
2  Hamburg,  Martinistrasse  52 
Prof.  Dr.  med.  C.A.  PRIMAVESI,  Hygiene-Institut  des  Ruhrgebiets,  4650  Gelsenkirchen, 
Rotthauserstrasse  19 
Prof.  Dr.  med.  BENTHE,  Pharmakologisches  Institut  der Universitat  Hamburg, 
2  Hamburg,  Martinistrasse  52 
BELGIUM 
H.  CALLUT,  Ingenieur  en chef  - Directeur des  mines,  Institut national  des  industries 
extractives  (INIEX),  60,  rue  Grande,  7260-Paturages IV,  10 
J.  BRACKE,  Ingenieur principal divisionnaire,  Institut national  des  industries  extrac-
tives  (INIEX),  60,  rue  Grande,  7260-Paturages 
Dr  J.  CRISPOUX,  2,  rue Potresse,  7200-Wasmes 
FRANCE 
G.  BLANPAIN,  Ingenieur,  Centre  d'etudes  et  de  recherches  des  Charbonnages  de  France, 
Verneuil-en-Halatte,  BP  27,  60-Creil 
R.  PLOUCHARD,  Ingenieur des  mines,  chef  du  laboratoire  lubrifiant,  59-Sin-le-Noble 
Dr  AMOUDRU,  Medecin-chef  des  Charbonnages  de  France,  9,  avenue  Percier, 75-Paris  Be 
E.  QUINOT,  Chef  de  la section physique  et  recherches  mathematiques,  Centre  d'etudes  medi-
cales minieres  du  Nord/Pas-de-Calais,  129-133,  avenue  Salengro,  59-Sin-le-Noble 
NETHERLANDS 
Ir.  VAN  BLARICUM,  staatstoezicht  op  de  mijnen,  Apollolaan  9,  Heerlen  (L.) 
- Experts  on  Ventilation 
GERMANY 
Dipl.-Ing.  W.  BOTH,  Hauptstelle  fur  das  Grubenrettungswesen  des  Steinkohlenbergbauvereins, 
43  Essen-Kray,  Schonscheidtstr.  28 
Dr.  rer.  nat.  W.  SCHMIDT,  Prufstelle  fur  Grubenbewetterung,  4630  Bochum,  Herner Strasse  45 
BELGIUM 
R.  STENUIT,  Directeur divisionnaire  a !'Administration des  mines,  24-26,  rue  J.A.-Demot, 
Bruxelles  4 
J.  PATIGNY,  Ingenieur divisionnaire,  institut d'hygiene  des  mines,  Havermarkt  22, 
Hasselt 
FRANCE 
M.  GANIER,  Ingenieur principal,  Cerchar,  35,  rue  St-Dominique,  75-Paris  7e 
J.  CRETIN,  Ingenieur  divisionnaire·,  poste  central  de  secours,  Belle-Roche, 
5 7-Merlebach 
E.  SIMODE,  Ingenieur divisionnaire,  Houilleres  du  bassin  de  Lorraine,  direction des  etudes 
et  des  travaux neufs,  57  Petite-Rosselle 
NETHERLANDS 
Prof. dr.  W.  MAAS,  chef van  de  veiligheidsdienst,  N.V.  Nederlandse  Staatsmijnen, 
Postbus  65,  Heerlen  (L.) 
III.  Working  Party  on  Windin~ Ropes  and  Shaft  Guides 
- Members  of  the  Working  Party 
GERMANY 
Dr.-Ing.  H.  ARNOLD,  Leiter der Seilprufstelle der Westfalischen Berggewerkschafts-
kasse,  4630  Bochum,  Dinnendahlstrasse  9 
Dipl.-Ing.  H.  R~HLINGER, Leiter der Seilprufstelle der Saarbergwerke  AG,  66  Saarbrucken, 
Trierer Strasse  1 
BELGIUM 
G.  LOGELAIN,  Directeur general  des  mines,  Ministere  des  affaires  economiques, 
24-26,  rue  J.A.-Demot,  Bruxelles  4 IV,  11 
R.  STENUIT,  Directeur divisionnaire a !'Administration des  mines,  24-26,  rue  J.A.-Demot, 
Bruxelles  4 
M.  VERWILST,  Association  des  industriels  de  Belgique  (AIB),  29,  avenue A.-Drouart, 
Auderghem 
FRANCE 
P.  BLOMART,  Ingenieur en  chef,  service exploitation des  Charbonnages  de  France, 
9,  avenue  Percier,  75-Paris  8e 
c.  ROGEZ,  Directeur  du  poste  central  de  secours  des  houilleres  du  Nord  et du  Pas-de-Calais, 
rue Notre-Dame-de-Lorette,  62-Lens 
M.  SUEUR,  Houilleres  du  bassin  de  Lorraine,  direction des  travaux,  service  electromecanique, 
57-Merlebach 
ITALY 
Prof.  dott.  ing.  C.  MORTARINO,  Istituto di  meccanica  applicata del  politecnico di 
Torino,  corso Duca  degli  Abruzzi  24,  Torino 
Prof.  dott.  ing.  L.  STRAGIOTTI,  direttore dell'Istituto di  arte mineraria del  politecnico 
di  Troino,  via S.  Quintino  42,  Torino 
LUXEMBOURG 
R.  MAYER,  Ingenieur de  securite a l'ARBED,  78,  rue  du  Fosse,  Esch-sur-Alzette 
NETHERLANDS 
Ir.  A.H.W.  MARTENS  (1),  inspecteur-generaal der mijnen,  Staatstoezicht  op  de  mijnen, 
Apollolaan  9,  Heerlen  (L.) 
Ir.  F.H.  SMULDERS,  Laura en Vereeniging,  Eygelshoven  (L.) 
Ir.  VAN  BLARICUM,  staatstoezicht  op  de  mijnen,  Apollolaan  9,  Heerlen  (L.) 
UNITED  KINGDOM 
G.E.  WINDER,  Head,  Mechanical  Engineering  Section,  Ministry  of  Power,  Safety in Mines 
Research Establishment,  Red  Hill,  Off  Broad  Lane,  Sheffield  3 
J.H.  LONGSTAFFE,  Esq.,  H.M.  Principal  Inspector  of  Mechanical  Engineering,  H.M.  Mines  and 
Quarries  Inspectorate,  Ministry  of  Technology,  Thames  House  South,  Millbank, 
London  S.W.l 
N.  HIGGINSON,  Esq ••  Chief  Mechanical  Engineer  of  the National  Coal  Board,  The  Lodge, 
South Parade.Doncaster,  Yorkshire 
- Experts  on  Winding  Ropes 
GERMANY 
Dipl.-Ing.  H.  GRUPE,  Seilprufstelle der Westfalischen Berggewerkschaftskasse, 
4630  Bochum,  Dinnendahlstrasse  9 
Dipl.-Ing.  W.  GOTZMANN,  Seilprufstelle der Westfalischen Berggewerkschaftskasse, 
4630  Bochum,  Dinnendahlstrasse  9 
FRANCE 
P.  BURGUN,  Directeur-adjoint principal  de  !'Association des  industriels  de  France,  10,  rue 
de  Calais,  75-Paris  9e 
J.  HAPCHETTE,  Ingenieur a !'Association des  industriels  de  France,  2,  passage  de 
Clichy,  75-Paris  9e 
(1)  Chairman  of the  Working  Party  as  representative of the Restricted Committee. IV,  12 
IV.  Working  Party  on  Combustible  Dusts 
GERMANY 
Berghauptmann  K.  HUEBNER,  Leiter  des  Oberbergamts  fur  das  Saarland  und  das  Land 
Rheinland-Pfalz,  6600  Saarbrucken,  Am  Staden  17 
Dr.-Ing.  A.  STEFFENHAGEN,  Geschaftsfuhrer der Versuchsgrubengesellschaft  mbH, 
46  Dortmund,  Tremoniastrasse  13 
E.  STEBEL,  Leiter des  Sachgebiets  Arbeitsschutz,  IG-Bergbau  und  Energie, 
4630  Bochum,  Alte Hattingerstrasse  19 
K.  R5SGEN,  Erster Bergrat  a.D.,  Steinkohlenbergbauverein,  Abteilung Grubensicherheit, 
43  Essen-Kray,  Frillendorfer Strasse  351 
BELGIUM 
A.  VANDENHEUVEL,  Directeur general  des  mines,  Ministere  des  affaires  economiques, 
24-26,  rue  J.A.  Demot,  Bruxelles  4 
H.  CALLUT,  Directeur des  mines,  Institut national  des  industries  extractives  (INIEX), 
60,  rue  Grande,  7260-Paturages 
A.  HAUSMAN,  Directeur  du  Centre  de  coordination  des  moyens  de  sauvetage  de  Campine, 
555,  Kempische  Steenweg,  Kiewitt-Hasselt 
FRANCE 
R.  CHERADAME  (1),  Directeur  general  au  Cerchar,  35,  rue  Saint-Dominique,  75-Paris  7e 
L.  KOCH,  Ingenieur  en  chef,  chef  du  service  des  techniques  minieres,  direction des  mines, 
Ministere  de  l'industrie,  99,  rue  de  Grenelle,  75-Paris  7e 
DELANNOY,  Directeur des  groupes  de  recherches  Cerchar,  35,  rue  Saint-Dominique, 
75-Paris  7e 
M.  SCHWEITZER,  Directeur  du  service  technique  des  Charbonnages  de  France, 
9,  avenue  Percier,  75-Paris  8e 
L.  CHAVEAU,  Federation nationale  des  syndicats  chretiens  des  mineurs,  8,  rue  de  Navarre, 
75-Paris  7e 
St.  NOWAK,  4,  rue  Charcot,  62-Lens 
NETHERLANDS 
Ir.  D.J.  KNUTTEL,  plaatsvervangend  inspecteur-generaal  der mijnen,  Staatstoezicht  op  de 
mijnen,  Apollolaan  9,  Heeren  (L.) 
UNITED  KINGDOM 
Dr.  H.L.  WILLETT,  Deputy  Director-General of Production,  National  Coal  Board, 
Hobart  House,  Grosvenor  Place,  London  S.W.l 
Director of Safety  in Mines,  Research  Establishment,  Ministry  of  Technology,  Field 
Laboratories,  Harpur Hill,  Buxton  (Derbyshire) 
G.  MILLER,  Deputy  Chief,  Inspector  of  Mines  and  Quarries,  Ministry  of  Power,  Thames  House 
South,  Millbank,  London  S.W.l 
J.W.  CALDER,  Esq. •  O.B.E.,  H.M.  Chief  Inspector  of Mines  and  Quarries,  Department  of 
Trade  and  Industry,  Thames  House  South,  Millbank,  London  S.W.l 
V.  Working  Party on  Common  Statistics of Accidents  in Coal-mines 
GERMANY 
K.  PALM,  Abteilungsdirektor,  Landesoberbergamt  Nordrhein-Westfalen,  4600  Dortmund,  Goeben-
strasse  25-27 
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K.  RtlSGEN,  Erster Bergrat  a.D.,  Steinkohlenbergbauverein,  43  Essen,  Frillendorfer 
Strasse  351 
FRANCE 
L.  KOCH  (1)  Ingenieur en  chef,  service  de  l'hygiene et  de  la securite m1n1ere, 
direction des  mines,  Ministere  de  l'industrie, 99,  rue  de  Grenelle,  75-Paris  7e 
R.  RIVIERE,  Chef  de  la division des  statistiques,  bureau  de  documentation miniere, 
4,  rue Las-Cases,  75-Paris  7e 
R.  GRISARD,  Ingenieur  des  mines,  Charbonnages  de  France,  9,  avenue  Percier, 
75-Paris  8e 
ITALY 
Dott.  ing.  B.  ANEDDA,  ispettore generale delle miniere,  distretto minerario di 
Iglesias,  via Gramsci,  Iglesias  (Cagliari) 
Dott.  ing.  G.  SATTA,  ingegnere  capo  delle miniere,  direzione  generale delle miniere, 
ministero de11'industria,  via Mo1ise  2,  Roma 
NETHERLANDS 
J.  VANLOO,  N.V.  Nederlandse  Staatsmijnen,  Postbus  65,  Heer1en  (L.) 
Ir.  Th.  M.  JANSEN,  inspecteur der mijnen,  staatstoezicht  op  de  mijnen,  Apol1o1aan  9, 
Heerlen  (L.) 
VI.  Working  Party "Ventilation and  Mine  Gas" 
GERMANY 
K.  PALM,  Ministerialrat,  Abtei1ungs1eiter  des  Landesoberbergamts  Nordrhein-Westfa1en, 
46  Dortmund,  Goebenstrasse  25 
Dip1.-Ing.  H.  BUSCHE,  Bergwerksdirektor  der Bergbau  AG  Niederrhein, 
Bergwerksdirektion Friedrich  Heinrich~4132 Kamp-Lintfort,Postfach  88 
Dip1.-Ing.  E.  SCHUBERT,  Leiter der Prufste1le  fur  Grubenbewetterung der  Westfa1ischen 
Berggewerkschaftskasse1 463  BochumJHernerstrasse  43-45 
H.  ALKER,  Hauptverwaltung der  Industriegewerkschaft  Bergbau  und  Energie9 463  Bochum,A1te 
Hattingerstrasse  19 
BELGIUM 
H.  GREGOIRE,  Hoofdingenieur-directeur der mijnen1 Thonissenlaan  18,  3500  Ha·sse1t 
J.  PATIGNY,  Ingenieur divisionnaire,  Havermarkt,  3500  Hasselt 
M.  COLINET,  33,  rue  de Monceau-Fontaine,  6031  Monceau-sur-Sambre 
E.  VANDENDRIESCHE,  113,  rue  de  Trazegnies,  6080  Cource11es 
FRANCE 
YOLIN,  Ingenieur des  mines,  Arrondissement  mineralogique  de  Douai, 
941,  rue  Ch.-Bourseu1,  59-Douai 
BELIN,  Cerchar,  Verneuil-en-Halatte,  BP  06,  60~Crei1 
SIMODE,  Ingenieur  en  chef ala direction  de  1'economie  et  de  1'informatique, 
Houi11eres  du  bassin  de  Lorraine,  5,  rue  Ambroise-Thomas,  57-Freyming 
GRISARD,  Ingenieur des  mines,  Charbonnages  de  France,  9,  avenue  Percier,  75-Paris  8e 
LARREUR,  54,  rue  Henri-Martin,  62-Lievin 
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LUXEMBOURG 
R.  MAYER,  Ingenieur civil des  mines,  ARBED,  78,  rue  du  Fosse,  Esch-sur-Alzette 
ITALY 
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A - Report  of  the  Harking Party 
-Background 
The  problem of statistics  in  coal mines  and  the  establishment of  a  method  for 
the preparation of statistics  ~vhich would  be  comparable  from  one  Community  country  to 
another,  had  already been  considered  at  some  length  in  1956  at  the  Conference held in 
Luxembourg  on  safety in coal  mines. 
1fuile  accepting  that it would  be  difficult to  evolve  a  method  for  the  prep-
aration of  comparable statistics,  the  conference  insisted that  such  statistics must  be 
available  since  they were  indispensable  for  the  execution  of different  items  of  research. 
To  this  end,  an  Expert  Committee  was  appointed with  the  following brief  :  (1) 
a  "Until  the statistics in  the  different  countries  have  been  lined  uo,  it would be best 
for  a  simplified table  to be  introduced,  to  serve  as  a  basis  for  a  uniform statistical 
system for  the whole  Community. 
In  order  that  as  little additional work  as  possible may  be  involved,  those statistics 
should be  such  as  can  readily be  extracted  from  the  more  detailed figures  currently 
compiled  in  the different  countries,  and  should  consist  only  of  a  summarized  breakdown 
of  accidents  by  technical  causes  and  degree  of  seriousness. 
b  "As  a  second  stage,  the  Expert  Committee  should produce  a  harmonized  and  comparable 
system of statistics on  accidents  in  coal  mines  throughout  the  Community. 
In  drawing  up  its tables,  the  Expert  Committee  should  include  those  of  the  follmving 
elements  which it considers  to  be  most  appropriate  for  use  in compiling,  analyzing  and 
comparing statistics  : 
(i)  technical  and  human  causes; 
(ii) workplaces  of  casualties; 
(iii)  consequences  (deaths,  permanent  disablement,  temporary  disablement); 
(iv)  classification  as  to  seriousness  and  frequency. 
The  I.L.O.  will  collaborate on  this work,  and  the  studies  already  carried out  by  this 
organization will be  used  as  a  basis  for  the  Expert  Committee's discussions." 
At  its meeting  on  13  December  1957  the  Expert  Committee  considered that it should 
confine  itself to  accidents  underground  and  devised  a  basic  common  systeM classifying ac-
cidents  in  accordance with  the  two  following criteria  :  severity and  cause  : 
- regarding  the  severity of  the  accident,  this  system made  a  distinction between 
1.  accidents  resulting in  the  death  of  the  victiM within eight weeks; 
2.  accidents  preventing  the  victim from  resuming work  underground within eight weeks. 
- regarding  the  classification of  accidents  listed according  to  cause,  12  cause  categories 
were  adopted. 
Moreover,  the  population  to be  covered,  the  concept  of  a  collective accident  and 
the  frequency  rate were  also  defined  and  th€·  basis  for  a  comparative  table worked  out. 
These  proposals  were  subsequently  agreed by  the  Mines  Safety  and Health  Commis-
sion  and  statistics were  first published in accordance with  the  system described for 1958. 
(1)  Page  159  of the  Report  on  the  Conference  on  Safety in Coal  Mines,  Luxembourg,  March 
195?. V,  6 
The  Safety  and  Health  Commission  was  thus  in  favour  of  adopting  a  simple basis 
to start with but  agreed  that,  after this  simplified system had  been  in operation  for  a 
certain length  of  time,  the  question  to what  extent it could  be  extended  and  completed 
would  need  to  be  studied.  . 
In  the  course of its annual  examination  of  the  common  statistics  and  associated 
graphs  and  charts,  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  noted  some  extensive  deviations 
in  the  frequency  rates  in different  countries  of  the  Community  and  the  question  repeatedly 
arose  as  to whether  the  figures  concerning  the  various  countries were  really comparable. 
The  Commission  thus  decided  to  set  up  a  new  working party whose  task would  be 
to  check  the  procedure  for  applying  the  original  scheme  which  dated  from  1958,  to  check 
on  anomalies  existing in  the  statistical data collected in each  country,  to  examine  the 
possibilities of making  allowance  for  them  in  the  comparisons  at  Community  level  and, 
finally,  to extend  the basic  system in order  to accommodate sufficient data to  facilitate 
better accident  prevention planning. 
The  Working  Party's  terms  of  reference were  as  follows  : 
- to  examine  the methods  used  in  the  Community  countries  for  drawing  up  m~n~ng accident 
statistics.  Particular examination of  the criteria applied  in defining  the  term  "mining 
accident"  and  the  criteria used  in classifying  the  accidents  according  to  cause,  duration 
of  absence  from work,  and,  possibly,  position of  the  injuries. 
With  the exact  definition of  these  criteria as  a  basis,  to  study  the  differences  between 
the  statistics  assembled  in each  country  and  the  ways  of  taking these differences  into 
account  in  comparisons  on  a  Community  level. 
The  tasks  entrusted  to  the  Working  Party may  be  summarized  as  follows: 
1.  To  improve  the  definitions  used  in the  compilation of  statistics  so  as  to  eliminate 
or at  least  to  reduce  distortions  noted  and  to  secure  comparable  statistics within 
feasible  limits  of  reliability. 
2.  To  examine  the  possibility of  collecting more  detailed Community  statistics by  extending 
the  coverage  to  accidents  resulting  in  a  shorter  period  of  incapacity  and  breaking  them 
down  in  terms  of  a  certain number  of  body  locations;  in  accordance with  the  spirit of 
its  terms  of  reference,  the  Working  Party also  examined  the possibility of  a  breakdown 
in terms  of  a  certain number  of  accident  sites  and  types  of  injury. 
The  Working  Party met  on  24  October  and  11  December  1968,  12  February,  28-29 
April,  7-7  October  1969;  19  February,  12  May  and  28  October  1970;  11  March  1971. v'  7 
HORKING  PARTY  REPORT 
Revie,.,  of work  done 
In order  to  comply  with  the first part of  the  terms  of  reference,  which 
consisted in identifying distortions  due  to  varying interpretations  of  the  definitions 
from  one  country  to  another,  the lvorking Party  examined in detail  the  definitions  applied 
in practice in  the  compilation of national statistics  and  drew  up  a  summary  table of  these 
definitions  (doc.  no.  3439/2/68).  This  summary  table was  compared with  the  basis  Community 
system dating  from  1958,  and  certain differences were  noted. 
In order  to  avoid perpetuation of  these  errors  or at  least to  reduce  their ef-
fect,  the  lvorking Party drew  up  some  proposals  for  common  definitions which would  be  as 
accurate  as  possible  and  acceptable  to  each  delegation  (1).  An  analysis  explaining  the 
differences  between  the  Community  and  national  definitions  is  given  below,  together with 
the  opinion of  the  Horking Party  on  the  extent  of  the  dis tort  ions  '.vhich  may  result  from 
them. 
With  regard  to  the  second part of  the  terms  of  reference,  four  new  tables  have 
been devised  to  take  account  of  the  extension of  coverage. 
These  tables  have  been  drawn  up  with  reference  to  the  technical possibilities 
for  coverage  in the  various  countries  and  have  been  tested for  1969  without  any major 
difficulties being encountered.  (2) 
Analysis  of  distortions  for  the  ?eriod  1958-1969 
The  Horking  Party noted  that  the distortions  due  to  varying interpretations  of 
the definitions were  not  very  extensive  and  had  existed since  the beginnings  of  common 
statistical coverage.  They  are  the  results  of  mistaken  conceptions  in the first order 
rather  than  of  interpretations which  have  gradually become  less  accurate.  It is  thus  a 
case of systematic errors which  involve distortions  from  one  country  to  another but  do 
not  affect  the  chronological  comparability of  the  statistics of  that  country  and  for  the 
Community  as  a  whole. 
Errors  relating to different definitions  of  the  concepts  "accidents",  "fata1 
accidents",  "frequency rate"  are not  of  any  great  significance,  as  is explained in doc. 
no.  3270/3/69.  Concerning  the  term "period of  incapacity",  the most  striking difference 
is in the  case  of  Belgium,  where  the period of  incapacity is  determined by  the  period 
following which  the  victim may  resume  work  in whatever capacity,  not  only  underground but 
also  at  the  surface,  for social  or medical  reasons.  Nevertheless,  similar practices  may 
also exist  in other countries,  which  would  reduce  the  extent  of  the  distortion. 
The  Working Party has  devoted particular attention to distribution of victims 
according  to "accident  causes"  and  has  noted  the  following  differences  for  the  five 
initial headings,  which  are  the  most  important  ones. 
I.  Falls  of  ground 
Belgium  includes  under  this heading  accidents  due  to  falls  of  stones  from  road-
way  lining  or  of  stowage materials,  which  in other countries  are  classified under 
heading V "falls  of objects".  Since,  howaver,  these  accidents  are  relatively few  in 
number  the  distortion does  not  appear  to be  very  significant. 
{1)  The  aommon  definitions and  interpretations of them  appear in seation B,  '~eaommenda­
tions" be tow. 
(2)  See  "Reaommendations"  last page v'  8 
II.  Transport 
The  frequency  rate  (1)  of  accidents  involving more  than  56  days'  incapacity is 
greater in  Belgium than  in Germany  and  France.  It accounts  for  27%  of  the  total of 
accidents  against  16%  in Germany  and  14%  in France. 
On  the  other hand,  category V "Falls  of objects"  accounts  for  a  lower  frequency 
in  Belgium  :  an  average  of  4%  as  compared  with  20%  in Germany  and  14%  in France  (1). 
This  difference  is  partly due  to  the  fact  that  accidents  caused  by  machines  and 
equipment  in general  during  transport  are  included under  category II "Transport"  and 
not  in V "Falls of objects". 
III.  Falls  and  movement  of  the  victim 
The  frequency  rate  (1)  of  accidents  involving more  than  56  days'  incapacity is 
much  the  same  in Germany  (18%)  and  France  (16%).  On  the  other hand,  it is much  lower 
in Belgium  (9%). 
This  difference  is  partly due  to  the  inclusion  under II "Transport"  of  certain 
accidents  listed in France  and  Germany  in  category III. 
IV.  Machines,  tools  and  supports 
The  frequency  rate  (1)  of  accidents  involving more  than  56  days  incapacity is 
higher in France  (16%)  and  Belgium  (20%)  than  in Germany  (7%).  In France  this  category 
is  used  to list accidents  caused by  stones  and  the  objects  themselves  during handling, 
which  are  included in V in Germany.  This  method  of classification artificially in-
flates  the  frequency  rate  of  this  category  IV  in France  and  consequently diminishes 
the  frequency  rate of  category V.  In  Belgium  a  fairly high  frequency  rate is  also 
noted,  for  category  IV  is used  to list accidents  due  to  the handling of  supports, 
whereas  these  are  classified under  V in  the other countries. 
V.  Falls  of objects 
The  frequency  rate  (1)  of  accidents  involving more  than  56  days'  incapacity is 
higher in Germany  (20%)  than  in France  (14%)  and  in  Belgium  (4%),  for  this  category 
is  used  to list accidents  caused  by  stones  and  objects  during handling,  whereas  in 
France  these  are  listed under  category  IV.  It is  also worth pointing out  the  very 
low  frequency  rate  in Belgium,  where  accidents  listed under V in Germany  and  IV  in 
France  are  included under II "means  of  transport"  and  IV  "Machines,  tools  and  sup-
ports",  respectively. 
It is  to be  noted  that  the  total  of  percentage  relating to  categories II, III, 
IV  and Vis practically  the  same  for all the  countries  (2)  :Germany  (61  %),  Belgium 
(60%),  France  (59%),  Italy  (65%),  Netherlands  (64%).  The  disortions  thus  seem  to  be 
due  to  a  certain extent  to  the  classification of  the  same  type  of  accident  under 
different headings. 
(1)  Average  frequency  rate  for  the  1958-1969  period. 
(2)  It  cannot~  however~  be  concluded from  these percentages  that the  accident risks 
are identical in each  country. v'  9 
New  proposals  by  the  Working  Party 
Accident  site 
It has  been  found  worthwhile  to break  down  accidents  in  terms  of  a  limited 
number  of sites,  in order  to  draw  attention  to  the  areas  of  the  mine  presenting the worst 
hazards. 
Four  categories  have  been  adopted 
1.  Production  faces 
2.  Headings  excluding  shafts  and  staple pits 
3.  Shafts  and  staple pits 
3.  Other places  (1). 
Classification of  accidents  according  to  period of  incapacity 
In  accordance with  the wish  expressed by  the  Commission  of  the  European  Com-
mun1t1es,  the possibility was  also  examined  of extending  coverage  to  accidents  involving 
absences  of  less  than  56  days. 
Taking  account  of  the  periods  at  present  in use  in  the different  countries  and 
of  the  technical possibilities in each  country  of  aligning its practice in order  to  adopt 
uniform periods,  two  subdivisions were  proposed  : 
- from  21  to  56  calender days 
-from 4  to  20  calender days  (2). 
In  this way,  the  period  of  coverage  was  defined within fairly close  limits,  and 
an  adequate  volume  of  information was  collected which  revealed  certain characteristic  trends 
in the  field  of  research  already  studied or  to  be  studied  in  the  future,  particularly,  in 
the  field  of  industrial medicine. 
Attention is nevertheless  drawn  to  the  dubious  comparability of accidents  in-
volving  incapacity for periods  of  less  than  21  days. 
In  this  case  the  frequency  depends  to  a  considerable extent  on  factors  unrelated 
to safety  and  accident  prevention.  Comparison  of  the  figures  is  thus  unlikely to provide 
worthwhile  information  and  indeed  involves  the  risk of  drawing wrong  conclusions. 
Cause  of accidents 
The  distribution of accidents  in  accordance with  causes  remains  the  fundamental 
element  in  the  statistical system and  in order not  to  interfere with comparability  (3), 
the  12  causes  adopted  in  the  1958  system have  been maintained with  subdiyisions  only 
for  categories  II,  III,  IV  and  VIII. 
II - Transport 
A distinction is made  between 
a)  continuous  transport,  and 
b)  discontinuous  transport. 
(1)  Belgium  ~ill endeavour  to align its practice  ~ith this  procedure  as  soon  as  possible 
(2)  For  France~  5  to  20  calendar  days~  but this  ~ill not involve any  significant dif-
ference 
(3)  "Comparability  bet~een the  present statistical system and  that  ~hich has  been  devised 
by  the  Working  Party  ~ill~  ho~ever~  be  some~hat impaired by  the  fact  that the present 
definitions are  not sufficiently precise". v'  10 
III - Falls  and  movement  of  the victim 
A distinction is made  between accidents  occurring 
a)  while  the  victim is moving  about  the  mine,  and 
b)  in  the  course of  other activities. 
IV  - Machines,  tools  and  supports 
Three  subdivisions have  been  introduced 
a)  machines 
b)  tools 
c)  supports 
VIII  - Outbursts  of  gas  - deoxygenation,  suffocation and  gas  poisoning 
The  subdivision of  the  former  category  into  two  subcategories  is  suggested 
in view  of  the  entirely different  measures  which  have  to  be  taken  against  sudden 
outbursts  of  gas  on  the  one  hand,  and  deoxygenation,  suffocation and  gas  poisoning 
on  the  other. 
Location  of  the  injury 
headings 
I. 
II. 
III. 
IV. 
v. 
VI. 
VII. 
VIII. 
IX. 
The  Harking Party has  devised  the  following  scheme  of  subdivision  under  nine 
Head  and  Neck 
Eyes 
Trunk 
Upper  limbs  (excluding hands) 
Hands 
Lower  limbs  (excluding  feet) 
Feet 
Multiple  locations  (several  parts  of  the  body) 
Not  specified 
Nature  of  the  injury 
The  Harking Party felt it '"ortln..rhile  to propose  concurrently  a  system of 
subdivision  under eight headings 
1.  Amputations  and enucleations 
2.  Fractures with  or without  injuries  to  the  soft  parts  of  the  body 
3.  Luxations,  twists  and  sprains 
4.  Concussion  and  internal  injuries 
5.  Open  wounds,  concussion  and  muscular  abrasions  (1) 
6.  Burns  and  harmful  effects  of electricity and  radiation 
7.  Poisoning  and  suffocation 
8.  Multiple or non-specified injuries  (including  complications) 
(1)  This  should inalude  musaular injuries  other than  ruptures  and  torn  and  laaerated 
musales,  whiah  should be  listed in Category  2. v'  11 
The  system of  classification pronosed  for  the  location  and  nature  of  injuries 
is  in  conformity 'vith  the  classification of  the  International  Labour  Organization  (ILO)  in 
Geneva,  in which  the  groups  have  been  rearranged  so  as  to  reduce  the  number  of  locations 
from  44  to  9  and  the  number  of  types  of  injury  from  18  to  8. 
Test  carried out  on  the  new  statistical tables  for  1969 
The  aims  in carrying out  these  tests were  : 
- to ensure  that Member  States were  in  a  position  to  draw  from  their national  statistics 
all the  information envisaged by  the  Harking  Party without  any  great difficulty; 
- to  check whether  the  distortions noted  from  one  country  to  another had  been  reduced by 
applying  the  new  definitions. 
~vith regard  to  the  first objective,  the  reply is pos1t1ve  for all  countries 
except  that  for  Belgium  a  certain period of  transition is  required  to  enable it to  align 
its national  regulations. 
The  second objective has  been partially achieved,  since  the  tests  carried out 
have  revealed  a  certain reduction  in  the  distortions  for  certain causes  of  accidents,  in 
particular those  of  categories  II,  IV  and  V. 
- Category II 
The  percentages  for  accidents  involving incapacity of more  than  56  days,  which 
had  been  13.5%  for  Germany,  24%  for  Belgium and  10%  for  France  were  16%,  24%  and  10% 
respectively,  using  the  new  definitions. 
- Category  IV 
The  percentages  for  accidents  involving more  than  56  days  incapacity which  had 
been  8%  for  Germany,  18%  for  Belgium and  20%  for  France,  were  12%,  9%  and  13%  respective-
ly using  the  new  definitions. 
- Category V 
The  percentages  for  accidents  involving more  than  56  days  incapacity,  which  had 
been  25%  for  Germany,  9%  for  Belgium  and  18%  for  France,  were  26%,  18%  and  25%  respec-
tively. 
On  the  other hand,  increased distortion is  to be  noted  for  Category III,  in 
which  the  percentages  of accidents  involving more  than  56  days'  incapacity,  which  had 
been  21%  for  Germany,  9%  for  Belgium  and  22%  for  France,  were  14%,  9%  and  22%  respective-
ly. 
Finally,  it should be  pointed out  that  differences  in the  interpretation of  the 
definitions  are  clearly not  the  only  causes  of  distortions.  Other  causes  - technical, 
geological  and  statistical - also play  their part. 
Research  at  the  "safety  level" 
The  Working  Party  undertook  certain mathematical  statistical studies  in order  to 
determine  to what  extent  the  differences  noted  in  the  frequency  rates,  when  compared 
chronologically or  from  one  country  to  another,  were  significant  from  the  statistical point 
of  view. 
Experience  indeed  shows  that even  for  the  Community  as  a  whole,  and  much  more  for 
each Member  country,  the  frequency  rates were  affected  from  one  year  to  another by  appar-
ently  random variations,  which  rendered  any  interpretation practically impossible. v'  12 
The  Working Party  adopted  as  a  first approximation  the  hypothesis  that  the 
frequency  rates  calculated each year  could  be  based  on  a  random phenomenon  in accordance 
with Poisson's  law,  which  made  it possible  to  determine  the  confidence  limits  correspond-
ing  to  a  given probability  (for example  95%)  (1),  and  thus  to  judge  the  significance of 
the  variations  observed  between  two  given units  (country  or coalfield). 
The  Working Party is,  however,  aware  that  this first examination  needs  to  be 
extended,  in particular with  regard  to  the  choice  of  the  statistical  law  or  laws  capable 
of being  applied  to mining  accidents.  This  study,  the  scope  of which  is  beyond  the  present 
terms  of  reference,  should  in  the  opinion  of  the  Working Party  form part  of  specific 
terms  of  reference  (2). 
(1)  This  means  that  the  real rate of frequency  has  a  95%  chance  of being within  the  range 
of the  confidence interval. 
(2)  These  terms of reference  are  contained in Annex II (List of Terms  of reference of the 
various  Working  Parties). v'  13 
B - Recommendation  on  the  preparation of  common  statistics 
of victims  of  accidents  underground 
In order  to  improve  the  comparability of  the  statistics relating to  accidents 
underground,  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  has  instructed  a  Working  Party  : 
(i)  to  review  the basic statistical system in operation since  1958; 
(ii)  to  formulate  in more  precise  terms  and  extend  the  present definitiuns. 
The  Commission  has  also  asked  the  Horking Party  to  extend  the  coverage  of  this 
statistical system. 
As  a  result of  the  work  done  by  the  Working Party,  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health 
Commission  recommends  that Member  States  should  compile  common  statistics in accordance 
with  the  definitions  and  criteria explained below. 
1.  Accident 
Bodily  injury resulting  from  a  sudden  and  abnormal  external  cause  in  the  course 
of work. 
Interpretation of  the  definition 
The  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission's  statistics should  only  cover victims 
of  accidents  underground,  including accidents  which  occur when  men  enter and  leave  the 
cages  and  while  the  cages  are  in motion. 
The  definition of  the  accident  should not  be  linked with  any  particular duration 
of  incapacity  or  take  into  account  any  form  of  compensation. 
It has  been  agreed  that  the  term "industrial accident" will not  be  strictly 
adhered  to  since it may  be  too  restrictive  and  might  imply  that  only  accidents  occurring 
during work  as  such  should  be  counted,  whereas  the  statistics with which  we  are  dealing 
here  are  intended  to  cover all accidents  occurring  underground wherever  the  victim may 
happen  to  be  in  connection with his work. 
2.  Fatal  accident 
An  accident  resulting in  the  death  of  the  victim within  56  days  following  the 
accident. 
Interpretation of  the  definition 
The  statistics of  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  are  only  covered  victims 
who  die within  56  days  following  the  accident. 
Victims  dying after  the  period  of  56  days  following  the  accident  should  not  be 
included  in  the  "fatal accident"  category but  in  that of  accidents  involving incapacity 
of more  than  56  days. 
3.  Persons  covered by  the  statistics 
Pit staff and  employees  of  contractor  firms  who  belong  to  a  miners,  social 
security  scheme. v'  14 
Interpretation of  the  definition 
The  statistics  count  victims  and  not  accidents; everyonewho  is  the  victim of  an 
accident while  actually underground  as  well  as  during  descent  and  ascent  should be 
included.  Victims  can,  therefore,  only be  miners,  supervisors,  engineers  or staff be-
longing  to  contractor firms. 
4.  Shifts  and  number  of hours  worked 
Shifts  and  number  of hours  worked  by  the  persons  on  the  books  of  the  mine  and 
other staff belonging  to  the  miners'  social  insurance  scheme;  account  should  be  taken 
of extra shifts  and  overtime. 
Interpretation of  the  definition 
The  period of  reference  adopted  is  the  actual  period  of exposure  to  risk;  shifts 
and  overtime  must  therefore  be  counted  in  terms  of  time  actually worked  and  not  the 
number  of hours  paid. 
5.  Accident  rates 
Number  of  accidents  per million hours  worked. 
The  frequency  rates  are  arrived at by  dividing  the  number  of  accidents  of  a 
given  category by  the  total  number  of hours  spent  on  all  types  of work  underground. 
Interpretation of  the  definition 
Accident  frequency  is  calculated by  the  following  formula 
- A  total  number  of  accidents  involving  absence  from work 
- n  total  number  of hours  actually worked. 
6.  Classification of accidents  according  to periods  of  incapacity involving  absence  of 
the  victim from work  underground 
- Fatal  accidents 
- Accidents  involving  an  absence  of more  than  56  calendar  days 
- Accidents  involving  an  absence  of  between  21  and  56  calendar days 
-Accidents  involving  an  absence  of between  4  and  20  calendar  days. 
Interpretation of  the  definition 
A point  to  be  noted is  that  the  day  on  which  the  accident  occurred  should not  be 
counted. 
The  number  of  days  of incapacity  to  be  taken  into  consideration is defined  by  the 
effective  absence  of  the  miner  from work. 
The  period of incapacity is not  defined by  the  period  following which  the  victim 
is  able  to  resume  the  work  he  was  doing prior  to  the  accident,  but  by  the  period  fol-
lowing which  the  victim is  able  to  resume  any  work  of whatever kind. v'  15 
7.  Site of  the  accident 
1.  Production  faces 
This  comprises  the  working  face  including  the  part between  the  face  or stable 
hole  and  the  stowed  or caved waste  but  does  not  include  roads  of  any  kind except 
dunnny  roads. 
2.  Headings  excluding shafts  and  staple pits 
This  also  covers  the  area where  loading,  timbering  and  steel work  are  carried 
out  immediately behind  the  face. 
In  the  case  of  slusher packing  the  cutter area extends  up  to  and  including  the 
line  of props. 
Development  headings  should  be  considered  as  drifts. 
3.  Shafts  and  staple pits 
This  also  covers  the  immediate  approach  to  insets  especially where  mine  cars  and 
stores  are  loaded  and  unloaded  from  the  cages. 
4.  Other places 
This  heading  covers  all victims  of  accidents  not  included  under  the  three  pre-
ceding headings. 
Interpretation of  the  definitions 
The  intention is  to  define  "sites" of work  and  not  "operations"  since,  although 
desirable,  it is  too  early at  this  stage  to  aim at statistical  coverage  in  terms  of 
operational activities. 
The  accident  frequency  rate  for  the  different accident sites is  obtained by 
dividing  the  number  of  accidents  by  the  total of hours  worked  underground  and  not 
by  the  subtotals  of hours  worked  at each  accident  site. 
8.  Causes  of  accidents 
I.  Falls  of  ground  and  rocks 
This  category of  accidents  covers  falls  of  stone  or coal  from its natural 
situation. 
It does  not  cover  accidents  caused by  falls  of  ground  resulting  from  one  of  the 
factors  included under  another  category,  for  example  the  use  of explosives,  ex-
plosion of  firedamp  or dust,  or  an  outburst.  Accidents  caused by  falls  of  stone  in 
a  caved waste  should be  included  in this  category;  on  the  other hand,  accidents 
due  to  slippage  of  stone  during  the  stowing  of waste  should be  classed  in category 
V  :  "Falls  of objects". 
Interpretation of  the  definition 
Accidents  caused by  materials  continuing  to  move  after falling  from  their 
natural position are  included  under  category  I  "Falls  of  ground  and  rocks",  except 
where  it is  a  case  of materials  set in motion  by  some  external  cause  after first 
coming  to  rest. 
II.  Transport 
Accidents  caused  by  any  means  of  transport whether  stationary or in motion,  used 
to  carry men  or objects  at  the  face,  in other workings,  in  roadways,  in shafts, v'  16 
staple pits, etc.,  including accidents  caused by  the  engines  providing motive 
power  for  transport.  This  category  includes,  for example,  accidents  caused by 
lumps  of  coal  falling  from  a  conveyor belt  or blocks  of wood  from  a  tub  loaded 
with timber, and  even  those  caused when  lumps  of  coal  are  projected during their 
descent  down  a  fixed  chute.  An  accident  caused by  the  gear wheels  or the  driving 
mechanism of  a  transport system should  also be  included in  category II  "Transport". 
Electrocution  caused by  a  trolley wire  should be  included  in  category  XI 
"E lectri  city". 
a)  Continuous  transport 
Transport equipment which  can  receive  products  along  the whole  of its  length  and 
maintain  a  continuous  flow. 
Interpretation of  the  definition 
This  sub-category  should  include  accidents  caused  in particular by  scraper 
chain  conveyors,  plate  and belt  conveyors,  retarding  conveyors,  fixed  chutes, 
pan  and  shaker  conveyors,  etc. 
b)  Discontinuous  transport 
All other  means  of  transport. 
Interpretation of  the  definition 
This  category should  include  accidents  caused in particular by  skips,  cages  and 
kibbles,  as  well  as  accidents  involving falls  of  objects  from  these  cages, 
skips  or kibbles;  rope  haulages,  locomotives,  mono-rails,  decking  rams  and 
other similar  devices. 
III.  Falls  and  movement  of  the  victim 
a)  While  moving  about  the  mine 
Falls  of  men  into  a  shaft  or staple pit,  falls  in  general,  stumbles,  slips, 
knocks  and  bumps,  sprains  of  limbs,  etc., whatever  the  cause,  should be  in-
cluded,  as  long  as  the basic  cause  of  the  accident  is  the  victim's  movement 
through  the  mine  in the  course of or at  the  place of work  and  where  no  means 
of  transport is  involved;  the  latter should be  included  in  category  II  "Trans-
port"  or III b  "Falls  of  victims  in the  course  of  other activities"  respect-
ively. 
Interpretation of  the  definition 
This  category  should only  include  accidents  strictly  connected with  the  movement 
of personnel  about  the  mine. 
b)  In  the  course  of  other activities 
Falls  of  men  into  a  shaft or staple pit,  falls  in  general,  stumbles,  slips, 
knocks  and bumps,  sprains, etc.,  as  long  as  the  fall was  caused basically by 
some  particular activity  and  not by  the  movement  of  the  victim about  the  mine, 
which  is  covered  in Ilia. 
Interpretation of  the  definition 
This  sub-category  should  only  include  accidents  due  to  falls  etc.  of  the  victim 
in the  course  of  his  work  as  such  and not  during  movement  about  the  mine,  which 
is  covered by  category Ilia "Falls while  moving  about  the  mine". v'  17 
IV.  Machines,  tools  and  supports 
Accidents  caused by  engines  powering  a  means  of  transport  should be  included 
in category II "Transport".  Category  IV  covers  accidents  occurring  during 
the starting up  and  running  of  other machines. 
Accidents  caused by  machines  falling while being moved  will be  included in 
category V "Falls  of objects". 
b)  Tools 
Category  IV  covers  accidents  caused  by  the  use  of  tools  such  as  portable 
drills, drills  on  stands,  hand  saws,  pneumatic  picks,  lifting gear,  pushers, 
etc. 
Accidents  caused by  falling  tools  should be  included  in  category  V "Falls  of 
objects". 
c)  Supports 
With  regard  to  accidents  occurring  during  the  handling  of  supports,  only  those 
involving  the  setting  up  or  removal  of  this  equipment  should be  included  in 
category  IV. 
If a  support  or one  of its  components  falls  during  transport,  the  accident 
should be  included  in  category V "Falls  of objects". 
Interpretation of  the  definitions 
Category  IV  only  covers  accidents  ar~s~ng from  the  use  and  movement  of machines, 
tools  and  equipment;  it is  emphasized  in  the  case  of supports  that only  acci-
dents  occurring  during  the  setting  up  and  removal  of  this  equipment  should be 
included in this  category. 
V.  Falls  of objects 
Accidents  involving  the  falling  or  dislodging  of  excavated material  and  of 
objects  such  as  frames,  timber,  tools,  props,  pipes,  materials,  etc. 
Interpretation of  the  definition 
This  category  includes  not  only  accidents  caused by  falls  of excavated materials 
or objects,  but  also  those  caused  by  objects  falling while  being handled. 
VI.  Explosives 
Accidents  occurring  during  the  transport  or handling  of explosives,  the  charging 
of shotholes,  due  to  accidental  or premature  firing  of  the  shots,  to  inadequate 
protection of personnel,  unfired explosives  being hit by  picks  or drills, misfires, 
long  fires,  residues  and  poisoning by  fumes  from  explosives. 
Where  the  use  of  explosives  sets off  an  explosion of  firedamp  or  dust  or  even  a 
heating  or  a  fire,  the  accident  should be  included  in  category VII  or  IX  respec-
tively. 
Accidental  firing  of explosives  caused by  the  use  of electricity should  be  in-
cluded  in category VI  "Explosives". v'  18 
VII.  Ignition or explosions  of  firedamp  and  coal  dust 
This  includes  poisoning or suffocation by  the  gases  so  produced.  An  explosion 
of  firedamp  or  coal  dust  brought  about  by  the  use  of electricity should be  in-
cluded  in  category VII.  As  a  generale  rule,  if the  causes  of  an  accident  include 
the  ignition or explosion of  firedamp  or dust,  it should  always  be  included  in 
category VII. 
VIII.  O~tbursts of  gas  - Deoxygenation,  suffocation or poisoning by natural  gases 
(C02,  CH4,  CO,  H2S) 
a)  Outbursts  of  gas 
Accidents  caused  by  ejected materials  or  roof  falls  caused  by  sudden  outbursts 
of  gas.  In  accordance with  the  rule  set  out  for  category VII,  if the  outburst 
is  followed  by  an  explosion of  firedamp,  any  accidents  caused  should be  in-
cluded  in  category VII  "Ignition or explosions  of  firedamp  or explosions  of 
coal  dust". 
b)  Deoxygenation  and  poisoning  by  natural  gases  (C02,  CH
4
,  CO,  H2S). 
This  includes  accidents  caused by  lack  of  oxygen,  by  suffocation  (CH4,  co2)  and 
by  poisoning  (CO,  H2S).  If suffocation or poisoning  is  brought  about  by  gas 
produced  by  explosives,  or by  an  explosion of  firedamp  or coal  dust,  or  even  by 
a  heating  or fire,  the  accident  should  be  classified under  those  headings.  If 
suffocation or poisoning  is  caused by  exhaust  fumes  from  diesel  engines,  the 
accident  should be  included  in  category  IV  "Explosives". 
IX.  Heatings  or  fires 
This  includes  poisoning or suffocation by  the  gases  produced  and  injuries  from 
burns,  roof  falls,  falls  of objects,  etc.  following  a  heating or fire  in  the  mine. 
A fire  following  an  explosion of  firedamp  or  coal  dust  should be  included  in 
category VII. 
A fire  caused  by  the  use  of electricity should be  included  in this  category. 
In  general,  if the  accident  is  due  to  several  combined  causes  including  a  heating 
or fire,  it should  always  be  included  in  category  IX 
11Heatings  and  fires",  unless 
one  of  these  causes  is  the  ignition or explosion of  firedamp  or coal  dust;  in 
this  last  case  the  accident would  be  included  in  category VII. 
X.  Inrushes 
Accidents  occurring when  old workings  are  broken  into or when  dead  ground  is 
encountered.  Injuries  from projected material,  falls  of objects,  falls  Jf ground, 
drowning,  etc. 
XI.  Electricity 
Accidents  caused by  electricity:  burns,  shocks,  electrocution. 
If electricity causes  the  ac~idental firing of explosives,  an  explosion of  fire-
damp  or coal  dust  or  a  heating or fire,  the  resulting accident  should  be  included 
in  those  categories  in  the  fo1lowing  order of priority: 
1.  explosion of  firedamp  or dust 
2.  a  heating or fire 
3.  explosives v,  19 
XII.  Other  causes 
This  category  covers  accidents  which  cannot  be  classified under headings  I  to 
XI,  that  is  to  say,  accidents  of which  it is  not  possible  to  establish  the  exact 
cause. 
This  category  may  also  be  used  to  record  accidents  caused by  compressed air; it 
has  not  been  felt  necessary  to  set aside  a  special  category,  since  accidents  due 
to  this  cause  are  relatively rare. 
9.  Location  of  the  injury 
When  an  accident  has  resulted  in multiple  injuries  to different parts  of  the  body 
and  one  of  the  injuries  is  clearly more  serious  than  the  others,  this  accident  should be 
classified in  the  group  relating  to  the  part of  the  body  most  seriously  injured.  For 
example,  a  fracture  of  the  leg,  together with  grazing  of  a  hand  should be  classified in 
category VI  "Lower  limbs"  and  not  in  category V "Hands". 
I.  Head  and  neck 
Covers  in particular the  skull,  the  scalp,  brain injuries,  the  ears,  the  mouth 
(including  the  lips,  teeth  and  tongue),  the  nose,  the  face,  the  neck,  but  not  the 
eyes,  which  are  included  in category II. 
II.  Eyes 
Also  covers  the  eye  socket  and  the  optic nerve. 
III.  Trunk 
Covers  the back  (vertebrae  and  adjacent muscles,  the  spinal marrow),  the  thorax, 
(ribs,  sternum,  bronchi,  lungs),  the  abdomen  (including  internal  organs,  kidneys, 
liver,  spleen),  the  pelvis  and  the  genital  organs. 
The  shoulders  and wrists  are  regarded  as  part of  the  upper limbs  (category  IV)  and 
not  as  part of  the  trunk  or hands  (category V). 
The  hips  and  ankles  are  regarded  as  part of  the  lower  limbs  (category VI)  and  not 
as  part  of  the  trunk or feet  (category VII). 
IV.  Upper  limbs  (excluding hands) 
This  includes  injuries  to  the  shoulders  including  the collar bone  and  shoulder 
blades,  injuries  to  arms,  elbows,  forearms  and wrists. 
V.  Hands 
The  wrists  are not  regarded  as  part of  the  hands  but  of  the  limbs  (category  IV). 
VI.  Lower  limbs  (excluding  feet) 
This  includes  hips,  thighs,  knees,  legs  and  ankles. 
VII.  Feet 
The  ankles  are not  regarded  as  part of  the  feet  but  of  the  lower  limbs  (category 
VI). 
VIII.  Multiple  locations 
This  group,  covering multiple  injuries,  should only be  used when  the  victim has 
suffered several injuries  to different  parts  of his  body,  none  of which  is  clearly 
more  serious  than  the  others. v,  20 
The  category may  cover injuries  to  the  head  and  trunk,  the  head  and  one  or more 
limbs,  the  trunk  and  one  or more  limbs,  or  an  upper  and  a  lower  limbs. 
IX.  Not  specified 
This  group  should only be  used when  there  is  no  evidence  of  the  exact  location 
of  the  injury. 
X.  Nature  of  the  injury 
When  an  accident  has  resulted in several  injuries  to different parts  of  the  body 
and  one  of  them  is  clearly more  serious  than  the  others,  the  accident  should be 
classified in  the  group  relating  to  the  most  serious  injury. 
1.  Amputations  and  enucleations 
Including  traumatic  avulsion of  the  eye. 
2.  Fractures with or without  dislocation 
This  includes  simple  fractures;  fractures  with  injuries  to  the  soft parts  of 
the  body  (closed or  compound  fractures);  fractures  with  internal  or nerve 
damage,  fractures with  luxations,  contusions  and  crushings. 
3.  Luxations,  twists  and  sprains 
Luxations 
This  covers  minor  luxations  and  dislocations,  traumatic  lumbago,  lumbago 
sciatica caused by  strain; it does  not  include  luxations with  fractures  covered 
by  category  2. 
Twists  and  sprains 
This  covers  ruptures,  torn  and  lacerated muscles,  tendons,  ligaments  and  joints 
as  well  as  hernia due  to  strain and  slipped discs,  except where  they  are  asso-
ciated with  open wounds. 
4.  Concussion  and  internal  injury 
This  category  includes  internal bruising,  internal bleeding,  internal  lacera-
tions  and  ruptures,  except where  associated with  fractures. 
It does  not  include  internal  injuries  accompanied  by  fractures  which  are 
covered by  category  2. 
5.  Open  wounds,  contusions  and  muscular abrasions 
Includes  lacerations,  flesh  wounds,  cuts,  contusions,  scalp wounds,  loss  of  a 
nail or  an ear,  wounds  with nerve  injuries,  haemarthrosis,  haematoma  and 
bruises;  contusions  and  bruising with  superficial wounds. 
It does  not  include  :  traumatic  amputation,  enucleations,  avulsion of  an  eye, 
which  are  covered  by  category I;  Compound  fractures,  contusions  and  crushings 
accompanying  a  fracture,  which  are  covered  by  category  2;  concussion  covered 
by  4;  burns  with wounds  covered  by  6. 
6.  Burns  and  harmful  effects  of electricity and  radiation 
Covers  burns  from  fire,  boiling  liquid,  friction,  chemical  substances  (external 
burns  only),  burns  with wounds,  electrocution,  electric shock  and  burns  caused 
by  elect+icity,  the effect of X-rays,  radioactive  substances,  ultra-violet  rays 
and  ionizing  radiation. V,  21 
It does  not  cover burns  caused by  the  absorption of  a  corrosive or caustic 
substance,  which  are  classified in category  7. 
7.  Poisoning  and  suffocation 
This  category  covers  the  effects  of  the  injection,  ingestion,  absorption,  or 
inhalation of toxic,  corrosive  or caustic substances. 
Asphyxiation or suffocation by  compression or  roof  falls;  asphyxiation  due  to 
the  suppression or reduction of  oxygen  in the  atmosphere,  the entry  of  foreign 
bodies  into  the  respiratory  system,  to  carbon monoxide  or other toxic gases. 
8.  Multiple or non-specified  injuries  (including  complications) 
This  category  includes  those  cases  in which  the  victim has  suffered several  in-
juries of different  types,  none  of which  is  clearly more  serious  than  the 
others,  and  those which  are  not  covered  in  any  other category. 
It also  covers  the  various  early complications  of  injuries  and  pathological 
reactions,  which,  however,  should  only  be  classified in this  group when  the 
nature  of  the  original injury  is  not  known. 
The  system of  classification proposed  for  the  location and  nature  of  injuries 
is  that of  the  International Labour Organisation  (ILO)  in Geneva,  in which  the 
groups  have  been  rearranged  so  as  to  reduce  the  number  of  locations  from  44  to 
9  and  the  number  of  types  of injury  from  18  to  8. 
The  Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission  recommends  that  figures  for  accident 
victims  should be  recorded by  coalfields  in accordance with  the  following 
tables,  starting with  1971: 
Table  la:  Breakdown  of  accident  victims  in  terms  of  cause,  site and  period 
of  incapacity  (absolute  figures) 
Table  lb:  Breakdown  of  accident  victims  in  terms  of  cause,  site and  period 
of  incapacity  (frequency  rate) 
Table  2a:  Breakdown  of accident victims  in  terms  of  location,  nature  and  period 
of  incapacity  (absolute  figures) 
Table  2b:  Breakdown  of  accident victims  in terms  of  location,  nature  and  period 
of  incapacity  (frequency  rate). v,  23 
C - New  statistical questionnaire  la - lb  - 2a  - 2b ANNEX 
Explanatory  notes  - Tables  1 
GE:<ERAL  DEFI~ITIONS 
1.~ 
Bodily  injury resulting  from  a  sudden  and  abnormal  external  cause  in  the  course  of  work. 
The  Mines  Safety and  Health Commission's  statistics should  onlv cover victims  of  acc1.dents 
undert'!;round,  includinJ!:  accidents which  occur  when  men  enter  and  leave  the  ca~es and  ...,hlle 
the  cages  are  in motion. 
2.  Fatal  accident 
An  accident  causin~ the  death of  the victim ...,ithin  56  days  followinF!  the  accident.  Victims 
dying  more  than  56  after  the day  of  the  accident  should not  be  included  in  the  fatal  acct-
dent  catestory but  in  that  of accidents  resultin~ in  incapacity  tnvolvin~ an  absence  from 
work  of  more  than  56  days. 
3.  Persons  covered  by  the  statistics 
P1t  staff  and  employees  of  contractor  firms  who  be lone.  to  a  m1ners,  soc tal  security  scheme. 
The  statistics count  victims  and  not  accidents,  everyone  who  is  the  victim of  an  accident 
while  actually  under~round as well  as  dur~n~ descent  and  ascent  should  be  included.  Victims 
can  therefore  only  be miners,  supervisors,  engineers  or  staff  belon~J;ing to  contractor  firms. 
4.  Shifts and  number  of  hours  worked 
Shifts  and  number  of hours  worked  by  the  persons on  the  books  of  the  mine  and  other staff 
belongin~ to  a  miners,  social  insurance  scheme;  account  should  be  taken both of extra  shlfts 
and  overtime. 
The  period  of  reference  adopted  is the  period of actual  exposure  to  riski  one  therefore 
counts extra shifts  and  overtime  in  terms  of  t1me  actually  worked  and  not  of  number  of 
hours  paid. 
5.  Accidents  rates 
Number  of acctdents  per million hours  worked. 
The  frequency  rates  are  arrived at  by  dividing  the  number  of accidents of  a  given  category 
by  the  total  number  of  hours  spent  on all  types. of  work  underground. 
CAUSES  OF  ACCIDE'ITS 
I. Falls of Ground  and  Rocks 
This  category of accidents  covers  falls of  stone  or  coal  from  its natural  situation  . 
It does  not  cover  accidents  caused  by  falls  ,.  ~  ~round resulting  from  one of  the  factors 
included  under  another  catejlory~  for  examp~.! the  use  of explosives,  explOSion  of  firedamp 
or dust,  or  an  outburst.  A~cidents caused  by  falls of  stone  in  a  caved  waste  should  be  in-
cluded in this  category;  on  the  other hand,  accidents  during  the  stowing of waste  should 
be  classed  in category  5 
11Falls  of Objects".  Acddents  caused  by materials  continuing to 
move  after falling  from  their natural position are  included  under  category  I 
11FG1ls  of 
ground  and  rocks'',  except  ..there  it  is  a  case  of materials  set  in motion  by  some  external 
cause after first  cominS~:  to  rest. 
!1.  Transport 
Accidents  caused  by  any  means  of  transport  whether  stationary or  in motion,  used  to carry 
~en or  object~ at  the  face,  in other workings.  in  roadways,  in  shafts,  staple pits, etc., 
lncludin~ acc1dents  caused  by  the  eng1nes  providin!l mOtive  power  for  transport.  Thu  cate-
gory  includes,  for  example,  accidents  caused  by  lumps  of  co31  fallln~ from  a  conveyor belt 
or  blocks  of  wood  from  a  t~.:.b  loaded  with  timber.  and  even  those  caused  when  lumps  of  coal 
are  projected during  their  descent  down  a  fixed  chute.  An  <tccident  caused  by  the  szear  wheels 
or  the  drivin.g  mechanism of  a  transport  system  should  also  be  included  in  cate~ory t1 
11Trdns-
port01. 
Electrocution caused  by  a  trolley wire  should  be  included  in  category  XI  "Electrtc.ity". 
a)  Continuous  Transport 
Transport  equipment  whiCh  can  receive  products  along  the  whole  of  its length and  maintain 
a  continuous  flow. 
b)  Discontinuous  transport 
All  other  means  of  transport. 
This  category  should  include  accidents  caused  particularly  by  skips,  cagE's,  kibbles,  as 
well  as  accidents  involving  men  or objects  falling  from  these  C:lf!.eS,  skips  or  kibbles,  rope 
haulages,  locomotives,  monorails,  decking  rams  and  other  similar devices. 
III.  Falls  and  movement  of  the victim 
a)  While  moving  about  the  mine 
Falls of  men  into  a  shaft  or staple pit 1  falls  in  general,  stumbles,  slips,  knocks  and  bumps, 
sprains  of  limbs,  etc.,  whatever  the  cause.  should  be  included,  as  long  as  the  basic  cause 
of  the  accident  is  the victim's movement  through  the  mine  in  the  course  of  or at  the  rlace 
of  work  and  no  means  of  transport  is  involved;  the  lR.tter  should  be  included  1n  category  II 
"Transport
11  or tti b  "Falls of  victim during  other activities" respectively. 
b)  In  the  course  of other activities 
Falls of  men  1nto  a  shaft  or  staple pit,  falls  in  general,  stumbles.  slips,  knocks  and  bumps, 
sprains of  lims,  etc. t  as  lon~ a.s  the fall  was  caused  basically  by  some  particular ,1.ctivity 
and  not  by  the  movement  of  the  victim  at>out  the  mine,  which  is  covered  in  HI a. 
This  category  should  only  include accidents  e.aused  by  the victim falling during his actual 
work  and  not  dunng  the  course  of  mavin~ about  the  mine  as  under  catel!:ory ltl a  "F:tlls of 
v1ctim while  moving  about  the mine,, 
IV.  \1achines,  tools  and  supports 
a)  ~lach1.nes 
Accidents  caused  by  en~ines  powerin~ a  means  of  transport  should  be  included  1n category  II 
"Transport",  Category  IV  covers  accidents occurring  during  the  starting  up  and  running of 
other machines. 
Accidents  caused  by machines  falltng while  betng  moved  will  be  tncluded  in  category V  "Falls 
of  objects',. 
b)  Tools 
category  IV  covers  accidents  caused  by  the use  of  tools  such as  por:able drills, drills  ~n 
stands  hand  saws,  pneumatic  picks,  llfting gear,  pushers,  etc.  Acctdents  caused  by  f11lllne, 
tools  ~hould be  put  1nto  cate~ory V "Falls of  objects". 
c)  Supports 
\hth  re~ard to  accidents occurring  during  the handling of  supports  only  those  involving 
the setting  up  or  removal  of  this equipment  should  be  in~luded in  catego~y  IV.  If.a suport 
or  one  of  its components  falls  durin~ transport,  the  acc1dent  should  be  1ncluded  1n cate-
gory  V "Falls of  objects". 
Cat~gory  IV.on~y covers_accidents  arising  from  the~  and  movement  of machines,  tools  and 
equ1pmen:;  lt  lS  emphasl.Zed  1n  t~e case  of  supports  that  only accidents occurring  durin~ 
the  sett1ng  up  ahd  removal  of  thu equipment  should  be  it'tcluded  in this category. 
V.  Falls of  objects 
Accidents  involving  the  fallin~ or  dislodging of  excavated material,  and  of  objects  such  as 
frams.  t1.mber,  tools,  props  1  p1pes,  materials,  etc. 
Th1s  ;ategory  includes  not  only accidents  cc-tused  directly by  falls of  excavating material 
or obJects,  but  also  those  caused  by  objects  falling while  heine.  handled. 
VI.  Explouves 
Accidents  ?ccurrin!i?:  during  the  tra~sport or handling of exploSlves,  the  charging of shot-
holas~.acctde~tal  ~r  prem~ture  fir1n~ of  shots,  inadequate  protection of  personnel,  unfired 
:::!~s~;~~ ~=~~~s~~:.~y ptcks  OT  drllls, mis-fires,  long fires,  residues  and  poisoning  by 
Where  7he  use  of  e~plosives sets  o~f an  explos1on  of  fire-damp or dust  or  even  a  heating 
or  a  flt"e,  the  ac::.ctdent  should  be  tncluded  1n  c::.ate~J;ory vn or  IX  respec::.tively. 
VIT.  Ignitions or  explosions  of  firedamp  and  coal  dust 
This  indudes  poisoning or  suffoc::.ation  by  the  gases  so  produced.  An  explosion  of  firedamp 
or  coal  dust  brought  abo':'t  by  the  use  of  electricity should  be  classified under  category 
V~I.  As  a  ~eneral :ule,  lf  the  causes  of  an accident  include  the  i~nition or  explosion  or 
hredamp  or  dust, lt should  always  be  included  in category VII. 
VIII.  Outbursts  of  gas  - Deoxygenation,  suffocanon or  poisoning by  natural  gases  (COz, 
CHtp  CO,  H2S) 
a)  Outbursts  of  F!;as 
Accidents  ca~sed by ejected materials of  roof  falls  caused  by  sudden outbursts  of  gas.  In 
a:cordanc~ wlth  the  rule  ~at out  for  category VII.  if the  outburst  is  followed  by  an  explo-
SlOn  of  firedamp,  any  accidents  caused  thereby  should be  included  in  category Jill  "lgnitions 
or  explosions  of  firedamp  or explosions  of  coal  dust
11
• 
b)  Deoxygenation  and  ooisomn$1:  bv  natural  Rases  (Co2 ,  CH4  .co,  P
2
S) 
This  includes  accidents  caused  by  lack  of  oxygen,  by  suffocation  (cH4 ,  co2)  and  by  poisonin!i!; 
!~
0
~x;t!!io~f  o;u~~~::~!;no~rc~:~s~~!~~ !;  ~:~~g~;  :b~~!t~~~  li!:~:  ~~~::c::e  b!c:~~!::i~~;u~~ ~~ 
clasu~ted unde~ those  cate~J;ories.  If suffocation or  poisonin~ is  caused  by  exhau!it  fumes 
from  d1cscl  cngtncs,  the  accidents  should  be  included  in  cate~ory IV 1  "Explosives11 • 
tX.  Heatings  or  fires 
This  includes  poisoning or  suffocation by  the  gases  produced,  injuries  from  burns,  roof 
falls,  falls  of  objects,  etc.  following  a  heating  or  fire  in the mine.  A  fire  following  an 
explosion of  firedamp  or  coal  dust  should  be  this category. 
In general,  if the  accident  is due  to  several  combined  causes  including  a  heating or  a  flre, 
it  should  always  be  included  in category  IX  "Heatings  or  fires
1
'  unless  one  of  the  causes  is 
the  u.~nition or  explosion of  firedamp  or  coal  dust;  in this last case  the  accident  "WOuld 
be  included  in  cdtegory VII. 
X.~ 
Accidents  occurrinp  when  old  workings  are  broken  into or  when  rlead  ground  is  encountered. 
InjurieS  from  projecterl  material,  falls of  objects,  falls  of  f!.round  drowntng,  etc. 
X!,  Electricity 
Accidents  caused  by electricity- burn1,  shocks,  electrocution.  1f electricity causes  the 
accidental  firin~ of  explosives,  an explouon of  firedamp  or  coal  dust  or  a  heating  or  a 
fire,  the  resulttng accident  should  be  tncluded  in  those  categories  1n  the  followinf:!  order 
of  priority  : 
I.  Fxplosion  of  firedamp  or dust 
2.  A  heating or  fire 
3.  Fxplosi•Jes 
XII.~ 
This  category  covers  accidents which  cannot  be  classified under  categories  I  to  Xl,  that 
is  to  say,  accidents  of  which  it is not  possibile  to  establish the  exact cause.  This  ca-
tegory may  alsc  be  used  to  record  accidents  covered  by  compressed  air. 
SITE  OF  THE  ACCIDE\'T 
This  Means  the  place where  the victim was  at  the  time  of  the  accident,  which  may  be diffe-
rent  from  the victim
1 s  normal  place of  work. 
I.  Production  faces 
This  comprises  the working  face  including  the  part  between  the  face  or  staple hole  and  the 
stowed  or  caved  waste  but  does  not  include  roads  of  any  kind  except  durmny  roads. 
2.  Headings  excluding  shafts and staple ptts 
This  also  covers  the  area where  loading,  timbering  and  steelwork  are carried  out  immediate-
ly behind  the  face.  In  the  case  of  slusher  packing  the  currin~ area  extends  up  to  and  in-
cludin~ the  1 ine  of  props, 
Development  headings  should  be  considered  as drifts. 
3.  Shafts  and  staple pits 
This  also  covers  the  irmnediate  approach  to  tnsets especially where  mine  cars  and  stores are 
loaded  and  unloaded  from  the  cages. 
4.  Other  places 
This  heading  covers  all  the victims  of  accidents  not  included  under  the  three  preceding 
headin!i!;s. 
PERIOD  OF  !~CAPACITY 
Accidents  should  be  broken dovn  as  follows  according  to periods  of  incapacity  : 
- Accidents  involving  an  absence  of  between  4  and  20 calendar  days 
- Accidents  involvin~ an absence  of  between  21  and  SfJ  calendar  days 
- Accidents  involving  an  absence  of  more  than  56  calendar days 
- Fatal  accidents. 
The  day of  the  accident  does  not  count.  The  number  of  days  of  incapacity to  be  taken  into 
consideration  is defined  by  the effective  absence  of  the  miner  from  work. MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common  Statistics on  victims 
of accidents  wtderground in  coal  mines 
SITE  OF  THE  ACCIDENT 
~ 
c 
I.  FALLS  OF  GROUNDS  AND  ROCKS 
I I.  TRAl'>ISPORT,  TOTAL 
a)  Continuous  Transport 
b)  Discontinuous  Transport 
III.  FALLS  AND  MOVEMENT  OF  THE  VICTIM, 
TOTAL 
I  a)  while  moving  about  the  mine 
b)  in  the  course  of other  activities 
IV.  MACHI:'>IES,  TOOLS  &'ID  SUPPORTS 
TOTAL 
f  - -------~  ---
I  a.)  Machines 
b)  Tools 
! 
I 
COUNTRY 
COAL-FIElD 
Production  faces 
1 
4  to  21  to  Fatal 
20  56  >56  acci-
days  days  days  dents 
(3)  (3)  (3) 
I 
' 
I 
total 
I 
I 
I 
I 
:- ---t-~--
c)  Supports  I 
I 
I  :."'" ~ """'" 
•  EXPLOSIVES 
! 
!vn.  IGN!TIOllS  OR  EXPLOSIONS 
~  OF  FIREDA111'  &'ID  COAL  DUST  I 
VIII.  OUTBURSTS  OF  GAS,  DE-OXYGENATION~~ 
r 
SUFFOCATION  OR  POISONING  BY  NATU~i 
RAL  GASES  (COz,  CH4,  CO,  HzS), 
TOTAL 
I 
a)  Outbursts  of  Gas 
b)  De-oxygenation  and  Poisoning 
by natural  Gases 
f- ". """"  "' ,. ·~· 
X.  INRUSHES 
I 
XI.  ELECTRICITY 
XII.  OTHER  CAUSES 
TOTAL 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  ACCIDENT  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  CAUSE  AND  SITE 
OF  ACCIDENT  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(absolute  figures) 
Headings  excluding 
shafts  and staple-pits  Shafts  and staple-pits 
2  3 
4  to  \21  to  Fatal  4  to  21  to  Fatal  4  to 
20  56  )  56  acci- total  20  56  >56  acci- total  20 
days  days  days  dents  days  days  days  dents  days 
(3)  ( 3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3) 
I 
i 
I 
~-r 
j  I 
I 
l  i 
I 
I 
-~ 
I  I  I 
I 
I  I 
i  I  I  I  I 
-- --r---
I 
I 
I 
(1)  Number  of hours  worked by pit staff and errpZoyees  of aontroetor  f~rrns who  belong to  a  miners 1  soeiaZ  insurance  saheme. 
(2)  Aceidents  involving more  than  five  easuaZties  (i.e.  who  either died or were  unable  to resume  work  under>ground  for at  least eight weeks). 
( 3)  Calender days. 
Table  la 
YEAR 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1) 
Total of  Group 
Other places  accidents  wtderground  accidents  (2) 
4  5  6 
21  to  Fatal  4  to  21  to  Fatal  56  Fatal 
56  )56  acc:i- total  20  56  )56  acci- total  1W 
acci- total 
days  days  dents  days  days  days  dents  dents 
(3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (3) 
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I ANNEX 
Explanatory  notes  - Tables  1 
GENERAL  DEFINITIONS 
1.~ 
Bodily  injury resulting  from  a  sudden  and  abnormal  external  cause  1n  the  course  of  work. 
The  ~ines Safety  and  Health Commission's  statistics  should  only  cover  viet  1ms  of  ace ident s 
underground,  includinR  acc1dents  which  occur when  men  enter  and  leave  the  ca!!;eS  and  while 
the  cages  are  in mot ion, 
2.  Fatal  accident 
An  accident  causing  the  death of  the victim with1n  56  days  followlnR  the  accident,  Vlctl.ms 
dying  more  than  56  after  the day  of  the  accident  should  not  be  1ncluded  in the  fatal  acci-
dent  cate,gory  but  in  that  of  accidents  resulting  in  1ncapacity  involvin~ an  absence  from 
work  of more  than  Sf)  days. 
3.  Persons  covered  by  the  statistics 
Pit  staff  and  employees  of contractor  f1rms  who  be lone  to  a  m1ners'  social  sec.urny  scheme. 
The  statistics count  victims  and  not  accidents,  everyone  who  1s  the  victim of  an  acc1dent 
while  actually  underground  as  well  as  durin~ descent  and  ascent  should  be  1ncluded.  Vict1ms 
can  therefore  only  be  miners,  supervisors,  engineers or  staff  belon~1ng to  contractor  firms. 
4.  Shifts and  number  of  hours  worked 
Shifts and  number  of  hours  worked  by  the  persons  on  the  books  of  the  m1.ne  and  other  staff 
belongin~ to  a  miners
1  social  insurance  schemei  account  should  be  taken  both of  extra shifts 
and  overtime. 
The  period  of  reference  adopted  is the  period of actual  exposure  to  risk;  one  therefore 
counts  extra sh1fts  and  overt1me  in  terms  of  time  actually worked  and  not  of  number  of 
hours  paid. 
S.  Accidents  rates 
Number  of accidents  per million hours  worked. 
The  frequency  rates are  arr1ved at  by  dividing the  numbar  of  accidents  of  a  g1ven  category 
by  the  total  number  of  hours  spent  on all  types  of  work  underground. 
CAUSES  OF  ACCIDENTS 
I. Falls of  GroUild  and  Rocks 
This  category of accidents  covers  falls of  stone  or  coal  from  its natural  situat1on  . 
It does  not  cover  accidents  caused  by  falls  ,  _  12;round  resulting  from  one  of  the  factors 
included  under  another  cate~ory,  for  examp'.!  the  use  of  explosives,  explosion of  firedamp 
or dust,  or  an  outburst.  Accidents  caused  by  falls of  stone  1n  a  caved  waste  should  be  in-
cluded  in thlS  category;  on  the  other hcmd,  accidents  during  the  stow1.ng  of waste  should 
be  classed  in category  5 
11Falls  of Objects'
1
•  Accidents  caused by  materic~ls  continuing  to 
move  after falling  from  their natural  position are  included  under  category  T  "Fctlls  of 
ground  and  rocks,,  except  Nhere  1t  is  a  case  of materuls  set  in motion  by  some  external 
cause after hrst comin12:  to  rest. 
I I.  Transport 
Accidents  caused  by  any  means  of  transport  whether  stationary or  in motion,  used  to  carry 
men  or objects  at  the  face,  in other  workings~  in  roadways,  in  shafts,  staple pits, etc,, 
includin~ accidents  caused  by  the  en~1nes  providin~ motlVe  power  for  transport.  This  cate-
gory  includes,  for  example,  accidents  caused  by  lumps  of  coal  fallin~ from  a  conveyor  belt 
or blocks  of  wood  from  a  tcb  loaded  with  timber.  and  even  those  caused  when  lumps  of  coal 
are  projected during  their descent  down  a  hxed  chute.  An  accident  caused  by  the  ~ear wheels 
or  the  driving mechanum of  a  transport  system  should  also  be  1ncluded  in  category II "Trc~.ns­
port". 
Electrocution caused  by  a  trolley wire  should  be  1ncluded  in  cateS!ory  XI  "F:lectriClty". 
a)  Continuous  Transport 
Transport  equipment  which  can  receive  products  alon~ the  whole  of  1ts  length  and  ma1nta1n 
a  cant inuous  flow. 
b)  Discontinuous  transport 
All  other means  of  transport. 
This  category  should  include  accidents  caused  particularly by  skips,  cages,  kibbles,  as 
well  as  accidents  1nvolving  men  or objects  falllng  from  these  c:t~es,  skips  or  kibbles,  rope 
haulages,  locomotives,  monorails,  decking  rams  and  other  simllar dev1ces. 
III. Falls and  movement  of  the  victim 
a)  While  moving  about  the  mine 
Falls  of  men  into  a  shaft or  staple pit,  falls  in general,  stumbles,  slips,  knocks  and  bumps, 
sprains  of  limbs,  etc., whatever  the  cause,  should  be  included,  as  long  as  the  bauc  cause 
of  the  accident  is  the victim's movement  through  the  m1ne  in  the  course  of  or at  the  place 
of  work  and  no  means  of  transport  is  involved;  the  latter should  be  1ncluded  in  category II 
''Transport" or  III b  "Falls  of  victim dur1ng other activities" respectwely. 
b)  In  the  course  of  other activities 
Falls  of  men  into  a  shaft  or  staple p1t,  f.'l.lls  in  general,  stumbles,  slips,  knocks  and  bumps, 
sprains of  lims,  etc.,  as  Ion~ as  the  fall  was  caused  baSlcally  by  some  particular activity 
and  not  by  the  movement  of  the  v1ctim  about  the  mine,  which  is  covered  in  III a. 
This  category  should  only  include  accidents  caused  by  the victim falling  during  hlS  actual 
work  and  not  during  the  course  of  movin12;  about  the m1ne  as  under  cate~ory 11I  a  "Falls of 
victim while moving  about  the  mine". 
IV.  ~fachines,  tools  and  supports 
a)  ~tach1nes 
Accidents  caused  by  engines  powerin~ a  means  of  transport  should  be  included  1n  category II 
"Transport
11
•  Category  IV  covers  accidents occurring  during  the  startin~ up  and  running  of 
other  machines. 
Accidents  caused  by  mach1nes  falling while  be1ng  moved  will  be  included  in  category  V  "Falls 
of  objects". 
b)  Tools 
Category  tV  covers  accidents  caused  by  the use  of  tools  such as  por:able drills, drills on 
stands  hand  saws,  pneumatic  picks,  lift1ng gear,  pushers,  etc.  Acc1dents  caused  by  fall1ne 
tools  ~hould be  put  1nto  catej!,ory  V "Falls of  objects". 
c)  Supports 
With  regard  to  accidents occurring  during  the  handling of  supports  only  those  involv1n12: 
the  setting  up  or  removal  of  this  equipment  s1-iou1d  be  in~luded  in  category  IV·  If.  a  suport 
or one  of  1ts components  falls  durin.Q:  tr.1.nsport,  the  accldent  should  be  1ncluded  1n cate-
gory  v  "Falls  of  objects". 
V,  Falls of  obJects 
Acc1dents  involv1.ng  the  fall1ng  or dislodging of  excavated material,  and  of  objects  such as 
frams,  t1mber,  tools,  props.  pipes, materials,  etc. 
This  7ategory  1.ncludes  not  only  accidents  caused directly by  falls of  excavating material 
or objects,  but  also  those  caused  by  objects  falling  while  beinS!  handled. 
VI.  ExploSlves 
Where  ~he use  of  e~plosives sets  o~f an  explosion of  fire-damp  or  dust  or  even  a  heating 
or  a  fne,  the  acc1dent  should  be  1ncluded  1n category VII  or  IX  respectively. 
VII.  Ignitions  or  explosions  of  firedamp  and  coal  dust 
This  includes  poisoning  or  suffocation by  the  gases  so  produced.  An  explosion of  firedamp 
or  coal  dust  brought  about  by  the  use  of  electricity should  be  classified under  category 
V~I.  As  a  general  ~ule, if the  causes  of  an  accident  include  the  i~nition or  explosion or 
flredamp  or dust,  1t  should  always  be  included  in category VII. 
VIII.  Outbursts  of  gal  - Deoxygenation,  suffocation or poisoning  by  natural  ~ases  (C02, 
CH4,  CO,  H2S) 
a)  Outbursts  of  gas 
Accidents  ca~sed by  ejected materials of  roof  falls caused  by  sudden outbursts of  gas.  In 
a:cordanc~ w1th  the  rule  ~et out  for  category VII, if the  outburst  is  followed  by  an  explo-
uon of  fnedamp,  any  acc1dents  caused  thereby  should  be  included  in category .1/Il 
01Jgnitions 
or  explosions  of  f1redamp  or explosions  of  coal  dust". 
b)  Deoxygenation  and  ooisonin~ bv  natural  gases  (co2,  CR4  ,CO,  ~ 2
s) 
This  includes  accident~ caused  ~y  l~ck of  oxygen,  by  suffocation  (C!I4,  co2)  and  by  poiaonin~ 
~~o  ~x~f~!io~f  0 ~u~i~~:~~;n  0 ~r  c~~~s~~~~~ ~:  ~~~~R~; :b~~~t~~~  g::  ~~~::c::.  b!c:~~!:~i~::U~~ ~! 
class1~1ed  unde~ those  cate12;orus.  If suffocation or  poison1ng  u  caused  by  exhauat  fumes 
from  d1cscl  cng1ncs,  the  accidents  should  be  included  in  cate~ory TV,  "Explosives". 
IX.  Heatinss  or  fires 
This  includes  poisoning or  suffocation by  the  gases  produced,  injuries  from  burns,  roof 
falls,  falls  of  objects,  etc.  following  a  heating or fire  in  the  mine.  A  fire following  an 
explosion of  firedamp  or  coal  dust  should  be  this category. 
~~ ~~~:~:1  ~l~;y~h~e  a~~~t:~!d  i:n  d~:t!;o;;v~~a~H~=~~~;:d  o~a~~;:s~n~!~:!~g  o:e  h~;t  !~: ::u:e!i~:' 
the  i~nition or  explosion  of  fl.rec.lamp  or  coal  dust;  in this  last case  the  accident  would 
be  included  in  Cdtegory  VII,. 
x.~ 
Accidents  occurrinp,  when  old work1ngs  are  broken  into or  when  rlead  !!t'Ound  is encountered. 
InJur1es  from  projecterl  material,  falls of  objects,  falls of  ~round drowning,  etc. 
XI.  Electricity 
Accidents  caused  by electridty- burns,  shocks,  electrocution.  tf electr1city causes  the 
acc1dental  firin~ of  explosives,  an  explosion  of  firedamp  or  coal  dust  or  a  heating or  a 
fire,  the  resulting accident  should  be  included  in  those  catep;ories  in  the  followin~ order 
of  prionty  : 
I.  Explouon  of  firedamp  or  dust 
2.  A  heating or  hre 
3.  Explosives 
XII.~ 
This  category  covers  accidents which  cannot  be  classified under  categor1.es  I  to  XI,  that 
is  to  say,  accidents  of  which  it  is not  poss1bile  to establish  the  exact cause.  This  ca-
tegory  may  also be  used  to  record  accidents  covered  by  compressed  air. 
SITE  OF  THE  ACClDE'IT 
This  !'leans  the  place where  the victim was  at  the  time  of  the accident,  which  may  be diffe-
rent  from  the  v1ctim' s  normal  place  of  work. 
I •  Product ion  faces 
Thu  comprlSes  the  working  face  including  the  part  between  the  face  or  staple  hole  and  the 
stowed  or  caved  waste  but  does  not  include  roads  of  any  kind  except  duftiDy  roads. 
2.  Headings  excluding  shafts and  staple pits 
This  also  covers  the  area  where  loading,  timberin~ and  steelwork are carried  out  imnediate-
ly beh1nd  the  face.  In  the  case  of  slusher  packing  the  curring area  extencl.s  up  to  and  in-
cluding  the  l1ne  of  props. 
Development  head1ngs  should  be  considered  as  drifts. 
3.  Shafts  and  staple pits 
This  also  covers  the  immediate  approach  to  1nsets  especially where  mine  cars  and  stores are 
loaded  and  unloaded  from  the  cages. 
4.  Other  places 
This  heading  covers  all  the victims of accidents  not  included  under  the  three  preceding 
headin~s. 
PERIOD  OF  l"tCAPACITY 
Accidents  should  be broken  down  as  follows  according  to  periods  of  incapac1ty  : 
- Acc1dents  involving an  absence  of  between  4  and  2n  calendar  days 
- Accidents  involving  an  absence  of  between  21  and  Sll  calendar  days 
- Accidents  involving  an  absence  of  more  than  56  calendar days 
-Fatal accidents. 
The  day  of  the  accident  does  not  count.  The  number  of  days  of  incapacity  to  be  taken  1nto 
cons1deration  is def1ned  by  the  effective  absence  of  the  m1ner  from  work. MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Conmon  Statistics  on  victims 
of  accidents  undergronnd  in  coal  mines 
SITE  OF  THE  ACCIDENT 
~ 
s 
I.  FALLS  OF  GROUNDS  AND  ROCKS 
COUNTRY 
COAL-FIELD 
Production  faces 
4  to  21  to I  Fatal 
20  56  >56  acci-
days  days  days  dents 
(3)  (3)  (3) 
4  to 
total  20 
days 
(3) 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  ACCIDENT  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  CAUSE  AND  SITE 
OF  ACCIDENT  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(frequency rates) 
Headings  excluding 
shafts  and staple-pits 
21  to  Fatal 
56  >56  acci- total 
days  days  dents 
(3)  (3) 
Shafts  and  staple-pits 
4  to  21  to  Fatal 
20  56  >J6  acci-
days  days  days  dents 
(3)  (3)  (3) 
4  to 
total  20 
days 
(3) 
YEAR 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1) 
Other places 
21  to  Fatal  4  to 
56  )56  acci- total  20 
days  days  dents  days 
(3)  (3)  (3) 
Total  of 
accidents  underground 
21  to  Fatal 
Table  lb 
56 
56  )56  acci- total  1W  days  days  dents 
(3)  (3) 
Group 
accidents  (2) 
Fatal 
acci- total 
dents 
II, TRANSPORT,  TOTAL 
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a)  Continuous  Transport 
b)  Discontinuous  Transport 
I 
II  I.  FALLS  AND  MOVEMENT  OF  THE  VICTIM, 
TOTAL 
a)  wh1le  moving  about  the  mine  I  I  1 
b)  1 n  the  course  of other  act  i vi tie  sl----l-----+----l-----+-----+---+----l-----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+-----f-----+----+---+----+--·-+----+----+----l------1---....j_~ 
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c)  Supports 
V,  FALLS  OF  OBJECTS 
I  I  ~----------------------~~----~---+----r-----~--~----~--~----+---~----+----+----~---~----~----r----r----r---~----r---4---~----+---~----+-~----+----~--~ 
VI.  EXPLOSIVES  I  I  I  I 
~V~~  I-;;;;:-~ONS  ;  EXPLOSIONS  ~-~- ------r---1---~·-+-----t-----+---+----+----+----t-----+----+-----+-----t-----+----+-----t-----+-----+---l-
l 
OF  FIREDA.'1P  AND  COAL  DUST  ----L- i 
VIII.  OUTBURSTS  OF  GAS,  DE-O.(YGENATION  •I  I 
suFFOCATION  oR  p.nso:n:;G  BY  NATu-1  I 
RAL  GASES  (cn2,  r 114,  CO,  HzS)  ,  ! 
~  TOTAL  _  ~---------r--~  ___ 1------ f----
1  a)  Outbursts  of  Gas 
l 
b)  De -oxygenation  and  Poisoning  ----+-----+-----+------+-----+---+----+-----+----+-----+----+-----+-----+-----+----+----+-----+-----!----+----+----+-----+----+----l-----+----1-----1----__j 
by  natural  Gas~s 
-IX.  HEATINGS  ORF  ~I-RE_-_s-------------t----~----r---~----r-----f--~----~--~----+---~----+----t----~--~----~----r----r----r---4-----r---4---~i----+---~----+----+----~--~ 
I  X.  INRUSHES 
I  u. wcrmm 
XII.  OTHER  CAUSES 
TOTAL  _1-,---=  ~~~:-::;:-=J_________l__________L__L_____L____L_____L_______I  _  _J_______L____j_____j_  _  __L___l_____L_______l_______J 
(1)  Number  of hours  worked by  pit staff and errployees  of aontraator .hrms who  belong to a  miners 
1  soaial  insurance  scheme. 
(2)  Acaidents  involving more  than  five  casualties  (i.e.  who  either died or were  unable  to reswne work  undergr•ound  for at  l-east  eight weeks). 
(3)  Cal.ender_,oo~~~,s~·----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------~-----------------------------------------__j ANNEX 
Explanatory  notes  - Tables  2 
1.~ 
Bodily  injury resulting  from  a  sudden  and  abnormal  external  cause  in  the  course  of  work. 
The  :'line  Safety  and  Health Commission's  statistics  should only  cover  victims of accidents 
underground,  including accidents which occur  when  men  enter  and  leave  the  cages and  while 
the  cages  are  in motion. 
2.  Fatal  accident 
An  accident  causin~ the death of  the  victim within  Sf\  days  following  the  accident.  Victims 
dying  more  than  56  days  after  the  day  of  the  accident  should  not  be  included  in  the  fatal 
accidents  category but  in  that  of  acc1dents  result1ng  in  incapacity  involving  an  absence 
from  ""ork  of  more  than  56  days. 
3.  Persons  covered  by  the statistics 
Pit  staff  and  enployees  of  contractor  firms  who  belong  to  a  m1ner's  social  security  scheme. 
The  statist1cs count  victims  and  not  acc1dents;  everyone  who  l.S  the  vict1m of  an  accident 
while  actually  underground  as  ""ell  as  during  descent  and  ascent  should  be  1ncluded.  V1ccims 
can  therefore  only  be  miners,  supervisors,  engineers or  staff  belonging  to  contr.1ctor  f1.rms. 
4.  Shifts and  number  of  hours worked 
Shifts and  number  of  hours  worked  by  the  persons on  the  books  of  the  m1ne  and  other  staff 
belonging  to  a  miners'  social  1nsurance  scheme;  account  should  be  taken both  of  extra  shifts 
and  overtime. 
The  period  of  reference  ctdopted  is  the  period  of  d.ctucil  exposure  to  nsk;,  extrd. shifts  ctnd 
overt1me must  therefor be counted in  terms  of  time  ctctuc~lly ""orked  dod  not  of  number  of 
hours  pctld. 
5.  Accident  rates 
~umber of  acc1dents  per million hours  ""orked. 
The  frequency  rates  are arrived  at  by  dividln!'!:  the  number  of  accidents  of  a  r,1ven  category 
by  the total  nuTTlber  of  hours  spent  on all  types  of  work  undet'ground. 
9.  Location of  the  injury 
\.,'hen  an  accident  bas  resulted  in multiple  1njuries to different  parts  of  the  body  and  one 
of  the  injuries  1S  clearly more  ser1ous  than  the  others,  this  accident  should  be classified 
in  the  group  relat1ng  to  the  part of  the  body  most  seriously  ihjured;  for  example,  a  frac-
ture  o(  the  le~.  together  with  grazing  of  a  hand,  should  be  clasufied  1n  category  VI  "Lo""er 
l1mbs''  and  not  in  category  V  "Hands". 
I.  Head  and  neck 
Covers  in particular  the  skull,  the  scalp,  brain  injuries,  the ears,  the  mouth  (1nclud1ng 
the  lips,  teeth  and  tongue),  the  nose,  the  face,  the  neck  but  not  the  eyes  whu:.h  are  ln-
cluded  in category  II. 
rt.  Eyes 
Also  covers  the  eye  socket  and  the  optic  nerve. 
III.  Trunk 
Covers  the  back  (vertebrae  and  adJacent  muscles 1  the  splnal  marro""),  the  thorax  (ribs, 
sternum,  bronchi,  lungs),  the  abdomen  (including  Internal  organs,  ktdneys,  l1ver,  spleen), 
the  abdoTIJ.en  and  the  gen1tal  or2ans. 
The  shoulders  and  wrists are  regarded  as  part  of  the  upper  l1mbs  (category  IV)  and  not 
of  the  trunk  or  hands  (cate)Gory  V). 
The  h1ps  and  the  ankles  are  regarded  as  part  of  the  lower  limbs  (category  VI)  and  not 
as  part of  the  trunk  or  feet  (category  VI1). 
rv.  t:pper  limbs  (excluding  the  hOlnds) 
This  1ncludes.  lOJuries  to  the  shoulders,  includln)G  the collar  bone  and  shoulder  blades, 
\.njunes  to  the  arms,  elbo""s•  forearms  and ""rists. 
V.~ 
fhe  wr1sts  are  not  reguded  as  part  of  the  hands  but  of  the  upper  limbs  (category  IV). 
VI.  Lower  llmbs  (excluding  feet) 
Th1s  includes  the hips,  thighs,  knees,  legs  and  ankles. 
VII.~ 
The  ankles  are  not  regarded  as  part of  the  feet  but  of  the  lower  l1mbs  (category  VI). 
Vlfl.  '!ult1ple  locations 
This  )Group.  coverin~ multiple  locations,  should  only  be  used  when  the  v1ct1m  has  suffered 
several  1njuries  to  d1fferent  parts  of  hlS  body,  none  of  ""hich  1s  clearly more  senous  than 
the  rthers. 
The  c:tte~ory may  cover  injuries  to  the  head  and  trunk.  the  head  and  one  or  more  llmbs,  the 
trunk  and  one  or  more  ltmbs  or an  upper  and  a  lower  limb. 
IX.  '\ot  specified 
This  group  should  only be  used  when  there  is  no  ev1dence  of  the  exact  location of  the  injury. 
10.  Nctture  of  the  injury 
Hhen  an  accident  has  resulted  in  several  injuries  to  dlfferent  parts  of  the  body  and  one 
of  them  l.S  clearly more  serious  than  the others,  the  accident  should  be  clas:sif1ed  in  the 
group  relaung to  the  most  serious  injury. 
I. Amputations  and  enucleations 
Thl.S  1ncludes  traumatic  avulSl.on of  the  eye. 
2.  Fractures  ""ith  or w1thout  dislocation 
Th1s  lncludes  simple  fractures;  fractures  with  injuries  to  the  soft  parts  of  the body, 
closed  or  compound  fractures;  fractures  wi':h  inter~1al or  nerve  damage,  fractures with  luxa-
tions,  contusions  and  crushings. 
3.  Luxations,  t""ists  and  sprains 
Th1s  covers  minor  luxations  and  dislocations,  traumatic  lumbAgo,  lumbago  scutica co1used 
by  strain;  it does  not  1nclude  lu'<ations  ""ith  fracture  covered  by  category  2. 
T{-:ISTS  A\lD  SPRAI\'S 
This  covers  ruptures,  torn and  lacerated muscles,  tendons,  li~taments  and  jo10ts as well  as 
hernia  due  to  strain and  slipped  discs,  except  ""hen  they are  assoc1ated with  open  wounds. 
4.  Concussion  and  lnternal  injury 
This  catef!ory  includes  1nternal  bruis1ng,  internal  bleedlnf,  1nternal  lacerations  and  rup-
tures  except  where  assoc1ated with  frrtctures. 
It does  not  1oclude  internal  injuries accompanied  by  fractures  ""hich  are  covered  by  cate-
gory  :!. 
5.  Open  wounds,  contusions  and  muscular  abrasions 
This  covers  lacerations,  flesh wounds,  cuts,  contuslons,  scalp  wounds,  loss of  a  nail or 
an  ear,  w~unds with  nerve  lojur1es,  haemarthosis,  haematoma  and  bnases,  contus1ons  and 
bru1ses  '71th  superf1c1.-tl  wounds.  lt docs  not  1nclude  traum..ttlc  amputation,  enucleat 1ons 
or  <'lv~lston of  an  e~e,  whlch  are  covered  by  cate~ory  1,  compounJ  fr,1ctures,  contusions  and 
crush1n~s accOml)anylng  a  fracture  ""h1ch  are  covered  by  ~ategory 2,  concuss1on  covered  by  4, 
burns  ""1th  wounds  covered  by  f... 
n.  Rurns  and  harmful  effects of  clectrictiy  and  rctdidtion 
Covers  ~urns  from  fne,  boiling  linu1rl,  fnctlon,  chemtc-ll  substances  (external  burns  only) 
1 
burns  wtth  wounds,  :lect:ocutlon,  electnc  shock  and  burns  caused  by  el<>ctricity,  the  ef-
fect  of  X-r,1ys,  rarhoactLVC'  suhstances,  ultr.1.  violet  rays  and  ionizing  r.1di.1tion. 
Tt  does  not  LOver  burns  c.tused  by  the  absorption  of  a  corrosive  or  c,1ttStlC  substance  whLch 
.lre  cla.ssified  in c.ttegory  7. 
7.  Potsomng  and  suffocatlon 
B.  ~'ultiple  InJuries or  those  not  specified  (including complications) 
This  (:ategory  includes  those  cases  1n  whlch  the  victim has  suffered  several  injuries  of  dif-
ferent  types!  none  of  ""hlch  is clearly more  serious  than  the  others,  and  those  which  are 
not  covered  In  •l.ny  other  C·'ltegory. 
lt also  covers  the  vartous  early  comp1H':tttons  of  lnJuries  and  pathological  react 1ons  which 
~~~e~~~~~hould only  be  class1fied  in  this  ~troup when  the  nature  of  the ong1nal  lnju;y  1 s  " 
PF"~IOD OF  !\CAPACITY 
Accidents  should  be  broken  down  according  to  two  periods  of  incapac1ty  : 
- acc1dents  1nvolv1ng  an  absence  of  more  than  SIS  calendar  days 
- fatal  accidents. 
The  ~ay of.the.accident  does  not  count.  The  number  of  days  of  iT'l.capac 1ty  to  be  taken  into 
conuderatton  151  deflned  by  the  effective absence  of  the  miner  from  work. MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common  Statistics on  victims 
of  accidents  underground  in  coal  mines 
NATURE  OF  THE  INJURY 
PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
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VIII. Multiple  locations  I  1 
IX.  Not  specified 
WTAL 
(1)  Nwnber  of hours  worked by pit staff cmd  employees of contractor  firms  who  belong to a  miner's social insurance  scheme. 
( 2)  including comp Zications. 
(J)  The  shoulders  cmd  the wrists  are included unckr  "upper  Zi!Ws". 
(4!  The  hips  and  the  ankles are incluckd unckr  "Lower  limbs". 
(5)  Caumckr days. ANNEX 
Explanatory  notes  - Tables  2 
GE~FRAL DEFI~ITIO~S 
I.  Accident 
Bodily  injury  resultin~ from  a  sudden  and  abnormal  external  cause  in  the  course  of  work. 
The  'line  Safety and  Health  Commission
1 s  statistics  should  only cover  victims  of  accidents 
underground,  ~ncluding accidents which  occur when  men  enter  and  leave  the  cages  and  while 
the  cages  are  in motion. 
2.  Fatal  a.ccident 
An  accident  causin~ the  death of  the  vtctlm wtthin  Sf,  days  following  the  acctdent,  V1c.t1ms 
dyin~ more  than  Sf)  days  after  the  day  of  the  accident  should  not  be  included  in  the  fatal 
accidents category but  in  that  of accidents result1ng  in  incapac1ty  involving  an  absence 
from  work  of  more  than  Sh  days. 
3.  Persons  covered  by  the statist1c1 
Pit  staff  and  employees  of  contractor  firms  who  belong  to  a  miner's  soc1al  secunty scheme. 
The  statisticS count  victims  and  not  acc.1dents:  everyone  w-ho  is  the  v1ctu11  of  an  accident 
while  actually underground  as  well  as dunng  descent  and  ascent  should  be  included.  V1ct1ms 
can  therefore  only be miners,  supervisors,  enpneers or  staff  belonging  to  contractor  firms. 
4.  Shifts and  number  of  hours  worked 
Shifts  and  number  of  hours  worked  by  the  persons on  the  books  of  the  m1ne  and  other  staff 
belongine;  to  a  m1ners'  social  insurance  scheme;  account  should  be  taken  both  of  extra  shdts 
and  overtime. 
The  penod  of  reference  .t.dopted  is  the  period  of  dctudl  exposure  to  risk;  extrd shifts  dnd 
overtime  must  therefor  be counted in  terms  of  time  .:~ctuo~.lly  worked  c:md  not  of  number  of 
hours  pdld. 
5.  Acc1dent  rates 
~umber of  accidents  per  mill1on hours  worked. 
The  frertuency  rates  are  arr1ved  at  by  div1d1n~ the  number  of  acc1dents  of  a  f"lVen  category 
by  the  total  number  of  hours  spent  on all  types  of  work  underground. 
9.  Location of  the  injury 
\..'hen  an  acctdent  has  resulted  10 multiple  injuries  to  different  parts of  the  body  and  one 
of  the  1njuries  u  clearly more  serious  than  the  others,  this  accident  should  be  classif1ed 
1n  the  group  relat1n~ to  the  part  of  the  body  most  senously injured;  for  example,  a  frac-
ture  of  the  le~,  to~ether with  graz.ing  of  a  hand,  should  be  classified  in  category  VI  "Lower 
l1mbs"  and  not  in  category  V  "Hands". 
1.  Head  and  neck 
Covers  in  particular  the  skull,  the  scalp,  brain  injuries,  the ears,  tne  !'louth  (including 
the  lips,  teeth and  tongue),  the  nose,  the  face,  the  neck  but  not  the  eyes  which  are  1n-
cluded  1n  category 1I. 
II.~ 
Also  covers  the  eye  socket  and  the  optic  nerve. 
III.~ 
Covers  the  back  (vertebrae  and  adJacent  muscles,  the  sp1nal  marrow),  the  thorax  (r1bs, 
sternum,  bronch1,  lun~s),  the  abdomen  (including  tnternal  organs,  ktdneys,  liver,  spleen), 
the  abdo'Tien  and  the genital  organs. 
The  shoulders  and  wnsts are  regarded  as  p<'\rt  of  the  upper  l1mbs  (category  IV)  and  not 
of  the  trunk  or  hands  (category  V). 
The  hips  an<!  the  ankles  are  re~arded as  part  of  the  lower  limbs  (category  VI)  and  not 
as  p.ut  of  the  trunk  or  feet  (category Vli). 
1\',  l'pper  limbs  (exclud1ng  the  h:mds) 
Th1s  1ncludes  1njuries to  the  shonlders,  includin.e  the  collar bone  and  shoulder  bl.1des, 
1njur1es to  the  arms.  elbows,  forearms  and  wrists. 
v.~ 
The  wrists  are  not  reg<1rded  as  part  of  the  hrtndi  but  of  the  upper  limbs  (category  IV). 
VI.  Lower  l1mbs  (excluding  feet) 
This  includes  the  hips,  thighs,  knees,  legs  and  ankles. 
VI1.  Feet 
The  ankles  are  not  regarded  as  part of  tl-te  feet  but  of  the  lower  limbs  (category Vl). 
Vl 11.  'lultiple  locations 
This  group.  covenng multiple  locations,  should  only be  user!  when  the  Vl.Ctlm  has  suffered 
several  1njurtes  to  different  parts of  hu body,  none  of  which  is clearly more  senous  than 
the  others. 
The  category may  !.!Over  injuries  to  the  head  and  trunk,  the  head  and  one  or  more  limbs,  the 
trunk  and  one  or  more  limbs  or  an  upper  and  .1.  lower  limb. 
IX.  \ot  specified 
Thts  group  should  only be  used  when  there  is  no  evtdence  of  the  exact  location  of  t'he  injury. 
10.  ~dture of  the  tnJury 
l,'hen  an  acc1dent  has  resulted  in  several  injur1es  to  different  parts  of  the  body  and  one 
of  them  15  clearly more  senous  than  the  others,  the  accident  should  be  clasSlf1ed  in  the 
group  relat1ng  to  the  'TIOSt  serious  injury. 
I.  Amputat 1ons  and  enucleations 
Th1s  Includes  traumatic  avulsion of  the  eye. 
2.  Fractures  with  or  without  dislocat1on 
Th1s  Includes  simple  fractures;  fractures  w1th  injuries  to  the  soft  parts of  the  body, 
closed  or  compound  fractures;  fractures  with  Internal  or  nerve  damage,  fractures  w1th  luxa-
tions,  contusions  and  c:rushings. 
3,  Luxations,  twists  and  sprains 
Ll'XATIO\S 
Th1s  covers  minor  luxations  and  dislocations,  traumattc  lumbago,  lumb<l~O  sc1atic<  c.tu&ed 
by  strain;  1t does  not  1nclude  luxat1ons  w1th  fra.:ture  covered  by  category  2. 
Th'I~TS A'\D  ~PRAI'-:S 
This  covers  ruptures,  torn and  lac:er.1ted  muscles,  tendons,  lq~aments and  jotnts  ,15  well  as 
hernia  due  to  strain and  slipped  dlSc:s,  except  when  they  are  assoc1ated with  open  wounds. 
4.  Conc:usston  and  internal  1n1ury 
This  caterory  includes  Internal  brulSlnf!,  internal  hleedlnf',  internal  L.1cer.tt1ons  dnd  rup-
tures  except  where  associated  w1th  fractures. 
It does  not  1nclude  tnternal  injuries accompanied  by  fractures  wh1ch  are  covered  by  cate-
Q:ory  2. 
5.  npen  wounds,  contusions  and  muscular  abr.1.s1ons 
Thts  covers  L1cerattons,  flesh wounds,  cuts,  cont11S1ons,  scalp wounds,  loss  of  a  na11  or 
~~u~=:~ ~~~~d:u;~~~  l:~:~e  w~:~~:  ~e~  ~  ~:::a~~~o:  ~~i  u~:e~;~:::t  7~d  .1.~;~!:~~~n  ~
0 ~~~~~::;  i~~: 
or  avulsion 0f  <In  eve,  which  are  covered  by  category  I,  compound  frnctures,  contus1ono;  and 
crush1n~s accompany1ng  a  fracture  wh1ch  are  covered  by  category  2.,  concuss1on  covered  by  4, 
burns  with wounds  covered  by  ~. 
f;,  'Rurns  and  harmful  effacts  of  ~lectnct1y ciOd  r"'dicition 
Covers  burns  from  ( 1 re,  bo Ill~? lululd,  friction,  chem1 ca  1  suhstances  (externa  1  burns only), 
burns  Wlt.h  wounds,  ~lectrocut1on, electr1c  shock  .1nd  hurns  caused  by  el('ctriclt)',  the  ef-
fect  of  \-ravs,  radlonctivc>  suhstances,  ultr,1  VIolet  r.tys  and  tontzlng radiation. 
tt  does  not  cover  burns  c.1used  by  the  absorption  of  a  corrosive or  c:tttStlc  substance  whtc"l 
are  classifted  1n  c,tte~ory  7, 
7,  Potsoning  and  suffocation 
Th1s  category  covers  the  effects of  the  1nject1on,  ingest1on,  absorption or  1nh,1lation  of 
toxic.  corrosive or  c.1ust ic  substances, 
Asphyx1at1on or  suffoca:ion  by  compression  or  roof  £:111;  asphyxiation  du~ to  the  suppression 
or  reductton of  oxy~en  Ln  the  atmosphere,  the  entry  of  .1.  forci~n bod1es  1nto  the  respiratory 
system,  to  carbon monoxide  or  other  tox1c  gases. 
B.  ~fultlple  1nJur1es  or  those  not  spectfied  (Including complications) 
This  category  Includes  those  cases  1n  which  the  victll"'  has  suffered  several  1n;unes of  dif-
ferent  types,  none  of  which  is clearly fTlore  o;:enous  than  the  others,  and  those  which  are 
not  covered  tn  any  other  cater,ory. 
It also  covers  the  vanous  early complicntions  of  1njunes and  pathological  react 1ons  which 
however,  should  only  be  clasS1f1ed  in  this  group  when  the  nature  of  the  original  inju;y  is  ' 
not  known. 
PFRIOD  OF  !\CAPACITY 
AcCidents  should  be  broken  down  accordtng  to  two  periods  of  incapac1ty  : 
- acctdents  involving  an  absence  of  more  th.1n  sn  calendar  days 
- fatal  accidents. 
The  ~ay of.the.accident  does  not  count.  The  number  of  days  of  incapac1ty  to  b&  taken  1nto 
conSlderat1on  1s  deflned  by  the  effective absence  of  the  miner  from  work. MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 
COMMISSION 
Common  Statistics  on  victims 
of  accidents  undergronnd  in  coal  mines 
NATURE  OF  THE  INJURY 
PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
LOCATION  OF  THE  INJURY 
I.  Head  and neck 
IX.  Not  specified 
TOTAL 
Amputations 
and 
enucleations 
>  56  [ Fat~l I 
days 
1 
acCl- , total 
(5)  I dents I 
COUNTRY 
COAL-FIELD 
Fractures 
with  or  without 
dis location 
>  56  \Fatal 
days  I acci-
(5)  dents 
total 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Luxations, 
twists  and 
sprains 
DETAILED  BREAKDOWN  OF  VICTIMS  ACCORDING  TO  LOCATION 
AND  NATURE  OF  INJURY  AND  PERIOD  OF  INCAPACITY 
(Frequency rates) 
Concussion 
and  inter-
nal injury 
Open  wounds 
contusions 
and  muscular 
abrasions 
Bums  and 
harmful effects 
of electricity 
and  radiation 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
>  56 
days 
(5) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
(1)  Nwnber  of hours  worked by pit sr;aff and  emp~oyees of contraotor fil'ITIS  who  belong to  a  miner's  socia~ inBU1'ance  scheme. 
(2)  ine~uding L?ompUcations. 
(3)  The  s~oulders and  r;he  wrists  are  inc~uded wuier  "upper  Umbs". 
(4)  The  hips  and the  ankles  are included under  "Lower  limbs". 
(5)  Caknder  days. 
YEAR 
MAN-HOURS  WORKED  (1) 
Poisoning  Multiple  injuries 
and  of  those not 
suffocation  specified  (2) 
>  56  Fatal  >  56  Fatal 
days  acci- total  days  acci-
(5)  dents  (5)  dents 
total 
4  to 
20 
days 
(5) 
Table  2b 
TOTAL 
21  to 
56 
days 
(5) 
>  56  Fatal 
days  acci- total 
(5)  dents 
- ----- ------
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Summary  table  of  regulations  and  directives  regarding  rescue  operations  in mines 
I.  Following  the  examination of  the  final  report  concerning  the  fire-damp  explosion 
which  occurred  on  22/7/1965  in  the Mont  Cenis  mine,  at  its meeting held  on  24  and 
25  April  1967,  the Permanent Authority  asked  the Working  Party "rescue operations 
and  fires  in mines"  to make  a  summary  comparison  of  the  regulations  and  directives 
regarding  rescue  operations  drawn  up  by  the  mining  authorities in the  member-coun-
tries  and  in  the  United  Kingdom. 
In  order  to facilitate  the  study  of  the  current  regulations,  the work  was  to be 
limited  to  the  preparation  of  a  summary  table  giving  the basic  conditions  in  force 
in  the  various  countries. 
In  addition,  an  appendix  gives  the  complete  text  of  the principle  conditions  of 
implementation,  circulars,  regulations,  principles  or directives  applicable  in  the 
various  countries.  In  the  case  of  those which  do  not  appear  in  the  summary  table or 
in  the  appended  regulations,  only  their title is mentioned  for  information  purposes. 
The  basic conditions  have  been  exploited  and  compared  taking into  account  the  fol-
lowing  questions  : 
(i)  rescue  service 
(ii)  rescue  stations 
(iii) breathing  apparatus 
(iv)  training premises 
(v)  principles  for  the training,  forming,  equipping,  supervision  and  intervention 
of  res  cue  teams 
(vi)  common  rescue  stations  and  mutual  assistance 
Although  in certain  countries  the mining administrations apply more  detailed regula-
tions  for  the  implementation  of  these basic  conditions,  in other  countries  the 
competent  departments  merely  regard this  implementation  as  being  covered by  the 
mining  regulations,  this being  the  case  in Belgium,  Italy and  the  United Kingdom. 
For  this  reason,  the  mining  regulations  of  these  countries  are  quoted  in full both 
in  the  summary  and  in  the  appendix. 
II.  The  following  basic mining  regulations  are  given  in  the  summary  table 
( 1)  Germany 
(a)  Mining  regulations  dated  18/12/1964  for  coal  mines  in  the district of the 
Oberbergamt  of  Dortmund  (Bonn),  chapter  6  :  "Rescue  operations  and  anti-gas 
protection  in mines". 
The  articles  given  in  the  table  do  not  include  the wording  concerning pro-
tection  against  gases. 
(b)  Police mining  regulation  of  the Oberbergamt  of  Sarrebruck for  collieries 
dated  1/10/1946,  amended  by  the police mining  regulations  dated  1/3/1948, 
30/1/1961  and  20/11/1967,  chapter  12,  section A  :  "Organisation of  rescue 
operations"  and  section B  :  "Rescue  operations". 
(2)  Belgium 
Decree  of  the  Regent  dated  25/9/1947,  amended  by  royal  decrees dated  10/8/1950; 
24/3/1955;  13/4/1965  and  16/4/1965,  section  IV  :  "Initial aid  and  medical  at-
tention  to  the  injured  and  sick",  section II  :  "Special  regulations". VI,  6 
(3)  France 
(a)  Mining  code  :  Decree  No.  56/838 dated  16/8/1956,  heading  IV,  chapter II  : 
"exercising of  administrative  supervision  and  measures  to be  taken  in  the 
event  of  accident". 
(b)  General  regulation  :  Decree  No.  51-508  dated  4/5/1951,  heading XIII,  chapter 
II  :  "Rescue  operations". 
(4)  Netherlands 
Mining  regulation  1964  dated  21/12/1964,  section  XV 
measures". 
(5)  Italy 
"Accidents  and  rescue 
Police  regulation  for  mines  and  quarries,  decree  of  the  President  of  the  Italian 
Republic No.  128  dated  9/4/1959,  heading  X,  section X  :  "Rescue  operations". 
(6)  United Kingdom 
Regulation  concerning  coal mines  and  other mines  (fires  and  rescue  operations) 
dated  1956,  first  appendix,  part  IV  "Rescue  measures". 
III.  The  following  complete  texts  are  appended  : 
(1)  Germany 
(a)  Rescue  procedure  (approved  by  the  Oberbergamt  of  Dortmund  on  26/11/1965  and 
by  the  Oberbergamt  of  Bonn  on  29/11/1965  (Appendix  I). 
(b)  Principles  relating to  rescue  operations  in  coal mines  approved  by  the  Ober-
bergamt  of  Sarrebruck  on  9/5/1967  (Appendix  II). 
(2)  Belgium 
Article  97  of  the  decree  of  the  Regent  mentioned  above  under  II.2,  as  well  as  the 
conditions  of  the  "Centre  for  the  co-ordination  of  rescue  operations  for  the 
Campine  Basin"  and  the  "Belgian National  Centre  for  rescue  operations  in mines  at 
Charleroi"  (Appendix  III). 
(3)  France 
(a)  Decree  of  the Minister  for  Industry  dated  14/4/1965  relating to  the  organi-
zation  of  rescue  operations  in mines  of  solid mineral  fuels  (Appendix  IV). 
(b)  Circular  DM/H  No.  259  to  the  chief engineers  of mines  on  the  organising of 
rescue  operations  (Appendix  V). 
(4)  Netherlands 
Instruction  dated  29/2/1968  of  the  general-inspector  for  mines,  relating to  the 
requirements  to be  met  by  the  rescue  service  (Appendix  VI). 
(5)  United Kingdom 
The  regulation quoted  above  under II.  6  (Appendix  VII). 
(6)  Italy 
The  chapter quoted  under  II.  5,  also  articles  656  to  658  of  the  police  regulation 
for  mines  and  quarries  dated  9/4/1959  (Appendix  VIII). 
IV.  Other regulations,  directives  and  instructions  concerning  the  organization  of  the 
rescue  operations  are  also  applied  in  the  various  countries. 
However,  these  are essentially regulations  or  instructions  for  rescue  centres  or 
rescue  stations. 
Since  the  mandate  formulated  by  the  Permanent  Authority refers  expressly  to  the  use 
of  regulations  emanating  from  mining  suthorities, it would  be  going  too  far  to  include 
regulations  for  rescue stations  in this  study. VI,  7 
However,  in the majority of  cases  these latter have been  communicated  to  the  rescue 
experts  during their visits to  the  rescue  centres;  furthermore,  part  of  the  text  of 
these regulations  is  given  in  the  reports  on  these visits. 
The  instructions  or directives  for  rescue stations  in the  possession  of the secreta-
riat are listed below  as  an  additional  item of  information  : 
(1)  Germany 
(i) Principles  concerning  the preparation  and  execution of  rescue  operations  in 
coal mines  (agreement  of the Oberbergamt  of Sarrebruck dated  29/6/1965). 
(ii)  Central  rescue  procedure  prepared by  the Sarre mines  for  a  period of  2  to 
3  years with  the  agreement  of  the  Oberbergamt  of Sarrebruck. 
(2)  France 
(3) 
In each basin,  the installation and  functioning  of  rescue  centres  and  rescue 
stations are  governed by  special regulations  and  instructions.  As  an  exemple,  the 
following  are  quoted  in respect  of  2  basins  : 
(a)  Coal-mining districts in the North  and  the Pas-de-Calais  : 
(i)  regulation dated  Zl/2/1966  fixing  the  conditions  for  the  installation 
and  functioning  of  the  central rescue  stations at Lens 
(ii) Instruction dated  21/2/1966  relating to the setting up  and  organization 
of  rescue stations  at workings  (secondary stations). 
(b)  Coal-mining districts  in the  Cevennes  : 
(i)  regulation dated  12/4/1966  concerning the  central  rescue station at 
La  Grand' Combe 
(ii) Instruction dated  12/4/1966  governing  the installation and  functioning 
of  a  rescue station affiliated to the  central rescue  station of  the 
coal-mining districts of  the  Cevennes  basin. 
Netherlands 
(i)  Regulation No.  84 
(ii) Regulation No.  85 
(iii) Regulation No.  86 
fire or explosion. 
(iv)  Regulation  No.  87  : 
instructions for the head of  the  rescue  service. 
instructions  for  the  team  leader. 
general  instruction to  be  followed  in the  event  of 
rescue  procedure. 
V.  The  inital study of all these  regulations  effected by  the  secretariat of  the  Perma-
nent Authority,  shows  that,  generally speaking,  the  rescue  organization is very 
similar and  that  any  differences  arise  from  local  conditions  and  peculiarities. 
In  conclusion,  it should be  stressed in this  connection  that  the  rescue  specialists 
hold  regular exchanges  of views  in  accordance with  the mandate  of  the  Permanent 
Authority,  and  are  regularly  informed  on  the most  current questions  in this  field, 
for which purpose the  annual  reports  of the  rescue  centres  and  the  2-yearly reports 
of  the  Rescue  Organisation  (1)  form  a  notable  contribution. 
(1)  The  Seventh Report  on  the Rescue  Organization  for the  years  1967  and  1968  was  adopted 
by  the Permanent  Authority at its plenary meeting on  26/2/19?0. Subject 
1.  Rescue service 
2.  Rescue station 
3.  Breathing 
apparatus 
4.  Training 
premises 
5.  Principles  for 
the training, 
=~:~t!::r:?~iJ 
aion,  and inter-
van tion of  the 
rescue service 
6.  Common  rescue 
and mutual 
assistance 
stations 
GERMANY 
RUHR 
Mining  regulation dated 18.12. 1964  for coal mines 
in the  Dortmund District  (Bonn). 
All workings  in use must  have  a  rescue  service 
(para.  65,  sub-para.  1). 
With  tha exception of the offici  ala  in charge of th 
maintenance  of the  apparatus  1  the  rescue service  rna 
only include persons whose suitability to serve in 
this  service has  been medically certified.  This 
suitability must  be  checked every  2  years  at  least, 
by medical examinations  (para.  66,  aub-para.  1). 
SARRE 
Police regulation dated  20.11.1967  for  coal mines 
in the Sarrebruck Oberbergamt. 
Every  autonomous  working site must  have  at  least 
one  rescue service familiar with breathing 
apparatus  (para.  264,  sentence 1). 
The  members  of the reacue  service are  to be 
provided with service instructions  (para.  267 • 
sub-para,  3). 
A superintendent belonging to the  rescue  service 
must be made  responaible  for the  rescue  operations 
The  membera  of the rescue  service are to be  provided  of each  autonomous  working site (Team  leader -
with service inatructions  (para,  66.  sub-para.  2).  Oberfiibrer)  (para.  266). 
A superintendent shall be  appointed as  head of the 
rescue service,  in order to aupervise the  rescue 
operations  and be  in charge of the  rescue  personnel 
(para.  67,  sub-para.  1). 
The  rescue  peraonnel must  be  provided at the 
workings,  with  a  depot for setting in order and 
maintaining the  apparatus  and equipment  (Rescue 
atation of the mine)  (para.  65 1  OJub-para.  3). 
The  owner of the mine  muat  equip  the  rescue staff 
with apparatus  (para.  65 •  sub-para.  2). 
The  breathing apparatus  of the rescue staff must 
only be  used by  them.  The  Bergamt  may  grant 
derogation& to this ruling,  except  u  regards  the 
uae  of closed-circuit  oxygen  apparatus  (para.  65 • 
sub-para.  5). 
One  peraon shall be made  reaponsible for maintainin 
the breathing apparatus  of the  reacue  teams  (para. 
65 1  sub-para.  6), 
The  rescue  team must be provided with training 
prembes  (para.  65 •  sub-para.  4.). 
The  training,  formation,  equipping,  intervention 
and  supervision of ·the rescue service must be  orgaa. 
iz:ed  in accordance with plans  (1)  approved by  the 
Oberbergamt  (para.  65,  aub-para.  7). 
In the event  of a  mining catastrophe,  the  rescue 
service  lenda  asaiatance to that of neighbouring 
workinga  in accordance with the mutual  assistance 
procedure  (rescue procedure,  chapter 5)  (1). 
(1)  Res  au. pl'OOeduN  ( approv.d by  t1uJ  Oberbergamt 
in Dozotnwad  on  Z8.11. 66  and b1/  tho Obsrbozog-
in Bonn  on  B9.11. 6S)  see  Appendi.:c  I.  It contains 
details oona.ming : 
thfl  NSC'Ue  Sflzoui.Otl_.  thfl NBOW.  oent:NJ  partioi-
pation of the NSowe  a.ntre_.  interv.ntion_. 
mutual assistance  ..  Naords. 
The  rescue service IIIU8t  be provided with a  rescue 
atation equipped with  the necessary  apparatus  and 
equipment  (store for arranging breathing apparatus 
and  training room)  (para.  265,  sub-para.  1). 
Work  in unbreathable  gas may  only be carried out 
with breathing apparatua  and under permanent 
supervision (para.  268). 
Only  apparatus  of  a  type authorized by  the  Ober-
bergamt  may  be used  (para.  265,  sub-para.  2). 
One  person must be  placed  in  charge of the main-
tenance of the breathing apparatus  and  their ac-
cessories  (para.  265 1  sub-para.  3). 
The  rescue aervice must be provided with  a  rescue 
station equipped with the neeeaaary  apparatus  and 
installations (store for keeping breathing ap-
paratua  and  training room)  (para.  265 1  sub-para. 
1). 
The  rescue  centre organises  and  checka  the  reacue 
operations in the district.  In agrae•nt with the 
Oberbergam.t,  it drawa  up  the necessary conditions 
(1)  for this purpose, especially  : 
a)  the principles  (1)  for the formation,  training 
equipping and  intervention of the rescue 
service, 
b)  the principle&  applicable to the preparation 
and execution of rescue  operations  (para.  267, 
sub-para.  2), 
c)  a  mutual uaiatance procedure  for minea  in the 
case of rescue operations  (general  rescue 
procedure)  (para.  267 1  sub-para.  2), 
The  owner of minas  in  a  district must maintain 
jointly a  rescue centre (para.  267.  sub-para.  1). 
The mine  owner  or  a  meuDer  of the supervisory 
personnel  appointed by  the latter must  ensure that1 
when  any intervention of tha reacue  aervice 
~:~=d  n:nc:s::~  1 .:~:s~;s~~:.~~t::a~a  t~:m::!:!:!] 
teams  are  ready  to coma  into action with their 
equipment  (para.  269). 
(1)  Pnnoi.p'Lss  r.'lating to resows operations in 
ooaZ.  minss  daUd 9.S.S?  (see  Appendl:t: II).  They 
gi,WJ  information on  : 
(i) the object of tlu!  rescue op41l'ation 
(ii.)  NBCU9  sePIJ'logs  and neaeBBaz'JI 
i.nstat.Zatione 
(iii) obt.igations of the  NBauerB 
(iv)  ob'Z.i.gati.ons  of tlu!  supel"intendenta who 
do not bel.ong  to the rescue service 
(V)  ths N8CJI4'!  opliiMtions 
(oil czaaia.>lte  due  to tho 14Sanng of breatlring 
appaNtue. 
VI.  SUif.IARY  OF  REGULATIONS  CONCERNING  RESCUE  OPERATIONS 
BELGIUM  PIWICE  NETHERLANDS  ITALY  UNITED  KINGDOM 
Decree of  the  Regent  dated 25.9.1947,  811lended  Mining  code  :  Decree No.  56-838 dated 16.8.1956,  Mining regulation  1964  (Decree dated 21.12.64  Police regulation  for mines  and quarries - Ragulation concerning coal mines  and  other mines 
by  Royal  Decrees  dated  10. 8.1950,  24.3.1955,  also General  Regulation  :  Decree No.  51-508 dated  bearing on  the  directive in article.  9,  sub-para.  1  Decree of the President of the Republic dated  (fires  and rescue)  dated  1956. Pirst Appendix, 
-1J:.!!:.!2§2_~!:1_.!§:.!!:..!2§2:.------------------ -i:.~:.!!lli------------------------------ j-!!!~-~L.2!_!!!..!!!..2L!2Q~-~-!!£!2!!!!h_________ .._  _!d:..!~~z.-!2:..1~------------------------- ..2!!:L!Y:.-------------------------
The  use  of the breathing apparatus  referred to  In the evant of  an  accident occurring in a  mine,  Works  above  ground  and drilling installations shall  Without prejudice to the  conditions  in  The  owner  of each mine tnust  ; 
in article 95  shall be entrusted to skilled  the mayors  aa.d  other police officers, in conjunc- be provided,  at the places  appointed by the  Article 539 1  a  rescue  team must  be  formed in 
workers,  absolutely familiar with the under- tion with the engineer of minea,  shall take all  management  of the  factory undertaking, with  the  all mines classified for the presence  of 
ground workings  and numbering at least four  auitable steps to remove the  danger  and provide  approval of our Minister, with  :  inf18DIIa8ble,  poisonous  or other harmful gases 
::~-!~:: ~~ •  apparatus  stipulated (article 96,  ::g=~~·:::;n!.;c!!:Is~i!: :::i;::t:f  h~:!::ut  a)  • • • • • • • • • • • •  (article 528). 
aDd  -.n,  .md  arr.mge for work to be  carried out  b)  • • • • • • • • • • • •  The  men  comprieing  the rescue  team must be 
These workers  are to be distributed as  far as 
possible between the various working points 
and  chosen  from those  living near the sites. 
Their names  and  addresses  shall be poated  at 
each of  the workings where  they may  be 
required to intervene  (article 96 1  sub-para. 
2). 
All  coal mines, with the exception of those 
classified as  non-gaseous  employing leas th.m 
75  persons  on  underground work,  shall be 
provided with depots  for breathing  apparatus 
able to serve quickly their various workings 
in the event of  accident  (article 95,  para.  1) 
Ibis breathing apparatus  shall be of the 
closed-circuit system,  i.e. with provision of 
oxygen  and regeneration device  for  exhaled 
air,  and their charging capacity must  be auf-
ficient  for  a  continuoua  atay  of at  least 
one  and  a  half hours  in  an  unbreathab  le 
atmosphere.  The  model  of  equipment  used must 
be  one  authorized by  the Mines  Adminiatration 
(article 95.  sub-para.  2). 
One  breathing apparatus shall be provided  for 
every 200  workmen  employed  simultaneously  in 
the  underground workings  1  subject to  there 
not being  leas  than five or more  than  ten per 
mine  (article 95 •  sub-para.  3). 
The  above  breathing apparatus shall be  main-
tained in constant good  functioning  condition. 
The  necessary measures  shall be  taken  at each 
depot  to enable  them all to be  usad 
simultaneously and  at  any  time  for  at  least 
48 hours  (article 95,  aub-para.  4). 
under the directiOD of the engineer of mines  or  volunteers,  at least 24  and not mora  than 
engineers placed under  the direction of specialist  c)  one  or more  groups  made  up  of persons suffi- 50 years  of age,  be  recognised  as  physically 
delegated for thia purpose by  the  local authority  ciently skilled in the lll8Dipulation of the  res- suitable by  medical examination repeated every 
(mining  coda  :  article 87).  cue means  referred under  a)  and  b)  year,  posses  a  well-tried self-control.  and be 
All workings where  more  than  one hundred workmen 
are  employed aimultaneoualy underground  on the 
largest shift, Dl\18t  possess  a  rescue station 
equipped with rescue  apparatua  ready for hmediate 
use, i.e.  : 
Portable breathing apparatua  making it possible 
to remain at leut one hour in an  unbreathable 
atmoaphere. 
Detection apparatus  for detecting any dangerous 
proportion of carbon monoxide •  and  individual ap-
paratus giving effective protection against this 
gas  (general raplatiOD I  article 320,  aub-para. 
1-3). 
The  operators  shall be responsible for maintaining 
in their establishments  in proportion  to the 
nuaber of workmen ·ad tha extent of the operations, 
the •dicinas  and mana  of  rescue  advised to  them 
by the Minister ra1ponaible  for mines  1  and  for 
~~~!!n~h~!t:u!::.:~a(::~g  i:::~u~t~:;:r;o;;:. by 
d)  a  auitable register of these persons  and  the 
drills which  they have  carried out  (article 
279). 
a)  a  sufficient number  of efficient breathing ap-
paratuses,  ready  for  use  and  suitably disin-
fected,making it possible to enter an  atmospher 
contaminated by suffocating or poisonous gases 
or by radio-active  substances 
b)  other sufficient equipment of an effective 
nature 1  ready for  use  and  suitably deainfected, 
necessary  for  rescue work  above  and  below 
ground  (article 279), 
Only  persona  sufficiently specialized,  equipped 
with  the apparatus  referred  to  in article 279 1 
sub-para.  1,  must  carry out  work  in an  atmos-
phere  contaminated by  suffocating or poisonous 
gases.  or by radioactive substances. 
A sufficiently equipped  team must be ready or 
prepared  immediately when  a  rescue  team  takes 
over ita tour of duty. 
The  appropriate measures  must  safeguard  the 
safety and health of  the persons  responsible 
for  rescue work  (article 280 0  sub-para.  1-3). 
It  muat be poasible for  the drills to  take place 
in suitable premises which  can be  filled with 
amoka  and suffocating gases  (article 279,  sub-para. 
2). 
particularly suited to carrying out work 
essential to rescue operation&.  They must have 
a  good knowledge  of below ground. 
A departmental bead shall be placed  in  charge 
of the  team,  and  a  suitable person must  be 
appointed to replace him in his  absence 
(article 529,  Al.l  and  4). 
In mines  of  an  isolated nature or usociated 
therewith,  referred to in article&  528  and  539, 
auitable premises  muat  be provided  for  guarding 
and maintaining the equipment used by  the rescu 
team,  complying with the asaantial conditions 
required for their use. 
These premises  1  which may  not  be us  ad for 
any  other purpose,  must be protected against 
fire and  situated near to the surface entrance 
to the route by which the workmen  normally gain 
access  to aa.d  leave the workings below ground 
(article 534). 
In premises  allocated to the  rescue  team the 
following must  be maintained in a  constant  and 
perfect state of maintenance  and  functioning  : 
(a)  autoprotecting breathing apparatus with 
independent  functioning  of  a  least one 
hour, at leut equal  in number to the 
strength of the reacue  team; 
(b)  - (g) 
The breathing apparatus  and masks  IIIU8t 
include a  sufficient atock of  sparea  for 
consumable element&. 
The maintenance of the autoprotacting 
apparatus  must  be carried out by  a  workman 
specially appointed for thia purpose 
(article 535 1  Al.  la), 2  and  6). 
The  functioning of the  autoprotecting 
breathing apparatua  and  other rescue 
apparatus  and  clothing,  must be checked 
on  the initiative of the management,  at 
least once  a  month.  The  results shall be 
recorded in the register (article 538). 
(i) aupply,  maintain  and direct, in accordance 
with the  following  conditions  of this part 
of these regulations,  a  rescue centra 
facilitating reacue operations  and other 
necessary work in this mine  following  .m 
explosion or a  fire, or in a  part of thia 
mine  where  the  atmosphere  is probably 
unbreathab la, 
(ii) take  .my  steps to procure for this mine 
the meana  available from  a  rescue centra 
organized.  .and  directed under  the  conditione 
laid down,  in the caae of  a  station dtuated 
up to 15 miles  from the entrance to the 
mine  or at  a  greater distance not exceeding 
20 milas 1  depending  OD  the  authority of .m 
inspector notified to  the owner. 
(Regulation No.  12 1  sub-para.  1). 
Each  rescue  centre shall be placed under the 
direct authority of  a  competent  foreman who 
has  undergone  full training in rescue work 
Blld,  unlasa  ha wu employed in this capacity 
before  1  January  1929,  guaranteeing at leut 
5  years practical experience in underground 
mining worka  (regulation 13, sub-para.  1). 
Failing any  exemption granted by  an inspector by 
notificatiOD aant to the manager1  the breathing 
apparatus  shall not be kept in the mine  1  but shall 
be obtained  from  a  rescue centre as  required 
during  rescue  operations or training in the mine 
(regulation No.  25,  sub-para.  1; for fuller 
details in this connection see sub-paras.  2  and  3) 
(1). 
(For other information on the rescue aervice and 
rescue  station&  aee regulation  No.  141  sub-para. 
1- 3  (permanent  rescue teams);  regulation No.  15 1 
sub-para.  1  - 2  (cooperation with rescue teaiu); 
regulation No.  16 1  aub-para.  1  - 3  (rescue teams); 
No.  17  (cDIIIIDUilicationa  with rescue personnel); 
regulation No.  23  (equipment  at rescue  centres)) 
(1). 
The  manager  of each mine shall be responsible for 
providing  above  ground  a  room of suitable 
dimenlioa.s,  adequately equipped,  for use by  any 
persoa.  taking part in the nscue operatioa.a  or 
drilla  (regulation No.  27,  sub-para.  1, 1st 
sentence;  for other details see  sentence  2  and 
sub-para.  2  - 3)  (1). 
These workmen  selected will perform Jrilla 
periodically in  the handling of the apparatus 
(article 96,  sub-para.  3). 
A mi.niaterial decree  (1)  fixes  the general 
coa.ditions  for organizing rescue stations,  and 
the regulations  to be  followed  for the training 
of the teams •  the maintenance  and use of the 
apparatus  (general regulation  ;  article 321, 
sub-para.  1). 
The  rescue procedure  (1)  for the  following  calendar 
year, referring to all the minas  and drilling 
inatallations  covered by  a  mining undertaking,  is 
sent annually  to  the General Inspector of Mines, 
within the  14 days  preceding the  calendar year in 
quaation. 
The  members  of the rescue  team must be  instruc- Competent instructors must be  employed  at the rea-
ted in the functioning  of the breathing equip- Cld.  centra to train the rescue personnel  (regula-
The  competent minister can authoriaa adjacent 
mines to set up  a  CotlllllOD  depot  for breathing 
apparatus  as  envisaged in article 95  above. 
This  coumon  depot must  satisfy the  following 
conditions  (1)  (article 97,  sub-para.  1). 
This decree  (1)  atatas the  c011dition.a  under which 
several workings  can be srouped for the purpose of 
creating a  comDOD.  atation  (general regulation  : 
article 3211  sub-para.  2). 
In the Cue of large baains1  a  ministerial decree 
(1)  c.m prescribe the installation of rescue 
cea.tras; it fixes  the area covered  and the 
functioning  cOildition•  in conjunction with  the 
stations of tha affiliated mines  (general  regula-
tion  :  article 322). 
WorUngs  where  one hundred or more workmen  are 
aaployed si11Ultanaouely below ground on  the largest 
shift may,  if necessary, ba subject by miniaterial 
decree to certain obligations  cODcaming the 
org.miaatioa. of the rascua operations  (general 
raaulation  :  article 323). 
The  operators  and aaa.agera  of tha minea  adj scent  to 
that where  m  accident occurs,  supply  any  rescue 
••• available to them,  aithar in man  or in  any 
other way,  subject to any  claim for their compan-
aatioa. where  applicable1  against the proper party 
(ad.oina code  :  article 90). 
When  a  mining or drilling inatallation begins  to 
jwork during  a  particular calendar year, it is first 
necessary to send to the General Inspector of Mines 
in good  time.  a  rescue achedule for this site 
relating to tha year in question. 
Our Minister decides which  data shall be  included 
in the rescue schedule  (1)  (article 279,  sub-para. 
3,  4, 5). 
Our Minister may  grant dispenaation  from the 
c~ditions of sub-paragraph&  1  and  2  for &elected 
~ning or drilling  works; he  can  approve  the 
formation  for certain mining  undertakings •  of  a 
common  rescue service, with  a  view to carrying out 
the  arrangements  made  by virtue of these sub-
tparagraphs  (article 279,  aub-para.  6). 
(1)  A:l'tiot.e  97 of ths aboPe  Ngu.lati.on ia g(.wn  (1)  DtiOJ<fi  of tM NlnisUzt of Induat:l'fl  dated 14.4.6  (1)  Instruction thted B8.B.1868  fztorn  the General 
in Ap~  III.  It covers  's giwn in ~ndi.:t: IV.  Its aim is :  Inspeotozo of ll{:nss  :  Requizrements  to be mst  by 
(i) ths manage1119nt and tralning of the  ({.)  to diJfl:M  the geMztal  fJOndlti.ons  fol' ths  tiN Nscue sel"Ui.oe.  It al.so  cleats with  the 
rescue sel"l1ice  organisation of :zoesoue  stations  r.rsoue procedure  (Append{.:&  VI J • 
(ii) the intsl"1>Bntion  and  continuous  .fU.J  to pzwsal'iba the instaZ.Zation of Nsaus 
availability Of the  .NSOUB  BBffloe  o.tntJWS  and to f{.z the aNa OOWNd by 
(iii)  the allocation and maintenant» of 
bNathing appamtus 
(ivJ  othel' equi.pmmt and installations. 
Fi.nally  ..  the dwties of thtl  C'tlntN  fol' oo-
ol'dlnating NBaue  ~Ntions in the :pQR(Jina 
basin aN listeft  togathel' with those of th 
"Bs lgian National Centzre  fozo  RumMJ 
Operations in lltnss" at ChaJoZeroi. 
thsm and tho funat;ionf.ng candi.tions. 
IXNuf.a>o of tho Minuter of Induela"!J  DN/B 
Vo.  1661  ot~nt.»l'ning t1ul  Ol'g(D'&isation  of rescue  ""'>im:ona  (Appendi.:c  V). 
meat  and  the instrument&  for  checking the  tion No.  13 1  1ub-para.  2;  for  other details aae 
atmosphere below ground,  and trained to execute,  sub-para.  3- 6)  (1). 
carrying the apparatus  on  their own  backs,  any 
operations which may  become necessary in a  mine 
in the  even~ of accident  (article 536). 
The  members  of the rescue team IIWit  undergo 
periods  of instructi011.  and  training in the 
placea  and manner  indicated by the manager. 
The  rescue  teams  must  take part in below  ground 
drills at leut once  a  month  (article 537, 
Al  1  .md  2). 
The  operator&  of mines  employing  leas  than  ona 
hundred workman  below ground on  the  largest 
shift can be authorised,  by decision of the 
chief engineer,  to join with those of adjacent 
minea with  a  view to  forming  a  COIIIIIOD  rescue 
team. 
The  instruc~ions relating to  the training and 
drilling of the members  of the common  team muat 
be  approved by  the  chief engineer (article 539). 
For mines  covered by  the preceding article, 
the Minister of Industry  and  Trade may,  at the 
propoaal of the  chief engineer,  prescribe the 
creation of  a  common  central rescue  station 
(article 540). 
If it is apparent  that the efficiency of the 
rescue  team is inadequate when it is brousht 
into action,  the manager requests  the  interven-
tion of team.s  from other mines. 
The  manager  r.~ceiving this request must place 
their rescue  te&IIIS  at the disposal of the parson 
malting the request  (article 541)  (1). 
(1)  ThB  full tezt of ohaptef'l  Z  "ReBC1MI  opszoa-
tions" of the police Ngut.ation  /Of" rn{,nas 
and quaJ"l"'ies  dated 8. 4. 1SS9  (heading  X)  i.s 
gi.V6n  i.n  Appendl:r:  VIII, 
It also mentions  azrti.oZ.s  BSB  to 61)8 
"nasaue  opazoat;ions". 
(For the questions  in this  connection see  regula-
tiODa  Nos.  19  - 21  :  qualifications of rescuers; 
regulation  No.  22  ;  recorda  of rescue  centres; 
regulation No.  23  :  equipment  of rescue cantrea; 
regulation No.  24  :  rea  cue  equipment  in mines; 
regulations  Nos.  26 1  28,  29,  30  - 34  :  procedures 
and  conducting of rescue operations)  (1). 
(1)  Tiul  tQ:&t of th. ribOtJr-mBntionBd  regulation 
OOMBming  aoal mines  and othe7' minaa  (fins 
and  NBo&ce  opsNtiuns) dated 18&6  ..  Fi:Nt 
appenN  ..  pal'"t Vis given i.n  AppBndi:&  VII. VI,  11 
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GERMANY 
Rescue  procedure 
(Approved  by  the  Oberbergamt  of Dortmund 
on  26/11/1965  and  by  the Oberbergamt  of  Bonn  on  29/11/1965) VI,  13 
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The  composition,  training,  equipment,  intervention  and  supervision of  the  rescue 
service  are  governed  by  the  following  procedure  (§  65,  sub-para  7  of  the  BVOSt). 
1.  Rescue  service 
1.1  Duties 
The  rescue  service  intervenes  below  ground  in the  course  of  operations  intended 
to  save  human  lives  and  to preserve property after explosions,  fires  and  mine-
fires,  and  any  other incidents which  threaten to  release harmful  gases  or bring 
about  a  lack of  oxygen  (§  155  BVOSt)  (1). 
1.2  Composition 
The  rescue  service  consists  of  : 
the head  of  the  service  (head  overman  or assistant  overman); 
the deputy(ies); 
the  rescue  teams  (team  leader  and  rescuers); 
the  head  of  equipment;  ) 
)  preferably metal workers. 
the officials  in  charge  of  equipment.  ) 
It also  includes  special members  (section  1.7). 
The  rescue  team  consists  of  a  team  leader  (superintendent  in  accordance with 
§  50  BVOSt)  (1)  and  four  rescuers. 
The  number  of  superintendents  belonging  to  the  rescue  services  does  not  exceed 
a  third of its strength. 
Some  of  the  rescuers  are  below  ground workers,  locomotive  drivers,  compressed 
air and  electric mine-shaft  winch  operators,  pit or blind shaft  sinkers. 
1.3  Strength 
1.4 
1.4.1 
The  number  of  rescue  teams  is  proportional  to  the  space  and  dangerous  character 
of  operations  below  ground.  It is  also  calculated  in relation  to  the  assistance 
available  from  othe~ rescue  services,  and  to  the  probable delay  in their arrival 
on  the site.  The  number  of special members  is not  taken  into  consideration. 
No  more  than  two  thirds  of  the  members  of  the  rescue  service may  be  occupied 
below  ground  at  any  station. 
Recruitment 
General 
Entry  into the  rescue  service is voluntary.  Applications  are  addressed  to the 
head  of  the  service. 
The  only persons  recruited  as  rescuers  are miners  fulfilling the  following 
conditions: 
(i)  between  21  and  40  years  of  age  inclusive; 
(ii)  having worked  below  ground  for  at  least  one  year; 
(iii)  possessing  a  medical  certificate classifying  them  in groupe  A/1  or B/1  and 
stating their suitability for  rescue work  (section  1.5); 
(iv)  having  successfully  completed  the  training  cycle  referred  to in 1.4.2. 
The  only  persons  who  can  be  recruited  as  officials  responsible  for  equipment  are 
miners  belonging to  groups  Al  or B2  (§  21  BV0St)(1),  recognised medically  as  free 
(1)  Mining  regulation. 1.4.2 
1.4.2.1 
1.4.2.2 
1.4.2.3 
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from  contagious  skin conditions  or  pulmonary  tuberculosis  (section 1.5)  and 
having  successfully participated,  after acceptance  by  the head  of equipment 
(1.6.3.2),  in  an  elementary  course  given  at  the  rescue  centre. 
The  head  of  equipment  may,  where  applicable,  be  a  person not  belonging  to groups 
Al  or Bl. 
Candidates  who  have  passed  the  entrance test  are  registered  as  members  and  then 
belong  to  the  rescue  service  in which  they  take  part  from  then  on.  The  date  of 
entry is that  of  the  day  of  the  first drill.  The  accepted  candidates  rec~ive 
the  service  instructions  for  rescuers,  receipt  of which  they  confirm by  signing 
the  members  register. 
After these  formalities,  the  rescuers  receive  their membership  card,  giving  the 
date of their entry. 
Traning  and  examination  of  the  candidates  for  the  rescue  service. 
Theoretical  training 
The  theoretical  training  includes  the  following  : 
Human  respiration;  composition  of  the air in  the mine,  incendiary  gases  and  ex-
plosion  fumes;  effects  of harmful  gases,  particularly  carbon  monoxide,  on  the 
human  structure,  and  dangerous  effects  of  lack of  oxygen. 
Design  and  functioning  of  the  closed-circuit  oxygen  apparatus;  its positioning 
and  method  of  use  for  training  and  in  the  event  of  a  disaster;  conduct  to  be 
observed  in the  event  of  a  disaster;  transport  of  injured;  service  instructions 
for  the  members  of  the  rescue  service. 
Practical training 
The  practical  training begins  as  soon  as  the  theoretical  training  is  finished. 
The  candidates  get  used  to working while  carrying the breathing  apparatus.  For 
this  purpose  they must  exercise  on  a  pulling apparatus,  carry  out  practical work, 
and  use  thetrainingpremises,  This  training takes  at  least  two  sessions  of  one 
hour. 
Entry  examination 
After training,  the head  of  the  service  gives  the  candidates  an  entry  test. 
First  of  all,  the  candidates  have  an  oral  examination  in which  they  must  show 
that  they  possess  the  required knowledge  on  the  oxygen  closed-circuit  apparatus, 
on  the  positioning of  the  apparatus.  and  on  the way  to  carry  on  in  the  event  of 
a  disaster.  They  then  undergo  a  rescue drill of  two  hours  in  the  training pre-
mises.  The  entry test  is  regarded  as  successful when  the  candidates  have  proved 
that  they  have  the  required knowledge  and  have  carried out  the drill correctly 
without  interruption. 
1.5  Verification  of suitability for  rescue work 
The  candidates  and  the  members  of  the  rescue  service  - excluding officials 
responsible  for  the  equipment  who  are  not  rescuers  at  the  same  time,  are 
subjected  to  checks  of  their suitability for  rescue  work,  in accordance with 
the  medical  check  procedures. 
These  inspections  are  carried out  only  by  doctors  authorised  for  this  purpose 
by  the  Oberbergamt. 
The  officials  responsible  for  the  equipment  undergo  a  medical  examination  rela-
ting to  contagious  skin  conditions  and  to pulmonary  tuberculosis.  Repeat  exami-
nations  take  place every  two  years,  unless  the doctor  decides  to  carry  out  an 
examination  at  a  shorter interval. 
The  special members  over  50  years  old  undergo  a  check  at  least  annually.  After 
any  serious  illness  or  one  of  long duration,  a  fresh  medicsl  examination  is 
carried out  to  check  suitability of  the person  concerned  for  rescue work.  The 
individual  is  only  reinstated in  the  rescue  team on  sight  of  a  medical  certifi-
cate  guaranteeing full suitability. 1.6 
1.6.1 
1.6.1.1 
1.6.1.2 
1.6.1.3 
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Training  and  improvement  of  the  rescue  service 
Improvement  of  the  leaders  and  rescuers 
General 
The  practical  and  theoretical  training of  the  leaders  and  rescuers  takes  place 
during  training shifts  and  (or)  drills  of  at  least  two  hours  outside working 
time.  The  drills  are  spread  evenly  throughout  the  year.  The  leaders  and  rescuers 
carry  out  a drill once a  year below  ground  during  the  course  of  a  training shift, 
the  period  of  the drills of  long  duration being  four  hours.  They  take  part  also 
in  three drills  of  at  least  two  hours  with  the  closed-circuit  oxygen  apparatus 
of which  at  least  two  take  place  in the training premises.  They  carry  out  a 
fifth drill of half  an  hour  at  least with breathing apparatus  with air  conduc-
tion  by  injector. 
Courses  are  also  organised,  either during  training shifts,  or  in  the  form  of 
two  additional  sessions  outside working  time.  The  drill carried out  using breath-
ing  apparatus with air conduction  by  injection must  be  accompanied  by  a  course. 
Drills 
The  drills  are  carried out  under  the  supervision  of  the  head  of  the  service  or  a 
team  leader delegated by  him. 
The  drills below  ground  intended  for  the  leaders  and  rescuers  include  a  number 
of  tasks,  for  example  rescue  of workers  who  are  victimes  of  accidents,  revival 
operations,  erection  of barriers  against  fire  and  of  rapid barriers,  organiza-
tion  of  a  liaison service,  taking  of  samples  of  incendiary  gases,  inspection 
of  internal shafts. 
Drills  below  ground  are not  carried out  at working  sites where  the  atmosphere 
contains  harmful  gases  or is  lacking  in  oxygen. 
Drills  carried out  with  closed-circuit  oxygen  apparatus  in  the  training premises 
last  at  least  two  hours.  They  are  carried out  at  a  temperature  above  the  average 
(up  to  40°C)  and  in  a  smoky  atmosphere,  with  the  humid  temperature not  exceeding 
28°C.  At  the  beginning  of  the drills,  each participant  carries  out  at  least 
60  pulls  on  a  exercising  apparatus,  so  that  the  alkali  cartridge warms  up  imme-
diately  and  the wearer  can  become  used  to  the warmth  of  the  air in  the  closed-
circuit apparatus.  During  the drill,  the  number  of  pulls  is  increased to  at 
least  180  and  the wearer must  run  round  the  training premises  several  times 
depenaing  on  its  area.  So  far  as  possible,  those  concerned  also  carry  out  rescue 
activities  (erection of barriers  against  fire,  transport  of  injured,  etc.). 
During  these  drills,  the  recording  apparatus  and  auxiliary  apparatus  of  the 
rescue  service  are  brought  into action.  If the drill takes  place with breathing 
apparatus with air  conduction  by  injection,  two  members  of  a  rescue  team work 
for  periods  of  at  least  15  minutes  in  the  smoky  premises,  during which  the  other 
members  of  the  team  are  shown  by  the  team  leader how  to position  and  handle  the 
above  apparatus. 
The  drills  are not  regarded  as  being  accomplished  unless  they  are  completed 
without  interruption. 
Courses 
Courses  include  the  following  items  : 
general matters  regarding breathing protection;  discussion  on  current models  of 
oxygen  circuit  apparatus;  rescue  procedures;  service  instruction  for  the members 
of  the  rescue  service;  basis  of  operation;  method  of  intervention by  the  rescue 
service  in the  event  of  a  disaster;  revival  and  first  aid;  kind  and  prevention 
of  fires  and  mine-fires,  fire-fighting;  extinguishers  for  use  in mines,  discus-
sion  and  practical exercises;  construction  of barriers  against  fire  and  rapid 
barriers;  alarm;  harmful  gases  and  lack of  oxygen;  danger  of  carbon  monoxide 
during fires  in mines;  behaviour  in  the  event  of  fire;  recording  apparatus  and 
auxiliary  apparatus  of  the  rescue  service with practical handling. 
So  far  as  possible,  a  doctor is  asked  to attend  the  revival  and  first  aid  cours-
es. 1. 6. 2 
1.6. 3 
1.6.3.1 
1.6.3.2 
1.7 
1.8 
1. 8.1 
1. 8. 2 
1. 8. 3 
1.9 
1. 9. 1 
1.9.1.1 
1.9.1.2 
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Improvement  of officials responsible  for  equipment 
Persons  responsible  for  the  equipment  are kept  regularly  informed  by  the  head 
of equipment;  every  two  months  at  least,  they  are  given  the  opportunity  of 
familiarising  themselves  with all operations  to be  carried out  on  the  apparatus. 
Any  such  person who,  in exceptional  cases,  is  a  rescuer  at  the same  time,  also 
takes  part  in  the  improvement  course  referred to in  1.6.1. 
Training  and  improvement  of  leaders  and  officials  responsible  for  equipment. 
Heads  of  service,  deputy  heads  of  service  and  team  leaders  are  trained  and 
improved  by  the  rescue  centre in accordance with  procedures  approved  by  the 
Oberbergamt. 
The  head  of  equipment  and  those  in  charge  of  equipment  are  trained  and  improved 
by  the  rescue  centre  in  accordance with procedures  approved  by  the  Oberbergamt. 
Before  taking part  in  an  elementary  course  organised  by  the  rescue  centre,  those 
in  charge  of  equipment  are  shown  by  their superior  how  to  check  and  maintain 
breathing apparatus. 
Special members 
The  rescue  service  includes  as  special members,  responsible  for  special duties 
during  intervention  of  the  rescue  service  involving  the  use  of breathing  appara-
tus,  certain persons with  special  training  (e.g.  specialised overmen,  ventilation 
engineers,  collaborators  from  cert-ain  functional  services,  etc.),  and  meeting  the 
following  conditions: 
(1)  having  belonged  as  a  rescuer  or head  of  rescue  service  for  at  least  one  year; 
(2)  having  successfully  completed  a  course  of  team  leader  at  the  rescue  centre; 
(3)  taking part  at  the least every  six months  in  a  drill of  at  least  one  hour 
with  a  closed-circuit  oxygen  apparatus. 
These  members  are  registered  as  special members  in  the  members  register. 
Close  of  activity 
Rescuers  reaching  the  age  of  45  years  and  heads  of service,  deputy  heads  of 
service  and  team  leaders  reaching  the  age  of  50  years  no  longer belong to  the 
rescue  service. 
There  is no  age  limit  for  special members  and  for  those  in  charge  of  equipment. 
Professional  rescuers  and  full-time  members  of  the  voluntary  rescue  service  are 
bound  by  the  following  regulation:  subject  to  the  agreement  of  the  Oberbergamt, 
the  rescuers  remain  members  of  the  rescue  team until  they have  completed  their 
fiftieth year,  and  heads  of  service,  deputy  heads  of  service  and  team  leaders 
until  they  have  completed  their fifty-fifth year of  age. 
Membership  of  the  rescue  service  ceases  as  soon  as  the  doctor  finds  any  perma-
nent  incapacity. 
Duties  of members  of  the  rescue  service 
Head  of  service 
The  head  of  service is  the official superior of  all  the  members  of his  service 
(including special members),  during  their training  and  in  the  event  of  a  disas-
ter. 
He  ensures  that  a  sufficient number  of  rescuers  forming  a  proper  group  is  ready 
to  intervene,  and  that  all members  are  quickly warned  and  brought  into action 
in  the event  of  a  disaster. 
Subject  to  the  authority of  the  head  of  the  rescue  operation,  he  is  also  respon-
sible  for  the efficient action  of  the  rescue  service. 
The  head  of service is  responsible  for  the  following  duties: 
(1)  sending  to  the  Bergamt  and  to  the  rescue  centre  the  I  report  (formed  from 
the  centre)  after each  intervention  of  the  rescue  service  following  a 
disaster; 1.9.1.3 
1.9.1.4 
1.9.1.5 
1.9.1.6 
1.9.1.7 
1. 9. 2 
1.9.2.1 
1.9.2.2 
1.9. 3 
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(2)  submitting the  annual  report  (form from  the  centre)  before  1st  February  to 
the  Bergamt  and  to  the  rescue  centre; 
(3)  sending  in  good  time  to  the  rescue  centre  the  schedule  of drills  and  courses 
for  the next  quarter; 
(4)  giving  immediate  advice  to  the  rescue  centre  of  all incidents  involving  the 
apparatus  (e.g.  on  inspection); 
(5)  giving  immediate  advice  to  the  Bergamt  and  to  the  rescue  centre  of  accidents 
likely to have  some  connection with  the  use  of breathing  apparatus,  the 
apparatus  in question  and  its ancillary breathing  equipment  are  placed  im-
mediately  at  the  disposal  of  the  centre,  by  agreement with  the  Bergamt. 
The  head  of  service  receives  the  applications,  decides  whether  the  candidates 
comply  with  the  conditions  referred to  in section  1.4.1,  carries  out  the  train-
ing of  suitable  candidates,  arranges  the entry test,  and  gives  the  accepted 
candidates  the  service  instructions  and  the membership  card. 
The  head  of service ensures  that  the  drills  and  courses  laid  down  for  the  mem-
bers  of  the  rescue  service  (1.6)  are  organised  regularly,  and  that  the drills 
are verified as  necessary  (1.6.1.2). 
During drills carried out with  closed-circuit  oxygen  apparatus,  he  arranges  for 
all the  apparatus  available to be  used with  the  same  frequency. 
The  head  of  service takes  care  to see  that  the  members  of  the  rescue  service 
(including  the special members)  undergo  the medical  examinations  on  the  dates 
laid down  in  the  regulations,  and  that  only  persons  passed  as  medically fit 
and  within  the  age  limit  take  part  in  rescue  activities. 
The  head  of service keeps  the  register of  members  and  drills of  the  rescue 
service. 
The  head  of service must 
(1)  supervise  the  monthly  check  of  all apparatus  of  the  rescue  service,  and 
countersign  the written inspection  report; 
(2)  check  the  stocks  of  apparatus  and  ensure  renewal  in  good  time. 
The  head  of service  arranges  : 
(1)  for  the  information  referred  to  in 6.4  to  be  constantly kept  up  to  date  and 
posted  at  the  places  indicated; 
(2)  for  the  schedules  and  plans  in  6.5  to  be kept  up  to date  by  the  surveyor 
within  the  periods  laid  down,  and  exhibited  or made  easily accessible  at 
the  places  prescribed. 
Team  leaders 
The  team  leaders  carry  out  the  instrictions which  they  receive  from  the  head 
of service. 
They  are  responsible  for  their  team  during  drills  and  in  the  event  of  a  disaster. 
Their  attention  is  drawn  to  the  fact  that  they  must  not  exceed  the  tasks  dele-
gated  to  them,  and  that  they  must  put  the  safety of  their section before  the 
carrying  out  of  the  task. 
The  heads  of  section must  report  to  the  head  of  service  after each drill.  At 
the  request  of  the  head  of  service  they keep  up  to  date  the  drill books;  they 
record  therein,  and  repott  to  the  head  of  service,  any  special observations 
arising during  the drills  (e;g.  defective  apparatus,  failure  of  certain res-
cuers,  etc.). 
Head  of  equipment 
The  head  of  equipment  ensures  that  all  apparatus,  devices  and  equipment  of  the 
rescue  station are  constantly  in  good  working  order. 
After  each  time  they  are used,  he  must  restore  to  condition  and  report  unusable 
apparatus. 1.9.4 
1.9.5 
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He  must  check  and  maintain  the  apparatus  in  accordance with the  directives  of  the 
rescue  centre. 
He  is  responsible  for  reporting to the head  of  service  any  shortage  of  stocks  at 
the  rescue  station,  as  regards  serviceable  apparatus,  spare parts  and  accessories, 
also other materials. 
Person  responsible  for  equipment 
Persons  in  charge  of  equipment  assist  the head  of  equipment  in  carrying out  his 
duties,  and  replace him when  necessary. 
The  person in charge present  at  the  base  of  operation  is  responsible  for  main-
taining and  checking  apparatus  and  all accessories  used  there. 
Members  of  the  rescue  service 
The  members  of  the  rescue  service must  report without delay to  the  rescue station 
and  hold  themselves  ready  there  to  go  into  action,  as  soon  as  they  are  alerted, 
or  as  soon  as  they  learn,  in  one  way  or  another,  that  the  rescue  team is  called 
upon  to  intervene. 
The  rescue  service  carries  out  the  instructions  of its  leader. 
2.  Rescue  station 
2.1  The  breathing  apparatus,  accessories  and  their parts,  also ail devices  and  ap-
paratus  used  by  the  rescue  service  are  arranged  on  view  and  in order in special 
premises,  reserved exclusively  for  the  rescue  service  (rescue  station). 
The  head  of service  and  the head  of  equipment  each  possess  a  key  to  the  rescue 
station.  Two  other keys  are  also held  available,  one  in  the  office of  the  head  of 
service below  ground  and  another  in  the shift  control  room.  The  rescue  station is 
connected  to  the  telephone network  of  the  depot. 
2.2  The  number  of  items  of  serviceable breathing  apparatus  is  related  to  the  strength 
of  the  rescue  service. 
Each  member  of  the  rescue  service possesses  a  breathing device. 
2.3  The  rescue  service possesses  training premises  in which drills  can  be  carried  out 
at high  temperatures  and  in  smoke.  These  premises  are  equipped with  a  suitable 
indicator device  and  emergency exits,  and  can  be  ventilated quickly. 
3.  Participation of  the  rescue  centre 
The  rescue  centre  is particularly responsible  for  the  following  tasks 
(1)  advice  and  assistance  during  action  by  the  rescue  service; 
(2)  maintenance  of  an  operational  depot; 
(3)  preparation of  a  plan  of  assistance  and  organisation  of  assistance  in  the 
event  of  a  mining  catastrophe; 
(4)  regular  checking  of  the rescue  service  and  of  the  rescue station,  as well  as 
one  ~f its items  of  apparatus  and  installations; 
(5)  training  and  improvement  of  heads  of service,  team  leaders  and  persons  in 
charge  of  equipment; 
(6)  assitance to the head  of  service  for  training  and  improvement  of  the  rescue 
service; 
(7)  examination  of breathing  apparatus  after accidents  (section  1.9.1.2). 
4.  Intervention 
4.1  Alarm 
By  means  of  a  proven  alarm system,  all members  of  the  rescue  service  can  be 
warned without  delay  and  in  a  minimum  period  of  time  in  the  event  of  a  disaster, 
even if they  are  below  ground. 
The  alarm system is  checked  one  a  month  (alarm test). 4.2 
4.2.1 
4.2.2 
4.2.3 
4.3 
4. 3.1 
4.3.2 
4.3.3 
4.4 
4.4.1 
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Once  a  year,  the  rescue  service undergoes  an  alarm drill,  the  results  of which 
are  given  in  a  written report,  the  alarm interval  running  from  the  time  the 
alarm is  released until  that when  two  rescue  teams  are  ready  to  go  into action. 
Measures  to be  taken  in  the  event  of  intervention 
As  soon  as  the  rescue  service is  called,  the  Bergamt  and  the  rescue  centre  are 
so  informed without  delay.  The  interventions  anticipated  from  the  rescue  service 
are  communicated  a  sufficiently long  time in  advance  to  the  Bergamt  and  to  the 
rescue  centre. 
In  the  event  of  intervention of the  rescue  service,  steps  are  taken  to  ensure 
that  replacement  apparatus  and  rescuers  are  available  in  time.  If the  actual num-
bers  and  those  of  adjacent workings  of  the  same  company  are  insufficient,  an  ap-
peal  is made  to  the  workings  bound  to help  in  accordance with  the  assistance 
plans. 
Pending  the  arrival  of  the head  of  the Bergamt,  who  is  authorized  to direct  the 
rescue  operation(§  205,  sub-para.  1  ABG),  (l)the  manager  of  the works  or his 
representative direct  the  rescue work  from  the  surface,  in  cooperation with  the 
representative  of  the  rescue  centre,  and  give  the necessary instructions  to  the 
head  of  service. 
The  person  in  charge  of  the  rescue  operation has  available  above  ground  a  room 
equipped with  a  sufficient number  of  connections  to  the official telephone net-
work  and  the  internal net't..rork.  As  soon  as  intervention by  the  rescue  service 
begins,  a  report  is  prepared,  under  the  authority  of  the  person  in  charge  of 
the  operation,  of  communications  received  and  instructions  given  and  decisions 
taken. 
The  head  of  service  gives  the  team  leaders  the necessary directives  for  carrying 
out  their duties,  and  directs  the  intervention  of  the  rescue  service  in detail. 
Base  of  operation 
In  the  event  of  intervention  of  the  rescue  service,  an  operation  base  is esta-
blished below  ground,  in  an  ad  hoc position  in  agreement  with  the  person  in 
charge  of  the  rescue work. 
Here  the  breathing  apparatus,  revival  apparatus,  and  any  auxiliary means  required 
for  carrying  out  the  operations,  also  first  aid  equipment,  is kept  at  the  dispo-
sal  of  the  rescuers  and  restored  to  condition  immediately after each  interven-
tion. 
A person  responsible  for  equipment  is  kept  permanently  at  the  operations  base  to 
verify  and  maintain  the  apparatus  stocked  at  this  point,  also its accessories. 
The  reserve  teams  are  stationed near  the  operations base. 
The  operations  base  is  connected without  delay  to  the  telephone network  of  the 
mine. 
In  addition,  when  possible,  a  telephone  link is established between  this base 
and  the  place where  the  rescue  teams  are  in action. 
The  operations  base  is  under  the  supervision  of  the  team  leader  and,  in his 
absence,  of  a  superintendent with experience  of mine  rescue,  specially appointed 
to .replat:e  him. 
Interventions  are  recorded  in  a  register giving  the  time  at which  they  took 
place. 
Behaviour to be  observed  in  the  presence  of harmful  gases  and  in  an  atmosphere 
lacking  in  oxygen 
If the  atmosphere  contains  harmful  gases  and  is  lacking in oxygen  (§  155  BVOSt) 
(2),  the  rescuers  use breathing  apparatus,  checked  shortly before use.  Each  time 
they  are  used,  new  alkali cartridges  and  completely  full  oxygen bottles  are  used. 
(1)  General  mining  law, 
(2)  Mining  regulation. 4.4.2 
4.4.3 
4.4.4 
4.4.5 
4.5 
4.5.1 
4.5.2 
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Only  members  of  the rescue  service use  closed-circuit  oxygen  apparatus  (§  65, 
sub-para.  5  BVOSt)  (1). 
If it is necessary,  in exceptional  case,  to  supply  other breathing equipment  to 
persons  not  belonging  to  the  rescue  service,  authority will be  requested  from  the 
Bergamt.  (§  65,  sub-para.  5  BVOSt)  (1).  The  work  of  these persons  is  supervised 
by  a  team  leader of  the  rescue  service. 
During  an  intervention with  closed-circuit  oxygen  apparatus,  the  team  leader 
checks  the  reserve  of  oxygen  for  each  item of  apparatus  at  suitable  intervals. 
He  orders  retirement  as  soon  as  the  item of  apparatus  with  the  smallest  reserve 
of  oxygen still contains  at  least  twice  as  much  as  is necessary  (estimated)  to 
accomplish  the  return  journey. 
The  head  of service may  only  place  teams  in  action when  he  has  spare  teams 
available;  generally  speaking,  a  team  is kept  in  reserve  for  each  team  in action. 
By  derogation  to  the  above,  and  for  the saving  of human  life,  the  head  of  service 
may  however  place  teams  in  action before  spare  teams  are  available,  when  he  is 
sure  of  the early arrival  of  the  latter. 
The  rescue  service  only  operates with  complete  teams  (one  leader  and  4  men)  and 
special members  do  not  count  in  calculating the strength of  a  team. 
When  local  conditions  enable  a  smaller number  of  rescuers  to be  placed  in  action 
without  inconvenience,  the  head  of service  can  so  decide  in  agreement  with  the 
person  in  charge  of  the  rescue  operations;  the  rescuers  in  action  must  always  be 
accompanied  by  a  team  leader. 
Behaviour  to be  observed  under  difficult  conditions 
The  conditions  are  considered  as  difficult  : 
(i)  in underground workings  where  the  atmosphere 
(ii)  in  the  case  of  low  visibility; 
is  hot 
(iii)  in the  case  of  reconnoitring  operations  in  unknown 
(iv)  in workings  difficult  to negotiate. 
and  damp; 
terrain; 
Under  such  conditions,  the  following  directives  are  observed  : 
(1)  Between  the  operations  base  and  the  team in action,  a  line  of  permanent 
communication  (telephone without  battery)  is established.  In  the  case  of 
stationary activities,  a  link is  established between  the  place  of  intervention 
and  the  operations  base. 
(2)  Each  reserve  team  is  stationed  as  near  as  possible  to  the  place  of  interven-
tion,  with  the  breathing  apparatus  in  the slung position without  donning it. 
Its  leader is  provided with  head-phones. 
(3)  A line of  communication  is established between  the  position  of  the  reserve 
team  and  the  operations  base. 
When  the  rescue  team operates  in  underground workings  where  the  atmosphere  is 
hot  and  damp,  it is  also necessary  to  comply  with  the  following  regulations  : 
(1)  Preference is  given  to making  use  of  the  following  rescuers 
(i)  those,  used  to difficult manual  work; 
(ii)  also  to working  in  a  hot  or  damp  atmosphere; 
(iii) not more  than  40  years  of  age. 
It may  be  possible  to derogate  from  this  ruling  for  the  saving  of human 
lives. 
(2)  Rescuers  recovering  from  illness  are  excluded,  also  those  not  in full  posses-
sion  of  their resources(e.g.  influenza,  effects  of  the  absorbtion  of  alcohol, 
etc.),  also special members  more  than  40  years  old.  The  rescuers  must  wear 
(1)  Mining regulation. VI,  25 
light  clothing  (roll up  shirt  sleeves  and  bottoms  of  trousers),  insofar  as 
a  danger  of explosion  does  not  oblige  them  to wear  fire-proof  clothing. 
(3)  On  instructions  from  the head  of  service or his  deputy,  the  team  leader in 
action measures,  by  means  of  a  psychorometer,  the  dry  and  humid  temperatures, 
and  gives  the  results  by  telephone. 
(4)  The  head  of  service or his  deputy  at  the  operations base  is  responsible  for 
deciding  the  duration  of  the  intervention.  Depending  on  the  humid  tempera-
ture th  given  to  him,  he  fixes  the  authorised duration  of  the  intervention 
on  the basis  of  the  following  table  and  taking  into  account  the  indications 
in  5 
c  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  40 
mn  70  60  so  45  40  35  30  25 
(S)  During  interventions  requiring  a  particularly intense physical effort  (e.g. 
scaling  ladders,  structures difficult  to negotiate,  use  of  fire-proof 
clothing),  the  period  of  action  indicated by  the  table will be  reduced  by 
10  minutes.  In  the  event  of  appreciable differences  between  the  humid  and 
dry  temperatures,  it will be  reduced  further  as  follows 
(i)  dry  temperature  more  than  5  to  10°  above  the  humid  temperature  : 
5  minutes  : 
(ii)  dry  temperature  more  than  10°  above  the humid  temperature  :  10  minutes 
(6)  Before  any  intervention,  the  members  of  the  rescue  service undertake not  to 
take  excessively  long breaks  during  action  (not  to sit down),  and  to report 
to  the  team  leader  any  sign  of heat-stroke,  such  as  heaviness  in  the  legs, 
headache,  difficulties  in seeing  and  hearing,  nausea,  giddiness,  etc.  The 
team  leader  informs  the  head  of service  or his  deputy  accordingly  by  tele-
phone,  and  returns with  all his  team without  delay. 
(7)  Blankets  and  hot  drinks  are  made  available  for  rescuers  returning  from  an 
operation. 
Breaks  of at  least  two  hours  are  provided between  two  interventions. 
5.  Mutual  assistance 
5.1  In  the  event  of  mining  catastrophes,  the  rescue  service  lends  assistance to  those 
of  adjacent workings  in  accordance with  the mutual  assistance plan. 
5.2  If the  rescue  service of  the  workings  in question  itself requests  the  assistance 
of  other services,  it places  some  of  this  members  at  their disposal  as  guides. 
6.  Records 
6.1  For  the  purpose  of  the  examinations  referred  to  in  1.5,  the  "Medical  certificate" 
and  the  "Health bulletin for  sickness  ~xaminations" prescribed in  §  16  (2)  of  the 
BVOSt  are  used  (1). 
6.2  Various  record  documents  are  prepared  on  forms  in  the  rescue  centre 
(i)  Report  I  on  the  use  of breathing  apparatus  in the  event  of disaster. 
(ii)  Report  II  on  an  incident with breathing  apparatus. 
(iii)  Report  III  on  operations  for  revival  of  an  injured person. 
(iv)  Certificates  of participation in  a  course. 
(v)  Register of members. 
(vi)  List  of members. 
(vii)  Drill books. 
(viii)  Certificates  of  inspection  of  equipment. 
(1)  Mining  regulation. VI,  26 
(ix)  Annual  report. 
(x)  Liaison service in  the  case  of  intervencion of  the  rescue  service. 
6.3  The  duties  and  responsibility of persons  participating in  the  rescue work with-
out  acting  as  members  of  the  rescue  service or without  belonging  to  the  latter, 
are  defined  in the  specimen  appended.  These  persons  are  informed  of their duties. 
The  premises  needed  for  rescue work  are  also  shown  in  the  appendix. 
6.4  Of  the  forms  referred to  in 6.2,  the  "List  of  members"  and  the  "Liaison service 
in  the  case  of  intervention of  the  rescue  service",  are  posted  at  the  following 
places  : 
( 1)  office of  the head  of service  below  ground; 
(2)  office of  the  head  of service; 
(3)  telephone  switchboard; 
(4)  shifts  control  room; 
(5)  rescue  station. 
The  list of  members  is  also posted  in  the  overman's  room. 
6.5  The  schedule  and  plans  relating to  the  "Plan  for  protection  against  fires  below 
ground"  are  posted or made  easily accessible  at  the  rescue  station  and  in  the 
overman's  room. 
7.  Additional  training 
The  competent  Bergamt  receives  regularly  additional  information  on  the  rescue 
service,  in  accordance with  the  form  appended.  A copy  of  this  information  is 
sent  to  the  rescue  centre. 
(Stamp  and  signature of  the  owner  of  the  mine) VI,  27 
We  approve  the  above  "Rescue  procedure",  the  appendix  on  "Additional  information  on  the 
rescue  service",  (1)  and  the  appendix  on  "Tasks  delegated to persons  and  supply of 
premises"  ( 1). 
G.-z.  42/15- 114.40/8363/65 
Dortmund,  26  November  1965 
Oberbergamt 
signed  SANDERS 
We  approve  the  above  rescue  procedure,  in  accordance with  §  65,  sub-para.  7  of  the 
general  order for mines  dated  18.12.1964. 
c.-).  41  I  5917/65 
(1)  Not  attached. 
Bonn,  29  November  1965 
Oberbergamt 
signed  SCHWAKE VI,  29 
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Principles 
relating to  rescue  operations  in  coal  mines 
The  following  conditions  are  applied  for  the  formation,  training,  installations, 
action  and  supervision  of  the  rescue  service  : 
1. 
2. 
2.1 
2. 1.1 
2. 1. 2 
2.1. 3 
2.1. 4 
2.2 
2.2.1 
2.2.1.1 
2.2.1.2 
2.2.2 
2.2.2.1 
2.2.2.2 
Purpose  of  rescue  operations  in mines 
The  purpose  of  the  rescue  service  in mines  is  to  enable  human  lives  and  property 
to be  saved  in  the  event  of  explosion,  mine-fires  or  other events  likely to 
create  danger  of poisoning by  harmful  gases  or  asphyxia,  and  which  require  the 
intervention  of  an  experienced  team  equipped with  protective breathing  appara-
tus. 
Rescue  service  and  necessary  installation 
General  considerations 
Every  autonomous  works  department must  possess  a  team  of  rescuers  (§  264)  (1). 
The  latter must  be  provided with  a  rescue  station equipped with breathing  appa-
ratus  and  the necessary  installations  for maintaining it  (§  265)  (1). 
In  agreement  with  the  Oberbergamt,  joint or district  rescue  stations  may  be 
installed to meet  local  requirements. 
The  measures  set  out  in this  document  and  in  the  "principles  for  the  prepara-
tion  and  execution  of  rescue  operations"  (document  No.  52)  must  be  taken  in 
order  to  alert  the  rescue  team  and  bring it into action quickly,  and  to  carry 
out  the  rescue  operations. 
The  rescue  installations  in  the  mines  are  supervised by  the  rescue  centre  (PCS). 
The  rescue  service 
Composition,  division  and  strength of  the  rescue  service 
The  rescue  service  consists  of  : 
the executive officer  (as  far  as  possible  a  head  overman  or  deputy  overman), 
his  deputy  (deputies), 
team  leaders,  rescuers  and  persons  in  charge  of maintaining  equipment. 
The  rescue  service  also  includes  members  for  special purposes  (2.2.6).  It is 
divided  into  teams  consisting of  a  team  leader  and  4  men. 
For  each  mine,  the  minimum  strength of  the  rescue  service  is  fixed  in  the  main 
schedule  for  rescue  operations.  It is  related to  the  strength  of  the  personnel 
and  the  more  or  less  dangerous  character of  the  mine.  The  minimum  strength is 
1  executive  officer,  2  team  leaders,  8  men  and  2  persons  responsible  for main-
taining  the  equipment.  The  strength of  the  rescue  service  is  fixed without  taking 
into account  the  number  if members  for  special purposes.  With  regard  to  the 
team  leaders,  it is necessary  to  provide  for  a  sufficient number  of  replacements. 
Recruitment 
Recruitment  in  the  rescue  service is  on  the  basis  of  volunteers.  The  executive 
officers,  team  leaders  and  rescuers  are  chosen  solely  from  the  members  of  the 
personnel  (superintendents  and  workmen)  of  the  below  ground  services.  The  per-
sons  responsible  for maintaining  the  equipment  must  belong  to  the  above  ground 
personnel  as  far  as  possible,  be  familiar with  the  conditions  below  ground,  and 
be  metal-workers. 
Only  personnel  fulfilling  the  following  conditions  may  be  recruited  in  the  rescue 
.service  : 
(1)  Police regulation dated  20/11/1967  for  coal  mines. VI,  34 
1.  be  between  21  and  40  years  of  age  and  have  worked  below  ground  for  at  least 
3  years  (below  ground  or  above  ground  in  the  case  of  persons  responsible  for 
the  maintenance  of  the equipment); 
2.  have  a  cool  and  determined personality; 
3.  be  sound  in body  and  mind  and  suited to service  on  the  rescue  team,  as  certi-
fied  by  a  doctor  accepted  by  the  Oberbergamt  for medical  examinations  for 
suitability purposes; 
4.  have  received  the necessary  training  and  passed  the  examination  laid down. 
2.2.2.3  The  executive  officer must  be  a  head  overman  or  a  deputy  overman.  Before  his 
nomination,  he  must  have  been  in  the  rescue  service  for  at  least  a  year  as  a  team 
leader,  and  have  successfully  completed  a  course  of  executive  officer organised 
by  the  rescue  centre. 
2.2.2.4  The  team  leaders  must  be  recruited solely  from  the  superintendents working  in  the 
below  ground  services. 
2.2.2.5  The  members  of  the  rescue  service must  be  recruited  from  superintendents  and 
experiences  miners,  also  from  carpenters,  masons,  winch  operators,  locomotive 
drivers,  fitters  and  electricians,  who  must  be  uniformly distributed between  the 
various  teams. 
2.2.2.6  Persons  responsible  for  the  maintenance  of  the  equipment  may  only  be  recruited 
from  persons  who  are medically  certified  as  being  free  from  contagious  skin  dis-
eases  or pulmonary  tuberculosis.  It is  desirable  for  persons  responsible  for 
maintaining  the  equipment  to  be  suited to work  necessitating the  carrying  of 
breathing apparatus,  but  this  is not  a  condition. 
2.2.2.7  The  executive  officer examines  whether  the  candidate  complies  with  the  required 
conditions;  be  then  sends  him  for  a  medical  examination  in  accordance with  the 
form  prepared by  the  rescue  centre. 
2.2.2.8  The  candidate  is  accepted when  his  training is  completed.  Acceptance  is  decided 
by  the  executive officer,  who  records  the name  of  the  person  concerned  on  the 
roll and  the  list of  members  of  the rescue  service,  and  gives  him  the  service 
instructions  (document  No.  51).  The  new  members  of  the  rescue  service signs  to 
the effect  that  he will  abide  by  these  instructions. 
2.2.3  Training. 
2.2.3.1  It is essential  for  the  members  of  a  team  of  rescuers  to  receive  reliable training 
and  to practice regularly. 
The  intital training is  given  by  the  rescue  centre.  It consists  of  theoretical 
teaching,  instructions  on  how  to use  the  apparatus,  and drills  carrying  the 
equipment. 
2.2.3.2  The  subjects  for  the  theoretical  teaching  are  as  follows  : 
human  breathing;  structure,  method  of  functioning,  handling,  treatment  and  use 
of  equipment  intended  for  rescue  operations  in mines,  composition  of  the  air in 
the mine,  gases  released by  a  mine-fire,  and  pockets  of  explosive  gas;  action  of 
poisonous  gases,  especially  carbon  monoxide,  on  the  human  structure,  and  dangers 
resulting from  lack  ~f oxygen;  causes  of  fires  in mines,  explosions,  etc.,  and 
combating  of  these;  structure,  method  of  action  and  handling  cf mine  extinguish-
ers;  organisation of  the  rescue  service  in  the  mine  and  intervention  of  the  team 
of  rescuers;  transport,  care  of  accident  victims  and  revival. 
2.2.3.3  In  the  course  of  the  practical training,  the  candidate  is  accustomed  to  work  in 
smoke  and  at  a  high  temperature wearing  the breathing mask.  During  the  course  of 
a  special drill, his  physical  endurance  is measured,  he  must  then work  continous-
ly  for  two  hours,  with  an  independant  breathing  apparatus  (closed-circuit  appara-
tus),  in  smoke  and  the  high  temperature  (work  on  ergometric  apparatus,  mining-
work,  moving  about  in  the  training premises).  For  acceptance  into  the  rescue  ser-
vice,  the drill of  the  candidate must  be  continuou~  and  the  performances  attained. 
In  addition,  the  candidate  must  show  by  examination  that he  has  the necessary 
knowledge  of  the method  of  operation  and  use  of  the breathing  apparatus,  also  of 
the behaviour to be  followed  in  the  case  of  a  disaster. VI,  35 
2.2.3.4  The  executive  officers,  their deputies  and  the  persons  responsible  for  the  main-
tenance  of  the  equipment  must  have  successfully  completed  special  training  courses 
given  by  the  PCS.  These  courses  must  be  renewed  every  four  years. 
2.2.4  Intervention 
To  permit  rapid intervention,  the  rescuers  must  live,  as  far  as  possible,  near 
the  rescue  station and  be  allocated  bet~een the various  shifts  (day),  so  that  in 
the  event  of  a  disaster  a  complete  team  can  be  on  the  spot  quickly.  It must  be 
possible  to alert  them quickly  in  the  event  of  a  disaster.  The  outside  door  of 
the  rescuers  building must  be  indicated by  a  special  sign  of  the  rescue  team. 
2.2.5  Drills 
2.2.5.1  The  rescuers,  including  the  executive  officer, his  deputy  and  the  team  leaders, 
must  take part,  at  least  once  every  three months,  in  a  drill  lasting two  hours 
wearing  the  closed-circuit breathing  apparatus.  The  drill is not  considered  as 
accomplished  unless  it has  been  uninterrupted.  Generally  speaking,  each  year  two 
drills must  be  carried out  helow  ground  and  two  in  the  smoke  chamber  in heat 
conditions.  During  the drills below  ground,  the  rescuers  must  carry  out  similar 
tasks  to  those which  may  be necessary  in  the  event  of  a  disaster. 
2.2.5.2  Each  rescuer must  also practice once  a  year with  the  breathing  apparatus  using  air 
conduction  by  bellows. 
In  addition,  each  rescuer must  participate at  least  once  a  year  in  a  revival 
drill,  and  attend  a  lecture  on  the  principles  relating to  rescue  in mines,  parti-
cularly on  the  service  instructions  intended  for  the  rescue  service  (document 
No.  51). 
2.2.5.3  The  drills must  be  inspected  by  the  executive officer,  his  deputy,  or  a  team  lea-
der  delegated  by  him  for  this  purpose,  unless  the  PCS  undertakes  to  do  this. 
2.2.5.4  Each  year  there  must  be  at  least  one  alert drill by  the  rescue  service.  The  result 
of  the  alert drill must  be  given  in  a  report  to  the  PCS  on  a  special printed  form 
provided  for  this  purpose.  The  duration  of  the  alert  is  the  time  elapsing between 
the  beginning  of  the  alert drill  and  the  advice  "to  rescue  teams  ready  to  take 
action". 
2.2.5.5  The  executive  officer  records  the  various  drills  on  a  special  printed  form  sup-
plied by  the  PCS.  The  result of  the drill  and  all the observations  made  must  be 
included  thereon.  In  addition,  he  makes  a  report  to  the  PCS  on  a  special  form 
concerning  the drills  carried  out  below  ground. 
2.2.5.6  The  drill  days  are  fixed  by the  PCS  according  to  a  special  programme.  At  the 
request  of  the PCS,  general drills  and  alert drills  take  place  additional  to  the 
programme. 
2.2.5.7  During  the  rescue  service drills, it is necessary  to  apply  the  "directives  for 
rescue  service drills"  contained  in  the  service  instructions  for  the  rescue  ser-
vice  (form No.  51). 
2.2.6  Special  members 
To  permit  the  carrying  out  of  special  tasks  in  the  event  of  intervention of  the 
rescue  service wearing breathing  apparatus,  persons  with  special  training  (e.g. 
specialized  overmen,  works  engineer,  etc.)  can  take  part  in  the  rescue  service  as 
a  special  case,  if they fulfil  the  following  conditions  : 
(1)  have  taken part  in  the  rescue  service  for  at  least  one  year  as  an  ordinary 
rescuer  or  as  a  team  leader,  or have  experience  of  at  least  five  years  of 
below  ground work; 
(2)  be  suited for  service  in  the  rescue  service; 
(3)  have  successfully  completed  an  executive  officer's  course  in  the  PCS; 
(4)  take  part,  at  least  once  a  year,  in  a  practice drill at  the  PCS  and  a  below 
ground  drill in  their own  mine,  wearing  the  closed-circuit breathing  appara-
tus. 
On  the  roll  and  list of members  of  the  rescue  service  they  are  shown  as  special 
members. VI,  36 
2.2.7  Departure  from  the  rescue  service 
2.2.7.1  Rescuers  who  no  longer satisfy the  required  conditions  for  acceptance  (2.2.2.2., 
2  and  3)  must  leave  the  rescue  service. 
2.2.7.2  Generally  speaking,  ordinary  rescuers  leave  the  team when  they  reach  4S  years  of 
age,  and  team  leaders  and  special members  when  they  reach  SO  years  of  age. 
In  exceptional  cases,  and  in  agreement  with  the  PCS,  particularly experienced 
rescuers  may  continue  to  take  part  in  the  rescue service  for  a  maximum  of  five 
years  beyond  this  limit. 
There  is no  age  limit  for  persons  responsible  for  the  maintenance  of  the  equip-
ment. 
2.2.8  Medical  examinations  for  rescuers 
2.2.8.1  Each member  of  the  rescue  service must  have  his  state of health  checked  by  an 
authorised doctor  of  the  Oberbergamt  for  the  purpose  of  the  check  examinations. 
Generally  speaking,  these  examinations  must  be  renewed  at  least  every  two  years; 
they must  take  place  each year  for  executive  officers  and  special members  more 
than  SO  years  of  age,  also  for  rescuers  more  than  45  years  of  age  (2.2.7.2). 
2.2.8.2  In  addition,  after any  serious  or prolonged illness, it is necessary  for  the 
rescuers  to undergo  a  medical  examination,  in order to establish whether  they 
are still suitable  for  service  in  the  rescue  team.  This  service  may  only be 
resumed  on  submission  of  a  medical  certificate certifying suitability. 
2.2.8.3  The  medical  certificates must  make  a  special point of referring to  the  satisfac-
tory  functioning  of  the  cardiopulmonary  system.  With  regard  to  the  persons  res-
ponsible  for  the maintenance  of  the  equipment,  the  examination must  pay  special 
attention  to  contagious  skin  diseases  and  pulmonary  tuberculosis. 
2.2.9  Guides  familiar with  the  localities  for  the  rescue  team 
2.2.9.1  With  regard  to  mines  authorised to organise  their  own  team  of  rescuers,  the 
Bergamt  fixes  the  number  of members  of the  personnel  suited to  receive  training 
wearing  the  breathing  apparatus,  with  a  view  to  serving  as  guides  knowing  the 
workings  to rescuers  from outside,  in  the  event  of  a  disaster.  These  persons 
must  satisfy the  conditions  required  in  2.2.2.2. 
2.2.9.2  The  PCS  is responsible  for their training.  Those  concerned must  carry  out  each 
year at  least  two  drills  in  accordance with  2.2.5.1.  i.e.  one  drill below ground 
and  another  in  the  training premises.  For  the  medical  examinations,  see  228. 
2.3  Rescue  stations 
2.3.1  Rescue  centre  (PCS) 
2.3.1.1  The  PCS  organises  and  supervises  rescue  in  the  mines  under its control  (§  267, 
sub-para.  2)  (1). 
2.3.1.2  It carries  out  maintenance  of  the  cars  used  for  rescue  purpose  and  a  large  stock 
of protective breathing  apparatus  and  revival  apparatus,  also  extinguishers with 
all their accessories,  and  places  itself in  this way  at  the  disposal  of  the  mines 
on  request. 
2.3.1.3  The  following  tasks  are  included  in its activities  : 
(1)  Training  of  rescue  services  by  theoretical  courses,  discussions  and  drills. 
(2)  Inspection of  rescue  services  and  their drills. 
(3)  Inspection  of  rescue  stations  at  mines  and  other  rescue  installations  in 
mines. 
(4)  Establishing of  the  principles  concerning  the  training of  the  rescue  services 
also  the  preparation  and  implementation  of  rescue  operations,  service  in-
structions  intended  for  members  of  the  rescue  service  (principle  rescue  plan), 
including  the  regulation  of  aid  given  by  doctors,  medical  establishments  and 
hospitals. 
(1)  Police regulation dated 20/11/1967  for  coal  mines. 2.3.2 
VI,  37 
(5)  Aid  in the  event  of  accidents  or fires  in  the  mines  and  during work  invol-
ving  risk of poisoning  by  harmful  gases  or  lack  of  oxygen,  in the  form  of 
dispatch of  teams,  apparatus  and  equipment,  also  by  advice. 
(6)  Examination,  supervision  and  specialist knowledge  of  rescue  installations 
and  apparatus  in mines. 
Common  rescue  station 
The  common  rescue  station is  responsible  : 
(1)  for holding  ready  and  maintaining  apparatus,  spare parts  and  other  items 
of  equipment; 
(2)  for maintaining drill premises  for  mines  which  do  not  possess  their  own 
premises  for  this  purpose,  and  for  arranging drills  there; 
(3)  for  giving  assistance  during drills or  action  by  teams  of  rescuers,  by 
placing  at  their disposal  persons  responsible  for maintaining  apparatus  and 
equipment. 
2.3.3  Rescue  station 
2.3.3.1  The  purpose  of  the  rescue  station is  to  ensure  satisfactory storage  and  mainten-
ance  of  the breathing equipment,  revival  equipment,  and  of  the  rest of  the 
equipment  for  the  rescue  team.  It must  only be  used  for  this  purpose.  The  appli-
ances  (vehicles  conveying  appliances)  and  other working  implements  which  must  be 
kept  ready  in sufficient quantity  for  the  rescue  service,  may  also  be  stored  in 
another place  or  even  above  ground,  depending  on  local  conditions. 
2.3.3.2  The  rescue station must,  as  far  as  possible,  be  divjded  into  a  room  serving  as 
a  store for  the  equipment,  a  workshop  for  the  persons  responsible  for  the  main-
tenance  of  the  equipment,  and  a  garage. 
2.3.3.3  When  a  special  store  is  provided  for  the  equipment,  it must  only  Se  used  to  store 
the  equipment  ready  to use.  It must  be well-fit,  free  of  dust,  be  possible  to 
heat,  protected against  the  rays  of  the  sun,  and  situated at  ground  level.  It 
must  be  provided with  a  telephone  and  must  be  maintained  at  an  average  tempera-
ture of  8  to  zoo  C. 
2.3.3.4  The  workshop  must  be  installed to  permit  cleaning,  disinfecting  and  drying,  also 
repair of  the  component  parts  of  the  equipment;  it must  also  be  provided with 
oxygen  filling equipment. 
2.3.3.5  Keys  to  the  rescue station must  be  kept  under  glass  in  the  office of  the  below 
ground  head  of  operations,  in  the  lamp-room,  and  in  the  sick-room.  In  addition, 
the  executive officer  and  the  persons  responsible  for  the maintenance  of  the 
equipment  must  be  in possession  of keys. 
2.3.4  Breathing  apparatus 
2.3.4.1  Each  rescue  station must  possess  at  least  11  independent  breathing  apparatuses 
(closed-circuit  apparatus).  This  apparatus  must  only  be  kept  at  the  rescue  station. 
2.3.4.2  The  items  of  apparatus  or parts  of  apparatus  which  are  unusable  must  be  marked  or 
stored  so  that  it is not  possible  to use  them by  mistake or  in  ignorance. 
2.3.4.3  The  breathing apparatus  and  other  apparatus  1Jsed  in  the  mine  must  be  provided with 
a  number  and  a  plate  indicating that  they  belong  to  the mine. 
2.3.4.4  It is  advisable  to keep  in  reserve,  for  each  closed-circuit  apparatus  in working 
order,  at  least  two  alkali  cartridges  and  one  full  oxygen bottle.  There  must  be 
a  ~outh-piece or  a  mask  for  each  rescuer.  The  oxygen  used  must  have  at  least 
98.5%  purity. 
Chests  must  be  kept  in  readiness  for  transporting breathing equipment,  replace-
ment  bottles  of  oxygen  and  alkali  cartridges. 
2.3.4.5  The  apparatus  is  distributed by  a  person  responsible  for maintenance,  on  the 
instructions  of  the  executive officer,  the works  management  or that of  the  rescue 
operations,  in  agreement with  the  executive officer.  Before  distribution,  the 
official in  charge  checks  that  the  apparatus  is  in working  order. VI,  38 
2.3.4.6  Repairs  and  cleaning of  the  apparatus  must  be  carried out  by  the  persons  respon-
sible for maintenance,  in  accordance with  the  instructions  given  for  this  pur-
pose  (§  7  of  the  service  instructions  for  the  rescue  team- document  No.  51). 
The  various  persons  responsible  for maintenance  of  the  equipment  must  play  an 
equal part  in  the work  in hand. 
2.3.5  Revival  apparatus 
2.3.5.1  The  revival  apparatus  of  the  rescue  service must  be  kept  at  the  rescue  station. 
It must  be  accessible to the medical  assistants  for  use  in  the  event  of  a  disas-
ter. 
2.3.5.2  Mines  which  have  no  rescue  station  of their own  can  store it in  the  sick-room. 
2.3.6 
2.3.7 
Maintenance  is  carried out  by  the  persons  responsible  for  the maintenance  of 
equipment  from  the  rescue  station serving  the mine. 
The  inspection  and  maintenance  of  the  revival  apparatus  of  the  detachment  serv-
ices  situated at  a  distance is  regulated  by  the  rescue  centre. 
Training premises 
For drills  in  smoke  and  heat,  the  rescue  team must  have  the  use  of  premises  pro-
vided with  a  heating,  lighting  and  ventilation system,  and  a  signalling device. 
Several mines  may  possess  common  training premises.  The  production  of  smoke  for 
the  drills must  not  involve  the  formation  of  poisonous  gases. 
Inspection  of  rescue  stations 
The  executive officer  and  the  person  responsible  for  the  maintenance  of  the 
equipment  must  check  one  a  month  the  condition  of  the  rescue  installations  and 
apparatus  in  the  mines.  The  results  of  the  inspection must  be written  down  and 
countersigned by  the  executive officer.  The  inspection register must  be  kept  at 
the  rescue  station.  The  head  of  the P.C.S.  or  an  official delegated by  him  for 
this  purpose,  inspects  the  rescue  stations  every six months. 
3.  Obligations  of  the  rescuers 
The  general  obligations  of  the  rescuers  and  the special  obligations  of  the  execu-
tive officer,  the  team  leaders,  the  rescuers  and  the  persons  responsible  for main-
taining the equipment,  are  defined  in detail  in  the  service  instructions  intended 
for  the  rescue  service  (document  No.  51). 
These  service  instructions must  be  handed  against  receipt  to  the  executive  offi-
cers,  the  team  leaders,  the  rescuers  and  the  persons  responsible  for  the  ~ainten­
ance  of  the  apparatus. 
4.  Obligations  of  superintendents not  belonging  to  the  rescue  service 
4.1  The  operator of  the mine  or the  person  in  charge  of  the below  ground  workings 
authorised by  him,  is  responsible  for  the  measures  to  be  taken  to ensure,  in  the 
event  of  accident,  that  the  rescue  service  is  alerted quickly  and  the  rescue 
operations  put  in hand  systematically. 
4.2  As  soon  as  the  use  of breathing apparatus  becomes  necessary  or probable  in  a  mine, 
for  example  when  a  smell  of  smoke  or fire  is  reported,  the  person  responsible  for 
the workings  below  ground  or his  deputy must,  before  investigating himself,  see 
that  the works  management  and  the P.C.S.  and  the Bergamt  are  immediately  advised 
by  telephone  (§  269  BPV  St)  (1). 
4.3  In  the  event  of  intervention by  the  rescue  service,  the  person  in  charge  of  the 
workings  below  ground  must  immediately  take  the necessary  action  to provide  re-
placement  personnel. 
4.4  In  mines  with  their  own  rescue  service,  all below  ground superintendents,  also 
persons  required to participate  in  the  rescue  operations,  shall  receive  instruc-
tion  once  a  year  given  by  the  works  manager  or his  deputy,  on  the  question  of 
rescue  in mines,  the  preparation  and  carrying out  of  rescue  operations,  the 
alerting procedure  and  the  rescue  procedure  in  the mines,  the  services  responsi-
ble  for  giving  assistance,  especially  on  the measures  taken  in  the  mine,  in order 
to protect  the  underground  excavations  against  fires  and  risks  of  explosions. 
(1)  PoZiae  regulations  dated  20/11/196?  for  aoaZ  mines. VI,  39 
5.  Rescue  operations 
5.1  Preparation  and  execution 
5.2 
5.2.1 
5.2.2 
5.2.3 
5.2.4 
5.2.5 
5.2.6 
5.2.7 
5.2.8 
5.2.9 
For  the  preparation  and  execution  of  the  rescue  operations,  the  "Principles  re-
lating to  the  preparation  and  execution  of  rescue  operations"  (document  No.  52) 
must  be  applied. 
Intervention  of the  rescue  service 
The  head  of  rescue  operations  orders  the  executive officer to  bring the  rescue 
service  into  action,  by  assigning  to  him  clearly defined duties.  The  executive 
officer settles  in detail  the  intervention  of  the  rescue  service  on  the basis 
of  the  strength  and  means  available  to  him,  and  taking into  account  the  local 
circumstances.  He  gives  the  team  leaders  clear orders  regarding  certain defined 
tasks  in  space  and  time.  If necessary  he  requests  aid  from  the  person  in  charge 
of  below  ground workings,  who  takes  the  necessary  action  to  supply  reserve 
rescuers  in  good  time.  If his  own  rescue  service is  inadequate,  the head  of  the 
rescue  operations  designate  the  rescue  service  from  other workings  which  is 
shown  in  the  general  rescue  plan  as  being  responsible  for  giving help,  and  ar-
ranges  to  advise it. 
The  executive officer makes  a  report  to  the head  of  the  rescue  operations  on  the 
fire  and  the extent  of  the disaster,  interference with ventilation,  prohibition 
measures,  working  sites  in  danger,  etc. 
Only  members  of  the  rescue  service provided with  closed-circuit breathing appa-
ratus  may  be  dispatched  to  combat  the  disaster. 
In  exceptional  cases,  persons not  belonging  to  a  rescue  service  and  provided 
with  other breathing  apparatus,  may  be  engaged  in  the  operations  when  the  Berg-
amt  has  given its  agreement. 
When  required  to  intervene,  the  rescue  teams  of other mines  are  placed  under  the 
orders  of  the executive officer of  the  rescuers  of the  mine  where  the  intervention 
is  taking place.  The  executive officer of  the  PCS  may  assume  direction of  the 
operations. 
In principle,  the  rescue  service may  only  intervene when  two  complete  teams,  pro-
vided with breathing  apparatus,  are  on  the  spot  (2.2.1.1).  In  cases  of  particular 
urgency,  a  team may  carry  on  if it is  certain that  the  second will arrive soon. 
Special members  may  only participate directly in  the  operations with  the express 
authority of  the  head  of  rescue  operations;  when  the  strength  of  a  rescue  team 
is  fixed,  they  must  not  be  counted  as  taking  part. 
In areas  with  accumulations  of  poisonous  gases  or where  there has  been  shortage 
of  oxygen,  the  rescue  service may  only  go  in,  in  the  first  instance, with  a 
strength of at  least  one  team.  A rescuer must  never  retrace his  steps  alone,  but 
the whole  team must  come  back.  The  intervention  of  a  lesser number  of  rescuers 
may  be  authorised  in exceptional  cases,  when  special  circumstances  so  require,  but 
it is necessary  for  at  least  one  leader  and  two  men  to  advance  together  (over  a 
short distance  and  under  known  conditions).  Once  the  local  conditions  are  clearly 
established,  individual  rescuers  may  also  be  given particular tasks,  constant 
supervision  and  liaison being  guaranteed with  other rescuers. 
vfuen  the  rescuers  go  forward,  it must  not  be  forgotten  that  penetration of narrow 
underground  workings  with breathing  apparatus  involves  particular risks. 
When  rescuers  are  obliged  to  penetrate  several  times  into the  same  area where  each 
rescuer  runs  risk of  poisoning by  poisonous  gases  or  lack of  oxygen,  it is neces-
sary  to establish  a  link by  special portable  telephone  between  the  various  res-
cuers  and  the  operations  base.  In  addition,  it is  recommended  in such  bases  that 
breathing equipment  ready  to  function  should  be  prepared  at  suitable places  in 
the  action  area,  to  replace  those which  might  be  defective. 
Special  care  is necessary when  advancing  under very difficult  conditions. VI,  40 
5.2.9.1  Very  difficult  conditions  exist 
(i)  in underground workings  where  the  air is hot  and  damp; 
(ii) when  visibility is very  limited; 
(iii) when  reconnoitring without  knowledge  of  the  action  conditions; 
(iv)  in underground workings  where  descent  is difficult. 
In  such  conditions,  the  regulations  to  be  observed  are  as  follows 
The  team which  goes  first must  remain  in constant  contact  (by  special  telephone) 
with  the  operations  base. 
A complete  reserve  team must  be  ready  as  near  as  possible to  the  point  of  inter-
vention,  the breathing  apparatus  being  in the  slung positiou. 
A link must  be  established between  the  place where  the  spare  team is  situated and 
the  operations base. 
5.2.9.2  In  the  case  of  intervention  in  a  hot  and  humid  atmosphere,  the  following  regula-
tions  must  also be  observed  :  • 
Only  members  of  the  rescue  service must  take  part  : 
these  shall preferably be  : 
(i)  those  used  to difficult physical work  and  to working  in heat  or in a  hot  and 
humid  atmosphere; 
(ii)  those  under  forty years  of  age. 
Rescuers  recovering  from  illness or  those who  do  not  feel  at  the  top  of  their 
form  (e.g.  those  suffering  from  influenza or under  the effect of  alcoholic bever-
ages,  etc.)  must  not  be  sent. 
The  rescuers  must  wear  light  clothing unless  the  risk of explosion  requires  fire-
proof  clothing to  be worn. 
Depending  on  the  instructions  of  the  executive officer or his  deputy,  the  team 
leader who  goes  first must  measures  with  a  psychcrometer  the  temperature  in humid 
and  dry  atmosphere,  and  transmit  the  results  by  telephone  to  the  operations  base. 
The  person  in  charge  of  the  base  or his  deputy  is  responsible  for  fixing  the 
duration  of  the  intervention.  Depending  on  the  results  of  the  temperature  record-
ings  given  to him,  he  calculates  the  permissible  duration  in  accordance with  the 
following  principles  : 
(1)  at  a  humid  temperature  of  29  to  32°C  and  at  dry  temperatures  up  to  37°C,  the 
duration  of  interventions  must  be  restricted to  less  than  two  hours,  i.e. 
90  - 60  minutes; 
(2)  if the  humid  temperature  reaches  32  to  34°C,  and  the  dry  temperature  does 
not  exceed  37°C,  the  duration  of  the  intervention must  be  restricted to 
60  - 45  minutes; 
(3)  at humid  temperatures  of  34  to  37°C  and  at  dry  temperatures  not  exceeding 
37°C,  the  duration  of  the  intervention must  be  restricted to  45  - 30  minutes; 
(4)  at higher  dry  temperatures  and  at  humid  temperatures  above  37°C,  interventions 
of  less  than  30  minutes  for  other purposes  than  the  saving  of  human  lives, 
must  not be  carried out  except with  the  agreement  of  the director of  the Berg-
amt  or his  deputy; 
(5)  the  interventions mentioned  in  2,  3  and  4  must  only  take  place  under  the 
direction of  the  PCS. 
Before  the  intervention,  the  rescuers  must  be  asked  to  declare  immediately  to  the 
team  leader  during the  intervention,  all symptons  of heat stasis  (heaviness  of 
the  limbs,  headache,  difficulties  in seeing  and  hearing, nausea,  giddiness).  The 
team  leader transmits  these  observations  to  the  operations base  and  retraces 
steps  immediately with  the whole  team.  During  the  intervention breaks  are  to be 
avoided.  Blankets  and  hot  drinks  must  be  prepared  for  rescuers  returning after 
an  intervention. 5.3 
5.3.1 
5.3.2 
5.3.3 
5.3.4 
VI,  41 
The  rescuers  must  not  be  sent  into action  again until at  least  two  hours  after 
their last intervention. 
Use  of breathing apparatus 
Only  breathing apparatus  of  the  type  authorised by  the  Oberbergamt  may  be  used. 
The  use  of working  apparatus  with  a  CO  filter is  only permissible  on  the  autho-
rity of  the  PCS  for  each  case  of  intervention.  It must  only be  authorised when 
the  conditions  are sufficiently known  and  foreseeable. 
A petrol safety  lamp  is  then  carried,  or  an  authorised  device  for  detecting 
oxygen,  in  order to be  able  to  ensure  that  the  content  of  oxygen  in the  air is 
sufficient for breathing. 
Before  being  issued by  the  person  responsible  for  maintaining  the  equipment  used, 
each breathing  apparatus  must  be  checked  by  the wearer  and  the  head  of  section 
to ensure  that it functions  satisfactorily. 
In  the  case  of  repeated  use  of  closed-circuit  apparatus,  fresh alkali  cartridges 
and  full  oxygen  bottles will be  used  for  each  fresh  intervention. 
During  the  period  of  use  permitted  for  the  alkali  cartridges,  the  cartridges  al-
ready  started may  continue  to be  used  after  a  break  in  respiration,  if they  have 
not  cooled  down  in  the  meantime. 
It is  prohibited to  re-use  cartridges which  have  been  used  for  a  short  time  and 
cooled. 
5.4  Signals 
5.5 
5.5.1 
5.5.2 
5.5.3 
5.5.4 
5.5.5 
The  team  of  rescuers will use  the  following  signals 
1  blast  stop 
2  blasts  coming  back  (we  must  retrace  our  steps) 
3  blasts  going  forward 
2  blasts  +  2  alarm signal 
4 blasts  is  everything alright?  (everything is  alright) 
1 blast  +  2  do  you  need help?  (we  need  help) 
When  the  rescue  service is  required  to  intervene  in  another mining  area,  agree-
ment  must  first be  reached  on  the  signals  to  be  used. 
Operations  base 
When  the  rescue  service  is  required  to  intervene below  ground  using breathing 
equipment,  it is necessary to instal near  the  site of  intervention,  in  a  place 
not  exposed  to  dangers  of  poisonous  harmful  gases  or  asphyxia,  an  operations 
base  occupied  by  experienced  rescuers,  equipped which  breathing  apparatus  and  pro-
vided with  a  telephone  link with  the  surface. 
The  operations  base must  be  roomy  and  protected  from  cold  draughts.  It must  be 
planned  and  equipped  so  that  the  apparatus  used  is  in working  order,  and  that 
spare parts  can  be  clearly  arranged  there  and  the  equipment  already  used  can  be 
prepared for  re-use. 
The  operations  base will be  occupied  permanently  by  a  person  responsible  for  the 
maintenance  of  the  equipment,  who  will  check  the  apparatus  used  on  the  spot, 
including  the  accessories,  and  will  carry  out  maintenance. 
A log  of  all interventions will be kept  at  the  operations base  in  accordance with 
the  specimen  laid  down. 
The  planning of the operations  base  in  the event  of  a  mining  catastrophe is  the 
subject  of  a  special regulation  on  the  "principles  for  the  preparation  and  exe-
cution  of  rescue  operations"  (document  No.  52). VI,  42 
5.6  Continuous  cover  above  ground 
During  operations  of  the rescue  service  in  the  mine,  the  person  in  charge  of 
operations  below  ground  or  a  competent  responsible  person with  a  good  knowledge 
of  the workings  must  be  in  attendance permanently;  he  must  be  in  a  position  to 
give full  information  on  the  service  conditions  and  to make  the  following  arrange-
ments:  (allocation of  strength,  supply  of  equipment  and  transport  of  the  latter). 
This  does  not  apply  to works  do  not  jeopardize the  safety of  the  mine  (e.g.  ex-
cavation work  in underground workings  with  no  air). 
5.7  Reports  after termination  of  the  rescue  operations 
Once  the  intervention of  the  rescue  service  is  completed,  the  mine  makes  a 
written report  to  the  Bergamt  and  to  the PCS,  on  the  prescribed  forms. 
6.  Accidents  due  to  the  carrying  of  breathing apparatus 
6.1  Any  accijent  occurring  to  a  rescuer wearing breathing apparatus  must,  irrespec-
tive of  the  consequences,  be  reported without  dely  to  the  Bergamt  and  to  the 
PCS  on  the  prescribed  form. 
6.2  As  far  as  the breathing  apparatus  involved  in  the  accident  is  concerned,  the 
oxygen  pressure must  be  noted  and  the  valve  of  the  oxygen bottle  clo~ed.  The  ap-
paratus  must  be  handed  to  the  PCS.  for  examination without  being  tampered with. VI,  43 
BELGIUM 
Extracts  from  the  Decree  of  the  Regent  dated 
25/9/1947,  modified  by  the  Royal  Decrees  dated 
10/8/1950,  24/3/1955,  13/4/1965  and  16/4/1967, 
Chapter  IV  "Initial aid  and  medical  attention 
to  the  injured  and  sick",  Section II  :  "Special 
regulations". 
Appendix III VI,  45 
Article  97  :  The  competent  Minister may  authorize  adjacent  mines  to establish  a  common 
depot  of breathing equipment  as  referred to in article 95  above. 
This  common  depot  must  satisfy the  following  conditions. 
(1)  The  depot  shall be  under  the  direction  of  a  head  of  service  responsible  to  a  super-
visory  committee,  and  also  to  the  Mines  Administration.  This  head  of  service must 
reside  in  the  immediate  vicinity of the depot,  ensure  the  maintenance  of  the breathing 
equipment  and  organise practice drills provided  for  in  the  last  sub-paragraph  of  ar-
ticle 96  above.  He  will have  two  capable  advisers  to help him  in  this  task  and  to 
replace him  as  necessary;  these  latter shall also  live  in  the  immediate vicinity of  the 
depot.  The  head  of service  and  the  two  advisers  shall  take  turns  in being permanently 
at  the  depot.  All  three  must  be  able  to  drive  the motor  car referred to below. 
The  head  of service  of  the  depot will keep  a  special register  in which  he will  record 
each month  his  observations  on  the  condition  of  each  of  the  items  of  breathing equip-
ment,  and  on  the  quality  and  quantity  of  the  existing supplies  regarding  all aspects 
necessary  for  the  use  of  such  apparatus. 
(2)  The  personnel  of  the  depot  shall also  include  18  professional  rescuers  recruited ex-
clusively  from  the  supervisors  or qualified workers  ot  the workings  in  the  area. 
These  rescuers  shall  live  in  the  neighbourhood  of  the  depot  and will be  divided  into 
three  groups,  each  including  three  teams  of  two  men.  Each  group  in  turn will be  on 
duty  at  the  depot  for  two  consecutive weeks:  during this  time  the  rescuers  of  the 
other  groups  will work  in  the  mine. 
On  each  shift,  one  of  the  teams  of  the  group  on  duty will be  permanently  at  the  depot; 
during  this  period,  the  team  in question will be  trained  in  the  use  of  the  breathing 
equipment  under  the  direction  of  the head  of  service  or  one  of  the  advisers  referred 
to  above,  and  will help with  the  instruction  and  training of  the  guide-rescuers  men-
tioned below. 
(3)  The  personnel  at  each working site shall  include  at  least  three  guiderescuers;  one 
of  the  latter will be  present  at  the workings  of  each  shift. 
These  individuals,  who  are  intended  to  serve  as  guides  to  the  rescuers  coming  to 
the  depot  in  the  event  of  a  disaster,  must  have  a  perfect  knowledge  of  the  topography 
of  all  the workings;  they will be  selected  from  the  general  supervisory staff. 
At  least  four  times  a  year  they will  undergo  training at  the  depot  in  the wearing  of 
the  breathing apparatus,  after receiving full  instruction  concerning its use. 
(4)  The  number  of  items  of breathing  apparatus will  be  1  for every  200  workers  occupied 
simultaneously  in  the  underground workings  of  the  grouped mines,  subject  to  this 
number  not  being  less  than  10  or more  than  20. 
However,  the  depot  shall  also  include  a  sufficient number  of  a  spare  items  of  breathing 
equipment  for  the  purpose  of instructing  and  training rescuers. 
(5)  A motor  car shall be  kept  permanently  at  the  depot  in  running  order,  and  containing 
ten  items  of  breathing  apparatus  in perfect working  order. 
(6)  The  depot  shall be  connected  to  all  the workings  by  telephone  and  arrangements will 
be  made  for  communications  to  be  received  at  any  time,  either by  day  or by  night. 
This  decree  leaves  those  concerned,  through  the  medium  of  a  ministerial  author-
ity,  the  choice  between  the  organisation  of  rescue  operations  at  local  level  or  regional 
leve  1. 
All  collieries  in  the  South  basin which  were  already  grouped  together previous-
ly  and  had  created  central  rescue  stations,  have  merely  needed  to  adapt  themselves  to  the 
new  regulations  of  the  decree. 
The  collieries  in  the  Campine  basin have  each  preferred to  reorganise  their  own 
rescue  station,  in  accordance with  the  conditions  laid down  by  the  decree  dated  25/9/1947. 
However,  at  the  beginning  of  1957,  the  7  collieries  in  the  Campine  basin  also  created  a 
"Centre  for  rescue  coordination",  for  the  purpose  of: VI,  46 
(1)  co-ordinating mutual  aid between  the existing rescue  brigades  in  the  collieries; 
{2)  contributing  to  the  selection  and  improvement  of  the advisers  and  rescue  team  leaders; 
(3)  keeping  abreast  of  each  incident  and  method  of operation,  with  a  view  to  acquiring  the 
essential necessary experience  as  soon  as  possible; 
(4)  obtaining  recognition  for  the  principles  that  in  the  event  of  rescue  operations  the 
Centre  for  co-ordination  should have  something  to  say  in this  connection; 
(5)  organising at  the  Centre,  during  certain periods,  drills with  the  rescue  squads  of 
the  collieries; 
(6)  giving  favourable  consideration  to  co-ordinating efforts by  regular  and  periodical 
contacts with  local  squads; 
(7)  constituting  and  maintaining  the  central  equipment  depot  fully  up  to date; 
(8)  analysing  samples  in  the  laboratory  and  training  chemists;  studying,  collating  any 
documentation  and  effecting researchts. 
(9)  organising  a  research office,  to  collate documentation  and  undertake  researches  on 
everything  connected with  rescue  operations. 
Very  recently  a  "Belgian national  centre  for  rescue  operations  in mines"  with 
headquarters  at  Charleroi has  been  created,  for  the  purpose  of  : 
(1)  effecting  any  studies  and  researches  and  carrying out  any  tests  connected with mining 
rescue  operations  and  the  prevention  of disasters, participating in  such  activities, 
promoting  and  circulating the  results  thereof; 
(2)  co-ordinating the  activities  of  the  various  Belgian mining  rescue  centres,  at  ~ech­
nical  and  medical  level,  and  organising relations with  the  administrations,  insti-
tutions  and  public or private bodies  needing  to  collaborate  in the  event  of  disaster; 
(3)  giving active help  in the  case  of  a  disaster; 
(4)  acquiring  and  supplying all services  and  provisions,  purchasing,  selling transferring, 
hiring or letting all personal  or  real estate,  in  conjunction with  the  body  concerned; 
(S)  representing all the  Belgian mining  rescue  centres  on  all regional  authorities  and 
institutions, whether national  or international,  and  of  collaborating with  them. VI,  47 
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Organisation  of  rescue  operations  in mines  of  solid mineral  fuel 
Decree  dated  14  April  1965 
(art.  320  to  322  of  the  R.G.) 
The  Minister for  Industry, 
In  consideration  of  decree  No.  56-838  on  the Mining  Code,  and  particularly 
article  88  thereof, 
In  consideration  or  decree  No.  51-508  dated  4  May  1951  bearing on  the  general 
regulation  on  the  operation  of  solid mineral  fuel  mines  and  particularly articles  320  to 
322  thereof, 
In  consideration  of  the decree  dated  29  May  192Y,  modified by  decree  dated 
19  August  1936, 
In  consideration  of  the decision  of  the  General  Council  for  Mines, 
At  the  proposal  of  the  Director of  Mines, 
DECREE 
Article  1  :  The  purpose  of  this  decree  is  to  : 
1.  Define  the  general  conditions  for  the  organisation  of  rescue  stations  referred to in 
article  321  of  the  decree  dated  4  May  1951  above-mentioned; 
2.  To  prescribe  the  installation of  rescue  centres  in  the  most  important basins,  to  fix 
the  area  and  conditions  of  operation  in  liaison with  the  rescue  stations  of  the 
workings. 
Article  2  :  Each  rescue  station  administered by  workings  occupying  more  than  one  hundred 
workmen  on  the  largest shift must  have  at  least 
(i)  six portable breathing  apparatuses  if the  number  of workmen  on  the  largest  shift  is 
is not  more  than  1200,  twelve  apparatuses  if the  number  is more  than  1200; 
(ii)  carbon  monoxide  detectors  capable  of  detecting  a  proportion  of  5/100000  of  this  gas, 
two  if the  number  of workmen  on  the  largest shift  is not  more  than  1200,  three if 
the  number  is more  than  1200; 
(iii)  one  revival  apparatus  for artificial respiration  and  oxygen  inhaling; 
(iv)  a  portable  telephone  line  at  least  lOOm  in  length with  two  telephones.  If the 
workings  to be  served  include  gaseous  areas,  the  telephone  line must  have  qualities 
of mechanical  strength  and  insulation,  and  the  apparatus  must  be  of  unquestionable 
reliability,  in  the  terms  of  article  23  of  decree  No.  30  dated  October,  1961,  re-
lating to  the  acceptance  of electrical equipment,  flame  safety  lamps  and  liquid  fuel 
locomotives  in  respect  of security  against  fire-damp. 
Article  3  :  The  apparatus  referred  to  in article 2,  its accessories  and  supplies,  must 
be  kept  on  the surface  in  premises  near  the pits,  dry,  well-ventilated,  sheltered  from 
dust  and  in  the  charge  of  a  specifically designated  employee.  However,  the  revival  appa-
ratus  can  be  kept  in premises  underground where  it is protected  from  deterioration. 
The  nearest  lamp-room  to  the  rescue  station must  always  be  in  a  position  to  supply  the 
rescuers  with electric  lamps  and  flame  safety  lamps  in sufficient number. VI,  50 
Article  4  :  The  rescuers  shall be  selected  from  workmen  or  employees  with  a  good  know-
ledge  of the  structure of  the workings,  and  familiar with  the  use  of  the  apparatus  from 
repeated methodical drills. 
They  must  undergo,  before  acceptance,  and  then  once  a  year  and  after any  illness  or in-
jury causing  temporary  incapacity of more  then  two  months,  a  thorough  medical  examination 
for  the  purpose  of  checking  that  they  possess  the suitable physical qualities. 
Article  5  :  The  number  of  rescuers  must  be  at  least double  the  minimum  number  of portable 
breathing  apparatuses  required by  article  2.  They  shall be  distributed,  as  far  as  possible, 
in  equal number  between  the  various  working  shifts,  They  must  live  as  near  as  possible to 
the  rescue station.  Their  names  and  addresses  shall be  contained  in  a  special register 
kept  constantly  up  to date. 
Article  6  :  The  team  leaders  and  at  leasr half of  the  other rescuers  must  be  familiar 
with  the  first aid  to be  given  to  the  accident  victims.  The  team  leaders  must  be  instruc-
ted  in  the  properties  and  actions  of  the harmful  or  inflammable  gases  and  in  the measures 
to be  taken  to  rescue  personnel  and  restore  the  structures.  They  must  also  be  practised 
in  the  reading  of  mine  plans. 
Article  7  :  At  least  a  quarter of  the  engineers  and  superintendents  attached directly to 
the  underground workings  must  receive  special  training to  be  in  a  position to  take  over 
the  direction of  a  rescue  team.  They  must  undergo  the  medical  examinations  provided  for  in 
article 4  above. 
Article  8  An  instruction  approved  by  the  Chief Engineer  of  Mines  determines  : 
(i)  the  conditions  of siting,  installation,  functioning  and  guarding  of  the depots; 
(ii)  the  measures  to  be  taken  for  the  conservation,  maintenance,  testing  and  use  of  the 
apparatus; 
(iii)  the nature  and  frequency  of  the drills  to be  gone  through  by  the  team  leaders  and 
the  rescuers  attached  to  the  station,  as  well  as  by  the  engineers  and  superintendents 
of  the workings  subject  to  a  special  training by virtue of  article  7; 
(iv)  the  conditions  in which  the  rescue  teams  are  engaged,  and  the  essential principles 
to be  observed  in  conducting  the  operations. 
Article  9  :  By  derogation  from  article 2  above,  the  Chief Engineer  of  Mines  may  authorise 
the  grouping of several workings  for  the  creation  of  a  common  rescue  station,  provided  that 
these workings  are  situated in  such  a  way  that  the  transport  of  the  rescuers  and  apparatus 
from  the  rescue  station  to  any  one  of  the workings  served  by  this  station  can  be  effected 
under sufficiently rapid  conditions.  The  number  of  items  of  apparatus  at  the  common  rescue 
station shall be  at  least  twelve. 
The  number  of  rescuers  per workings  attached  to  a  common  rescue  station must  be  equivalent 
to  that which  would  have  been  fixed  by virtue  of  the  application of  articles  2  and  5, if 
there were  no  common  rescue  station. 
All  the  other  conditions  of  articles  2  to  8  are  applicable  to  common  ~escue stations.  The 
instruction  referred to  in article  8  must  fix  the  means  of  transport  for  the  apparatus 
and  rescuers  in the  event  of  a  disaster. 
Article  10 
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The  coal mines  in  the basins  listed below  are  required  to  instal  a  rescue 
the  Nord  Basin  and  the Pas-de-Calais 
the Lorraine Basin 
the  Blanzy  Basin 
the  Loire  Basin 
the  Cevennes  Basin 
the  Provence  Basin VI,  51 
The  area covered by  the  central stations  corresponds  to  the  geographical  coverage  of  the 
coal  mines  in  the basin. 
Article  11  :  The  number  of breathing apparatuses  at  a  rescue  centre must  be  not  less  than 
one  for  a  thousand workmen  occupied  underground  at  the  affiliated workings.  However,  no 
rescue  centre  may  possess  less  than  twelve  apparatuses  and  need not  possess  more  than 
twenty.  Each  rescue  centre must  also possess  carbon monoxide  detectors,  apparatus  for 
artifical respiration,  telephone  lines  and  equipment  in sufficient number  and  not  less 
than  the numbers  fixed  in article 2. 
Article  12  :  The  rescue  centre shall be  placed  under  the  immediate  direction of  an  engi-
neer familiar with  the use  of  the  equipment.  He  must  have  at his  disposal  rescuers  pro-
perly drilled  and  familiar with  the  use  of all the  rescue  apparatus  used  in the  affiliated 
mines. 
The  number  of  rescuers  of  the  centre must  be  at  least  18.  Unless  a  permanent  staffing of 
rescuers  is  organised at  the  centre to permit  its intervention with  the  least delay,  the 
rescuers  must  live  as  near  as  possible to  the  centre;  their names  and  addresses  must  be 
contained in  a  special register. 
The  conditions  of  article  4,  sub-para.  2,  and  those  of  article 6  apply  to  the  centres. 
Article  13  :  A regulation,  approved  by  the Chief Engineer  of Mines,  fixes  the  conditions 
of  installation and  functioning  of  the  rescue  centre,  particularly 
(i)  conservation,  maintenance,  tests,  use  of  apparatus; 
(ii)  supply  to  the  rescuers  of  individual  lamps,  flame  lamps  and  gas-verifiers  as 
necessary; 
(iii)  training of  the  rescuers; 
(iv)  liaison with  affiliated workings,  alerting devices,  transport  of  rescuers  and 
equipment. 
Article  14  :  The  conditions  of  this  decree will  come  into force within  a  period of  one 
year with effect  from its publication  in  the Official Journal.  However,  the  character of 
unquestionable  reliability of  the  telephonic  equipment  referred  to  in article  2 will not 
be  required until  a  period  of  two  years  has  elapsed.  Derogations  may  be  granted by  minis-
terial decree  by  decision of  the  General  Council  of Mines. 
Article  15  :  On  the date of  coming  into force  of this  decree,  the  previous  decree  dated 
29  May  1929  modified  by  decree  dated  19  August  1936, will be  abrogated,  together with  the 
ministerial  approvals  and  decisions  or derogations  taken  in application of  the  articles 
4,  5  or  13. 
Article  16  :  The  Director of Mines  is  responsible  for  the  execution  of this  decree,  wich 
will be  published in  the Official Journal  of  the  French  Republic. 
Paris,  14  April  1965. 
Minister  for  Industry, 
for  the Minister 
and  by  Delegation, 
Director of Mines, 
Signed:  DAUNESSE VI,  53 
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Organization of  the  rescue service 
(art.  320  to  322) 
DM/H  No.  259 
The  Minister for Industry  to  the  Chief Engineers  of Mines 
1.  The  organization of  the  rescue  operations  in mines  has  been  governed  so  far  by  the 
Decree  dated  29  May  1929,  modified  on  19  August  1936.  The  amendments  to  the  conditions 
of  the  general  regulations,  relating to  the  rescue  operations,  the  progress  made  in the 
design  of  the  apparatus,  the  development  of  the  ideas  and  methods  regarding equipment, 
training of  rescuers,  and  the  use  of  the  equipment,  have  made  it necessary  to  revise 
these  regulations. 
The  essential  conditions  of  the  Decree  of  1929-36  have  been  inserted in the  decree 
dated  4  May  1951  and  they  form  articles  320  to  323  which  refer,  as  regards  the  rules 
of  organisation,  training,  maintenance,  use,  to  a  ministerial decree.  In addition,  the 
installation of  centres  is no  longer  left to  the  sole  initiative of  the  operators,  but 
maybe  made  obligatory  in  important basins. 
The  corresponding  conditions  of  the  Decree  dated  27  January  1959  are much  less  severe 
and  leave  to  a  ministerial decree  the  question  of prescribing in  certain workings,  the 
establishing of  rescue  stations.  This  decree  has  therefore  implicity exempted  "other" 
mines  from  the  application of  the  Decree  of  1929-36.  For  these mines,  as  well  as  for 
fuel  mines  below  the  minimum  strength of  100  workmen  on  the  largest shift,  it will be 
left  to  you  to  propose  the  creation  of  rescue  stations  to  me,  where  applicable. 
The  scope  of  the  Decree  dated  14  April  1965  is  therefore  limited to  solid mineral  fuel 
mines  only.  It refers  at  the  same  time  to  the  conditions  of  article  321  and  those  of 
322  of  the  General  Regulations  for  the  application  of which  separate Decrees  were  laid 
down.  The  purpose  of  this  circular is  to  clarify certain of  these  conditions,  especial-
ly  those  which  differ  from  the  old  regulations. 
2.  The  term "workings"  shall be  taken  as  meaning  any  individual mine,  constituting an 
autonomous  unit,  or  any  group  of  mining  shafts,  shafts  for  the  descent  of  personnel  or 
equipment,  ventilation shafts  or shafts  for  placing filling materials,  forming  an  auton-
omous  unit.  The  structure  of  certain  adjacent  workings  may  be  too  complex  to  comply 
with either of  these  definitions.  It is  left  to  you,  taking into  account  the  extent  of 
the workings,  any  communications  between pits  existing below ground,  the situation  and 
number  of  the pits, etc.,  to distinguish  those  combinations  which  could  be  said  to 
constitute  a  separate working,  The  conditions  of  article  9  also afford  another means 
of  resolving  this  difficulty.  The  breathing  apparatus  must  be  of  modern  design,  robust 
and  light  in weight.  The  progress  achieved  in  their  construction makes  it possible  to 
guarantee,  in  the  case  of  recent  apparatus,  a  stay of  at  least  two  hours  in  an  unbreath-
able  atmosphere.  It is  recommended  that  the  apparatus  of  the  team  leaders  should be 
provided with  a  mask  or helmet  to  enable  them  to  give  the necessary orders,  and  that  a 
reflector strip  should  be  placed  on  all apparatus  so  that  the  rescuers  can  be  easily 
discerned. 
Each  rescue  station must  possess  2  or  3  carbon  monoxide  detectors.  These  detectors  are 
intended  for  the  rescue  teams  and  must  therefore  remain  at  their disposal.  The  detectors 
currently  used  by  the workings  for  supervising suspect working  sites must  not  be  those 
from  the  rescue station. 
Article  2  does  not  stipulate  any  m~n~mum number  of  individual  items  of  apparatus  for ef-
fective  protection against  carbon  monoxide,  to  be  supplied  to  each  rescue station in 
application of article  320  of  the  Decree  dated  4  May  1951.  In  actual  fact,  the  filtering 
apparatus  at  present  in  service is  unlikely  to  give  effective protection.  But  apparatus VI,  56 
with  a  reserve  of  oxygen which  can  be  used  in  any  atmosphere,  has  appeared  recently  on 
the market;  it would  be  desirable to use it to  gradually  replace  the  filtering  appara-
tus  at  the  rescue stations.  As  a  first stage,  you will make  sure that  each Basin  posses-
ses  a  minimum  of  25  apparatuses with  a  reserve  of  oxygen kept  in the  centre or distri-
buted between  the  rescue  stations  of  the workings. 
The  telephone  equipment  must  comply with  the  regulations  laid down  for  equipment  of 
intrinsic reliability.  It goes  without  saying  that  the  obligation  to have  conventional 
telephonic equipment  does  not  exclude  the  use  of other means  of  telecommunication, 
provided  that  they  give  equivalent  guarantees,  which  does  not yet  appear  to  be  the 
case. 
3.  The  storing in  the  underground  workings  of  revival  apparatus  may  be  advantageous  in 
bringing quicker  aid  to victims  of  accidents  not  justifying the  intervention of  the 
rescue  team  (e.g.  caving in).  However,  this  solution requires  the  existence  of  revival 
apparatus  at  each working,  if the  rescue  station serves  several workings  as  provided  for 
in article 9. 
4.  The  rescuers,  which  now  undergo  obligatory medical  examinations,  must  be  chosen  paying 
particular attention  to  the  following  criteria:  elimination of workmen  who  are  too  fat, 
have  cardiac or  pulmonary  complaints,  defective sight  or hearing,  or bad  dentition. 
It is difficult  to  require  that all rescuers  should have  a  perfect knowledge  of  the 
workings  and  should be  capable  of moving  around without  a  guide. 
In principle,  at  least  a  third of  the  rescuers  from  a  working  should  satisfy these 
conditions.  It is  therefore  advisable  to  choose  them  from  the  various  areas  of  the 
mine  and  to keep  them  informed  of  the  development  of  the works. 
The  delegated miners  complying with  the  conditions  fixed  in article  4  can  be  integrated 
into  the  teams  of  rescuers,  but  should  be  placed  under  the  orders  of  the  team  leaders 
during the  operations. 
5.  The  number  of  rescuers  shall be  at  least  twelve  for workings  employing  a  maximum  of 
1200  workmen,  and  at  least  twenty-four  for workings  with more  than  1200  workmen. 
This  number  is  justified by  the  need  to  form  teams  of  at  least  five  men,  including  one 
team leadert  to which  may  be  added  an  engineer  or  a  superintendent.  Experience  has 
shown  that  a  team  smaller in number  would  have difficulty in  looking  after ics  own 
safety  and  bringing  to  the  surface  a  rescuer  accidentally.incapacitated.  For  short-
distance  operations,  as  an  exception,  a  smaller number  of  rescuers  can  be  engaged,  pro-
vided  that  these  latter remain  in  contact by  sight  or other reliable means,  with  a 
emergency  team  ready  to  intervene. 
If it is not  alway  easy  to  allocate  the  rescuers  in equivalent numbers  between  the 
various working shifts,  there must  never  be  more  than  two  thirds  of  the  rescuers  below 
ground. 
The  lists of  rescuers  must  be  carefully kept  up  to  date,  and  completed  as  and  when 
departures  occur,  so  that  complete  teams  are  always  available. 
6.  The  minimum  number  of  rescuers  capable  of  rendering effective  aid  to  the  victims  of 
accidents  is  largely increased.  There  must  be  a  tendency  to  see  that  all rescuers  have 
undergone  first  aid  training. 
7.  It is desirable  for  the  greatest possible number  of  below  ground  engineers  and  super-
intendents  recognised  as  medically fit,  to be  able  to participate in  the  rescue work 
and  to  take over,  where  applicable,  the  direction of  a  team. 
8.  This  instruction fixing  the  conditions  of organisation  and  functioning  of  the  rescue 
stations of the workings  was  merely  sent  to  you.  In  future,  it will be  submitted  to 
you  for  approval,  and  you will be  able  to  make  thereto  any  amendments  which  you  consider 
necessary. VI,  57 
9.  The  rescue drills  should  be  effected  in  turn  at all the workings  covered by 
the  common  rescue  station. 
You  should  ensure,  in particular,  that  the  common  station has  available,  at 
any  time,  the means  of  transporting  the  personnel  and  equipment  to  the pit 
where  the disaster has  occurred,  without  delay. 
10.-11.-12.  Article  10  merely  confirms  a  statement  of  fact.  The  other basins  can  be 
exempt  from  the  obligation of  a  rescue  centre,  either by  reason  of  their les-
ser  importance,  or by  reason  of  the  extreme  concentration of  the works  or, 
conversely,  of  to great  a  dispersion of  the workings. 
What  has  been said  above  for  rescue  stations  and  workings  applies  to  the 
centres,  concerning which it is necessary  to stress particularly the  ar-
rangements  made  to alert  the  rescuers  and  convey  them  as  soon  as  ever pos-
sible  to  the workings  which  have  appealed  to  the  rescue  centre. 
If rescuers  are  in permanent  attendance  at  a  rescue  centre making  use  of 
rescuers  from workings,  the  numbers  from  the secondary  stations  should  be  suf-
ficient  to  ensure  that  any  functioning  of  the  latter is not  compromised  by 
the  absence  of  a  section of  the  rescue  personnel. 
In  certain cases,  the  rescue  centre  can  also play  the part  of  rescue  station 
for workings  immediately  adjacent.  In  this  case however,  the numbers  of  the 
rescuers  from  the  rescue  centre  and  the  number  of breathing apparatuses  must 
be  at  least equivalent  to  the  sum  of  the  corresponding minima  laid  down  for 
the  secondary  station  and  for  the  centre  in articles  2,  5,  11  and  12. 
13.-14.-15.  In  the future,  it will be  your  responsibility to  approve  the  regulations  for 
the  centres.  Article  15  of  the new  decree  abrogates  all decisions  or  approv-
als  given  in application of  articles  4  and  5  of  the  Decree  dated  1929-36. 
It will  therefore be necessary  to  proceed with  a  fresh  examination  of  these 
regulations  and  possibly  to  arrange  for  them  to  be  modified,  taking  into  ac-
count  the  alterations  occurring in  the  regulations  and,  subsequently,  to  ap-
prove  them. 
The  ministerial  decisions  which  have  permitted  the  grouping of  several workings 
in execution of  article 4  of  the  Decree  dated  29  November  1929, will be  abro-
gated  at  the  same  time  as  this  decree,  like  the  approvals  of  regulations  for 
centre stations  referred  to previously.  This  is  an  excellent  occasion  to  re-
view,  in its entirety,  the  organisation of  the  rescue  operations.  The  period 
of  one  year  laid  down  in article  14  of  the new  decree will make  it possible 
to  carry  out  this  study with all the  care it requires. 
The  material  in  articles  7  and  12  of  the  Decree  dated  1929-36 has  not  been 
included  in  the new  decree. 
The  conditions  of  article  7  lose  all justification by  virtue of  article  322 
of  the  decree  dated  4  May  1951,  the  execution  of which  is  assured  by  articles 
10  to  13  of  the new  decree.  The  general  conditions  of  articles  77  and  140  of 
the Mining  Code,  and  of  article 10,  last sub-para.  of  the  Decree  dated 
14  January  1909,  completed  by  the delegations  explained  in articles  8  to  13 
of  the new  decree,  give sufficient expression  to  the mission which  article  12 
of  the  decree  1929-36  sets  out  to define. 
For  the Minister 
and  by  Delegation, 
Director of Mines 
Signed  :  DAllliESSE VI,  59 
NETHERLANDS 
Requirements  to be  met  by  the  rescue  service 
(Instructions  dated  29/2/1968  of  the  General 
Inspector for  Mines) 
Appendix  VI VI,  61 
Article  1 
1.  To  be  a  member  of  the  rescue  service, it is necessary  : 
(a)  to  have worked  below  ground  for  at  least  two  years; 
(b)  to have  been  passed  as  medically suitable; 
(c)  to have  taken part  in  theoretical  training  and  in  a  sufficient number  of drills 
in  a  smoke-filled encolusre. 
2.  The  members  of  the  rescue  service must  undergo  a  suitability medical  examination each 
year. 
Article  2 
1.  Each  trained rescuer muse  take  part  each  year  in  5  drills at  least,  2  of  these being 
in  the  smoke  chamber  and  2  below  ground. 
2.  Every  year  an  alert drill must  be  organised,  and  it is  obligatory for  the  department 
for  the  control  of  mines  to be  immediately  informed.  In  calculating the  number  of 
drills,  this  alert drill is equivalent  to  a  drill below  ground  for all those  concerned. 
3.  If it is  found  that  a  rescue  team  is insufficiently drilled,  the  General  Inspector of 
Mines  may  order  temporary  participation of  the  members  of  this  team in more  frequent 
drills  than provided  for  in  the  first  sub-para. 
Article  3 
1.  The  number  of  items  of  rescue  apparatus  must  be  at  least  : 
10  units  if the shift below  ground  has  a  maximum  strength  of  less  than  700  workmen; 
15  units  if the shift below  ground has  a  maximum  strength of  700  workmen  or more. 
2.  Taking  into  account  the  extent  of  the  underground  workings  and  the  dangerous  character 
of  the  mine  due  to  the  presence  of  gas  or  coal dust,  the  General  Inspector  of Mines  may 
stipulate  a  greater number  of  items  of  apparatus  than  that  laid down  in  the  first  sub-
paragraph. 
3.  Failing written authority previously  granted by  the  General  Inspector  of Mines,  it is 
forbidden  to  make  any  radical alteration to  the  safety apparatus,  to  the extent  of 
changing its functioning. 
Article  4 
The  number  of  rescuers  must  be  at  least  three  times  that  of  the  number  of  items 
of  rescue  apparatus  required. 
Article  5 
The  direction  of  the  rescue  operations  must  be  entrusted  to  an  employee  special-
ly  appointed  for  that  purpose,  who  must  be  given  an  instruction  approved  by  the  General 
Inspector  of  Mines. 
Article  6 
The  direction  of  the  rescue  service must  be  entrusted  to  an  employee  specially 
appointed  for  that  purpose,  who  must  be  given  an  instruction  approved  by  the  General 
Inspector  of Mines. 
Article  7 
1.  In  addition  to  the number  of  rescue  apparatuses  required by  article  3,  the  following 
must  be  available  at  the  rescue  station or at  another suitable point 
(a)  a  sufficient number  of  spare  parts  for  the  rescue  apparatus; 
(b)  one  or more  large bottles  of  oxygen,  equipped  as  necessary with  a  reduction  valve, 
for  filling the  oxygen  bottles  of  the  apparatus; 
(c)  for  each  item of  rescue  apparatus,  a  full  oxygen bottle  and  4  alkali  cartridges; VI,  62 
(d)  thermometers,  CO  detectors,  stretchers,  oxygen  breathing  apparatus,  and  auto-saving 
apparatus; 
(e)  a  number  of masks  similar to that  of  the  rescuers; 
(f)  the ventilation plan  of  the  mine. 
2.  The  oxygen  used  for  the  rescue  apparatus  must  have  a  degree  of purity  of  at  least  99.2, 
certified by  chemical  analysis  carried out  at  the  request  of  the  undertaking. 
Article  8 
The  rescue  procedure  referred  to  in article  279,  third sub-para.  of  the  mining 
regulation  of  1964,  must  give  the  following  at  least  : 
(a)  the  number  of workmen  below  ground  and  the strength of  the  shift with  the  most  work-
men; 
(b)  the  names  of  the  head  of  the  rescue  service  and  of  the  rescue  team  leader,  as  well  as 
those  of their replacements  and  of  the  supervisor of  the  rescue  station; 
(c)  the number  of  rescuers  and  the  number  of persons  suitable  for  carrying  out  the 
functions  of  team  leader; 
(d)  the  means  of  checking  the  presence  of  the  rescuers  at  the  mine; 
(e)  the  number,  nature,  date  and  duration  of the drills; 
(f)  the nature  and  number  of  items  of  rescue  apparatus; 
(g)  the  inventory  of  the  rescue  station; 
(h)  the  instruction  intended  for  the  head  of  the  rescue  organization; 
(i)  the  instruction intended  for  the  rescue  team  leader; 
(j)  the  method  of warning  the  rescuers  and,  if necessary,  transporting  them  to  the 
mines. VI,  63 
UNITED  KINGDOM 
Decree  concerning  coal mines  and  other 
mines  (fire  and  rescue)  dated  1956, 
appendix  1,  part  IV  :  Rescue  operations 
Appendix  VII VI,  65 
PART  IV 
Rescue 
Central  rescue  stations 
12.  (1)  It shall be  the  duty  of  the  owner  of every mine 
(a)  to provide,  maintain  and  conduct,  in  accordance with  the  following  prov~s~ons 
of  this Part of  these  Regulations,  a  central  rescue  station  to provide 
facilities  for  the  conduct  of  operations  for  rescue  and  other necessary work 
at  that mine  after  an  explosion  or  a  fire,  or in  an  atmosphere which  is  or 
may  be  irrespirable thereat,  or 
(b)  to make  arrangements  to  ensure  that  there  are  available  to  that mine  such 
facilities provided  by  a  central  rescue  station so maintained  and  conducted, 
being  a  station situate within  15  miles  of  the  entrance  to  the  mine  or such 
greater distance not  exceeding  20  miles  as  an  inspector may  authorise by 
notice  served  on  the  owner. 
(2)  An  inspector may  by  notice  served  on  the  owner  of  a  mine  exempt  him  from  the 
precedingprovisionsof this  regulation with  respect  to  that mine; 
(a)  if the inspector is satisfied that  there  are  in  force  effective  arrangements 
for  the  conduct  of  operations  for  rescue  at  that mine  independently of  a 
central  rescue  station,  or 
(b)  if the  mine  is situate more  than  15  miles  from  such  a  central  rescue  station 
then existing  and  the  inspector is  satisfied that it would  be  unreasonable 
that  the  owner  should  be  required  to provide  such  a  central  rescue  station 
or 
(c)  if the  inspecto! is satisfied that  the  owner  has  unsuccessfully made  reson-
able efforts to  conclude  such  arrangements  as  are  referred  to  in sub-para.  (b) 
of  the  last preceding paragraph  and  that it would  be  unreasonable  that he 
should be  required  to  provide  such  a  central  rescue  station. 
(3)  The  owner  of every  mine  to which  paragraph  (1)  of  this  regulation  applies  shall 
ensure  that it is  in  telephonic  communication with  the  central  rescue  station 
the facilities  of which  are  available  to  that mine. 
(4)  Without  prejudice  to  the  generality of section  175  of  the Act,  to  an  authority 
or  exemption  given under  this  regulation,  there  may  be  attached  conditions 
requiring the  provision at  the mine  of  rescue  aquipment  other or in excess  of 
that specified in these  regulations. 
Superintendents  of  and  instructors  at  central  rescue  stations 
13.  (1)  Every  central  rescue  station shall be  under  the  immediate  control  of  a  competent 
superintendent being  a  person who  has  been  fully  trained  in  rescue work  and  who, 
unless  so  employed  before  1  January  1929,  has  had not  less  than  5  years  practical 
experience of work  below  ground  in  a  mine. 
(2)  There  shall be  employed  at  every  central  rescue  station instructors  competent  to 
train rescue workers. 
(3)  Arrangements  shall be  made  to  ensure  that  an  instructor is  present  at  and  appoint-
ed  to  take  charge  of  a  central  rescue  station at  any  time  when  the  superintendent 
is not  present  thereat. 
(4)  The  number  of  instructors  employed  at  a  central  rescue station at which  a  perma-
nent  rescue  corps  is maintained shall not  be  less  than  two,  and,  if the total 
number  of persons  employed  below  ground  at  the mines  to which  the  facilities  of 
that station are  available  exceeds  15  000,  shall not  be  less  than  three. VI,  66 
(5)  The  number  of  instructors  employed  at  a  central  rescue station at which  a  per-
menent  rescue  corps  is not maintained shall not  be  less  than  two,  and,  if the 
total number  of  rescue  brigades  required  by  these  regulations  is  to be  maintained 
at  the mines  to which  the  facilities  of that station  are  available  receeds  50, 
shall not  be  less  than  3,  and,  if the total number  of  such  rescue  brigades 
exceeds  100,  shall not  be  less  than  4. 
(6)  For  the  purpose  of  the  two  last preceding paragraphs,  a  superintendent  who 
~ndertakes the training of  rescue workers  may  be  included  as  an  instructor. 
Permanent  rescue  corps 
14.  (1)  At  any  central rescue  station where  a  permanent  rescue  corps  is maintained,  that 
corps  shall consist  of not  less  than  6  men  fully  trained  in  rescue  work,  exclusive 
of the  superintendent  and  of  the  person  appointed  to  take  charge  of  the  station 
when  the  superintendent  is  not  present  thereat. 
(2)  One  or more  members  of  the  corps  shall be  trained  to  act  as  captain thereof. 
(3)  The  members  of the  corps  shall be  continuously employed  at  and  in  residence  at 
the  central  rescue station. 
It is understood  that  an  inspector,  by  notice  served  on  the  superintendent  of  the 
station,  may  authorise members  of  the  corps  to  reside not  more  than half  a  mile  from 
the  station,  so  long  as  suitable means  of  summons  from  that  residence  to  the  station 
are provided. 
Rescue  workers  to act with  permanent  rescue  corps 
15.  (1)  It shall be  the  duty  of  the  manager  of every mine  at which  not  less  than  100 
persons  are  employed  below  ground,  and  to which  the  facilities  of  a  central 
rescue  station are  available,  being  a  station at which  a  permanent  rescue  corps 
is maintained,  to  appoint  men  who  are  employed  at  that mine  and  have  a  good 
general  knowledge  thereof,  and  who  have  been  fully  trained  in  rescue work  to 
co-operate with  the  corps  in work  and  practice  on  the  following  scale,  i.e.  : 
where  not more  than  500  persons  are  employed  below  ground  at  the mine,  not  less 
that  one  man; 
where  more  than  500  but not more  than  100  persons  are  so  employed,  not  less  than 
two  men; 
where  more  than  1000  but not more  than  1500  persons  are  so  employed,  not  less 
than  three men; 
where  more  than  1500  persons  are  so  employed,  not  less  than  four  men. 
(2)  The  manager  of every mine  to which  the  last preceding paragraph  applies  and  at 
which  more  than  one  such  man  has  been  appointed,  shall endeavour  to ensure  that 
at no  time  are  they both or all employed  below  ground  simultaneously otherwise 
than  in rescue work  or practice. 
Rescue  brigades 
16.  (1)  It shall be  the  duty  of  every mine  to which  the  facilities  of  a  central  rescue 
station are  available,  being  a  station at which  a  permanent  rescue  corps  is not 
maintained,  to  organise  and  maintain  rescue  brigades  on  the  following  scale  : 
where  not  more  than  500  persons  are ·employed  below  ground  at  the  mine,  not  less 
than  one  brigade; 
where  more  than  500  but not  more  than  2000  persons  are  so  employed,  not  less 
than  two  brigades; 
where  more  than  2000  persons  are  so  employed,  three brigades, 
provided  that  : VI,  67 
(a)  the  preceding prov1s1ons  of  this  paragraph  shall not  apply  in  respect  of  a 
mine  at which  less  than  100  persons  are  employed  below  ground  if arrangements 
are  in  force  whereby  a  brigade  from  another  mine  will  be  made  available 
promply  in case  of  need,  and 
(b)  mines  of which  the surface  entrances  to all  the  shafts  and  outlets  for  the 
time  being  in  use  lie within  a  circle having  a  radius  of  2  miles,  may  be 
treated together  as  one  mine  if the  managers  have  made  arrangements  there-
fore  and  served notice  thereof  on  the  inspector  for  the district; 
(2)  The  manager  of  every  mine  to which  this  regulation  applies  shall  appoint not  less 
than  5  men  fully  trained in  rescue work  and  employed  at  that  mine,  to  each bri-
gade,  and  shall  appoint  one  of  them  as  captain. 
(3)  The  manager  of  every mine  to which  this  regulation  applies  shall  endeavour  to 
ensure  that at  no  time  are: 
(a)  in  the  case  of  a  mine  at which  one  rescue  brigade  is maintained,  all the 
members  of  that brigade,  or 
(b)  in  the  case  of  a  mine  at which  more  than  one  rescue  brigade is maintained, 
members  of both  or all  the  brigades, 
employed  below  ground  simultaneously,  otherwise  than  in  rescue work  in practice. 
Communication with  rescue work 
17.  The  manager  of  every  mine  to which  either of  the  two  last  preceding  regulations  ap-
plies,  shall make  arrangements  for  summoning  every  person  appointed  thereunder  from 
his  residence  in  case  of  need. 
18.  In  any  prosecution  for  a  contravention  of  article 15  or  article 16  above,  it shall 
be  defence  to  prove  that  the  manager has  made  reasonable  efforts  to  induce  appropriate 
persons  to be  trained  in  rescue  work  and  that  the  failure  to  comply  fully was  due  to 
an  insufficiency of persons  able  and  willing to  acquire  the  requisite qualifications. 
Qualifications  of  rescue  work 
19.  No  person  shall be  selected for  training in  rescue work  with  a  view  to  appointment 
as  a  member  of  a  permanent  rescue  corps,  as  a  rescue worker  to  co-operate  at  a  mine 
with  such  a  corps  or  as  a  members  of  a  rescue  brigade  at  a  mine  unless  : 
(a)  he  is  certified by  a  registered medical practitioner after thorough  examination 
to  be  fit  to  undertake  rescue work  and  to  be  free  from  any  organic disease or 
weakness; 
(b)  he  has  had not  less  than  two  years  practical experience  of work  below  ground  in 
a  mine,  and 
(c)  he  is  the holder  of  a  certificate of proficiency in first  aid  granted  by  a 
society or body  approved  by  the Minister  for  the  purpose. 
20.  No  person  shall for  the  purpose  of  these  regulations,  be  deemed  to be  fully  trained 
in rescue work  unless  he  has  attended  one  or more  courses  of instruction  and  practiced 
therein at  a  central  rescue  station,  being  courses  complying with  a  scheme  approved 
by  the Minister,  and  has  been  certified by  the  superintendent  of  that station to be 
efficient and  able  to undertake  rescue work  with breathing  apparatus. 
21.  No  person  shall be  qualified to be  appointed  or  to be  a  member  of  a  permanent  rescue 
corps,  a  rescue worker  to  co-operate  at  a  mine  with  such  a  corps  or  a  member  of  a 
rescue  brigade  at  a  mine,  unless  he  has,  within  the  last preceding  12  months  : VI,  68 
(a)  been certified by  a  registered medical  practitioner after  thorough  examination, 
to be fit to undertake  rescue work  and  to be  free  from  any  organic disease  or 
weakness,  and 
(b)  attended  a  course  of instruction  and  practice in rescue work,  being  a  course 
including practices with breathing  apparatuses  in  a  hot  and  irrespirable  atmos-
phere  and  complying with  a  scheme  approved  by  the Minister  for  such  courses  for 
maintaining efficiency. 
Records  at central  rescue  stations 
22.  There  shall be kept at every  central stationta record  of  every  person  attending  a 
course  of  instruction and  practice in  rescue work  thereat,  including  the  date  and 
character of each practice  and  the  condition of  each man  after each practice,  and 
if anything  abnormal  is  observed  in  the  condition  of  any  man,  whether it is  consid-
ered  to be  due  to  any  defect  in any  apparatus  used  by  him. 
Equipment  at central  rescue stations 
23.  At  every  central  rescue station  there shall be  provided  and  maintained  in readiness 
for  immediate  use,  the  following  equipment  : 
(a)  twenty  sets  of breathing  apparatus  of  a  type  approved  by  the Minister,  ~ith means 
of supplying sufficient oxygen  or liquid air to enable  such  apparatus  to be  used 
for  48  hours,  and  means  of  charging  such  apparatus; 
(b)  four  rescue helmets  or other apparatus  serving  the  same  purpose,  of  a  type  ap-
proved by  the Minister,  with not  less  than  120  feet  of  tubing  for  each; 
(c)  four  sets of  reviving apparatus,  not being  apparatus  of  a  forced  breathing  type, 
each with  a  cylinder or  cylinders  capable  of  supplying not  less  than  20  cubic  feet 
of  oxygen; 
(d)  a  first  aid  box  of  a  type  approved  by  the Minister; 
(e)  20  electric safety-lamps  and  6  flame  safety-lamps; 
(f)  cages  of  small birds  for  testing  for  poisonous  gases; 
(g)  a  motor vehicle of  adequate  capacity; 
(h)  2  portable signalling devices  and 
(i)  means  for  training persons  to  test  for  inflammable  gas  with  a  flame  safety-lamp. 
Rescue  equipment  at mines 
24.  It shall be  the  duty  of  the  manager  of  every mine,  other  than  a  mine  at which  less 
than  one  hundred  persons  are  employed  below  ground,  to  secure  the provision  and  read-
iness  for  immediate  use  thereat,  of  the  following  equipment  : 
(a)  a  rescue helmet  or other apparatus  used  for  the  same  purpose,  of  a  type  approved 
by  the Minister,  with not  less  than  120  feet  of  tubing; 
(b)  reviving  apparatus  for  the  injured,  of  a  type  other  than  the  forced  breathing 
type,  with  a  cylinder or  cylinders  capable  of  supplying not  less  than  20  cubic 
feet  of  oxygen; 
(c)  one  electric safety-lamp  and  one  flame  safety-lamp  for  each  man  fully  trained in 
rescue work  and  employed  at that mine  and 
(d)  two  small birds  for  testing for poisonous  gases. VI,  69 
Breathing  apparatus 
25.  (1)  Subject  to  any  exemption  given  by  an  inspector by notice served  on  the  manager, 
breathing  apparatus  shall not  be  kept  at  any  mine  but  shall be  obtained  as 
required  for  rescue work  or  training thereat,  from  a  central  rescue  station. 
(2)  Every  item of breathing  apparatus  kept  at  a  central  rescue  station·,  or at  a  mine 
in pursuance  of  an  exemption  given  under  the  last  preceding paragraph,  shall be 
adjusted  and  tested  at  the  times  and  in  the  manner  specified in  the  first sched-
ule hereto,  snd  the  results  thereof shall be  recorded  in  accordanc~ with  those 
provisions. 
(3)  No  oxygen  cylinder shall be  used for recharging breathing apparatus  unless  a  part 
of  the  contents  has  been  analysed  and  found  to  contain not  less  than  90  % of 
oxygen.  A record  shall be kept  of  the  result  of  every  such  analysis. 
(4)  No  breathing  apparatus  shall be  used  below  ground  in  any  mine  unless,  directly 
before  use,  it has  been  tested  for  leakage  by  immersion  in  the  manner  specified 
in  the  first  schedule hereto  and  found  safe,  except 
(a)  upon  a  practice  in  air which  is not  irrespirable,  or 
(b)  in  a  case  in which  subjection  to  such  a  test would  prejudice  an  attempt  to 
save  life  and  the  apparatus  has  been  tested  immediately before  use  for  leak-
age  by  mouth  suction. 
(5)  Without  prejudice  to  the  operation  of  sections  116  and  117  of  the Act,  on  the 
occurrence  of  any  accident  or  incident  at  a  mine  likely to  require  the  use  of 
breathing apparatus,  the  manager  shall  inform,  by  the  quickest  means  available, 
the  inspector  for  the  district  and  the  person  for  the  time  being nominated  to 
receive notices  under  sub-para.  (1)  of  section  116  of  the Act. 
Signals  for  use  in  rescue work 
26.  In  rescue work  and  training for  these  operations,  the  signals  specifi~d in  the 
second  schedule  (1)  hereto  shall  alone  be  used  for  the purpose  specified  jn relation 
thereto. 
Accommodation  for  rescue workers  at mines 
27.  (1)  It shall  be  the  duty  of  the  manager  of  every  mine  to  secure  the  provision  on  the 
surface  thereat  of  a  suitable  room  with  sufficient  accommodation  for  any  persons 
who  may  be  engaged  in  rescue  work  or practice.  This  room  shall be  near  to  a  shaft 
or  outlet normally  used  by  persons  employed  below ground  at  the mine,  and  shall 
be  adequatly heated  and  lighted  and  kept  clean  and  properly maintained. 
Plans 
(2)  At  every  mine  at which  not  less  than  100  persons  are  employed  below  ground,  the 
room  in question,  if not  permanently  separated  from  accomodation  used  for  any 
other purpose,  shall be  so  arranged  that it can  readly be  so  separated.  The 
equipment  provided  in  pursuance  of  these  regulations  at  that  time  shall be  kept 
therein. 
(3)  The  manager  of  every  mine  shall appoint  a  responsible  person  to  be  in  charge  of 
the  room  provided  in  pursuance  of  this  regulation. 
28.  It shall be  the  duty  of  the  manager  of  every  mine  to keep  at  the  mine,  or at  such 
other place  as  may  be  approved  by  an  inspector,  a  sufficient number  of sets  of  plans 
of  the workings  of  the  mine,  in  a  form  suitable  for  use  by  rescue workers,  so  that 
at  any  time  there  are  plans  for  each part of  the  mine  showing  clearly  and  accurately 
(1)  Not  published in this  document. VI,  70 
up  to  a  date not more  than  three months  past,  the extent  of  the workings,  airways 
and  the direction of  the  air current  therein  and  all principle doors,  stoppings,  air 
crossings,  regulators  and  telephone stations,  by  means  of  the  signs  specified in the 
third schedule  (1)  hereto. 
Inspection of equipment,  etc. 
29.  It shall be  the  duty  of  the owner  of  every mine  to which  the  facilities  of  a  central 
rescue  station are  available,  to make  arrangements  for  the  inspection at  intervals 
not  exceeding six months  by  the  superintendent  of  the  station or  an  instructor 
nominated  by  him,  of  the  accommodation  and  equipment  provided  at  the station for 
rescue work  and  training.  Such  arrangements  shall ensure  that  on  any  such  inspection 
the  superintendent or his  nominee  shall be  accompanied  by  an  official of  the mine, 
and  that  any  defect or deficiency disclosed  thereby  is promptly  reported  to  the 
manager  of  the mine. 
Provisions  relating to  conduct  of  rescue work 
30.  (1)  It shall be  the  duty  of  the  manager  of  every  mine  to make  rules  allotting to 
competent  persons  the duties  to  be  performed  by  them  on  any  occasion  on  which 
rescue work  is  about  to  be  or is being  carried out  at  that mine. 
(2)  Such  rules  shall  include provisions  to  ensure  that  on  any  such  occasion,  at  any 
time when  the  manager  is not himself performing  those  functions,  a  competent 
person  is  in  charge  on  the  surface  to  ensure  that  : 
(a)  no  person  enters  any  shaft  or outlet  for  the  purpose  of  going  to  a  part  of 
the  mine  affected,  unless  he  is duly  authorised  to  do  so; 
(b)  the name  of  every  person  going  below ground  or  returning  above  ground  at  the 
mine  is  recorded  in writing; 
(c)  teams  of  rescue workers  are  organised  and,  where  such  a  team is not  a  perma-
nent  rescue  corps  or  a  rescue brigade,  a  captain  thereof  is  appointed; 
(d)  items  of breathing  apparatus  are  testP.d  in  accordance with  paragraph  4  of 
article  25,  and 
(e)  such  other steps  as  can be  taken  on  the  surface  to  regulate  and  facilitate 
the  rescue work  are  taken. 
31.  Whenever  rescue work  is  about  to be  or is  being  carried  on  in  any  mine,  no  person 
shall  go  below  ground  for  the  purpose  of  going  to  a  part of  the  mine  affected,  unless 
authorised  to  do  so. 
32.  (1)  Whenever  rescue  work  is  about  to be  or is being  carried  on  in  any  mine,  no  person 
shall be  authorised  to  go  below  ground  to  any  purpose which  may  involve  the  use 
of breathing apparatus,  unless  he  is  a  person  for  the  time  being qualified to be 
a  member  of  a  rescue  corps,  a  rescue worker  to  co-operate  at  a  mine  with  such  a 
corps,  or  a  member  of  a  rescue brigade  at  a  mine. 
(2)  On  any  such  occasion,  no  person shall be  permitted to  engage  in  a  second  or  sub-
sequent  spell of work  involving  the use  of breathing  apparatus,  unless  he  has 
been medically  examined  since  the  preceding  spell of work  and  is  found  fit  to 
undertake it. 
33.  (1)  Whenever  rescue work  is  to  be  carried out  in  a  mine  in  a  atmosphere which  is  or 
may  be  irrespirable,  there shall be  organised  as  soon  as  possible,  a  base  or 
bases  (hereinafter referred  to  as  a  "fresh air base")  in respirable air but  as 
near  to  the  places  in which  the work  has  to  be  carried out,  as  appears  safe. 
(1)  Not  puhZ.ished in this  doawnent. VI,  71 
(2)  Whenever  any  persons  are  engaged  in  rescue work  beyond  the  fresh  air base,  there 
shall be  stationed thereat,  so  far  as  is practicable; 
(a)  two  persons,  including  a  person  competent  to  test  and  maintain breathing  ap-
paratus  and  other  rescue  equipment,  and  a  person holding  a  certificate of 
proficiency in first aid  granted  by  a  society  or body  approved  by  the Minister 
for  the  purpose; 
(b)  a  team of  rescue workers  ready  for  immediate  service  and  equipped with 
breathing apparatus,  and 
(c)  a  set of  reviving  apparatus,  a  stretcher  and  a  cage  of birds. 
(3)  Telephonic  communication shall, if practicable,  be  established  and  maintained 
between  any  fresh  air base  and  the surface of  the  mine,  or  at  an  entrance  below 
ground  to  a  shaft  or outlet. 
34.  (1)  Whenever  rescue work  is to  be  carried out  in  a  mine,  no  team of  rescue workers 
shall  go  beyond  a  fresh  air base,  or where  an  appropriate  fresh  air base  has  not 
been  established,  shall  go  below  ground  unless  the  captain has  been  given  clear 
instructions where  the  team is  to  go  and what it is  to  attempt,  by  the  person  in 
charge  at  the fresh air base  or  on  the surface,  as  the  case  may  be,  and  if breath-
ing  apparatus  is  to  be  used,  has  assured himself  that  the  apparatus  in question 
has  been  tested  in  accordance with  paragraph  4  of  article  25. 
(2)  Unless  the  captain  of  such  a  team is personally  familiar with  the  route  to  be 
taken,  he  shall not  proceed without  a  plan  of  the  relevent part  of  the mine,  made 
in pursuance  of  article  28,  and  on  which  that  route  is  clearly marked. 
35.  (1)  It shall be  the  duty  of  the  captain of  any  rescue  team  engaged  in rescue work  in 
any  mine,  to  devote  himself  to  the  direction of  the  team  and  to  secure  its safety, 
and  accordingly he  shall not  engage  in manual work. 
(2)  Without  prejudice to  the  generaltiy  of  the  foregoing,  the  captain  of  a  team  so 
engaged  shall examine  the  state of  the  roof  and  sides  of  any  place  to  be  entered 
or passed  by  the  team,  and  he  shall not  permit  the  team to pass  any  place which 
appears  to  him  insecure or,  except where it is necessary  to  do  so  in  an  attempt 
to  save  life,  to pass  through  any  passage  less  than  two  feet high  and  three  feet 
wide. 
(3)  If visibility is  obscured  by  smoke,  the  captain of  a  rescue  team shall ensure  that 
a  life-line is  taken  in  from  the  fresh  air base  or  another place  at which  the  air 
is  respirable,  and  that no  member  of  t~e team moves  out  of  reach  of  that  line or, 
if that  is not practicable,  that  any  road  branching  from  a  route  is  fenced  off 
before  the  junction is passed. 
(4)  If visibility is not  obscured  by  smoke,  the  captain  of  a  rescue  team,  when  passing 
any  junction,  shall  see  that  the  route  is  clearly indicated by  means  of  arrows 
or other suitable marks. 
36.  The  captain  of  any  rescue  team which  is  to  use  breathing  apparatus  in  the  course  of 
any  rescue  work  at  any  mine,  shall make  sure  that  each  item of  such  apparatus  is 
working  properly  immediately before  the  team enters  an  atmosphere  which  is  or may  be 
irrespirable,  and  shall,  in  the  case  of  such  apparatus  in which  compressed  oxygen  is 
used,  read  the  pressure  of  oxygen  at  intervals not  exceeding  20  minutes. 
37.  Whenever  a  fire  is  being  dammed  off,  there shall be  kept  available  at  or near  the 
place,  two  sets  of breathing  apparatus  and  persons  qualified to  use  them under 
article  32,  or  two  smoke  helmets  and  persons  competent  to  use  them. VI,  73 
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HEADING  X,  CHAPTER  X 
"Rescue" 
Article  528 
Without  prejudice to  the  conditions  of article 539,  a  rescue  team must  be  formed 
in  any  mine  classified with  the presence  of  inflammable,  poisonous  or  otherwise harmful 
gases. 
Article  529 
The  men  making  up  the  rescue  team must  be  volunteers,  be between  24  and  50  years 
of  age,  recognised  as  physically fit by  medical  examination  repeated every year,  possess 
a  proven  cool  temperament,  and  be  particularly suited  to  carry  out  the  activities  inherent 
in  rescue  operations.  They  must  have  a  good  knowledge  of  the workings  below  ground. 
If the  volunteers  are  insufficient  in number,  the  manager  shall select  the  members 
of  the  team,  after seeking  advice  from  the  college  of  representatives  for  safety. 
The  workmen  belonging  to  the  rescue  teams  must  take  part  in  rescue  operations 
and  drills. 
A head  of  service is  placed  in charge  of  the  team,  ani  a  suitable person  appointed 
to  replace  him  in his  absence. 
Article 530 
It must  be  possible to  advise  the members  of  the  rescue  team easily,  and  they 
should  preferably  live near  the  mine. 
If this  is not  possible,  the  management  of  the  mine  must  have  suitable means  for 
calling the members  of  the  team  together  rapidly. 
Article  531 
The  minimum  number  of  members  of  a  rescue  team  is  one  for. every  25  workmen  allo-
cated  to  the workings  below  ground  on  the  largest shift,  and  must  not  be  less  than  5  in 
any  circumstances. 
The  number  of senior officials allocated  to  the  rescue  operations  must  be  at  least 
two. 
Article  532 
The  management  must  keep  up  to date  the  list of  the  members  of  the  rescue  team, 
and  post it above  ground  in  a  clearly visible position frequented  by  the workmen. 
Article 533 
The  members  of  the  rescue  team must  be  suitably allocated between  the  three 
shifts. 
Rescue  stations 
Article 534 
In the mines,  whether  individual  or  grouped,  referred  to  in article 528  and  539, 
suitable premises  must  be  provided  for  storing  and  maintaining  the  equipment  for  the  rescue 
team,  complying with  the essential  conditions  required  for  their use. VI,  76 
These  premises,  which  may  not  be  used  for  any  other purpose,  must  be  protected 
against  fire  and  situated near  the outlet  to  the  surface  of  the  route which  the workmen 
normally  take when  going below  ground  and  returning. 
Article  535 
The  following  should be  constantly maintained  in  a  perfect state of  maintenance 
and  functioning  in  the  premises  allocated to  the  rescue  team 
(a)  autoprotecting breathing apparatus  able  to  function  autonomously  for  at  least  one 
hour,  and  at  least equivalent  in number  to  the  strength of  the  rescue  team; 
(b)  apparatus  for  artificial respiration; 
(c)  masks  with  a  filter against harmful  gases  which  may  be  encountered,  in number  at 
least double  that  of  the strength of  the  team; 
(d)  electric safety  lamps,  in number  at  least  equivalent  to  the  strength of  the  team, 
increased by  50  % if there  is no  lamp  room,  as  well  as  fire-damp  lamps  and  signalling 
apparatus,  at  least  one  unit  for  each  gas  known  to be  present or  suspected,  and  for 
each  group  allocated; 
(e)  tarpaulins  and  flexible  hoses  for  emergency barriers,  and  for  activating ventilation 
circuits; 
(f)  tools,  ropes  and  anything which  may  be  necessary  for  the  rescue  operations; 
(g)  fire-proof  protective  clothing. 
The  breathing  apparatus  and  masks  must  have  a  sufficient stock of  parts  for  the 
consumable  elements. 
When  the  number  of  items  of  apparatus  and  rescue  appliance  is not  clearly stated 
in this  regulation,  it is- the  responsibility of  the  chief engineer  to  lay  this  down  in  an 
instruction,  after consulting with  the  manager  and  taking  into  account  the  characteristics 
of the  mine. 
The  rescue  appliances  and  apparatus  referred  to  in (a),  (b),  (c),  and  (e)  must  be 
of  approved  type. 
Once  a  year,  on  the initiative of  the Mining  District it is necessary  to  carry 
out  a  check of  the  rescue  appliances  and  apparatus,  verifying their number  and  condition 
of maintenance. 
The  maintenance  of  the  autoprotecting  apparatus  must  be  carried out  by  a  work-
men  specially appointed  for  this  purpose. 
Article  536 
The  members  of  the  rescue  team must  be  instructed  in the  functioning  of  the 
breathing equipment  and  instruments  for  checking  the  atmosphere  below  ground,  and  trained 
to  carry out,  while  transporting  the  apparatus  on  their backs,any operations  likely  to 
become  necessary  in a  mine  in  the  event  of  accident. 
Article  537 
The  members  of  the  rescue  team must  complete  periods  of  instruction  and  training 
at  the places  and  in accordance with  the  methods  indicated by  the manager. 
The  rescue  teams  must  undergo  drills below  ground  at  least  once  a  month.  The 
drills carried out,  the names  of  the  persons  taking part  and  the  findings  thereof,  must 
be noted  in  a  special register,  with  the  date  and  signature of  the head  of service  in 
charge  of  the  rescue  team. VI,  77 
Testing of  apparatus 
Article  538 
The  functioning  of  the  autoprotecting breathing  apparatus  and  other  rescue 
apparatus  and  clothing must  be  checked,  on  the  initiative of  the  management,  at  least 
once  a  month.  The  results  are  recorded  in  the  register. 
Association  between  adjacent  mines 
Article  539 
The  operators  of mines  employing  less  than  100  below  ground workers  on  the 
largest shift  can  be  authorised,  by  a  decision  of  the  chief engineer,  to  associate  them-
selves with  those  of  adjacent  mines,  with  a  view  to  forming  a  common  rescue  team. 
The  instructions  relating to  the  instruction and  drills of  the members  of  the 
common  team must  be  approved  by  the  chief engineer. 
Central  rescue  station 
Article  540 
For  the mines  referred to  in  the  previous  article,  the  Minister  for  Industry 
and  Commerce  may,  at  the  proposal  of  the  chief engineer,  prescribe  the  creation  of  a 
common  central  rescue  station. 
Rescue  operations 
Article  541 
If,  at  the  time  it is  required  to  go  into action,  the  effectiveness  of  the 
rescue  team is  shown  to be  indequate,  the  manager  shall  request  the  intervention  of  teams 
from  other mines. 
The  managers  to whom  this  request  is  addressed,  must  place  their rescue  teams 
at  the  disposal  of  the  person  making  the  request. 
HEADING  XVI,  Article  656  - 658 
"Rescue  operations" 
Article  656 
In mines  or quarries,  the  rescue  operations  and  work  necessary  to counteract 
imminent  danger  must  be  carried out  on  the  initiative of  the manager. 
In  the  event  of  serious  accident,  the  managers  of  the  adjacent  mines  or quarries 
shall  be  required  to  supply  the means  and  personnel  at  their disposal  and,  in  case  of need, 
to  take  the  necessary measures  within  the  sphere  of their respective  mines  or quarries, 
subject  to  their right  to equitable  reimbursement.  The  operations  referres  to  in the 
preceding  sub-paragraphs  shall be  carried  out  under  the  supervision  and  with  the  approval 
of  the  chief engineer,  or  a  subordinate  appointed by  him,  wpen  they  are  present. 
Article  657 
In  the  cases  referred to  in  the  previous  article,  the  mayor  of  the  parish  and 
the  public safety  authority shall take  the  essential measures  within  their competence,  in 
agreement with  the  engineer  and  with  the  specialist  of  the Mines  Authority until  the 
arrival  of  these  latter,  after having  sought  the  opinion  of  the management  of  the mine 
or quarry where  the  activities mentioned  in the  previous  article are  taking place. VI,  78 
Article  658 
The  costs  resulting  from  the  immediate  aid  given  to  the  victims  of  accidents  ~," 
and  from  the  execution  of  the  rescue work,  also  payments  against  requisition of  equipment, 
motor  cars  and  other emergency  means,  shall be  the  responsibility of  the  operator  of  the 
mine  or quarry. 
The  accounts  relating thereto  shall be  passed  forward  for  payment  by  the  prefect, 
at  the  proposal  of  the  chief  engineer,  after audition  of  those  concerned,  and  subsequently 
forwarded  for  collection  of  direct  taxation  for  recovery by  the  preferential  tax procedure. EIGTH  REPORT 
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Introduction 
I.  This,  the  8th  report  on  the  organisation  of  the mines  rescue  services  in  the 
countries  of  the  European  Community  and  the  United Kingdom  for  the  1969  and  1970, 
shows  how  just  as  in  the earlier reporting periods  the  rise in  the  total number  of 
rescue  stations  and  trained personnel  is  closely related  to  the  demands  made  by  tech-
nical developments.  These  developments  are necessarily  aimed  at  increased  concentra-
tion  of workings  and  ever production units. 
As  of  31  December  1970,  the number  of  rescue  stations fell  from  203  in  1968  to  187, 
and  the personnel  decreased  from  11  198  in  1968  to  10  084.  The  total number  of  rescue 
personnel,  per  1  000  men  employed  underground,  has  risen slightly  from  20.5  in  1968 
to 21.1. 
II.  1.  Within  the  programme  of visits  to mines  rescue  head-quarters,  which  included Essen, 
Nottingham  and  Mansfield  (East  Midlands  Division),  Lens  (Nord/Pas-de-Calais), 
Friedrichsthal  (Saar)  and  Merlebach  (Lorraine),  a  visit was  made  to  the  mine  rescue 
headquarters  in Seruci  (Sulcis  Division). 
The working party for  "Mines  Rescue  Service  and  Mine  fires" was  thus  able  to obtain 
first-hand  information  on  the safety equipment  and  rescue  facilities,  and  also  fire 
precautions  and  firefighting  arrangements  at  Seruci  colliery.  The  workings  here  are 
extensively mechanised  and  electrified. 
2.  The  "Mines  Rescue  service  and  mine  fires"  Working  party was  able  to  complete  some 
of  the  tasks  assigned  to the  experts  and  listed in the Fifth  and  Seventh  Reports 
on  organisation of  the mine  rescue  service. 
Although  this  aspect  of  the work will be described  in the  annual  reports  of  the 
Mines  Safety  and  Heath  Commission,  (1)  some  particular items  are worthy  of mention, 
published under  the titles  listed below  : 
(i)  Underground  use  of  foamed  polyurethane  in  coal mines  (Annex  VI  to  7th  Report 
of Mines  Safety & Health  Commission,  September  1970) 
(ii)  Results  of  research  into possible  improvements  in breathing apparatus 
(Annex  VI  to  8th  Report  of  the Mines  Safety  & Health  Commission,  June  1971) 
(iii) List  of experts  and  apparatus  available  for  rescue  bore holes,  both  from  the 
surface  and  below  ground,  as  of  1  January  1971  (Annex  III to  8th  Report  of 
the  Mines  Safety & Health  Commission,  June  1971). 
(iv)  Compilation  of  Regulations  and  Directives  for  mine  rescue  services  in  the 
European  Community  and  United Kingdom  (Doc  No.  3845/1/71  dated  26.  March 
1971  (2)  which will be  published  in the  9th  Report  of  the  t1ines  Safety & 
Health  Commission,  1972). 
(1)  The  last report  (8th)  of the Mines  Safety  & Health  Commission  was  published in June 
1971  and  aan  be  obtained~  as  aan  all reports  on  mine  resaue  organisation  ~  free  of 
aharge  from  the Searetariat of the Mines  Safety  & Health  Commission  of the  European 
Communities~  Luxembourg~  29~  rue  Aldringen. 
(2)  Doa.  No.  3845/1/70  aan  be  obtained free  of aharge  from  the Searetariat. a) 
b) 
c) 
d) 
e) 
A  - 1)  ORGANISATION  DU  SAUVETAGE  DANS  LES  MINES 
Pastes  de  sauvetage  et  sauveteurs 
Situation  Jl  aecembre  1970 
PAYS  Republique  federate  d'Allemagne  France  Belgique  Ita  lie  Pays-Bas  Royaume-Uni  Nombre 
Bassin  Ruhr 
(1)  ( 2) 
Siege  de  la Centrale  de  sau- Essen-Kray 
vetage  (domaine  de  competen-
ce  a)  1,2,4,5 ,6. 
Nombre  de postes de  sauvetage  69 
~ombre de  sauveteurs  3  949 
Nombre  total  du  personnel 
inscrit  au  fond  123  981 
Sauveteurs  par  1  000  person-
nes  inscrites  au  fond  31,9 
(+)  Pour  le bassin  du  Centre-Midi 
(H-)  Pour  les  Pays-Bas 
(+<-+-)  Pour  le  Royaume-Uni 
a)  Domaines  de  comp€.t ence 
Numeros  de  designation 
total 
Aix-la- Sarre  Nord  Lorraine  Centre-Midi  Borinage  Charleroi/  Liege  Campine  Sulcis  Limbourg 
Chapelle  Pas -de-Calais  Namur 
( 3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (lo)  (11)  (12)  ( 13)  (14)  (15) 
Hong en- Friedrichs- Lens  Merlebach  Hensie"  Marcinelle  Glain  Hasselt  Mini era 
Mariador f  thai  (+)  Seruci  (++)  (+++) 
l ,2 ,4,  1,2 ,3 ,4,6'  1 '2 ,4,6,  l ,2, 3 ,4,6,  l '2 ,4,  1,2,3,4,5,6,  1 ,2,3,4,  1 ,2,4,6,  1 ,2,4,5' 
32  22  A  ~  13  187 
B  =  13 
262  578  426  451  823  21  142  106  271  34  279  2  742  10  084 
11  640  15  712  41  605  14  916  14  773  1  001  7  035  3  900  15  189  785  6  462  221  188  478  187 
22,5  36,8  10,2  30,2  35,7  21,0  20,2  27' 1  17,8  43,3  43,0  12,3  21' 1 
- Dans  le bassin  du  Centre-Midi,  il n'existe  pas  de  paste  central  de  sauvetage. 
- Dans  le  bassin  du  Limbourg,  il n
1 existe  pas  de  peste  d~  sauvetage, 
- Chaque  station  de  sauvetage  dessert  normalement  les  mines  se  trouvant  dans  un  rayon  de  15  miles.  Elles  sont  subdivisees  en  postes  de  sauvetage  du  "Plan  A
11  et  pastes  du 
11Plan  B
11 
- Les  pastes  du  "Plan  A"  :  Ce  sont  ceux ayant  (en  plus  du  responsable  ,  de  son  adjoint  et  des  instructeurs)  leur  propre  corps  permanent  de  sauveteurs  dent  les  membres  habitent 
a  la  station ou  a  proximite.  Ils  sont  assistes  par  un  ':ertain nombre  de  sauveteurs a  temps ·partiel  dans  les mines  desservies  par  le  poste. 
- Les  postes  du  "Plan  B"  Ce  sont  ceux  qui  ont  un  responsable,  un  responsable adjoint  et  des  instructeurs mais  pas  leur  propre  corps  de  sauveteurs vivant  a  la  station  ou  a 
proximite.  Ces  stations  disposent  de  sauveteurs  a  temps  partie!  travaillant  dans  les  mines  desservies  par  la  station.  Ils  sont  organises  en  brigades. 
l  =  Organisation  du  sauvetage 
2  =  Surveillance  des  sauveteurs  et  des  pastes  de  sauvetage 
3  =  Service  de  permanence  de  sauveteurs 
4  =  Formation 
5  =  Examen  d' agrement  des  appareil  s  de  sauvetage 
6  =  Travaux  de  recherche  dans  le  domaine  du  sauvetage 
<: 
H 
H 
-....J A  - 2)  ORGANISATION  DU  SAUVETAGE  DANS  LES  MINES 
ETAT  DE  L' EQUIPEMENT  AVEC  DES  APPAREILS  RESPIRATOIRES  A  CIRCUIT  FERME  D' UNE  DUREE  DE  FONCTIONNEMENT  DE  DEUX  HEURES  AU  MOINS 
Situation  31  decembre  1970 
~ombre 
Pays  Republ ique  federale  d 'Allemagne  France  Belgique  I talie  Pays-Bas  Royaume-Uni  total 
Bassin  Ruhr  Aix-la  Sarre  Nord  Lorraine  Centre-Hidi  Borinage  Charleroi  Liege  Campine  Sulcis  Limburg 
Chapelle  Pas-de-Calais  Namur 
(1)  ( 2)  ( 3)  (4)  ( 5)  ( 6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  Clo)  Cll)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15) 
T:n~e  d'aeeareil 
a)  Dr tiger  BG  160  A  546  41  159  98  11  14  22  81  44  20  1036 
b)  Drilger  llG  170/400  679  22  39  7 57 
cl  Drager  BG  172  765  19  29  37  20  34  20  14  48  976 
d)  Dr tiger  174  235  51  36  90  416 
e)  Dr!:lger  KG  210  13  19  <: 
H 
f)  Al'ER  fiR  11132  H 
g)  All[R  NR  54/400  16  66  83  ~ 
h)  AUCR  fiR  56/400  62  63 
i)  FE~ZY 56  369  308  682 
j)  Pirelli  45 
k)  Pirelli  205 
l)  Bll~l  Aerecheon 
m)  BB~I Aerophor  96  96 
nJ  Proto  724  726 
o)  Sa  vox  86  86 
p)  :-<ormalair 
q)  Aerorlox  600  602 
r) 
fOTAL  2303  135  224  369  225  308  31  50  54  153  66  134  1506  5548 
Par  groupe  de  100 
sauveteurs  58' 3  51,5  38 '7  86,6  50,0  37,4  150  35' 2  so, 9  56' 5  194,1  48,0  54,9  55,0 B  - NOMBRE  D'INTERVENTIONS  DE  SAUVETEURS  UTILISANT  DES  APPAREILS  RESPIRATOIRES  A CIRCUIT  FERME 
Annees  1969  et  1970 
Coup  de  grisou  Degagement  de  Incendies  de  de  mines  Ouverture  de  Causes  Feux  ou  de  poussieres  gaz  naturels  mines  barrages 
--
Bassins  a)+ 
I 
b)++  1  c)+++  a)+  b)++  c)+++  a)+  b)++  c)+++  a)+  b)++  c)+++  a)+  b)++  c)+++ 
L 
(1)  (2)  ~~-=~ I  (4) 
(5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16) 
- - -
-~--- ~---~= 
! 
!  1.  Ruhr  - 1  !  31  1  37  659  - 7  933  - 12  795  - 11  15  353 
:  I 
2.  Aix-la-Chapelle  - 1  i  452  - 10  36  - - - - - - - 1  I  5 
I  I 
3.  Sarre  - - ;  - - 4  23  - - - - - - - - -
4.  ALLEMAGNE  - 2  483  1  51  718  - 7  933  - 12  795  - 12  5  358 
5.  Nord/Pas-de-Calais  l  1 
! 
20  - 1  10  - - I  - - - - - I  - -
I 
I 
6.  Lorraine  - -
i 
- - - - - - - - - - - - -
7.  Centre-Midi  - - - - I  4  20  - 2  49  - 6  781  - 2  74 
I  8.  FRANCE  1  1  I  20  - 5  30  - 2  49  - 6  781  - 2  I  74  I 
i  9.  Borinage  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
10.  Char1eroi-Namur  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
i 
11.  Liege  -
I 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
12.  Campine  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
13.  BELGIQUE  - - - - - - - - - - - - - I  - I  -
14.  ITALIE  (Sulcis)  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - i  -
15.  PAYS-BAS  (Limbourg)  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
16.  ROYAUME-UNI  - 1  4  - - - - 2  98  - 17  1  004  - 6 
I  173 
I  17.  COMMUNAUTE  +  1  4  507  1  56  748  11  1  080  35  2  580  20  5  605  ROYAUME-UNI  - - -
I  a)+  Interventions  pour  1e  sauvetage  du  personnel. 
!  b)++  Intervention  pour  le sauvetage  du  materiel. 
i 
c)+++  Nombre  de  cartouches  d'epuration  de  l'air utilisees au  cours  de  ces  interventions. 
Causes  diverses 
a)+  b)++  c)+++  a)+ 
(17)  (18)  (19)  (20) 
- 4  41  1 
- - - -
- 10  !  138  -
- 14  I  179  1 
I 
1  - I  10  2 
- 1 
I  12  -
- 4  I  20  -
1  5  I  42  2 
-
I 
- - -
- 2  6  -
- - I  - -
- - - -
- 2  6  -
- - - -
- - - -
- 10  82  -
1  31  309  3 
--~-
Total 
b)++ 
(21) 
72 
12 
14 
98 
2 
1 
18 
21 
-
I 
2 
I  -
I  I 
I  - I 
2 
-
-
36 
157 
c)+++ 
(22) 
7  812 
493 
161 
-
8  466 
40 
12 
944 
996 
-
6 
-
-
6 
-
-
1  361 
10  829 
-
I 
I 
< 
H 
H Annees 
r-·· 
VII,  13 
C - ACCIDENTS  SURVENUS  AUX  SAUVETEURS  PORTANT  DES  APPAREILS 
DE  PROTECTION  CONTRE  LES  GAZ 
1969  et  1970 
Dans  les  cas  A l'exercice  d'accidents  BASSINS  graves 
avec  suite  avec  suite  avec  suite  avec  suite 
non  rnortelle  rnortelle  non  rnortelle  rnortelle 
( 1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
I.  Ruhr  - - - -
2.  Aix-la-Chapelle  - - - -
3.  Sarre  - - - -
4.  Allernagne  - - - -
5.  Nord/Pas-de-Calais  - - - -
6.  Lorraine  - - - -
7.  Centre-Midi  - - - -
8.  France  - - - -
9.  Borinage  - - - -
10.  Charleroi-Narnur  - - - -
11.  Liege  - - - -
12.  Carnpine  - - - -
13.  Belgique  - - - -
14.  Italie  (Sulcis)  - - - -
15.  Pays-Bas  (Lirnbourg)  - - - -
16.  Royaurne-Uni  - - - -
17.  Cornrnunaute  +  Royaurne-Uni  - - - -VII,  15 
D.  SUPPLEMENTARY  DETAILS  AND  DATA  INCLUDING  NOTABLE  CHANGES  COMPARED  WITH  REPORTING  YEARS 
1967  AND  1968 
I.  FEDERAL  REPUBLIC  OF  GERMANY 
1.  Mine  Rescue  Service Headquarters,  Essen-Kray 
(a)  Re  A.l)  Stations  and  personnel 
No  change 
(b)  Re  A.2)  :  Closed-circuit breathing  apparatus 
There  has  been  a  slight  change  in  the  total  amount  of  closed-circuit  appa-
ratus  held,  in that  the  proportion  of  apparatus  giving  four  hours'  service 
stands  close to  77  %.  Oxygen  units  of  the  obsolescent  Drager  BG  160  A type 
is  being  replaced  as  required by  the  new  Drager  BG  174,  of which  235  are 
already  in stock.  Equipping  the  rescue  teams  with  oxygen  self-rescuers  of 
the  Drager Oxy-SR  45  type  has  continued.  By  the end  of  1970  there were  317 
of  these  devices  in  the  rescue  stations. 
(c)  RE  B  :  Number  of  operations  in serious  cases 
The  number  of  operations  carried out  by  the  rescue  teams  within  the  re-
porting period has  risen  from  67  to  73  as  a  result  of  increasing  cases  in 
stale air  (travelling stopped-off workings).  The  total number  of mine  fires 
has  fallen;  this  is  predominatly  so  in  the  case  of  spontaneous  combustion. 
This  must  be  attributed  to  improved  stopping-off  techniques  and  monitoring 
of  abandoned workings,  together with  roadside  packs  accompanying  the work-
ings,  concentration  of  mining  operations  and  the  decreasing number  of work-
ings  in steep measures. 
There  has  been  an  increase  in the  number  of  fires  started by  extraneous 
means.  The  reason  for  this  is  the  rise  in belt-road fires.  The  numerous 
operations  aimed  at  recovering panels  or parts  of panels  endangered by  fire 
involved  a  great  deal  of  preparatory work.  In all cases  the  teams  had  to 
work  under  the worst  climatic conditions which  made  great  demands  on  the 
men  involved. 
The  annual  reports  for  1969  and  1970  from  the  Essen  HQ  provide details  of 
these  operations.  The  annual  reports will be  sent  out  to members  of  the 
Working  Party. 
(d)  RE  D  :  Research  and  development  results 
Breathing  apparatus 
The  final  report  on  research  into  improvements  to breathing  apparatus  car-
ried  out  by  the Hasselt  Headquarters  (Belgium)  and  Liege  University  on  be-
half of  the  Commission  of  the  European  Communities  was  laid before  the  Mines 
Safety & Health  Commission. 
By  Command  of  the Minister  of  the  Interior of  the  land North-Rhine Westpha-
lia,  the  following breathing  apparatus  has  been  tested  for  use  by  fire 
brigades  : VII,  16 
Drager  Compressed-Air breathing apparatus  PA  54/1800  S 
Drager  Compressed-Air breathing  apparatus  PA  38/1600 
Matter  Compressed-Air breathing apparatus  UH  44 
Drager  Oxygen  Protection  apparatus  TRAVOX  120 
Filter-type self-rescuers 
The  "Plastics Tests  Definitions"  issued by  the Mines  Inspectorate,  Dortmund, 
on  4  November  1966  stipulate that filter self-rescuers be  tested  in respect 
of  the  protection they  give  against  the  presence  of  fire  decomposition  pro-
ducts  before plastics may  be  used.  A new  test rig was  built  at  the Essen  HQ 
in  the  reporting period.  In  all,  llevaluations from  this  sector have  already 
been  issued  on  behalf of  the Mines  Inspectorate. 
Once  filter self-rescuers  fitted with heat  exchangers  had  been  developed, 
the  Dortmund  Mines  Inspectorate  demanded  that  they  be  used.  Filter self-
rescuers  without  exchangers  can  be  used  up  to  the  end  of  1972  provided that 
a  re-equipment  plan  is  made  out,  detailing  the  changeover  from  apparatus 
without  heat  exchangers  to the  new  types  fitted with  the  exchangers.  The 
plan has  now  been worked  out  in  collaboration with  the  inspectorate,  the 
collieries  and  the  Rescue Headquarters;  the  replacement  programme  is 
already  in hand. 
398  filter self-rescuers  have  been  used  in  34  cases  (mine  fires  and  the 
like)  in  the  reporting period. 
Dust  filters 
By  a  decision  of  the  German  Mines  Rescue  Service  Committee  in  1969,  the 
Essen Headquarters  became  the  responsible  centre  for  approving  dust-filters 
to be  used  on  the  surface.  To  date  six filters  from  various  manufacturers 
have  been  approved. 
Sampling  tubes 
Trials were  successfully  concluded  in  respect  of  the  hydrogen  sulphide 
tube  H2S/c  and  nitrogen  tube  N02/c  from  Dragerwerk  AG,  Lubeck,  and  also  the 
carbon  dioxide  tube  co 2-o.l%-GT  developed  by  the Auergesellschaft  GmbH 
Berlin. 
Prevention  and  control  of mine  fires 
Trials with  the  "Blitzdarmner"  composition,  started in the  last quarter of 
1968,  have  in  the  meantime  been  concluded.  Good  "pumpability",  negligible 
shrinkage  and  rapid  setting time  render  this material  suitable  for  road-
side  packs  and  also  for  stoppings. 
In  the  third quarter of  1970,  a  start was  made  with  a  test  programme  on  the 
hydro-mechanical  plaster procedure  for stoppings and  fire  dams  at  the  Essen 
Headquarters.  Operational  trials  are still in progress. 
A total of  42  decisions  was  taken with  regard  to  fire protection  underground; 
of  these  18 dealt with  means  to  prevent  fires  affecting ventilation, with 
special reference  to downcast  ventilation.  The  increasing  number  of  fires 
within  the  area  covered  by  the  Essen Headquarters  area  resulted  in  the 
setting-up  of  a  study  group  to handle  "Belt  fire hazards"  at  the  end  of  1970, 
assisted by  the  Essen  Headquarters.  The  aim  of  the  group  is  to develop,  in 
collaboration with  the manufacturers,  a  ne~v  laboratory  method  for  testing 
rubber belts  for non-flammability. 
The  Landesoberbergamt(  Provincial  Mines  Inspectorate)  of  North-Rhine  West-
phalia has  completed  a  draft  of  Regulations  for  Stopping-off  and  Damming 
workings  in  coalmines. VII,  17 
(e)  Plans  and  directives 
The  Essen Headquarters  has  revised  or  re-issued  the  following  comments  : 
Supplement  to  "Regulations  for  approval  and  construction of  automatic Mine 
fire extinguishers  (BuT)"  dated  31  March  1960,  by  Section  34  :  "Automatic 
Dry  Powder  Extinguishers  for  Underground  Use",  dated  30  May  19b9. 
List  of Specialists  and  Apparatus  for  Rescue  Bores  from  the  Surface,  as  of 
1  January  1970. 
Plans  for  assisting Mine  Rescue  Services  in  the  Essen Headquarters  area, 
as  of  1  May  1970. 
Provisions  for  rescue  operations  (model  alarm plan),  12  October  1970. 
2.  Friedrichsthal Headquarters  (Saar) 
(a)  Changes  in establishment 
Closure  of  the  rescue  station at  Velsen  on  1  March  1969  reduced  the  number 
of stations  in  the  Saar  coalfield  from  10  to 9. 
(b)  Regulations,  plans,  operating procedures 
The  following  regulations,  plans  and  procedures within  the  competence  of 
the  Heddquarters  were  revised  or  re-issued  in  the  reporting period  in the 
rescue,  fire  and  explosion  sectors  : 
1.  Mine  rescue  teams  procedure  dated  4  February  1969. 
2.  Hydrornechanical  plaster darns  (practical introduction to fire  darn 
construction),  September  1969. 
3.  Master  Rescue  Plan  as  of  1  March  1970. 
4.  Principles  of  Gas  Protection,  24  July  1970. 
5.  Procedures  for  Gas  Protection Teams,  23  September  1970. 
(c)  Re  D  :  Research  and  development 
CO  meters  and  alarms 
Following  on  the  successful  conclusion  of  the  1 arges cale tests of  CO  meas-
uring  and  alarm  instruments  in  1968,  a  systematic start has  been made  with 
equipping  underground workings  with  apparatus  of  this  kind.  Districts 
equipped with  CO  meters  and  alarms  have  no  longer to be  inspected  on  rest 
days  for  traces  of  possible  fires. 
Hydro-mechanical  plaster damming 
The  Saaralit-Bergbaugips-Verfahren  (Saaralit-Mining Plaster Method)  has 
been  used within  the  reporting period  in the  following  sectors 
(i)  driving  through  blockages  due  to  roof  falls  in  roads  and  faces 
(filling the  caved  area); 
(ii)  filling cavities  alongside  gate-roads  to prevent  build-up  of  CH4• 
(iii)  lining  roads  to prevent ventilation  creep. 
(iv)  making  air crossings. II.  FRANCE 
VII,  18 
Bentonite-CaC12  Pulp 
For  the first  time  in the  Saar,  bentonite-CaC12  pulp was  used  to  control  a 
latent  fire by  sealing off a  coalpillar which  had  been  loosened  up  by  rock 
pressure,  close to  the  seat  of  the  fire.  The  bentonite-CaClz paste was  pre-
pared with special additives  and  stirring equipment  in  the  paste  shop  at 
Luisenthal Colliery  to  give  a  stable-structure  compound  which  was  carried 
in 1400-litre paste  cans  to  the  point  of  use  and  there  injected by means 
of  a  high-pressure Hauhinco,  300/55  PAS,  paste  pump  in  conjunction with  the 
paste hose  NW  25  and  infusion  sonde. 
(a)  Re  A.2  :  Closed-circuit breathing  apparatus 
Rescue  stations  in  the  Centre-Midi  coalfield have  been  equipped with  45-minute 
oxygen  self-rescuers.  These  comprise  306  of  the  FENZY  66  type,  and  50  of  the 
Inter-Techniques  I.T.  40  design. 
(b)  Re  B  :  Number  of operations  in serious  incidents 
The  operations  related to  the  following  : 
(i)  4  February  1970,  a  firedam  explosion  at  shaft  6,  Courrieres,  (16  dead 
and  11  seriously  injurt!d); 
(ii)  21  August  1970,  stale air  from  old workings  at  Lemay  colliery  (no  victims, 
erection of  a  dam); 
(iii)  3  November  1970,  search  for  two  men  after  an  inrush  of water  in  a  rise 
heading  at  Lievin  Colliery  (breathing  apparatus  used,  as  local ventila-
tion had  been put  out  of  order by  the water); 
(iv)  17  December  1970,  ignition of  firedamp  in  a  crosscut  heading  at  shaft 
3,  Courrieres  (no  casualties, water  used  to  fight  the  fire). 
(c)  Re  D  :  Research  and  development 
In  collaboration with  CERCHAR  and  the  Essen-Kray  Mines  Rescue  headquarters, 
the Merlebach  and  Lens  stations  examined  possible  improvements  in  large-hole 
drilling  from  below  ground  to  rescue  trapped personnel. 
This  programme  is still in progress.  Appendix  I  gives  details  of  the  stage 
reached  in the  programme  in  the  Lorraine  coalfield. 
Closed-circuit  oxygen  apparatus,  FENZY  M 
Appendix  II describes  the  apparatus,  and  experiments with it. 
Gypsum  applications  underground  in the Lorraine  coalfield in  1970 
4,170  tons  of  gypsum was  used  in  1970  for  : 
- 45  dams  to  close  off  abandoned  panels  (2,732  t); 
- filling-in  11  caved  areas  (738  t); 
-sealing-off 2  roads  (700  t). 
In  all,  57  workings  were  processed  using  the  mixer  pump  from  the  Mine  Rescue 
Headquarters. VII,  19 
The  following  performance  figures  were  achieved 
- 90  m vertical  and  120  m horizontal  range; 
- 600  m pump  lift  (descending)  per  dam; 
sealing between  tubbings  and  supports  in  a  road  (12m2),  using  599  t 
gypsum,  carried  out  by  two  PUTZMEISTER  units,  in  10  shifts,  including 
installation; 
- Mohno  4  NE  50  pump  performance  - 10  t/hr  (63  t  in  6  hrs with  a  lift of 
120m); 
- performance  of  the  PUTZMEISTER  KK  139 
- performance  of  the  PUTZMEISTER  KA  139 
9  t/hr; 
6  t/hr. 
All  operations were  carried  out  by  colliery personnel  supervised  and  assisted 
by  Rescue  Headquarters  staff. 
III.  BELGIUM 
(a)  General 
The  Frameries  Headquarters  has  shut  down  now  that practically all collieries 
in  the  Borinage  division have  been  closed,  except  the  Hensies-Pommeroeul 
colliery. 
The  Inspectorate  only  permitted  the Headquarters  to  close  as  of  1  January  1971 
on  condition  that  a  special Headquarters  would  be  placed  at  the  disposal  of 
Hensies-Pommeroeul  colliery.  Assistance  can  also be  obtained  from  the 
Marcinelle headquarters,  which  is  the nearest  to  the  Hensies  headquarters. 
Marcinelle Headquarters  has  expanded  its activity in  terms  of  equipment, 
training etc to  take  in branches  of  industry  other  than  coalmining. 
(b)  Re  D  :  Research  and  development 
Breathing  apparatus 
As  mentioned  above,  the  joint project dealing with  physiological  conditions 
involved  in  the wearing  of breathing  apparatus  and  financed  by  the  Commission 
of  the  European  Communities  has  now  been brought  to  a  close.  The  Hasselt 
Coordination  Centre  played  an  important  part  in  this  research  programme.  It 
was  also  responsible  for  co-ordinating  the  three  Institutes  involved  in  the 
project,  and  for  compiling  the  report  dealing with  the  results. 
Rescue  operations  at high  temperatures  and  in difficult  climatic  conditions 
The  Co-ordinating Centre  made  a  comparison  between  the  effectiveness  of  various 
methods  and  equipment  used  to  cool  men  working  at high  temperatures. 
Work  under  difficult  climatic  conditions 
A medical  study  has  been  carried out  in  collaboration with  the  medical 
faculty  of  Louvain  University  into  the behaviour of  men  working  in difficult 
climatic  conditions. 
Controlling  a  tip fire 
A fire  extending  over  an  area of  4  hectares was  extinguished with  the  aid  of  a 
layer of  cement  and  lime,  followed  by  a  gypsum  layer,  applied  after the  area 
of  the  fire had  been  sprayed with water. 
The  extinguishing operations  lasted  44  days. VII,  20 
IV.  UNITED  KINGDOM 
(a)  Re  A.l)  Rescue  stations  and  personnel 
The  Heriot Watt  station in Edinburgh was  closed  during  the year  and  trans-
ferred  to  a  new  modern building  in Lingerwood,  south  of Edinburgh.  Work 
began  on  two  new  stations  in the  second half of  1970  to  replace  two  extremely 
old  &tations  in  the Midlands  area. 
(b)  Re  A.2)  :  Closed-circuit  apparatus 
In  the  second half of  1969  and  the  beginning of  1970,  600  Aerorlox  Liquid 
Oxygen  apparatus  were  delivered.  24  rescue stations  each  received  25  sets  of 
equipment.  During  1970  all rescue  personnel were  trained  in  the  use  of  the 
equipment.  The  stations  using  the Aerorphor  liquid  oxygen  equipment  were 
equipped with Aerolox  apparatus  in  1970.  Stations  using  the  "Proto"  type 
apparatus will be  issued with Aerorlox  apparatus  in the  middle  of  1971.  The 
Proto  apparatus  using  compressed  oxygen will be  retained  for  the  first  teams 
to  go  underground  because  of  their  immediate  availability. 
(c)  Re  D  :  Research  and  development 
The  plan envisaging all pits  fitted with self-rescuers was  nearly  complete  by 
the  end  of  1970. 
By  the  middle  of  1971  every  underground  worker will have  his  own  apparatus  and 
will be  trained to use it. 
Systematic  advanced  training in the  use  of  the  apparatus will be  carried out 
at all collieries. 
Mines  rescue  competitions 
Competitions  are  held yearly  at  some  stations  between  rescue  teams.  Competitions 
of  this kind  promote  interest  in  the  rescue  teams  and  increase their efficiency. VII,  21 
ANNEX  I 
LOCATION  AND  RESCUE  OF  TRAPPED  MINERS 
(Lorraine  coalfield reports  on  the  state of  reserach  to date) VII,  23 
I.  LOCATING  THE  TRAPPED  MINERS 
In  order  to  rescue  the  men,  a  method  must  be  devised  by which  they  can  be  loc-
ated  as  accurately  as  possible.  We  have  carried out  a  number  of  experiments  to  solve 
this  problem  and  have  been  able  to  formulate  the  technical  aspects  of  the  apparatus 
involved with  a  fair  degree  of precision. 
Thus  during  1970  we  extend  the  location  range  from  20/40m  to  60/80  m. 
This  gives  us  reason  to  view  optimistically the  possible  extension  of  this  to 
even  greater ranges. 
Experiments  on  20  March,  and  6  June  1970 
Without  pre-amplifying,  we  were  able  to  locate knocki.ng  signals  through  the  rock 
over  distances  between  20  and  40  m.  Electrical noise  interfered with  the  readings  of 
our  instruments  (light-pen  recorder,  magnetic  tape  recorder). 
It became  clear that  the  pre-amplifier was  not  powerful  enough  to deal with 
distances  of  the  order  of  100  m. 
We  consulted  the  "Communications  Office" with  the  object  of  testing the  SANGAMO 
tape  recorder with  six  tracks  and  one  acoustic track;  they  informed  us  of  experience 
gained  by  the  CIMEL  ELECTRONIC  in  locating  seismic noises. 
Experiments  on  17  October,  1970 
Similar situation  :  Merlebach  colliery,  826  metre  level,  first North-east  panel 
between  seams  Erna  3  and  Frieda  1. 
The  layout  comprised  :  6  geophones  resin-bonded  to strata bolts  in  the  roof  of 
Erna  3  (in  the  previous  test  they were  wedged  into boreholes). 
Four  of  these  geophones  were  of  the  7.5  Hz  type  (CIMEL  detectors  1,2,3,4)  and  the 
other  two  (Ceo-Space  5  and  6)  were  of  the  28  H7  type. 
The  four  first-mentioned  geophones  were  coupled  to  CIMEL  pre-amplifiers with 
controlled  dynamics  (60  to  100  dB).  The  pre-amplifiers  passed  their  output  signals 
via the  Sangamo  recorder  and  Hartmann  and  Braun  voltage  amplifiers  to  the  light  pen, 
whereas  the  other  two  detectors  (5  and  6)  passed  signals directly to  the  pen. 
In  the first  few  tests it became  apparent  that  the  amplifiers  with  H  and  B dif-
ferential  input  upset  the  reading by  noise;  though  this  was  not  the  case with  the 
CIMEL  pre-amplifiers.  The  interference was  due  both  to  the  amplifiers  themselves 
(transistor noise)  and  their cross-linkages. 
In  the  second  series  of  tests,  the Hartman  and  Braun  amplifier  system  (detectors 
5  and  6)  were  disconnected,  and  the  knocking  signal  from  the  various  points  were 
recorded  on  the  Sangamo  instrument.  It was  found  that  these  recordings  were  superior 
to  those  from  the  preceding  test.  Noise  here  was  reduced  to  a  normal  level  (around 
0,3 ;'' V),  whilst  mechanical noise was  reduced  by  cutting out  the  local booster  fan 
situated  a  few  metres  away  from  the  detectors. 
CONCLUSION 
Our  experiments  have  shown  that  amplifiers  used  must  have  m1n1mum  noise  and  that 
the  mechanical  connection between  the  rock  and  the  detector must  be  of  a  superior 
quality. VII,  24 
II.  BOREHOLE  FOR  FIRST  CONTACTS 
(a)  Bore 
Longyear  equipment  for  sinking  the first  contact bore was  ordered  as  follows 
First  case  :  drilled both ways  with  NQ-U-rods; 
Second  case  :  difficulties may  occur 
-drilling partly by  NQ  U (75.7  m.m.  external dia)  rods; 
-the NQ  U rods  are  retrieved  and  replaced  by  a  BX  casing  (63.5  m.m.  internal dia); 
-drilling continued with  BQ  U  (60  m.m.  external dia). 
(b)  Containers 
Canister  for  food,  medicaments,  essential  support material etc.,  consist  of  the 
total  inner  core  of  3  m and  a  pointed  cap  placed  on  an  adapter  (NQ  U)  or  a  BQ  U tube 
(43  m.m.  external dia). 
The  overshot  used  to  retrieve  the  canisters,  in  the  same  way  as  the  inner  core 
barrel during drilling. 
Container  operations  presented  no  problems. 
(c)  Telephone 
Two  self-locking drive  heads  (NQ  U/BQ  U)  are being  tested  at  present,  which  are 
drilled to  accept  the electric connecting  cable,  and  have  oblique  edges  to  prevent 
the  telephone  container  from  being  slung  out  of  the  NQ  U or  BQ  U tube. 
The  head will be  tested  to  see whether it is  suitable  for  leading  the  nylon 
rope  into  the  trapped men  so  that  they  can  erect  the  sheave  for  returning  the  rescue 
canister to  the  surface  through  the  rescue  hole. 
We  feel  that  the  cable  telephone  should  only be  a  temporary  solution.  Attempts 
to  use  the drill rods  as-a-wave  carrier proved  positive  (3  April,  between  main  roads 
North  on  545  m and  686  m levels  in the  Reumaux  seam  at Merlebach);  a  casing with 
outside  diameter  of  125  mm,  such  as  we  used  for  our externally-fitted transceiver, 
provided  us  with  an  extremely satisfying connection,  at  210  kc/s. 
CERCHAR  will use  these  data to  design  a  transceiver  to be  coupled  to  a  NQ  rod 
(60.3  mm  internal dia.  and  69.9  mm  external dia). 
In  the meantime tests will be  carried  out  on  : 
-a battery  telephone  (CERCHAR), 
-a sound-powered  capsule  telephone  (PCS). 
These will be  removed  from  the  NQ  U and  BQ  U tubes  to make  room  for  the 
containers. 
To  cut  down  on  the  work  here,  we  plan  to  run  the  permanent  carrier wire  between 
the  NQ  U  (60.3  mm  internal  dia)  and  BQ  U  (55.5  mm  external dia)  tubes  so  that  the 
inside  of this  tube  (46  mm  internal dia)  will  remain  free  for  the  containers  (43  mm 
internal dia). 
The  reliability of  the  method  has  yet  to be  tested,  as  it is  possible  that  the 
correcting  cable  may  be  parted. VII,  25 
III.  RESCUE  HOLE  MACHINE 
Analysis  of  the  P  30  drill with  extensible,  rotary  and  retractable  stand  and  with 
the necessary  equipment  for  a  486  x  508  rnrn  external diameter  casing  showed  that  the 
success  of  any  recovery  operation  depends  on  the  following  factors  : 
- time  taken  to  open  out  the  recess  and  install  the  machine  together,  with  its degree 
of  complexity  (two  assemblies  are  fixed  using  50  rock bolts,  1.20  to  2.40  m); 
- the drilling  technique  used  at  the  moment  (drilling upwards  under pressure with 
danger  of  the  rod  buckling). 
If the  P  30  is  replaced  by  a  more  suitable machine,  and  if the  compressed-air 
drill  from  Soding  and  Gebarth  is  exchanged  for  a  hydraulic  reamer with  tie-rod 
transmission,  the  savings  in  terms  of work  involved  are  as  under  : 
- driving the  recess  25% 
- installing the drill  30% 
- drilling  40% 
- casing  30% 
We  haved  asked  the  Institut  Fran~ais du  Petrole  to  supply  us  with  the  addresses 
of  modern  drill manufacturers. 
IV.  RESCUE  CANISTER  TRAVEL  IN  THE  CASED  HOLE 
4.1.  Casing 
Once  it had  been  completed,the hole was  cased  three  times  using  smooth 
486  x  508  rnrn  tubes  not  sealed  at  the joints, with  an  "Erdol"  thread having six  turns 
per  inch  and  a  taper  of  6.25%. 
These  inside  and  outside  threads  were  only  screwed  in  to  between  50  and  80%  of 
their  length,  as  they  had  seized  owing  to  irregular movement  of  the drill. 
Provided nothing unforeseen  occurs,  drilling performance  should  reach  to  6  m/hr. 
We  noted  that  the winch  ropes  tended  to  tangle  due  to  faulty hydraulic brakes 
when  the  single  lenghts  of  casing started to  turn. 
We  have  continued  research  into ways  of  overcoming  the  following  difficulties  : 
(1)  Seizing  of  the  tubes  :  a  differential  feed  device  is  to be  powered  off  the drill 
itself; 
(2)  Tangling  of  the  ropes;  6  turns  to  the  inch  threaded  tubes  are  to be  r~placed by 
four  turns  to  the  inch  tubes,  packed  at  the  joints. 
4.2.  Aligning  the  pipe  string 
This  is best  carried out with  the help  of  the  trapped  men  linked by  telephone 
to  the  rescue  team. 
In  the  event  of  the  trapped  men  not  being  able  to help,  the  idea is  to  line  the 
string up  by  means  of  a  camera. 
Contact  has  been made  with  POLAROID  for  the  camera  and with  THOMSON-HOUSTON  for 
the  ultrasonics. VII,  26 
4.3.  Fitting the haulage  cable  for  the  rescue  canister 
The  nylon  rope  carried  down  with  the winch  drum  has  been  used with  success 
several  times  to fit  the  steel  cable  into  the  pulleys  on  the  casing head,  the  return 
and  tension stations,  and  also  to  the  rescue  canister itself. 
This  job  takes  two  hours  (60  m hole).  If the  rope  breaks  (fall of  ground)  then 
to  these  two  hours  must  be  added  : 
(a)  five  hours  if the  rope  and  canister  and  rods  are  to  be  fed  in; 
(b)  one  hour if the  rope  is  lowered  through  the  first-contact hole; 
(c)  half  an  hour  if a  replacement  rope  held  in  the  head  is  run  down. 
Only  (b)  and  (c)  are  acceptable. 
4.4.  Lowering  and  raising the  rescue  canister 
This  was  carried out  without  any  problems 
- the  device  used  to steer the  canister in  the  tube  worked  faultlessly; 
- the  cable  tension was  regulated without  difficulty 
The  drive  speed worked  out  at  0.50  m/sec. 
We  should point  out,  however,  that  the  canister is  too narrow  for  corpulent 
miners  and  the height,  outside  the  road  (2.6  m),  must  be  reduced  to  more  acceptable 
dimensions  (e.g.  1.80 m). 
4.5.  Communications  link between  rescue  team  and  trapped  men 
Satisfactory results were  obtained with  the  shortwave  transceiver,  CERCHAR  X 
and  Y phones  and  an  antenna mounted  on  a  wind-in  drum. 
To  avoid  having  to erect  the  antenna,  which  could  also  be  cut  during  the  opera-
tion,  we  plan  to  use  the  canister  cable  as  the  lead.  We  have  approached  SCHLUMBERGER 
with  the  object  of borrowing  from  them  a  70  m long  12  mm  diameter test  cable. 
V.  LOWERING  AND  RAISING  IN  AN.UNCASED  HOLE 
This  method  should  only  be  used when  the  trapped  men  are  in  great  danger  (e.g. 
falls  in  caved  areas,  etc.) 
There  are  a  number  of possibilities here  and  selection must  depend  on  the  time 
available  and  the  conditions  : 
(1)  Pulley  frame  and  drill are  carried  down  in  the  container when  the  men  cannot  erect 
a  pulley  in  the  axis  of  the hole. 
This  method  has  not  yet  been  tested  and  the  equipment  is  undergoing  trials at 
present. 
(2)  The  trapped  men  attach  a  pulley which  had  previously been wound  up  in  the  rescue 
hole  by  means  of  the  rope  lowered  down  the  first-contact hole. 
Recovering  the  apparatus  through  the  rescue  hole  is  no  problem.  Tests  are  at 
present being  carried out  on  introducing the  nylon  rope  through  the  first-contact 
hole. 
We  consider that  the  entire operation would  take  three hours. VII,  27 
(3)  The  trapped men  cannot  help,  so  that  the material  is  carried down  in  the  rescue 
canister,  in which  is  a  member  of the  rescue  team 
This  took  10  hours  in  our  60  m hole.  For safety reasons,  a  doll was  substituted 
for  the  team member  during  the  descent  of  the  canister in the  uncased hole. 
Film 
A film is  to be  produced  on  the  sections  relating to  "Rescue  Canister Travel 
in  a  Cased  Hole
11  and  "Travel  in  an  uncased hole". 
VI.  Colloquia,  Visits  - Para  2  of  ECSC  Agreement 
April  1970 
P  30  drill. 
visit  of  a  Polish delegation,  pit visit  at Wendel  to  inspect  the 
August  1970  :  visit by  Herr  de  la Touche,  Director of  "Service  Technique  de  la 
Chambre  Syndicale  des  Mines  de  Fer  de  France". 
CONCLUSIONS 
The  experimental work  to  date has  given  a  clear insight  into  the  problem. 
The  tests have  further  shown  that  the basic principles  are  correct. 
Which  of  the  methods  quoted  is  elected depends  on  wh~ther the  operation  can  be 
carried out  without  mishap,  and  just how  much  time  is  needed.  An  exhaustive series 
~f tests  is needed  to  confirm our  assumptions. 
Not  until  these  tests have  been  carried out  can  an  apparatus  be  developed which 
will be  properly  adapted  to  the  problem in question. VII,  29 
OXYGEN  CLOSED-CIRCUIT  APPARATUS  FENZY  - M 
(Report  from Lorraine  coalfield on  operating 
principle of  the  apparatus). 
ANNEX  II VII,  31 
I.  PRINCIPLE 
The  Fenzy  M is  a  closed-circuit  apparatus  operating with  compressed  oxygen, 
regenerating  the  exhaled  air  and  cooling  the  inspired air. 
Oxygen  is  supplied  to  the wearer  by 
- constant  throughput  from  a  175  litre  cylinder at  200  bars; 
- underpressure  inlet valve; 
- hand-operated backup  valve  to  supply  oxygen  as  required. 
Exhaled  co2  is purified by  a  U-shaped  caustic soda regenerator cartridge 
weighing  1.4 kg,  and  retaining most  of  the moisture. 
Inspired  air  is  cooled  by  a  cooler with  a  1.2  kg  ice  cylinder  and  a  very  large 
exchange  surface. 
II.  GENERAL  FEATURES  OF  THE  PROTOTYPE 
It is  slightly smaller  than  the  DRAGER  BG  174. 
In  use,  complete with  caustic soda  and  ice,  the  apparatus  weighs  12  kg,  giving 
three hours  service. 
III.  TESTS 
The  apparatus  was  tested for  45  hours  30  minutes  at  the Central  Rescue  Station 
as  under 
Laboratory  (19  hrs  in  8  single tests,  rescue worker  on  a  bicycle machine) 
- oxygen  supply 
- co2  purification 
- temperatures. 
1)  Oxygen  supply  (Reduction valve,  automatic  throughput  etc.). 
Oxygen  pressure  gradient  amounts  to  48.5  bars  hr  in  the  laboratory  compared with 
48.68  in  use  (Annex  1). 
Gradient  remains  constant  throughout  total period  of  use  (Annex  3). 
It is virtually identical with  the  value  obtained by  the  DRAGER  BG  17'4. 
Should  the worker  become  breathless  as  a  result  of  exertion,  each breath  he 
takes  releases  automatic  flow  and  thus  increases  the  consumption  considerably, 
because  of  the  deficient  volume  of  the breathing bag  as  illustrated by  an  oxygen 
pressure  drop  of  6  bars/min  (Annex  7). 
2)  C02  purification by  the  U-shaped  caustic  soda  cartridge  Residue  remains  constant 
throughout  period  of  use. 
The  value  at  rest was  0,2%,  0,5%  during work  over  period of  3  hours. 
The  automatic  throughput  switched  itself in frequently because  the outlet  from 
the  cartridge was  clogged  by  liquid soda  (Annexes  5  and  6). VII,  32 
3)  Temperature 
A feature  of  the  apparatus  is  the  slow rise in  inspired air temperature  due  to 
the water  and  ice, which  remained virtually constant  in  volume  so  that  the  tempe-
rature  can  be  held  at  an  almost  fixed  level  (Annex  2). 
4)  Comfort 
The  apparatus  fits  snugly  to  the  mau's  back  and  is  streamlined  to  avoid 
obstacles. 
It has  been  accepted by  our  rescue  men  who  are working with both  French  and 
other  foreign  types  of  apparatus. 
5)  Strength 
This  is  a  robust  apparatus with  the  exception  of  the brass  sleeve  round  the  U 
cartridge which  could be  improved  :  a  good  deal  of  repair work  was  needed  here  to 
avoid  interrupting our  test  programmes. 
IV.  CONCLUSIONS 
On  the basis  of  these  results,  cooling  the  inspired air by  the water surface  is 
to be  preferred to  a  dry-ice  cooling  action. 
The  simple  mechanical  construction of  the  apparatus  (reduction  valve  is  in 
14  parts)  is  of  advantage  when  it comes  to maintenance  and  repair. 
However,  the manufacturer  should  look  to  these  points 
- the  volume  of  the breathing bag must  be  enlarged,  and  cartridge  clogging  prevented 
in order  to prevent  unintentional  operation  of  the  automatic  throughput  system. 
- the  pressure  line should be  protected against  oxygen  leakage. 
Once  fully  developed,  the  apparatus  must  cl~arly rank with  the best  of  the  conven-
tional  foreign  models. Cooler 
Overpressure 
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ANNEX  I 
Test  Progranune 
Date  Duration  02  con  sump- Date  Duration  02  con  sump-
tion  tion 
Laboratory  test  chamber 
12.01. 71  2  hr  92  bars  01.02. 71  2  hr.  105  bars 
20.01.71  3  hr  143  02.02.71  1  hr.45  75 
21.01.71  3  hr  134  18.02. 71  1  hr.45  90 
27.01.71  3 hr  168  23.02.71  1  hr.15  75 
13.02.71  48  rnn  38  25.02.71  2 hr.  100 
15.02.71  70  mn  63  27.02.71  1  hr.  45 
17.02.71  3  hr  148  02.03.71  1  hr.45  95 
24.02.71  3 hr  136  08.03.71  2  hr.  90 
8  tests  19  hr  922  11.03.71  1  hr. 45  90 
12.03.71  2  hr.  100 
thus  48.5  bars  per hour  18.03.71  2 hr.  90  : 
23.03.71  2  hr.  90 
25.03.71  1  hr.30  70 
26.03.71  2  hr.  95 
06.04.71  1  hr.45  80 
15  tests  26  hr.  1,290 
thus  :  48.680 bars  Eer hour Temperature 
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VII,  39 
Comparative  throughput  of  reducation 
valve  after  45  hrs  30  min  operation. 
oxygen  pressure 
cylinders  reduction valves 
Test  1  Test  2  Test  1  Test  2 
12.1.71  29.3.71  12. 1. 71  29.3.71 
200  bars  200  bars  5.7 bars  5. 7  bars 
182  182  5.2  5.1 
169  170  4.8  4.8 
157  160  4.5  4.5 
147  148  4.3  4.3 
137  137  4.2  4.1 
127  128  4.1  4 
118  118  3.9  3.8 
109  106  3.8  3.6 
100  98  3.7  3.5 
92  90  3.6  3.4 
85  82  3.3  3.3 
77  72  3.2  3.2 
69  65  3.2  3.1 
62  55  3.1  3 
54  48  2.9  2.9 
47  41  2.8  2.8 
ANNEX  3 
long-term throughput 
Test  1  Test  2 
12.1.71  29.3.71 
2  litre/mn2  2  litre/mn2 
1. 80  1. 82 
1. 68  1. 72 
1.57  1. 61 
1. 51  1. 53 
1. 44  1. 45 
1. 36  1.38 
1. 31  1. 32 
1. 20  1. 27 
1. 20  1. 22 
1.15  1.15 
1.10  1.12 
1.04  1.07 
0.99  1.03 
0.95  0.99 
0.91  0.97 
o. 89  0.93 17  February  1971 
Wearer  : 
Colliery 
Time 
Single 
time 
0 
10 
5 
10 
5 
0 
5 
10 
5 
10 
5 
10 
5 
10 
5 
10 
5 
10 
5 
10 
5 
0 
5 
10 
5 
STOLZ  Jean-Baptiste 
SIMON  L 
Temperatures 
cumu- milieu  Fenzy 
lative 
time 
0  21.5  21 
10  21.7  10.5 
15  21.5  10 
25  21.9  6.5 
30  22  8.5 
40  21.7  2 
45  21.8  5 
55  21.8  3 
60  21.7  6 
70  21.7  6.2 
75  21.6  9.3 
85  21.9  10.2 
90  22  12.5 
100  22  12.7 
105  21.9  15.5 
115  21.8  15.4 
120  21.8  17.1 
130  22  17 
135  22  18 
145  22.2  20.2 
150  22  22.2 
160  22  22.7 
165  22.1  23.4 
175  22.1  23.2 
180  21.9 
VII,  40 
FENZY  M 
Oz 
M 
200  13 
187  7 
180  10 
170  5 
165  8 
157  5 
152  7 
145  5 
140  8 
132  4 
128  7 
121  3 
118  6 
112  3 
109  6 
103  4 
99  6 
93  3 
90  8 
82  4 
78)  20 
58)  6 
52)78  52 
0) 
ANNEX  5 
Badge  No.  11  13 
Personal  No.  811  132 
Bicycle machine  (20  kg/m) 
ice water 
before  1250  g) 
)  - 150  g 
after  100  g) 
U Soda  Cartridge 
before  2,830) 
)  - 175 
after 3,005  ) 
02  consumption 
continuous  lung  control 
cartridge  clogged  up 27  January  1971 
Wearer  :  Hoffmann,  Edmond 
Colliery  :  Merlebach 
VII,  41 
FENZY  M APPARATUS 
Time  Temperatures  o2 
single  cumu- milieu  Fenzy  M 
lative 
0  0  20.2  20.5  205  13 
10  10  21  11.5  192  5 
5  15  21  14  187  9 
10  25  21  13.7  178  4 
5  30  21  15.5  174  9 
10  40  21. 1  13.7  165  4 
5  45  21  16.3  161  9 
10  55  20.9  15.5  152  4 
5  60  20.8  17.5  148  8 
10  70  20.9  17  140  3 
5  75  21  19  137  7 
10  85  21.2  17.2  130  4 
5  90  21.2  19.4  126  8 
10  100  21  18.7  120  3 
5  105  21. 1  19.2  117  9 
10  115  21. 1  19.2  108  5 
5  120  21. 1  20.3  103  10 
10  130  21.2  20.4  93  3 
5  135  21.2  21.4  90  10 
10  145  21.6  21.4  80  5 
5  150  21.4  21.7  75  13 
10  100  21.6  21.2  62  3 
5  165  21.7  21.7  59  18 
10  175  21.8  21. 1  41  4 
5  180  21.8  22  37  6 
1  181  21.7  21.5  30 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
ANNEX  6 
Badge  No.  559 
Personal  No.  367  334 
Bicycle machine  (20  kg/m) 
ice water 
before  1070  g  ) 
)  -40  g 
after 670  g  ) 
soda  cartridge 
before  2725  g  ) 
)  +  226 
after 3011  g  ) 
consumption  :  561  bars/hr 
release  of  automatic 
throughput  1  to  3  times 
per minute 
7  bars/min 
velocity  :  30  km/hr VII,  42 
ANNEX  7 
FENZY  M - Ice  Water 
Wearer  :  MULLER  from  PCS  - two  hours 
12  Apri 1  1971 
Time  Temperatures 
single  cumu- milieu  Fenzy  o2  . 
lative 
0  21.4  15  200  bars 
10  10  22,5  14.6  185  5  ice water 
5  15  22,6  14.1  180  5  before  1400  ) 
10  25  22.9  14.6  173  7  lung  control)  700 
5  30  22.2  16.2  168  5  after 700  ) 
10  40  22.4  18.2  159  9  Soda  cartridge  (U) 
5  45  23  19.6  154  5  ice water  as  above 
10  55  22.2  18.1  147  7  temperature  =  +8°2 
5  60  22.4  21.8  142  5  lung  control 
10  70  22.8  20  138  4 
5  75  22.6  20.4  134  4 
10  85  22.5  20.2  128  6 
5  90  22.2  21.1  125  3 
10  100  22  21.4  119  6 
5  105  22.4  22.2  117  2 
10  115  22.8  23.4  110  7 
5  120  22.1  23.2  108  2 
3  123  22.2  23.6  90  39  automatic  throughput 
pulses 
velocity  :  30  km/hr 
02  6  bars/min IMPLEMENTATION  OF  RECOMMENDATIONS 
OF  THE  MINES  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH  COMMISSION 
(AS  AT  1.1.1972) 
ANNEX  VIII VIII,  3 
The  recommendations,  assessments,  principles  and  reports  prepared by  the Mines 
Safety  Commission  since  the beginning  of  its activities  and  distributed to  the  Govern-
ments  and  other interested bodies  in  accordance with its  terms  of  reference,  for  further 
action  or  for  information,  can  usefully be  classified in five  groups  according  to  their 
date  of  issue  :  • 
A- recommendations  set  out  in  the  1st  and  2nd Reports of  the  Min~s Safety  and  Health 
Commission  covering  1957-60,  implementation  of which  was  reported  upon  in  the  3rd 
Report  as  at  1.1.1966  and  in the  5th Report  as  at  1.1.1968, 
B - recommendations  set  out  in the  3rd  Report  of  the Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission 
covering  1961-65,  implementation  of which was  reported  upon  in  the  same  report  as  at 
1.1.1966  and  in the  5th  Report  as  at  1.1.1968, 
C - recommendations  set  out  in  the  4th  Report  of  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission 
covering  1966,  implementation  of which was  reported  upon  in the  5th Report  ~s  at 
1.1.1968, 
D - recommendations  set  out  in  the  5th  and  6th  Reports  of  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health 
Commission  covering  1967-68,  implementation  of which was  reporte~ upon  in the  7th 
Report  as  at  1.1.197~ and 
E  - recommendations  set  out  in the  7th  and  8th Report  of  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health 
Commission  covering  1969-70,  implementation  of which  is  reported  upon  for  the first 
time  in this  tht 9th Report  as  at  1.1.1972. 
The  following  symbols  are  used  in  the  tables  : 
C  The  national  regulations  are  already  in  accordance with  the  recommendations 
C'  The  recommendations  have  not  been  embodied  in  regulations,  but  have  been 
implemented  de  facto 
NRC  New  regulations  in  accordance with  the  recommendations  have  been  drawn  up  and 
issued 
NRP  The  preparation  of  new  regulations  in  accordance with  the  recommendations  is  in 
hand 
E  The  preparation of  new  regulations  is being studied 
?  There  is uncertainty  regarding  the  steps  to be  taken 
A  The  national  authorities  have  abstained  from bringing their regulations  into 
line with  the  recommendations. 
To  ensure  a  certain degree  of  uniformity with  regular  reports  on  the measures 
taken,  the  following  survey  shows  not  only  those  recommendations  which  aim  at  modifying 
regulations  and  to this  end  are  indicated by  the  letters  used  for  the  purpose,  but  also 
those which need not be  implemented  by means  of  regulations  or  laws.  These  latter call 
for other modes  of  application. 
The  situation with  regard  to  implementation  of  the  above-mentioned  recommenda-
tions  and  proposals  is  indicated, with explanatory notes,  in  the  following  tables. VIII,  5 
A - Regular  report  on  the  implementation of  the Mines  Safety  and Health 
Commission's  Recommendations  published  in the  1st  and  2nd  Reports 
I.- TECHNICAL  ASPECTS 
N.R./1-lph.  Saar  Belgium  France 
Recommendations  by  the  Commission 
A.- ELECTRIFICATION 
I  - Recommendations  regarding  elimination of oil 
from  underground electrical eguipment  (1st 
Re12ort  of Mines  Safet~ Commission,  E·  7 
(German  text) 
2a)  Resistances  installed underground  should 
not  contain  any  combustible  oi  1.  (Excep-
tions  are  allowed  for  the  starting-up 
resistances  of  large motors  driving water 
pumps) 
b)  Condensers  and  transformers  installed 
underground  must  not  contain either  com-
bustible oil or dielectric substances  which 
can  give  off noxious  gases. 
- Otherwise  effective measures  should be 
taken  against  the  dangers  to workers 
caused by  the  use  of  these  devices. 
c)  Switches  and  rela~s, used  underground  and 
operating on  voltages  below  1.100 v,  must 
not  contain  any  flammable  oils 
d)  Protection  of workers  against  dangers 
involved  in  the  use  of  switches  and  rela~s, 
which work  on  voltages  above  1,100  V and 
contain  flammable  oil 
3.  Recommendation  to  continue  research  into 
the  manufacture  of  low-oil  or oil-less  HT 
switchgear  and  protective relays  which 
give riskfree service  in gassy pits. 
can 
Recommendation  to begin detailed investiga-
tion  into  the  degree  of  increased safety 
which  can  be  achieved,  when  prescribing  an 
explosion-proof housing  for normally 
spark-producing  components  only,  and  a 
design  of the  "increased safety"  type  for 
all  other equipment. 
4.  Extending  the  use  of  low-oil  or oil-less 
HT  switchgear  and  oil-less  HT  protective 
relays  at points where  there is no  gas 
risk. 
II- Recommendations  for  shotfiring  leads  (2nd 
Report  of  Mines  Safety  Commission,  P•  10) 
2.  Recommendations  for  all shotfiring leads 
- Every  conductor mustbe  provided with  at 
least  one  good-quality  insulation. 
- All  connections  must  be  properly  insulated 
·-----------
(1)  cannot  be  laid down  in inspectorate regulations; 
(2)  not applicable; 
1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1. 
1970  1972  1970  1972  1970  1972  1970  1972 
C'+  C'+ 
c  c  c  c  NRC  c  NRP  NRP 
C'+  C'+ 
c  c  c  c  NRC  c  NRP  NRP 
C'+ 
c  c  c  c  NRC  c  c' INRP 
C'+  C'+ 
c  c  c  c  NRC  c  NRP  rRP· 
c  c  c  c  NRC  c  c  c 
(1)  (1)  (2)  (2)  (3) 
A  A  - - c'  ?  C'  c' 
(1)  (2)  (2)  (4)  (4) 
c  A  - - NRC  c  E  E 
(1) 
c  A  c  c  NRC  c  C'  C' 
c  c  c  c  NRC  c  c  c 
c  c  c  c  NRC  c  c  c 
Italy 
1.1.  1.1. 
1970  1972 
C'  C' 
C'  C' 
C'  C' 
C'  C' 
c  c 
(2)  (2) 
- -
c  c 
c  c 
c'  c' 
C'  C' 
(3)  devices with satisfactory characteristics exist;  the  conditions of application must be  specified; 
(4)  approval  regulations  have  been  issued for  equipment in the  "increased safety" category,  but the  type of 
protection is left to  the individual  firms; 
(5)  with regard to  the  approval of certain high-voltage switches. 
Nether-
lands 
1.1.  1.1. 
1970  1972 
c  c 
NRP  NRP 
NRP  NRP 
NRP  NRP 
c  c 
NRP  NRP 
NRP  NRP 
E  E 
c  c 
c  c VIII,  6 
N.R./\{ph.  Saar  Belgium  France  Italy  Nether-
lands  Recommendations  by  the  Commission 
1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1. 1.  1.1.  1.1. 
1970  1972  1970  1972  1970  1972  1970  1972  1970  1972  1970  1972 
- Every  shotfiring  lead must  have  the 
appropriate  degree  of  flexibility.  c  c  c  c  NRC  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  c  c 
- The  conductors  must  be  of  such  cross-
sectional  area that  they  do  not  occasion  C'+  C'+  an  excessive voltage  drop.  c  c  c  c  NRC  c  C'  c'  C'  C'  NRP  NRP 
- The  shotfiring leads  must  be  made  up  and 
laid so  that  the  risk of  any  fault  cur-
rent,  resulting  from  contact with metal  NRP  objects,  is  reduced.  c  c  c  c  NRC  c  c  c  c  c  +  c  c 
- Before  any  shotfiring operation  in 
particular workings  and  before  the  simul-
taneous  firing  of  a  fairly  large number 
of  shots,  the  ohmic  resistance  of  the 
circuit must  be measured.  c  c  c  c  NRC  c  c  c  c  c  c  C' 
I  a)  Tem12ora!2:  shotfirin~ leads 
- Careful  inspection before  each  firing.  c  c  c  c  NRC  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C' 
-------- -------- -
- Regular  and  thorough  testing by  an  expert 
either at  the  surface  or in  an  underground 
workshop.  c  c  c  c  NRC  c  c  c  C'  c'  C'  C' 
A thorough  checking must  consist  of  at 
least  : 
- a  careful  inspection of  the  lead  over its 
whole  length;  c  c  c  c  NRC  c  c  c  c  c  C'+E  C'+E 
- measurement  of  the  insulation between  the 
two  conductors,  if the  lead  consists  of  a 
cable  or  rubber-covered  lead;  c  c  c  c  NRC  c  c  c  c  c  C'  C' 
- measurement  of  the  ohmic  resistance  of 
the  lead  c  c  c  c  NRC  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  --
b)  Permanent  shotfiring  leads 
( 1)  ( 1)  - Regular  and  thorough  checks  by  an  expert.  c  c  c  c  NRC  c  c  c  C'  C'  - -
- Written  record  of every  thorough  check,  (2)  (2)  ( 1)  (1) 
with  the  date.  A  A  c  c  NRC  c  C'  c  c  C'  - -
3.  Further  recommendations  for 12ermanent  and 
temporary  shotfirin~ leads  used  in  ~ass~ 
mines 
- The  shotfiring leads  must  fulfil  condi-
tions  which  ensure  sufficient safety 
with  regard  to  : 
a)  mechanical  strength  and  in particular 
tensile,  bending  and  abrasion 
strength;  c  c  c  c  NRC  c  c'  c'  NRP  NRP  C+C'  C+C'  --r---
b)  electrical insulation;  c  c  c  c  ~RC  c  C'  C'  NRP  'NRP  C+C'  C+C' 
c)  impermeability  (to moisture)  of the  C'+  C'+ 
insulation  and  the  sheathing.  c  c  c  c  ~RC  c  C'  c'  NRP  · NRP  NRP  NRP 
I  -- (1)  not applicable; 
(2)  seems  unnecessary  and would increase  administrative work. Recommendations  by  the  Corrunission 
Recommendation  that  checking standards 
which  correspond  to  the  conditions  be  laid 
down. 
4.  Supplementary  recommendations  for permanent 
shotfiring  leads  used  in  gassy pits 
- Permanent  leads  should be  so  arranged 
that,  as  far  as  possible,  damage  during 
firing of  the  shots  or  from  other  causes 
is  avoided. 
- If the  shotfiring  lead  consists  of  two 
separate  conductors,  these  should be 
arranged  arranged sufficiently far  apart 
and  in  such  a  way  that  inspection is 
possible 
- In  shafts  and  dipping  roads,  the  leads 
must  have  an  adequate  mechanical  strength 
III - Recommendations  regarding the protection of 
underground  distribution networks  against  the 
danger  of  causing electric shocks  (2nd  Report 
of  the  Mines  Safety  Commission,  p.l3) 
I.  The  following  recommendations  refer only  to 
the  MT  networks  defined below;  Medium 
Tension  (MT)  :  the  normal  voltage  range  for 
working  equipment  used  underground with 
three-phase  A.C.  (between  380  and  1,100  V). 
These  networks  should fulfil  all  the  recom-
mendations  set  out  below. 
These  recommendations  refer neither to  the 
HT  networks,  nor  to voltages  which  are  lower 
than  the  medium-tension  range  and  are  used 
for  particular purposes  (lighting,  drilling 
apparatus,  telephone  installations,  etc.) 
for which  some  easing  of  the  restrictions 
may  be  allowed.  Overhead wire  networks 
with bare  trolley wires  are  also excluded. 
II.  Protection  against  the  risk of electric 
shocks 
A - First  order precautions 
(Protection  against  direct  contact with 
a  live  phase) 
VIII,  7 
N.R./Hph. 
1.1. 
1970 
c 
c 
c 
c 
1.1. 
1972 
c 
c 
c 
c 
Saar 
1.1. 
1970 
c 
c 
c 
c 
1.1. 
1972 
c 
c 
c 
c 
Belgium 
1.1.  1.1. 
1970  1972 
NRC  c 
NRC  c 
NRC  c 
NRC  c 
France 
1.1. 
1970 
1.1. 
1972 
{1)  (1) 
Italy 
1.1. 
1970 
1.1. 
1972 
- - NRP  NRP 
C'  C'  c'  C' 
C'  C'  C'  C' 
c  c  c  c 
Nether-
lands 
1.1.  1.1. 
1970  1972 
E  E 
(1)  (1) 
(1}  (1) 
C'  C' 
1.  Every  chance  contact with  a  live 
phase  should  be  avoided  as  far  as 
possible by  laying  the  conductor  out 
of  the workmen's  reach,  by  interpo-
sing effective barriers,  by  sheathing 
the  phase  or by  insulating it.  ~c---+_c  ____  ~c  ____  ~c  ____ ,_c  __  ~~c  ____ +-c---+_c  ____  ~c---r_c  __ _,_c  __ _,_c  __ ~ 
2.  The  cables  and  leads  used  in medium-
tension  underground networks  should 
be mechanically protected either by 
means  of  a  metal  armouring  connected 
to  the  pilot  lead,  or by  a  flexible  c +  c + 
envelope  of  the best  possible  design.  rc  ____  +c  ____ -rc  ____  ~c  ____ ,_c  __  ~~c  ____ +-c---+_c ____  r __  c __  ~c  ____  ,_N_RP  __  ,_N~RP--~ 
- Leads  without  metal  armouring  must 
be  electrically protected by  sepa-
rate  or  common  protective  screens, 
which  trip safety devices  in the 
event  of  a  fault.  C 
3.  Only  trained men  should  be  allowed  to 
open  the  housings  of  accessible  live 
c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP 
____________  parts  (medium-tens ion  vo 1 t age:______:r:_!a~n!l~_g,~e=-~  ),___-l-__  .J._ __  .J___~-----~-----I-----i----1'-----''----L------'------ __  _ 
(1)  not applicable. VIII,  8 
I 
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and  this  only under  conditions  which 
have  been  clearly laid  down  in 
advance.  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c 
4.  The  repair  and  maintenance  of  the 
electrical equipment  should be 
entrusted only to  trained personnel  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c 
B - Second  order  Erecautions 
(Equipotential  connection between 
conductive parts of  the  installation) 
1.  All  underground networks  must  be 
provided with  an  equipotential 
connection between  the  conductive 
(not  live  in normal  operation) 
components  of  the  installation and 
the other metal  elements  connected 
thereto,  such that its  conductance 
is sufficient to prevent  the  occur-
renee,  between  any  two  points  acces-
sible to  a  workman  simultaneously, 
of  a  voltage higher  than  the weak 
voltage.  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP 
2.  This  equipotential  connection  (pro-
tective  lead)  must  ensure electric 
connection between  the  conductive 
elements  of  the  installation over 
the whole  length  of  the  network.  It 
must  be  maintained  in satisfactory 
condition  and  must  be  inspected  as 
often  as  is necessary  to ensure  this.  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP 
3.  The  above-mentioned  equipotential 
connection  (protective  lead)  must  be 
earthed  to  at  least  one  point  of  the 
network via  an  earth  connection  of 
the  lowest  possible  resistance.  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP 
4.  This  earth  connection  must  be 
combined with  the  star-point earth 
connection,  if a  star-point  is 
employed  c  c  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP  C'  C'  NRP  NRP 
c - Third order Ere cautions 
(Reduction  of  fault  duration) 
1.  Any  fault  current must  be  considered 
dangerous  in underground  medium-
tension networks  if, when  the  fault 
current  flows through the protective 
lead  and  connected  conductive  compo-
nents  of  the  installation of earth, 
there  is  produced between  any  two 
points  accessible  to  a  workman 
simultaneously  a  voltage  exceeding 
the  level  of  a  weak  voltage,  regard-
less  of whether it occurs  between 
parts  of  the  installation or between  NRP  NRP 
such  parts  and  earth.  c  c  c  c  c  c  +  C'  +  C'  c  C'  c  c 
2.  If the  star-Eoint of  a  network  is 
earthed via  a  weak  imEedance  or 
without  anl  imEedance,  so  that  the 
Eresumed  fault  current  is not 
restricted to  a  low  value,  then  the 
network  must  be  provided with  safety 
devices  which  can  at  any  time  auto-
matically isolate  the  damaged  section 
of  the network  from  the current  source 
(or  render it completely  dead)  before 
the  fault  current  flowing  through  the 
protective  lead  and  connected 
conductive  components  of  the instal-
lation or earth  reach  a  dangerous  (1)  (1)  ( 1)  (1)  ( 1)  (1)  C+  C+ 
value  - - - - - - NRP  NRP  E  E  NRP  NRP 
-~ 
(1)  not applicable,  as  only isolated ciPcuits  aPe  used. Recommendations  by  the  Conunission 
- Since the  complete  or partial 
cutting-off of  a  line voltage 
can  have  serious  effects  on  the 
current  supply to  important 
equipment,  appropriate preventive 
measures  should be  taken. 
- Only when  the  line has  been  repai-
red or the  fault eliminated,  or  at 
the  direction of  a  specialist who 
has  taken  all necessary precau-
tions,  may  that section  of  the 
network be  brought  under voltage 
again. 
3.  If the  star-point of  a  network  is 
insulated or earthed via some  imped-
ance,  which  restricts  fault  currents 
to  a  low  value,  the  network must  be 
fitted with  supervising devices  which 
are  always  in  a  state of  readiness 
and  which  are  capable  : 
a)  - either of  checking  the  insula-
tion  of  the various  parts  of 
the network  and  of  indicating 
any  damage  they may  have 
suffered or 
- of  automatically  cutting off 
the  damaged  section  of the net-
work  from  its source  of  current 
VIII,  9 
N.R./Hph. 
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1970 
c 
c 
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1972 
c 
c 
Saar 
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NRC  c 
NRC  c 
France 
1.1. 
1970 
1.1. 
1972 
C+  C+ 
NRP  NRP 
C+  C+ 
NRP  NRP 
(or  rendering  the  entire net- (1)  (2)  C+  C+ 
Italy 
1.1. 
1970 
E 
E 
1.1. 
1972 
E 
E 
Nether-
lands 
1.1.  1.1. 
1970  1972 
c  c 
NRP  NRP 
work  dead).  ~C~~~C--~~C~~C~--~N~R=C-4_C~-4~N~R~P-+N~RP~-4-=E--~E~-+~N~RP~rN~RP~~ 
- If no  automatic  cut-off device 
is  installed,  the  responsibility 
for  cutting-off should be 
entrusted to  an  expert who  can 
intervene  as  soon  as  the warning 
signal  of  the  supervisory 
system is  tripped or if the 
( 3)  ( 3) 
fault  assumes  major  dimensions.  ~c--~_c  ____  ~c~~-C~--+-N_R~C~~C--~~N~RP~~N~R=P~~C_'  __  ~c~'--~-----+----~ 
- If cutting-off has  been  neces-
sitated by  one  of  the  two  cases 
cited  above,  the restoration  of 
current may  be  accepted  only 
after repair of  the  line  or 
elimination  of  the  fault,  or 
only  at  the  direction  of  an 
expert  official,  who  has  taken 
all necessary precautions 
- If no  automatic cut-off  device 
is installed,  the  rubber-covered 
leads  of mobile  machines  should 
be  f1tted w1th  an  automatic  de-
vice which  renders  them  dead  as 
soon  as  there  occurs  a  fault 
current which  is  caused by  damage 
to  the  external  armour  or by 
damage  to  the  insulation  of  an 
c  c  c  c  NRC  C  NRP  . NRP  C'  c'  c  c 
individual  phase;  ~c  ____  +c  ____  ~c  ____  ~c~--~N~R~c~~c  ____  ~c---+~c  ____  ~c~  __  ~c~  __  ~N~RP~~N~RP=-~ 
b)  - or  of automatically cutting off 
the  damaged  section  of  the net-
work  from  its source  of  current 
(or  rendering  the  entire net-
work- dead)  as  soon  as  a  double 
fault  occurs  leading  to  a  danger-
ous  fault  current  in  the protec-
tive  lead  and  connected parts  of 
the installation. 
(1)  must be  carried out by  1.10.19?1 in pits where  there is a risk of firedamp; 
(2)  was  carried out in workings  where  there is a risk of firedamp; 
(3)  not  applicable~  as  only isolated circuits are  used. Recommendations  by  the  Commission 
- In  this  instance,  the  current 
may  be  switched  on  again  only 
after the  line has  been 
repaired or  the  fault  elimi-
nated. 
N.B.  The  comments  on  this  Recommendation  are given 
in  the  Second  Report  of  the Mines  Safety 
Commission,  pp.  15/22. 
B.  - MECHANISATION  AND  LOCOMOTIVES 
I  - Recommendations  regarding  locomotive  equipment 
(First  Report  of  the  Safety Commission,  p.20 
(German  text) 
1.  New  locomotives  must  be  equipped with  fixed, 
rigid cabins  which  at  all times  give  the 
driver a  clear view  along  the  roadway,  ahead 
and  behind,  without  any  need  for  him  to put 
his  head  out  of  the  cabin.  (Fixed  cabins  are 
understood  to  cover  those  forming  a  part  of 
the  structure or which  can  be  removed  only 
laboriously with  special  tools.) 
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France 
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lands 
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1970  1972 
NRP  NRP 
c  c 
2.  The  locomotives  in service must  be  modified 
to meet  this  requirement,  ~c~~-c~(
2 _J-+_c~~~c---+~A--~~A~-4~E~-~~E~_1 
__  c=--+-C~--~~A--+-~A~_, 
- locomotives  which  cannot  be  modified 
should  gradually be withdrawn  from service, 
within  a  period  to be  fixed  by  the 
responsible  inspectorate,  or  ~C~~-c  ____  +-c--~~c---4~A--~_A  __ ~  __  E  __  ~_E  ____  ~c  __ -+_c  ____  ~(_2~)-r_~(_2_~)-
- only be  used  in  roadways  which  are  wide 
and  high  enough  to eliminate  accident  risk.  C  c  c  c  c  I  c'  E  E  A  A  (2)  (2) 
+-----~---+-----+----4-----~~-4------
3.  For particular types  of  locomotive,  or in 
certain circumstances,  the  responsible 
Inspectorate  can  grant  exceptions  from  the 
above  regulations,  provided  that  safety 
regulations  of  equal  stringency  are  laid  down  ~C~-4~C~--~C~~~C~--~N~R~C~~N~R=C~+-=E--~=E--~~A~-+~A~  __  ~C~-+-C~~ 
II - Recommendations  regarding  the neutralisation of 
Diesel-engine exhaust  fumes  (First  Report  of 
the  Safety  Commission,  p.  23  (German  text) 
- General  use  of better starters 
1-=c~~~c~·---+~E~~~E~--~E~--~E~--4-~?--~~?  ____  ~?---t~?  _____ ~  __  c  __  ·~~c--~ 
- Intensified research into improving  combustion  (6)'  (6) I 
by  the  use  of  catalysts.  ~?--~?~--~A~(_
6_J+A~(
6 _J-4~E~-4~E~~~?--4-?~--~(~6~)-r~(~6)~~A~-t~A~-l· 
- Draw  attention  to  the existence of  this  process~---(
1 _J~  __  r_1 _J-+_-_r_ 1_)+  ___  ( 1 _)~---(_ 1 _J_+---(_1_)4-_--(1_J,_  __  (_1_)-r---(_1_)~-----+---(_1_)t- __  (_1_J
1 
- Continuation  of  the  research  into  an  automatic 
transmission system,  which  would  make  it pos-
sible to  give  Diesel  engines  a  constant  rpm. 
- Subsequent  resumption  of trials with  the 
Houdry  carbon  monoxide  purification process. 
C.- FIRES  AND  UNDERGROUND  COMBUSTION 
I  - Recommendations  regarding  equipment  for  shafts 
in  connection with  the prevention  of  fires 
E  E  (6)  (6) 
(First  Report  of  the Safety  Commission,  p.  11 
L---~=(G=e=rm==an===t=e=x=t~)~---------------------------------+----4-----~---+----~--~~---+----+-----~---+----~----~ 
(1)  not applicable; 
(2)  in the  case of main-road  locomotives,  with the exception of "a  clear view behind",  which is 
difficult technically; 
(3)  no  application made  to  gateroad  locomotives,  because  the  risk of accident is increased; 
(4)  for  trolley  locomotives; 
(5)  for other than  trolley  locomotives; 
(6)  the  problem of the  low  CO  content of Diesel  engine  exhaust  fumes  is solved by  blocking the injection 
pump  at a  pumping  capacity at which  the  CO  content  shows  a  marked rise. VIII,  ll 
N.R./Hph.  Saar  Belgium 
Recommendations  by  the  Cormnission 
1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1. 
1970  1972  1970  1972  1970  1972 
2.  Ste:es  to :erevent  anl  accumulation  of  srease 
and  coaldust  (First  Report  of  the  Mines 
Safety  Commission,  p.  15  (German  text)  and 
Report  of  the  Conference,  P·  54,  No.  2, 
para.  C.) 
- Skip-winding  installations  should  as  far 
as  possible be  sited only  in upcast  (1)  (1) 
shafts;  C'  C'  A  A  E  E 
- Equipment  in new  shafts  should be  of 
aerodynamic  form;  C'  C'  C'  c'  E  E 
- all suitable steps  should be  taken  to 
avoid  in every  case  any  accumulation  cf 
dust  to ensure  that  any  such  accumulation 
is  removed.  c  c  c  c  NRC  c 
3.  Preferred siting of  methane-draina~e lines 
in upcast  shafts  (First  Report  of  the Mines 
Safety Commission,  p.  16  (German  text)  and 
Report  of  the  Conference,  p.  54,  No.  3, 
Par.  d) 
- This  recommendation  of  the  Conference 
applies  particularly to pressure lines.  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC 
4.  Siting electric cables,  comEressed-air 
mains  and  ~as-draina~e Ei:ees  (First Report 
of  the  Mines  Safety Commission,  p.  16 
(German  text)  and  Report  of  the  Conference, 
p.  54,  No.  3,  par.  e) 
- electric cables  and  leads,  compressed-air 
drains  and  gas-drainage  pipes  should not 
be  sited in the haulage  compartment  :  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC 
- electric cables  should not  all be sited 
in  the  s arne  shaft.  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC 
II- Guiding  princi:eles  for  fi~htin~ mine  fires bl 
sending  down  water  (Second  Re2ort  of  the Mines 
Safetl Commission,  E·  26) 
1.  Installation 
a)  At  the  top  of  every  shaft  re~ching to  the 
surface there must  be  a  device  which  can 
send  down  at  least  50  lit  res  of water 
per minute  and  per square metre  of shaft 
cross-section.  c  c  c  c 
b)  This  device  must  be  installed in such  a 
way  that  the  supply  of water  can  at no 
time  be  seriously  affected by  drawing-off 
or  flowing-away  of water  at  other points.  c  c  c  c 
c)  The  water  pipes  and  the  spray  jets must 
be  set  in  such  a  way  that  they  are 
protected  from  frost.  c  c  c  c 
d)  The  damming  device  or devices  must  be  set 
outside  the  shaft-top building  in  such  a 
way  that  they  can  be  operated at  any  time. 
They  must  be  marked  by  means  of  an 
instruction plate.  c  c  c  c 
2.  Fires  in  down-cast  shafts 
a)  Immediate  measures 
- It is  essential to indicate  in  the 
fire-fighting plan  the maximum  amount 
(1)  all skip-winding equipment still in use is installed in downcast  shafts; 
(2)  no  methane-drainage  lines in service. 
NRC  E 
NRC  E 
NRC  E 
NRC  E 
France  Italy  Nether-
lands 
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Recommendations  by  the  Commission 
1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1. 
1970  1972  1970  1972  1970  1972  1970  1972  1970  1972 
of water which  can  be  sent down  each  of 
the downcast  shafts, without  creating 
additional dangers  for  the workers  by 
A(1)  A(1)  A(2)  A  (2)  its effects  on  the ventilation.  E  E  E  E  E  E 
- the  damming  device which  can be 
operated  at  this  stage must  not  release 
more  than  this  prescribed quantity of 
A  (3)  A(3)  A(2)  A(2)  water.  E  E  E  E  E  E 
- until the  leader of  the  rescue  operations 
has  issued his  instructions  and  as  long 
as  there  has  been no  reversal  of venti-
lation, water  may  be  sent  down  only by 
opening  the  damming  device  prescribed 
A(3)  A(3)  A  (2)  A(2)  for this  purpose.  E  E  E  E  E  E 
b)  Measures  to be  taken  on  the  instructions 
of  the  leader of  rescue  o:eerations 
- the  leader of  the  rescue  operations must 
therefore  decide 
- taking  into accont  all the  circumstances 
- either to  send  down  an  increased 
quantity of water - or  must  he  give  orders 
that  reversal  of  the  ventilation be  brought 
A(2)  A(2)  A  (2)  A(2)  about  or encouraged.  E  E  E  E  E  E 
- to facilitate  the  reversal  of  the venti-
lation in the  burning downcast  shaft, 
once  this  has  been  opened  and  the main 
fan  stopped,  water  can  be  sent  down  the 
up cast  shaft.  c  c  C'  C'  E  E  E  E  E  E 
- if reversal  of  the ventilation has  al-
ready  occurred - either as  a  result  of 
the  upward  current produced by  the heat 
of  the fire  or deliberately - downcast 
shafts  should be  treated  as  though  they 
were  upcast  shafts.  c  c  C'  C'  E  E  E.  E  E  E 
- if the  calculated water quantity  appears 
to be  too small  to extinguish the fire 
immediately,  or to hinder its spread, 
additional  precautions  must  be worked 
out  and  laid  down  in the  fire-fighting 
plan  : 
- simultaneous  supply  of water  down 
A(2)  A(2)  A(2)  A  (2)  all downcast  shafts,  E  E  E  E  E  E 
- partial shutting-off of  the burning 
A(  4)  A  (4)  A(4)  A  ( 4)  shaft  at  surface level,  NRC  NRC  E  E  E  E 
- shut  underground  fire-doors,  etc.  A(4)  A(4)  c  c  E  E  E  E  E  E 
3.  Fires  in  u:ecast  shafts 
- in upcast  shafts, water may  be  sent  down 
only  on  the  instructions  of  the  leader of 
the  rescue  operation.  c  c  c  c  E  E  E  E  E  E 
- as  long  as  there  are still any  workers  in 
the pit,  only so much  water may  be sent 
down  as will  allow  the  fumes  of  the  fire to 
continue to be  extracted whilst  the water 
is  falling.  c  c  c  c  E  E  E  E  E  E 
Note.  A commentary  and  examples  (with diegrams),  re-
garding the  calculation of the effect  of  falli~ 
(1)  there  are  doubts  as  to the practicability of the Recommendation;  minimum  water quantities are  laid down; 
(2)  not suitable  for inclusion in regulations; 
(3)  there  are  doubts  as  to  the practicability of the Recommendation; 
(4)  not suitable for inclusion in regulations;  must be  decided separately in each  case; 
Nether-
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1970  1972 
c  c 
c  c 
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c  c 
c  c 
c  c 
c  c 
c  c 
c  c VIII,  13 
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Recommendations  by  the  Commission 
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water  on  the ventilation  are  given in the 
Second  Report  of the  Mines  Safety  Commission, 
pp.  29-50. 
III - Recommendations  for  the  sealing-off  b~ dams  of 
mine  fires  and  underground  combustion  (Second 
Re:2ort  of  the  Mines  Safet~ Commission 2  E·  53) 
Introductory  remark 
The  following  Recommendations  are  not  binding. 
They  are  not  intended  to  give  Inspectorates 
"ready-made"  regulations;  on  the  contrary,  it 
remains  for  the  competent  authorities  to decide 
:ww  these  Recommendations  are  to be  applied  as 
regulations,  circulars  or service  instructions. 
These  Recommendations  refer only  to  the  actual 
fighting  of  the  fire  or  combust ion;  they  do 
not  refer to the measures  to be  taken  as  a 
matter  of priority to rescue  men  following  the 
outbreak. 
A  - When  a  mine  fire has  broken  out  or under-
ground  combustion  developed,  it is  indis-
pensable  to  take  the  necessary preparatory 
steps  for  any  later sealing-off by  dams 
which  may  be  necessary while  the  direct 
firefighting  operations  are still going 
on. 
- In  the event  of  sealing-off by  dam 
becoming necessary,  as  a  general  rule  the 
first  stoppings  to  be  erected  must  be 
advance  dams.  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  C'  C'  c'  c'  c  c 
These  aJvance  dams  are  in  fact  the  real 
subject  of  the  present  Recommendations. 
B  - Structure  and  erection  of  the  advance  dams 
1.  If there  is no  risk  of  exElosion  ( 1)  : 
a)  to make  the  advance  dams  themselves 
as  air-tight  as  possible  and  to 
create  the  closest  possible  seal 
between  the  dam  and  the  surrounding 
walls;  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  C'  C'  E  c  c  c 
b)  there  is nothing  against  shutting 
off first  of  all the  intake  air.  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  c'  C'  E  E  c  c 
2.  If there  is  a  risk  of  ex:2losion  : 
a)  - to have  at  all  times  the  most 
precise  information possible 
regarding  the  degree  of  explosion 
risks  in  the  fire  zone;  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  c'  C'  E  E  c  c 
- it may  be  necessary  to  provide  the 
men  constructing the  advance  dams 
with  fireproof  clothing;  c  c  c  c  E  E  C'  C'  E  C'  c  c 
b)  - to ensure  that  the  advance  dams  are 
as  air-tight  as  possible;  to ensure 
that  they  are  strong  enough  to 
resist  an  explosion;  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  c'  C'  E  C'  c  c 
c)  - to ensure  that  for  the entire 
period  during which  the  stopping  is 
being  erected,  there is sufficient 
ventilation of  the  fire  zone  to 
counter  as  far  as  absolutely pos-
sible the  formation  of  an  explosive 
gas  mixture;  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  C'  C'  E  c'  c  c 
(1)  for the  assessment of the risk.  see  chapter A -II a).  p.  52. VIII,  14 
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d)  to ensure  that  all suitable  I  -
measures  are  taken  to reduce  as 
far  as  possible  the effects  of 
any  explosion which  may  occur; 
(dust  barriers,  stone-dusting or 
water  trough barriers);  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  C'  C'  E  C'  c  c 
e)  - to  the  greatest possible extent, 
the  dams  on  the  intake  and  return 
sides  should be  sealed  simul-
taneaously;  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  C'  C'  E  C'  c  c  --
- only  the  number  of workers  and 
members  of  the staff strictly 
necessary  for  this work  should 
stay behind;  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  C'  C'  E  C'  c  c 
- as  soon  as  the  dams  have  been 
sealed,  the  danger  area must  be 
completely  evacuated.  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  c'  C'  E  C'  c  c 
c - The  final  dams  must  be  durable,  built of 
brick or  concrete  under  the  protection 
offered by  the  advance  dams.  c  c  c  c  NRC  NRC  C'  C'  E  C'  c  c 
Note  :  Additional details  to  the  foregoing 
Recommendations  are  given  in  a  Commentary 
(Second  Report  of  the  Mines  Safety  Commis-
sion,  PP·  53/58). VIII,  15 
I I  - HUMAN  FACTORS 
Recommendations  by  the  Commission 
A.- RECOMMENDATIONS  REGARDING  MEDICAL 
EXAMINATION  (SECOND  REPORT  OF  THE  MINES 
SAFETY  COMMISSION,  p.  79) 
I  - Pre-Entry Medical  Examinations 
- All  applicants  for  employment  at  collieries 
should undergo  a  pre-entry medical  examina-
tion. 
- This  must  es.tablish that  the  applicant  shows 
no  symptoms  rendering him unfit  for  such 
employment. 
The  pre-entry medical  examination must 
include  : 
- a  general examination 
- such  special examination  as  may  be  deemed 
necessary  for  the  purpose. 
- The  examinations  effected must  include,  as 
regards  the  chest,  a  radiograph  or radio-
photograph  of  format  not  smaller  than  70  x 
70  mm; 
- the  latter to be  supplemented if need be  by  a 
standard-format  (1  :  1)  radiophotograph; 
- The  nature  of  these  examinations  and 
- the  practical details,  together with 
- the  criteria on  which  the  doctor  should base 
his  findings, 
- should be  defined by  medical  experts. 
- In  the  case  of  recruitment  for work,  whether 
below  or  above  ground,  where  the worker will 
be  exposed  to  a  dust  hazard,  the  examination 
must  show  a  normal  pulmonary  image. 
- The  concept  of  normal  pulmonary  image  must  be 
defined  by  medical  experts. 
- These  are  to be  regarded  as  minimum  medical 
recommendations. 
- The  points  concerning the number  and  type  of 
examinations  to be  carried out, 
- the  effecting of  radiological  examinations 
- the  definition  of  the normal  pulmonary  image 
- are  subject  to  review  in each  country 
- whenever  this  is felt  to be  appropriate  in the 
light  of progress  in medical  and  radiological 
knowledge 
-working conditions,  and 
- preventive measures. 
II - Special Examinations 
1.  The  object  of  special medical  examinations 
should  be  to establish - taking  into  account, 
according to  circumstances,  the  opinions  of 
N. R. /Wph. 
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- vocational-guidance  and  applied 
psychology  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP 
- and  other services  concerned  a  worker's 
fitness  for  certain specific occupations.  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP 
2.  Such  examinations  are  essential  in  the  case 
of  jobs 
- which,  either in  themselves  or  owing  to 
the  conditions  under which  they  are  per-
formed,  involve  a  special hazard  to  the 
worker  himself  or  to  others  as  regards 
health and/  or safety,  c  c  c  c  NRP  c 
- which  involve  special health or safety 
requirements, 
- or which  demand  particular physical 
aptitudes  or  characterological qualities.  c  c  c  c  NRP  c 
3.  No  attempt  has  been  made  here  to  list in 
full  the  cases  in which  special  examinations 
are  necessary,  this  being  left  to  the 
competent  authorities  in  each  country. 
Examples  include  : 
- winding  enginemen, 
- staple pit enginemen, 
- motormen  (drivers  of  locomotives,  mobile 
haulers  and  surface vehicles), 
- workers  assigned  to hot workings, 
- all those  employed  on  cage handling. 
III - Routine  examinations  during  emElo~ent 
A - Periodic health  checks 
- The  object here  is  to establish whether 
the  subject  is still fit  for  duty,  c  c  c  c  c  c 
- to  detect  any  symptoms  of  occupational 
disease  at  the earliest possible stage,  c  c  c  c  c  c 
- where  appropriate  to help  supervise  the 
subject's health  generally.  c  c  c  c  c  c 
- All  personnel  should  undergo  such  check-ups 
at  intervals  c  c  c  c  c  c  -- ------
- The  interval is  fixed  at  two  years.  c  c  c  c  c  c 
----- ------ ----
- The  interval is  reduced  for workers  under 
21.  c  c  c  c  c  c  --
- The  interval should be  considered  as  a 
(4)  (4)  (4)  maximum  figure.  c  c  - - - c 
This  interval  can  also be  reduced  :  . 
- if the state  of health  of  a  worker  indicates 
that  such  a  reduction  is desirable;  c  c  c  c  c  c  f------- -- --· --
- in  relation  to  the  type  of work  performed;  c  c  c  c  NRP  c 
- because  of  the  nature  of  the  place  at which 
the  work  is  being  done.  c  c  c  c  NRP  c  --
(1)  the  interval is one  year; 
(2)  article  648  of Inspectorate  Regulations provides  for  an  interval of one  year; 
(3)  for workers  under 18  years; 
(4)  not  applicable. 
France  Italy  Nether-
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1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1. 1.  1.1.  1.1. 
1970  1972  1970  1972  1970  1972 
C'  C'  E  E  C'  C' 
c  c  c  c  c  c 
c  c  c  c  c  c 
c  c  c  c  c  c 
I 
I 
c  c  c  c  c  c 
c  c  C'  C'  c  c 
c  c  C'  C'  c  c 
c  c  c  c  c  c  ------- --~---------
c  (1)  c  (1)  c(2J  c(2J  c  c 
-----~---
c(3)  c (  3)  c  c_  NRP  NRP 
c  c  c  c  c  c 
c  c  C'  c'  C'  C'  ------1----1----· 
c  c  ~---- ~--~  c  c  --r--
c  c  E  E  c  c Recommendations  by  the  Commission 
B - Medical  examinations  on  specific occasions 
1.  In  the  case of  reassignment 
- Workers  whom  it is proposed  to  assign 
to  jobs  involving hazards  not 
previously  taken  into  account  for 
the  man  concerned  should  be  re-examin-
ed. 
2.  Medical  examination  following  absence 
from work 
-Where  a  man's  return to work  after  an 
illness  or  accident  involves  risk to 
the  safety  of himself  or others,  he 
may  be  subjected  to  a  special  examina-
tion, 
- the  type  and  extent  of which  should be 
fixed  in  each  case  according  to  the 
circumstances. 
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I  - TECHNICAL  ASPECTS 
N.R./Hph.  Saar  Belgium  France  Italy 
Recommendations  by  the  Commission 
I  - Recommendations  regarding  the protection of 
underground electrical networks  against  fire 
and  firedamp-explosion  risks  (Doc.  1156/61/4) 
1.  Recommendations  regarding the protection 
of  underground  electrical networks  against 
fire  risk 
A - First-order precautions  - avoidance  of 
fire  risk 
1)  Avoidance  of excessive heating  of 
cables  in normal  use  by  providing 
adequate  conductivity.  Avoidance  of 
unforeseen  local heatings  by  the  use 
of suitable designs  and  by  proper 
supervision. 
2)  Reduce  the  possibility of  faults  and 
short-circuits occurring between 
conductors,  or between  conductor  and 
earth,  by  adequate  insulation or 
proper  spacing  of  the  conductors. 
B - Second-order precautions  - protection 
against  the  effects  of  a  heating  or  a 
fault 
1)  Use  of heat-stable insulations. 
2)  Use  of protective sheathing  for 
equipment  and  for  cables,  made  of 
flame-resistant  and  non-propagating 
material. 
- Use  of  oil  as  a  non-conductor  only 
if no  fire  risk for  the workers  is 
involved. 
3)  Accumulations  of  flammable  or  combus-
tible materials  and  pipelines  for 
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combustible gases  should  be  sited  C'+  C'+  C +  C + 
well  away  from  electrical equipment.  I-C_+_C_'--1-c  __  +C_+_c_'-+-c---1_c  __  -+_c_--i_N_RP  ______ ~!!'- ~'__~~  ~~- ~-~--
C - Third-order precautions  - measures 
regarding  the  network 
1)  Automatic protection  of  networks  C +  c  + 
against  abnormal  overloads.  1 _c_-t~c-~~C--~~c--~-c~~-c~_~c~-+-c~-4~c~~~c~-4~N~RP=-~N~R~P~ 
2)  Automatic protection  of networks 
against  short-circuit;  these  protec-
tive devices  must  be  able  of  hand-
ling  the  maximum  short-circuit current 
at  their point  of  installation.  C 
Selecting and  regulating of  these 
devices  in  relation to  the minimum 
c  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP  C'  c 
c  +  c  + 
NRP  NRP  --
short-circuit current which  can  occur  C +  c  + 
at  the  end  of  the section  they  protect.~C---t~c--~~c--~c~  __  ,_c_~~~c~--~N~R=P-+~N~R~P--~c~·-~c  __  ' __  ~N~RP~~N~R~P~-~ 
3)  Steps  to give effective orotection 
against  lrn~current faults,  which 
might  get  past  the  above-named  protec-
(1)  with respect to armoured  cables. VIII,  20 
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1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1. 
1970  1972  1970  1972  1970 
tive  devices  and  cause  dangerous 
c(1J  c  (2)  heatings.  c  c  NRC 
2.  Recommendations  for  the ;erotection  of 
underground electrical networks  against 
firedam;e-explosion  risks 
A.  First-order ;erecautions  - Erevention 
of  accumulations  of  firedamE 
1)  The  firedamp  content  at  the  site of 
the electrical apparatus  must  be  kept 
within  the  limits  prescribed by  the 
Inspectorate.  c  c  c  c  c 
2)  The  ventilation situation must  be 
checked before  any  new  installation or 
extension  of electrical equipment.  c  c  c  c  c 
3)  There  must  be  a  thorough  investigation 
of  the  possible  consequences  of  any 
alterations  in working  method,  of 
ventilation or  gas  omission,  which 
might  cause  problems  in  the  vicinity 
of electrical equipm!nt.  c  c  c  c  NRC 
B.  Second-order Erecautions  - :erotection 
against  ignition 
1)  In  gassy workings  :  use  of  electrical 
equipment  which  is  permitted by  the 
Inspectorate  only under  its  own 
specified  conditions,  c  c  c  c  c 
2)  The  electrical equipment  must  be 
installed,  used,  supervised  and  main 
tained  in  such  a  way  as  to keep it 
flameproof.  c  c  c  c  c 
All  cables  must  be  of  adequate 
mechanical  strength.  c  c  c  c  c 
All  cables  must  be  installed  and 
maintained without  damage.  c  c  c  c  c 
c.  Third-order  Erecautions  - cutting off  the 
circuit 
1)  Networks  must  be  designed  and  installed 
in such  a  way  that  any  fault  current  I 
which  may  arise between  phase  and  earth 
is  reduced  to  a  low  value  or  quickly  c  (1)  cut  off.  c  c  c  NRC 
2)  A protective relay,  preferable  automa-
tic,  must  be  provided  against  between- c  (1)  phase  faults  and  earth faults.  c  c  c  NRC 
3)  Precautions  must  be  taken  to  avoid 
accidents  when  faults  are being  sought 
or dealt with.  c  c  c  c  NRC 
4)  Protection must  be  given  to  leads wit-
hout  metallic sheathing,  and  to those 
which  supply movable  machines,  by  means 
of  individual  or  collective  screens 
which  bring  a  protective  device  into 
operation if  a  fault  occurs.  c  c  c  c  NRC 
5)  If the  firedamp  content  rises  above  the 
prescribed  limit,  all the  sections  of 
the network  involved must  be  cut  off.  c  c  c  c  c 
Issuing instructions  to maintain  in 
operation  certain machines  which  provide 
ventilation.  c  c  c  c  c 
(1)  must be carried out oy  1.10.1971 in pits where  there  is  a  risk of firedamp; 
(2)  was  carried out in workings  where  there is a  risk of firedamp. 
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Restarting  only when  the  firedamp 
content  has  fallen below the  permis-
sible value,  and  only  on  the  orders  c +  c  +  of  a  trained person.  c  c  c  c  NRC  c  c  c  c  c  NRP  NRP  ----
SuEElementa!X  Erecautions  for Eits  liable to 
sudden  outbursts  of gas 
1.  Risk  of  damage  b;t  Earticles Erojected by 
an  outburst  of  gas 
- The  threatened  zones  in which projection 
c  (1)  c (  1)  c  (2)  c  (2)  can  occur  should not  be  electrified.  A  A  c  c  NRC  c  A  A 
- The  electrical equipment  and  cables 
should  be  protected  against  heavy  blows.  A  A  c  c  c  c  c  c  c (  2)  c  (2)  c  c 
- The  electrical equipment  should be 
c  (2)  c  (2)  designed  to  give  adequate  robustness.  A  A  c  c  c  c  c  c  _c  __ __ c_  --r=---
2.  The  risk  of  firedamE  concentrations 
- Increased ventilation  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  c  c  c (  2)  c(2)  c  c 
- Use  of  remote-indicating methano-meters 
or ventilation-fault detecto_rs  which  can 
I 
cut  off  the  threatened section of  the 
c  (2)  c  (2)  c +  c  +  network.  c'  C'  C'  C'  E  c  c  c  NRP  NRP 
- Relaxation  shot-firing only  after all 
c(2)  c (  2)  equipment  has  been  switched off.  C'  C'  c  I  C'  NRC  c  c  c  - -
3.  SupElementary electrical 12recautions 
a)  Preferable  use  of  a  starpoint earthed via 
a  strong  impedance,  e.g.  by  means  of  an  C'+  C'+ 
c(2)  c  (2)  insulation detector.  c  c  c  c  NRC  c  NRP  NRP  NRP  NRP 
b)  Quickest  possible  automatic protection 
of  the  network  against  all insulation 
faults,  even if formed  by  resistances 
c(3)  c(2)  c(2)  c  +  c +  between  phase  and  earth.  c  c  c  NRC  c  c  c  NRP  NRP 
II- General  guidelines  for  the  orening-ur of sealed-
( 1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
off fire  areas  (Doc.  1304/3/64) 
I.  GENERAL  (4)  (4) 
Special  reasons  for  opening-up  a  district 
sealed-off after a  fire  : 
- recovery  of  bodies 
- salvage  of material 
- recovery  of  roadways  and  workings 
- reduction  of  the  sealed-off  area 
- inspection  of  the district,  and,  if 
necessary, 
- direct  fire-fighting. 
The  following hazards  can  arise  from  reopen-
ing  a  sealed-off district  : 
the  use  of electPicity is foPbidden  in pits liable  to  sudden  outbupsts of gas~  excepting foP  lighting and 
shot-fiPing.  Exceptions  can~  howeveP~ be  appPoved by  the  senioP mining engineePs  :  when  using annouPed  cables~ 
telephone installations  and methanometePs  in intake aiPWays- pPovided that no  damage  is likely to  occuP  as  a 
Pesult of a  gas  outbuPst  - and  also in main  PetuPn  aiPWays. 
No  pits  liable to sudden  outbuPsts of gas.  HoweveP~ in pits  OP  paPts of mines  which  aPe  considePed to be 
liable  to  sudden  outbuPsts of gas~  the  use of electPicity~  excepting fop  lighting purposes  and poPtable  lamps~ 
must be  authoPized by  a  senioP mining  engineeP~  subject  to  the  obsePVance  of all otheP  measuPes~  pPecautions 
OP  PestPictions which  might be  included in the  authoPization such  as  fop  example  the  above-mentioned 
Pecommendations. 
must  be  caPPied out by  1.10.19?0 in low-tension netwoPks. 
the  opening-up of fiPe  aPeas  is caPPied out on  the  Pesponsibility of the  manageP,  who  pPepaPes  a  peopening  plan  -
taking into account  the  scale and  type of fiPe  and  the  ventilation situation in the  /iPe  aPea  - in collabopation 
with  the  Main  Rescue  Station.  The  action plans of the  Main  Rescue  Stations  vepy  laPgely  embody  the  guidelines 
laid down  in Doc.  1304/3/64. 
I Recommendations  by  the  Commission 
- release  of  CO,  foul air and  hot  damp  air, 
- explosion  of  firedamp  or fire  gas,  where 
the  fire  is not yet  extinguished, 
- recrudescence  of  the  fire,  which  need  not 
necessarily  occur  immediately,  but  even 
after some  time  has  elapsed. 
Recrudescence  of  the  fire  can  occur  only 
when  fresh  air reaches  the  seat  of  the  fire, 
so  that with all operations  involved  in 
reopening  a  fire  area it is  of  prime 
importance  to  inspect  the  individual air 
currents  constantly. 
All places  suspected  of having been  seats  of 
fire  or heatings  must  be  ascertained with 
the  utmost  speed. 
II.  BASIC  RULES 
Sealed-off districts  may  be  reopened  only 
VIII,  22 
N.R./Hph. 
1.1.  1.1. 
1970  1972 
c  c 
NRP  NRP 
Saar 
1.1. 
1970 
c 
c' 
1.1. 
1972 
c 
c' 
Belgium 
1.1.  1.1. 
1970  1972 
c  c 
C'  C' 
France 
1.1.  1.1. 
1970  1972 
C'  C' 
c'  C' 
Italy 
1.1. 
1970 
C' 
C' 
1.1. 
1972 
C' 
C' 
Nether-
lands 
1.1.  1.1. 
1970  1972 
C'  C' 
c'  c' 
after the  competent  authorities  have  been  (1)  (1)  (1)  (1) 
notified or have  given  their permission.  r-_c  __  ,__c  __  -+  __  c  __  ~_c  __  ~  ___  c  __  ~_c  __  ,__c  __  ~  __  c  __  ~_c  __  -+  __  c  __  ~_c  __  '-+-c  __  '~ 
Before  opening  commences,  gas  samples  must 
be  taken  from  the  fire  area,  at  each  stopping 
~d fr~ all  s~ling pipes.  r--c  __  ,__c~-+~c--~_c~~-c-~~-c~,__c_·~~--c_'  __  r-c---+--c---+_c  __  '-+-c  __  '~ 
The  gas  samples  are  ~alysed and  the  results 
assessed  from  the  point  of view  of explosion 
risk in  the  sealed-off area  ~d the  state of 
the  seat  of  the  fire.  C  C  c  c 
r----+----+----+-----~--~----- c  c 
The  cooling-off  time  of  the  seat of  the  fire 
must  be  taken  into account.  NRP  NRP  c  c 
c'  C'  C  C  C'  C' 
~---+----+----+----4---~----~--~-----+----~---+----+----
C'  c'  c'  c'  c'  c'  c'  C' 
If possible,  the  sealed-off district should 
be  inspected before  any  air is  circulated or 
any  operations  are  started.  f---A __  ,__A~-+~C_'--1--c_'  __  +-_C_~--- ___ c~_  -~-·-- _ C_' __ ~C=--'·---+--C=--'  ~-C-=-'~--=-C-'---1 
Before  opening  commences,  a  pl~ should  be 
drawn  up  jointly with  the Main  Rescue  Centre. 
This  pl~ must  cover  the  following  points  : 
- the  method, 
- nature,  scope  ~d order  of  operations, 
- direction  ~d superv1s1on, 
- checking of  the  ventilation  system  and  of 
the  composition  of  the  air, 
- communications, 
- preparation of material, 
- evacuation,  prohibition  of  access  to  ~d 
remanning  of  end~gered workings, 
- deployment  of  the  Rescue  Team, 
- connection  and  disconnection  of electrical 
equipment  and  cutting-off  the  supply  of 
electricity in both  equipment  and  part  of 
network  concerned, 
- opening  ~d closing of  the  compressed air, 
water  ~d methane-drainage pipeline valves, 
- re-sealing of  the  fire  area in emergency. 
The  method  to be  adopted  for  reopening 
sealed-off districts  depends  on  the presence 
or  otherwise  of 
- non  explosive  gaseous  mixtures  which  remain 
non-explosive  on  dilution with  air, 
- non-explosive  gaseous  mixtures  which  may 
become  explosive  on  dilution with air,  or 
- explosive  gaseous  mixtures. 
Fire areas  may  be  opened  at  one  point  or at 
several points.  In  the  latter case  a 
c  c  c  c  C' 
c  c  c  c  C' 
{1)  applies  only to the opening-up of fire  areas after partiaularly  large  fires. 
C'  c'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
C'  c'  C'  c'  C'  C'  C' I 
I 
Recommendations  by  the  Commission 
continuous  direct circulation of air is 
automatically established  and  the  fire  area 
is  permeated with  fresh  air.  An  examination 
should  be  made  of the effects of  the  opening 
of  the  area on  the  ventilation  system of  the 
pit  as  a  whole  and within  the  fire  area. 
A sealed-off district may  be  reopened  by 
- breaching  one  or more  stoppings  (with  or 
without  the  use  of  an  air-lock),  or 
- cutting a  new  entry into  the  fire-area. 
Before  opening  a  sealed-off area,  provision 
should be  made  for  immediate  reclosure if 
necessary. 
Stoppings  may  be  op~ned only  on  the  instruc-
tions  of the  manager  underground  and  under 
the  constant  supervision of  personnel  ap-
pointed by  him. 
Workings,  into which  the  opening  of  a  stop-
ping may  release  toxic  gases  or foul  air, 
or where  there  is  a  risk of  explosion,  must 
be  evacuated  and  put  out  of bounds  to per-
sonnel  before  opening. 
Since  conditions  in the district,  the state 
of  the seat of  the fire  and  the  risk of  gas 
explosion  may  change  during  the  opening 
operation  the  composition of  the  fire  gases 
or  fumes  must  be  checked  at  regular inter-
vals. 
The  kind  and  number  of  samples  and  the points 
at which  they  are  to  be  taken  should be 
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fixed  in  advance.  ,_..:.C_-+-_:C_--+___:C_--1-_:C:__ _  _,_C::..._'  __  .J--C=---'  ---I_:C_::...__'_+-_:C ~'---- _C  ~--~----JI--C_'___,I--C_'  --i 
In  doing  so,  the possibility of  gas  accumula-
tions  forming  should be  allowed  for.  (In 
general,  the  formation  of  gas  layers  is 
fostered  by  low  air velocities  and  differ-
ences  in  temperature.)  ~c=---+-c-=----+--=c-4--=c--+--=c_'---l~c::..._'_+-=c::..._'_-+--=C=---'---I-c=---'-+-c-=----~c-~-=c----l 
Where  a  stopping is  opened  in  the knowledge 
that  a  fire  is not yet  extinguished,  or where 
the  fire  is  revived  as  a  result,  the  area in 
question must  be resealed at  once,  if the 
composition  of  the fire  gases  or  fumes 
changes  in  such  a  way  that  an  explosion 
hazard  might  arise.  ~c=----4-c=---_+-c=----1-=c--4i_c=---'-+-=c=-'-~c=-'-+-~c_'_~c!_'_-+-~c::..._'_~c::..._'_~c~'--4 
With  non-explosive  gas  mixtures  in  the  fire 
area,  this  is necessary  only if extinguishing 
operations  seem  unlikely to succeed.  1--=c=---4-C=------+-c-=---'---I~C_'_+--=c_'_~c::..._'_~c::..._'_--l-_:c::..._'  ___ ~~~c  __  '_~c_'_+-c_'_~ 
It is  the  responsibility of  the  Rescue  Team 
to  open  and  inspect  fire  areas,  even  after 
they  have  been ventilated. 
On  the  intake side,  breaching of stoppings 
need not  be  carried out  by  the  Rescue  Team 
provided  that no  gas  hazard  is  to be 
reckoned with. 
When  deploying  the  Rescue  Team,  allowance 
should  be  made  for  the  adverse  climatic 
conditions  which  are  likely to  obtain at  any 
point where  they  may  be  employed. 
III.  OPENING-UP  SEALED-OFF  DISTRICTS  CONTAINING 
NON-EXPLOSIVE  GAS  MIXTURES 
1.  Opening-up  one  side only 
A sealed-off district containing non-ex-
plosive  gas  mixtures  may  be  opened  on  one 
side  even  if the  fire  is not yet 
extinguished. 
c  c 
c  c 
c  c 
c  c  C' 
c'  C'  C' 
c  c  C' 
C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
C'  C'  C'  c'  C'  C'  C' 
C'  c  c  c'  C'  c  c Recommendations  by  the  Commission 
It must  first be  established whether 
the  remaining  stoppings  and  seals  are 
sufficiently air-tight and  that  there is 
no  risk of  releasing  fire  gases,  in 
particular  carbon monoxide  in  other 
parts  of the working,  which  may  be 
connected with  the fire  area. 
If the  stopping  to be  opened  is  on  the 
return side,  special attention should 
be  paid  to  the  release of  CO  or of 
other  toxic or dangerous  gases  or  foul 
air. 
The  decision  as  to whether  to  carry out 
operations  in  the  fire  area without 
ventilation air or with  auxiliary venti-
lation depends  on  the  purpose  of  the 
reopening  of  the  area,  the  expected 
duration  of  the  Rescue  Team's  operations 
and  the possible hazards  involved. Auxil-1 
iary ventilation  is especially desir-
able  for  extended  operations within  the 
fire  area. 
a)  Working  without  ventilation  air, 
especially behind  an  airlock,  has 
the  advantage  of  eliminating the 
risk of  reviving the  fire,When  carry-
ing  out  extinguishing operations 
without  ventilation air  and  under 
unfavourable  air  conditions,  it is 
advisable  first  to  set  up  water 
sprinklers  or nozzles  and  to  put 
these  into operation  only  after the 
Rescue  Team  has  left  the  fire  area. 
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I 
b)  If auxiliary ventilation is  used,  it 
should preferably be  by  suction. 
It is  advisable  to  isolate the  fire 
area ventilated by  an  auxiliary  fan 
from  the  non-ventilated  section by 
means  of  an  auxiliary  stopping if 
the  seat  of  the  fire is  situated  in 
the non-ventilated section. 
2.  Opening  on  two  sides  to  establish  a 
circulation of  air round  the  sealed-off 
area 
A sealed-off area containing non-explo-
sive  gas  mixtures  may  be  ventilated  only 
c 
c 
c 
c 
(1) 
A 
c 
A 
c 
if it is  likely that  the  fire is extinct i--=C--+.:::.C _____ t--~---- C 
While  ventilation is being established, 
a  Rescue  Team wearing breathing apparatus 
may  enter  the  fire  area to  examine 
conditions within it and  to extinguish 
(1) 
C'  C'  C'  C'  (2}  _(2)  C'  Cl 
C'  C'  c  I  C'  Cl  C'  c  I  c~ 
C'  C'  C
1  C
1  C
1  C'  C
1  C
1 
- -- ..  ------ - 1--- ----- --- ----+---+-------
any  fires.  ~--"c'---+-'=c'---+--'=C:__--t...:C:__  __  ~C::..
1 
__  +C:-:_'  --+c::::..._' --~~-- c:_'---+-c=--'  -+C=--' --+c_'  ---+ 
IV.  REOPENING  OF  SEALED-OFF  DISTRICTS  CONTAIN- I 
ING  GAS  MIXTURES  WHICH  MAY  BECOME  EXPLOSIVE 
ON  DILUTION  WITH  AIR 
1.  Opening  on  one  side  only 
A sealed-off  area  containing  gas  mix-
tures  which  may  become  explosive  on  dilu-
tion with air may  be  opened  on  one 
side  only1 even  if the fire  is not  yet 
extinguished. 
It is,  however,  essential to install  a 
tight  airlock in  front  of  the  stopping 
to be  opened,  so  as  to ensure  an  effec-
tive_  ~~--~ea!:_  _________ --------·--------~c=-c.:::.  :::::±o::;C'=::=±_::;C'==i==:C==~C~
1 =::±::C'f='  =::I:C:::' =±:=C='  =::£C~
1 =::±::::C::-:,~=::±::;C:::'=±=C0::
1 =:::! 
(1}  experience hitherto  has  shown  that blowing  aux~l~ary ventilation is preferable,  to ensure  that no  explosive  gases 
are  sucked in by  the auxiliary  fan. 
(2)  the  use of blowing auxiliary ventilation is preferred. Recommendations  by  the  Corrunission 
It must  first be  checked whether  the 
remaining  stoppings  and  seals  are 
sufficiently air-tight  and  that  there 
is  no  risk of  releasing fire  gases, 
in particular  carbon  monoxide,  into 
other parts  of  the workings  which  may 
be  connected with  the  fire  area. 
If the  stopping  to be  opened  is  on  the 
return  side,  particular attention must 
be  paid  to  the possibility of  releasing 
CO,  CH4  or  foul  air 
All  operations  must  be  carried out 
without  ventilation air. 
There  must  be  continuous  sampling  and 
evaluation  of  the  results  of  analysis 
to  check whether  the  gas  mixture  re-
mains  non-explosive. 
For extinguishing  operations,  see 
section III. 1. 
If the  size  of  the  sealed-off  area is 
to  be  reduced,  a  new  explosion-proof 
stopping must  be  erected.  In  order  to 
be  able  to erect  this  stopping  under 
tolerable  climatic conditions  and  pos-
sibly without  wearing breathing  appa-
ratus,  auxiliary ventilation may  have 
to  be  provided. 
For  this  purpose,  an  auxiliary  stopping 
must  first be  erected  and  sealed in  an 
unventilated  atmosphere.  (Before 
constructing the  main  stopping,  it 
should be  considered whether  to  erect 
several  successive  auxiliary  stoppings, 
according  to  the  possible hazards.) 
The  section  of  roadway  thus  recovered 
must  then be  ventilated by  an  auxiliary 
fan  so  as  to  create suitable air condi-
tions  for  the  erection  of  the  main 
stopping. 
When  starting up  the  auxiliary ventila-
tion,  it must  be  remembered  that  the 
gas  mixture  becomes  explosive  on  dilu-
tion with  air.  It is  therefore esential 
to ensure  that  there  is  no  source  of 
ignition  in  the  workings  to  be  ventila-
ted. 
In  addition,  it is essential  to  make 
certain  that  the  fan  used  cannot  cause 
any  risk of  ignition. 
Before  starting up  the  auxiliary venti-
lation,  all workings  likely to be  expo-
sed  to  the  hazards  of  fire  gases  or ex-
plosions  must  first be  evacuated  and 
access  thereto prohibited. 
Electrical equipment  must  be  cut  off 
from  the  power  supply. 
In addition,  the  ventilation must,  as 
far  as  possible,  be  regulated  so  that 
no  explosive  gas mixtures  can  be 
released  over  long distances. 
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(1)  special attention is drawn  to  the  fact  that  the  fan  must  be  switched off. VIII,  26 
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For this  purpose,  the  quantity  of  air 
circulated should,  if necessary,  be 
increased.  c  c  C'  C'  c'  C'  c'  C'  C'  c'  C'  C' 
2.  o:eenins  on  two  sides  to establish  a 
circulation of  air throush  the fire 
area 
This  method  of  opening  automatically 
results  in the  formation  of  a  through 
air-current  in the  open district,  but 
not necessarily  in other parts  of  the 
district.  The  method  can be  used  only 
if there  are  no  remaining  signs  of  fire 
in  the district.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  c'  C'  C'  C' 
In  addition,  a  period  long  enough  for 
the seat  of  the  fire  to  cool  off must 
have  elapsed since the  estimated  time 
of extinction.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
If possible,  the  Rescue  Team  should 
carry  out  an  inspection  in  an  unventil-
ated  atmosphere.  A  A  c  c  C'  c'  C'  C'  C'  C'  c'  C' 
Failing this,  the results  qf the 
snuffle pipe  tests  should be  used  to 
determine  the  condition  of  the  seat  of 
the fire.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  c'  c'  c'  C'  C'  C' 
-
Furthermore,  it should be  considered  in 
such  cases whether  the  method  described 
in section IV.l might  not  be  preferable  NRP  NRP  C'  C'  C'  c'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
In  each  case,  it is  essential to  check 
the  likelihood of  a  recrudescence  of 
the  fire  during ventilation,  by  means 
of fire  gas  samples.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  c'  c'  C'  C'  C' 
This  applies  particularly in  the  case  of 
a  much-branched district.  c  c  C'  C'  C'  c'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
Before ventilating the  fire  area,  all 
workings  exposed  to  the hazards  of 
fire  gases  or explosions  of  fire  gases 
or  fire-damp when  the  stopping is 
opened must  be  evacuated.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  c'  c'  c'  C'  C' 
---t-------
All electrical installations  in  these 
workings  must  be  cut  off  from  the  power 
supply.  c  c  c  c  c  c  c'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
On  safety grounds,  it is  advisable  to 
open  the  return stopping first.  NRP  NRP  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  c'  C'  C' 
After  the  Rescue  Team  has  withdrawn  to 
less  dangerous  zones,  the  intake stop-
ping should be  opened.  NRP  NRP  c  c  C'  c'  C'  C'  C'  C'  c'  C' 
When  ventilating the  fire  area,  the 
quantity  of air and  the  content  of 
inflammable  gases  in the  air-current 
circulating through  the  fire  area,  and 
in  the  current  into which  it sub seq-
uently  flows,  should  be  checked.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  c'  C'  C' 
The  two  air-currents  should be mutually 
adjusted in  such  a  manner  as  to ensure 
that no  explosive mixture  of  gases  is 
present  over  long  distances  after their 
junction.  c  c  c  c  C'  c'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
Access  to the  fire  area is  prohibited 
until it has  been ventilated.  c  c  c  c  c'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' VIII,  27 
N.R./Hph.  Saar  Belgium  France  Italy  Nether-
Recommendations  by  the  Corrunission  lands 
l. 1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1. 
1970  1972  1970  1972  1970  1972  1970  1972  1970  1972  1970 
v.  OPENING  OF  FIRE  AREAS  CONTAINING 
EXPLOSIVE  GAS  MIXTURES 
Sealed-off districts may  not  be  re-
opened,  either on  one  side  or  on  two 
sides,  if the presence  of explosive 
gas  mixtures  behind  the  stoppings  is 
established.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  c'  C'  C'  C' 
VI.  OPENING  OF  FLOODED  FIRE  AREAS 
The  composition  of  the  air in fire 
areas  flooded  to extinguish  the  fire 
must  be  checked  after draining.  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  c'  C'  C'  C' 
In workings  with  solid  coal,  allowance 
must  be  made  for  the  increased hazard 
of  spontaneous  ignition after drainage. 
Where  fire  areas  have been  isolated by 
local  flooding  instead of by  stoppings, 
the  rules  mentioned  in  section  I  to V 
should be  observed,  insofar  as  applic-
able,  when  opening  a  district.  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  c'  C'  C'  1------f---·-- ---·  f-.---·  - ----- --
VII.  REMANNING  OF  FIRE  AREAS 
After ventilating a  fire  area,  workings 
may  not  be  manned  until  a  Rescue  Team 
has  established that  all workings  are 
free  of noxious  gases.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  c'  C'  C'  C' 
If the fire  area is merely  being  re-
duced  in size,  workings  free  of  noxius 
gases  may  be  manned  only when  the 
remainder  of  the  fire  area has  been 
sealed-off by  permanent  stoppings.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  c'  C'  C'  C' 
~ --~ - ------ 1-· 
III- Guidelines  for  the  construction  of  advance 
fire  stopEings  from Elaster  (doc.  4928/63/2) 
In  all cases  where it is possible  and 
advantageous,  the  erection of plaster stop-
pings  to seal off  fires  and  beatings  is 
recommended. 
Is  this  process  applied in practice  as  laid  (1)  (2)  (3)  (3)  down  in the  gnidelines  contained in the  report?  NRP  NRP  c  c  yes  yes  yes  yes  E  E  E 
Is  the  application of  this  process  prescribed 
by  regulations?  NRP  NRP  c  c  no  no  no  no  no  no  E 
Is  this  process  applied  in practice in  a  man-
ner differing  from  the principles  laid down?  NRP  NRP  yes  yes  no  no  no  no  no  no  E 
Is  the  application  of this modified  process 
prescribed by  regulations?  NRP  NRP  yes  yes  no  no  no  no  no  no  E 
IV  - Fourth  reEort  on  SEecifications  and  testing 
conditions  relating to fire-resistant  fluids 
used  for  Eower  transmission 
Part II - SEecifications  and  test  conditions 
(EE·  19  onwards) 
Article  1  - Conditions  of  authorisation 
1.  Fire-resistant  fluids  for hydraulic power  L  transmission  and  hydra~lic control,  before 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
formulation of guidelines relating to fire  stoppings  and sea"lings;  the section "fire stoppings  made  of bending 
materials" is equaUy applicable  to  aclvance  fire  stoppings. 
the  construction of advance stoppings against will be  the subject of new  regulations when  the  fire-fighting 
directives are  revised. 
the  choice  of means  is,  however,  left to  the mine-manager. 
1.1. 
1972 
C' 
C' 
C' 
c' 
C' 
E 
E 
E 
E Recommendations  by  the  Commission 
being used  in  mine  workings,  must  be  given 
a  certificate of  approval. 
This  certificate must  indicate that  the 
product  has  been  subjected to the  fol-
lowing  tests  : 
a)  Laboratory  tests  (articles  3  - 7) 
aa)  to  determine  criteria of 
flammability 
VIII,  28 
N .R. /\~ph. 
1.1. 
1970 
c 
1.1. 
1972 
c 
Saar 
1.1. 
1970 
c 
1.1. 
1972 
c 
Belgium 
1.1.  1.1. 
1970  1972 
France 
1.1. 
1970 
1.1. 
1972 
C'(l)C'(l) 
Italy 
1.1. 
1970 
1.1. 
1972 
C'  C'  +E(2) E  (2)  E  E 
Nether-
lands 
1.1.  1.1. 
1970  1972 
E  E 
(article  3 ,  p.  2 2)  1-C=--+--=C--+_.::._C_+-C=---t---=C:...'-4--=-C-'  ----4-C:::.__::'  E=----t---=C:...'~E+=E--+--=E=--+~E::__-+=E---l 
bb)  to determine health criteria (art-
icle 4,  p.  23)  1 _c_-+_C_----ti--C--I--C--+-C-'---JI--C_'_+--C_'_E-+_C_'  E---JI--E  __  +--E--t-E---1-E--~ 
cc)  to  determine  technical  criteria 
(article 5 ,  p.  2  3)  1--C---+_C_--I~-_C_-+-C--+-C-'--II---C-'_-I-C-'_E-1--C-'  E_I--E----1-E--+-E--+-E--I 
b)  Long-term tests  during normal  operations 
(art  i c 1  e  8,  p .  2  7)  1_c::__-I-__:C::__----t--..:C:...'_~C:_'_+---=C_'----t-..::.C_'  -~C_'  E=---1-C.:.......:'  E=----i~E=--~E=----+-=E=----+-=E=----i 
2.  These  tests  are  carried  out  under  an 
authorised body.  !--C=--t--=C=-~---=C:__-t--=C--+--=C_'~-..::.C_'_~C~'E=--+-C~'E~~E~-~E~~~E~~~E~~ 
3.  Authorisation  for  use  underground  should  be 
dependent  on  presentation of  the  certific-
ate  mentioned  in 1.  above.  r-c--~_c  ____  t-c--~-c~--+-~c_'  __  ~c_'  __  +-c-'_E  __  ~c-'_E~~E----+-E----~E----+E~--~ 
Article 9  - Withdrawal  of  approval 
At  the  request  of  the  authorised body,  the 
permitting authority may  withdraw  the  approval 
for  the  fluid  to  be  used  in mine  workings.  ~C~--1--=C~--+-C~--11--C~--4-~NRP~~C-'  __  ~C:...'~E:.__~C:...'~E~~E~--~E~--~E~--+E~--~ 
V - Report  on  the electro-magnetic examination  of 
winding  rope  (doc.  nr.  8470/64/2). 
Steps  taken to  develop electro-magnetic 
testing methods  and  results  obtained. 
VI  - Report  on  the  use  of  accelerometers  to test 
winding  installations  doc.  3725/1/61,  p.  9 
(German  text). 
Tests with  accelerometers  should  be  continued 
on  a  large  scale. 
C'3 
c' 
_{5)  C'  {3) 
C' 
C'  _(3)  c' 
{3) 
C' 
(3) 
C'  {6) 
E  E 
C'  C' 
C'  C' 
Use  of  accelerometers  should be  extended.  (?) 
C'  C'E  - - - - - - E  E  C'  C' 
r---+----~----~-----~-----~----+-----l------1=---~=---~----~---~ 
(3)  (3) 
VII  - Recommendation  regarding the  consulting of 
foreign  experts  in the  case  of  rescue  opera-
tions  connected with major mining  accidents 
(doc.  4364/61/3). 
In  certain serious mining  accidents  advice 
requested by  the  leaders  of  the  rescue  opera-
tion  from  qualified  foreign  experts  in mine-
rescue matters. 
The  heads  of  Mine  Rescue  Stations  are  provided 
for  this  purpose with  a  plan containing  the 
most  important  addresses  and  information  (8)  (8)  CJ8J C'  (8)  C'(8) C'(8}  C(8J  C'  (8)  C'  (8)  (8) 
needed.  ,~c~·--~:r~c_'_-r~~~--~:,__-+~--+-=~~~--~--~~c~·--~c-~8) c~8)1 
This  plan  should be  constantly kept  up-to-date.  C'(8)ic•(8)  C'(8)  C'(8)  c•( 8) C'(8)  c(8)  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  ----------....  -..... --------· ---------- _________________  :.:::.~.~  ::~:.:  ___  :_=-t='==--=:t:'::==:t=====l====l::===:::l:"'===l===~~=~~=='=~==!=~=~==l 
(1)  in the  Charbonnages  de  France  register,  the Mines  Safety  Commission  Recommendations  have been taken into account. 
(2)  the question of drawing  up  a  new  regulation is being examined by  the  competent  authority. 
(3)  trials to improve  electro-magnetic testing methods  are  underway. 
{4)  electromagnetic monitoring is required in the  special case of cables  consisting of flat wires in multiple  layers. 
(5)  measurements  are  taken in individual  cases. 
f6)  electromagnetic examination of cables is not  compulsory. 
(?)  the  formulation  of rules regulating acceleration measurements in certain cases is being examined. 
{8)  the main  First-Aid Stations  are  in touch with  the main  Rescue  Stations  in the  Community  countries. Recommendations  by  the  Commission 
VIII  - Report  on  firedamp-proof  electrical equipment 
for nominal voltages  above  1,100 volts 
(doc.  2400/64/1) 
1.  What  use has  been made  of  the  information 
contained in this  report,  and,  in parti-
cular,  to whom  was  it distributed? 
2.  The  Workings  Party has  noted  that,  in the 
Community  countries,  research into the 
development  of  low-oil  or oil-less H.T. 
switchgear having  the  correct  character-
istics  for  use  in gassy pits is being 
continued. 
What  is  the present position  regarding 
this  reserach  and  what  data have  been 
obtained to date? 
3.  The  Working  Party has  no~ed that  oil is 
being used  in respect  of  relays,  and  that 
research would  be  needed  to  reduce  or 
eliminate the  use  of oil.  What  research 
is being  carried out  to this  end? 
4.  This  Report  notes  that switchgear 
specialists  are  trying to use  less - or 
even no- oil with voltages  above  1,100 
volts  and  that,  in particular,  oil-less 
switchgear with separate poles,  and  low-
oil switchgear,  were  being more  and  more 
widely used  in most  countries,  at  least 
for  new  plant. 
These  observations  were  deduced  from 
practice during  1960  - 1962. 
What  have  been  the  trends  since  then? 
(1)  trials with oil-less relays  are  underway. 
(2)  no  research of this kind is being carried out. 
(3)  see  above. 
(4)  this trend continues. 
(5)  not applicable. 
(6)  cf.  p.  IX,  33. 
VIII,  29 
N.R./Wph. 
1.1.  1.1. 
1970  1972 
Saar 
1.1. 
1970 
1.1. 
1972 
Belgium 
1.1.  1.1. 
1970  1972 
France 
1.1. 
1970 
1.1. 
1972 
Italy 
1.1. 
1970 
1.1. 
1972 
Nether-
lands 
1.1.  1.1. 
1970  1972 
1----l---+--....J...--+----'  ---1---..l---+--~-·--1-----l.-----" 
(1)  (1)  (2)  (2)  NRP  NRP  (3)  (3)  (2)  (2) 
(4)  (4)  (5)  (5)  (4)  ( 4)  NRP  NRP  (6)  (6)  (5)  (5) VIII,  30 
II - HUMAN  FACTORS 
N.R./i~ph.  Saar  Belgium 
Recommendations  by  the  Corrunission 
1. 1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1. 
1970  1972  1970  1972  1970 
Recommendations  on  the  fixing  of  climatic  limits 
(the  unabridged 
3034/4/62) 
text  is  reEroduced  in doc. 
1.1  The  basis  is  the American  effective  tempera-
ture  (0  eff basic scale).  c  c  c  c  C' 
Air velocities  above  3  metres/sec should be 
considered  as  only  3  metres/sec  in determi- (2)  (2) 
ning  the  American  effective temperature.  c  c  c  c  C' 
1.2  The  temperature  data must  be  given  so  as  to 
make  possible  a  comparison  on  the basis  indi-
cated  under  1.1.  c  c  c  c  C' 
1.3  The  climatic limits  determined  shall  be 
maximum  values.  c  c  c  c  -
More  favourable  climatic values  for  the 
workers  shall  remain  unchanged.  c  c  c  c  -
1.4  There will be  further  investigation  into the 
effectiveness  and  accuracy  of  the  various 
climatic indices.  - - - - -
2.  Determination  of  a  maximum  climatic value 
2.2  Work  on  location is  forbidden  in working 
places  where  the  temperature  exceeds  32°  eff 
A  (basic scale),  excepting the  cases  named 
in  2.3  and  2.4.  c  c  c  c  -
2.3  An  exception  can  be  made  to  the ban  on  working 
on  location  in  temperatures  above  32°  eff A 
(basic scale)  if the  competent  authority has 
given permission  and  the workers  in question 
have  been  medically  examined. 
In this  case  the  following  conditions  must  (5)  (5) 
also be  fulfilled  :  c  c  c  c  -
2.3.1  The  responsible  authority  can  only  issue per-
mission  for  a  fixed  period  and  for  given 
working  operations.  c  c  c  c  -
2.3.2  The  work  must  be  carried out  under medical  (6)  (6) 
supervision.  c  c  c  c  -
Guidelines  must  be  worked  out,  in  collabora-
tion with medical  experts,  covering  the 
medical  examination  envisaged  under  2.3.  c  c  - - -
-------- ------
2.3.3  Work  must  not  continue uninterrupted  for  more 
than  one  hour.  A suitable break must  then  be 
arranged  in  a  better "climate".  c  c  c  c  -
The  duration  of  uninterrupted working  time,  as 
well  as  the  duration  and  frequency  of  the 
breaks  and  the  climatic  range  in which  this 
break is  spent,  as  also  all other necessary 
provisions  are  to be  laid  down  in writing  by 
the  competent  authority together with  the  c(?J  c(?J  responsible  doctor before the work begins.  c  c  -
---------- ---
--------~---- ---------~------- ---L- -----!--- --
(1)  climatic values only  have  to  be  determined in certain very  exceptional  cases. 
(2)  3,5 metres/sec. 
(3)  not applicable. 
1.1. 
1972 
C' 
C' 
C' 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
------
-
-
France  Italy  Nether-
lands 
1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1. 
1970  1972  1970  1972  1970  1972 
{1)  (1) 
E  E  NRP  NRP  c  c 
- - NRP  NRP  c  c 
- - NRP  NRP  c  c 
- - NRP  NRP  G  c 
(3)  (3) 
- - NRP  NRP  - -
(3)  (3) 
- - NRP  NRP  - -
(4)  ( 4) 
E  E  NRP  NRP  c  c 
- A  NRP  NRP  c  c 
- - NRP  NRP  c  c 
- - NRP  NRP  c  c 
- - NRP  NRP  c  c 
--
- - NRP  NRP  c  c 
- - NRP  NRP  c  c 
(4)  working points where  the  temperature reaches  28°C  are  considered as  particularly hot  (without  this being an 
absolute maximum  value). 
(5)  for mine  rescue  personnel. 
(6)  medical  supervision obligatory. 
(7)  laid down  generally in the mine  rescue  plans. VIII,  31 
N .R. /Wph.  Saar  Belgium  France  Italy 
Recommendations  by  the  Commission 
1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  l.l.  1.1.  1.1.  l.l.  1. 1.  1.1. 
1970  1972  1970  1972  1970  1972  1970  1972  1970  1972 
2.3.4  Acclimatised persons  must  be  chosen.  Persons 
over  40  years  of  age  should not  be  put  to  (1) 
this work.  c  c  - c  - - - - NRP  NRP 
"Persons  under  21  and  over  45  years  of  age  (2)  (2) 
must not be  put  to  this work.  c  c  c  c  - - - - NRP  r--B_RP  -·-----------
2.4  An  exception  can  also be  made  to the ban  on 
working  on  location in temperatures  above 
32° eff A (basic scale)  if danger  threatens 
or  in special  circumstances  calling for  (3) 
innnediate  action.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  c  c  NRP  NRP  ---
In  such  case,  however  : 
2.4.1  The  competent  authority  and  the  responsible 
doctor must  be  innnediately  informed.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  - - NRP  NRP  r-----~--
2.4.2  This  work  must  be  performed  as  soon  as  pos-
sible under  the  conditions  listed in 2.3.1 
to 2.3.4.  c  c  c  c  c'  C'  C'  C'  NRP  NRP  ,----- ----- -------- -~-- -- ----------
3.  Climatic  ran!i!e  between  32°  eff A and  28°  eff 
A (basic scale) 
3.1.1  Only  persons  shown  by medical  examination  to 
be  suitable  can be  employed  in this  climatic 
range.  A  A  C'  C'  - - c  c --
The  medical  examination must  pay  particular 
attention to the heart  and  to blood  circu-
lation.  A  A  C'  C'  - - c  c 
Persons  continually  employed  in this  climatic 
range must  be  examined medically at  least  once 
a  year.  A  A  - - - - c  c 
In  addition,  the  following provisions  apply  : 
3.1. 2  As  soon  as  a  working-point  reaches  a  tempera-
ture  above  280  eff A  (basic scale)  the  compe- c  (4) 
(4) 
tent  authority must  be  informed  in writing.  A  A  c  - - - -
---
3.1.3  The  length  of stay  in  the  climatic range  bet-
c (  5) 
(5) 
ween  30° and  32° eff A (basic scale)  is  re- A  A  c  - - - -
stricted to  5  hours,  and  in the  range  between  -+-----f----
28°  and  30° eff A (basic scale)  to  6  hours.  c  c  c  c  c'  C'  - -
3.1.4  For work  in  a  climatic range  between  280  and 
32° eff A (basic scale)  a  method  of  payment 
corresponding to these  conditions  must  be 
A(6)  A(6)  A(6)  A(6)  applied to eliminate  any  overloading.  - - c  c 
3.1.5  The  provisions  quoted  in  3.1. 3  and  2.1.4  apply 
to all persoms  who,  during  one  shift,  have  to 
work  more  than half the  time  of that shift  in 
one  of the  climatic ranges  mentioned  above.  A  A  c  c  - - - -
(1}  only required for rescue work. 
(2}  no  provision made  for excluding persons below  21  years  of age  from  exceptional.  hot work. 
(3)  ... ban  on  work  on  location in excessively high  temperatures 
(4)  if 30° eff A  (basic  seale)  is reached or  exceeded~  the  Mines  Inspectorate must  be  informed. 
(5)  six hours. 
(6)  must  be  arranged by  tariff~  outside the intervention of the  Mines  Inspectorate. 
NRP  NRP  ----- -----
NRP  NRP 
NRP  NRP 
NRP  NRP  --r--··-
NRP  NRP  ------------
NRP  NRP 
NRP  NRP 
NRP  NRP 
~ether-
lands 
1.1.  1.1. 
1970  1972 
c  c 
c  c 
c  c 
c  c 
c  c 
-----~--
c'  C' 
---
C'  C' 
~---- --
C'  C'  ------
c  c 
----- - ------ --·-
c  c 
----·  -----
c  _c  I 
--1 
I 
c'  c' 
I 
j  C'  c' 
- 1--· ---VIII,  33 
C - Regular report  on  the implementation of the Mines  Safety and Health 
Commission's  Recommendations  published in the Fourth Report 
HUMAN  FACTORS 
N.R./Wph.  Saar  Belgium  France 
Recommendations  by  the  Commission 
1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1. 
1970  1972  1970  1972  1970  1972  1970 
I. Recommendations  on  the esicholosical and  sociolo-
sical factors affectins safeti  ~3rd reeort of the 
Mines  Safeti Commi.ssion 2  I!•  425~ 
1.  Measures which will make it eossible for work-
men  to reco~ise dansers  and  to car!l out 
their work  in such a w!l that these dansers 
are avoided 
1.1  Reco~isin& dansers 
1.1.1  Before starting work  in a  district, a  section 
of a  working or a  workingpoint and before 
any planned major change  in the manpower 
deployment  or in working conditions, it is 
important to check all the safety precautions 
to meet  any  dangers  to be encountered.  c  c  c  c  c'  C'  c 
1.1.2  During the work,  regular reports on  the fol-
loving points must  be prepared on  the basis 
of the safety conditions which have to be 
observed under continuous supervision  : 
a)  changes  in operating conditions 
:lJ 
b)  accidents or incidents  c  c 
c)  dangerous situations encountered during 
work  C+C'  C+C'  C+C'  C+C'  (3)  (3)  C' 
The  data brought together in these reports 
should be systematically assessed with a  view 
to improving or adapting the safety precau-
tions in force.  C+C'  C+C'  C'  c•  C'  c•  c• 
1.1.3  After the work  has been finished,  the data 
assembled on  the basis of daily experience 
should be used to prepare a  report  of experi-
ence which should at least include information  C'  C'  c'  C'  (4)  (4)  c• 
regarding the winning methods  used,  C'  C'  c•  c'  (4)  (4)  C' 
the dangers which have arisen and the precau-
tions taken to deal with them,  C'  c'  c  c  (4)  (4)  c• 
together with any  accidents,  incidents and 
dangerous  situations which have occurred durin 
the working operations.  c•  C'  c  c  (4)  (4)  C' 
1.2  Makin&  known  the dansers to all concerned 
1.2.1  Before starting work  in a  district,  a  section 
of a  vorking or a  workingpoint or in the event 
of a  major change  in the operating conditions, 
it is advisable to arrange  a  discussion bet-
ween  representatives of the management,  super-
visory staff and members  of the safety services 
as well as the workers  concerned or their re-
presentatives,  in order  : 
- to inform each individual with regard to the 
work envisaged 
- to study in detail the work to be  carried 
nut- ----------------1--- h--
(1)  no reporl is lh>cwn  up,vezibal OP  tJPitten instPUations given to the pePSonnel  concerned. 
(2)  as regaPds  the pattem of tJoPk  and not actual opePations as mentioned in the text. 
(3)  sueh situations aPe  discussed at management  01' supePVisoP level,  no repol't is dPaLm  up. 
(4)  no  Peporl is lh>cwn  up  although account is taken of e:epePience  gained. 
(5)  not only ~Phen IPOPk  is finished but in any  case eitheP IPeekly,  monthly 01' annually. 
1.1. 
1972 
c 
c• 
c• 
C' 
C' 
c' 
C' 
Italy  .Nether-
lands 
1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1. 
1970  1972  1970  1972 
C'  c•  c•  c• 
(2)  (2) 
C'  C' 
C'  c• 
c•  c'  C'  c• 
c•  C'  c•  c• 
(~)  (5)  c•  C' 
c•  c•  c•  c• 
c'  C'  c•  c• 
C'  c•  C'  c' Recommendations  by  the  Commission 
- to settle upon  the method  of work 
1.2.2  The  workers  concerned  should be  informed  by 
the  most  appropriate means  of  the  method  of 
VIII,  34 
N.R./Wph. 
1.1.  1.1. 
1970  1972 
c'  C' 
Saar 
1.1. 
1970 
1.1. 
1972 
Belgium 
1.1.  1.1. 
1970  1972 
France 
1.1. 
1970 
1.1. 
1972 
(2)  (2) 
C'  C'  (1)  (1)  c'  C' 
Italy 
1.1. 
1970 
c' 
1.1. 
1972 
C' 
Nether-
lands 
1.1.  1.1. 
1970  1972 
c'  C' 
work  chosen.  C  c  c  c  C'  c'  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C' 
~----+----+---~----,_--~,---~---~l-----r----+----+----+----1 
1.2.3  During  the  execution  of the work,  the manage-
ment  and  the  supervisory staff should refer to 
the  regulations  and  instructions  to be 
observed  as  often  as  necessary  to  counteract 
C'  the effects  of habit.  C  C  C  C  C  C  c'  C' 
r----r----T---~----,_--~-----r--~r----+----+----+----+----1  C'  C' 
1.2.4  If it is  considered necessary  to  issue new 
safety instructions,  these  should be  brought 
regularly to  the notice  of  every worker 
concerned.  C  c 
(3) 
c  c 
r----r----+---~----;---~r----r----r----+----+-----r----+----1 
(3) 
c'  c'  c'  C'  C'  c'  c  c 
1.2.5  Reports  made  by  each  of the workmen  regarding 
dangerous  situations which  arise during  the 
work  should be  brought  to  the notice of  the 
management  staff. 
1.3  Instruction  in  the  manner  in which  the work 
is  to be  carried out  without  danger 
1.3.1  Every worker  assigned  to  underground work  must 
be  able  to  show  that  he has  : 
c  c'  c  c  C'+C  C'+C  C'  C'  C'+C  C'+C  c  c 
(4)  (4) 
- a  general  training  as  an  underground worker; r-c---+  __  c  __ -+_c  __ -;  ___  c  ___  r-_c_'-4r--c_'-+--c_'~r-c_'  __  1-(  __  5_J  __  +-_(v_"J  __ r-_c __  +-_c __  ~ 
- a  special  training for  the work  to which  he 
is  to be  assigned;  r-c---+  __  c  __  1-_c  __ -r_c  ___ +-_c_'-1--c  __  '-r-c  __  '-+-c  __  '~~(_5_J  __  ~(_5_J~  __  c  __ ,__c  __  ~ 
- the necessary  additional  tra~n~ng to  cover 
the  special working  conditions  at  the  point 
where  he will work.  C  c  c  c 
~--~-----+----~----+-----~--~----~----~----+-----~---+----~ 
C'  (5)  (5)  c  c  C'  C'  C' 
( 6)  (6) 
1.3.2  Should  there be  a  change  in  the work  or  in 
the working  conditions,  the necessary  ad-
ditional  training must  be  provided.  C'  C'  C  C  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
~~-+~~4-~--~~-+~--1-~--~~--r~---r~--r-~--i~--- -----
1.3.3  Instruction in safety precautions  is  to be 
considered  as  an  integral part  of  vocational 
training. 
1.4  Supervision to check  that  safety regulations 
are  observed  during work 
1.4.1  During  the work,  the  safety  consitions must 
be  subject  to  continual  supervision. 
1.4.2  The  duty  to see  that  safety  regulations  are 
observed,  and  the  responsibilities  resulting 
from this  duty,  fall upon  the  management  and 
supervisory staff. 
1.4.3  The  supervision,  which must  be  exercised with 
authority,  should  in its every-day  action seek 
to  improve  the  training  and  education of  the 
workmen  on  the basis  of daily experience,  and 
c  c 
c  c 
c  c 
c  c  c'  c' 
c  c  c  c 
c  c  c  c 
should  give  rise to fines  or penalties  only  in  C'+  c' 
C'  C'  C'  C'  c'  C' 
c  c  C'  C'  c  c 
c  c  c  c  c  c 
z.  ;;:;~;:;:;;;r:;;:;;;;;;d.::·::P::.:::::n:::::'·~c_'  __  4-_c_' __  +-c_' __  4-_c_'  __  4-(-~  _  __j  __  ~_(  __  ?_~~L- __  c  __  '_:lc'  ____  ~_c  __  '-.~c--·~--c-·-.~c-·~ 
(1)  this  takes  place  at  engineer or supeY'Visor  level3  or even  at Safety  Committ6e  z~-Jel,  hd not  at meetings  where  all 
the  people mentioned are  present. 
(2)  workers'  safety representatives  may  give  their opinion and  submit  their obsel"'Vations  ·in  the  form  provided for in 
the  labour  legislation. 
(3}  by means  of service instructions issued by  the management  of the mine 3  or of service notes  issues by  departmental 
heads  and  supervisers. 
(4)  convention of the Joint  National  Mines  Commission. 
(5)  systematic training courses were  provided up  to  1963.  After 19633  no  new  staff were  er.gaged  and therefore  appren-
ticeship  and  training are  only provided where  new  machinery  and  equipment is  introduce~. 
(6)  laid down  by  the  responsible authorities  for particular cases3  otherwise generally  included in the  enterprises 
manual. 
(7)  concerns  the  last part of the  sentence:  " ... and  should give rise ...  " Recommendations  by  the  Commission 
2.1  ~ 
2.1.1  Steps  must  be  taken  to ensure that  the  super-
visory staff does  not  change  posts  frequently 
2.1. 2  The  vocational  training should be  adapted  to 
the particular features  of  the staff member's 
task  and  his  responsibilities,  and  in parti-
cular  to  the  requirements  of his  place  in  the 
hierarchy  of management  or  supervisory staff. 
2.1. 3  The  transition  from  one  grade  to  another 
should  be  possible  for  a  given person  only 
after he  has  actually proved  to have  the 
required knowledge  and  skill. 
2.2  Guidelines  for  the vocational  tra1n1ng  of  the 
management  or  suEervisor~ staff 
2.2.1  The  management  and  supervisory staff must 
have  an  adequate  knowledge  of  : 
- the  safety  regulations; 
- the  safety precautions  to be  taken; 
- the  available safety equipment  and its 
use; 
- the  instructions  in  force  for  the  different 
vocational  groups  whose  work  they  are 
called upon  to  supervise,  and  the  instruc-
tions  for  the  exercise of  activities  at  the 
working  points  for which  they  are 
responsible. 
2.2.2  The  management  and  supervisory staff must  be 
able  : 
- to point  out  in  a  suitable way  to  the 
workers  under  their orders  the  dangers  as-
sociated with  their work; 
- to instruct  these workers  as  to  how  best 
to  carry  out  the work  in order to  avoid 
these  dangers. 
2.2.3  The  management  and  supervisory  staff should  be 
trained  in how  to  issue instructions. 
2.2.4  Special  attention must  be  paid to  the 
continual further  tra1n1ng  of all management 
and  supervisory staff. 
2.2.5  The  management  and  supervisory staff must 
both  : 
- account  for  and  report  on  the  execution  of 
their work,  and 
- account  for  and  report  on  all  accidents  and 
other notable  incidents which  have  occurred 
during  the working  period  at  the  points  for 
which  they  are  responsible. 
2.2.6  The  management  and  supervisory staff must  be 
able  : 
- to  draw  up  accident  reports  correctly; 
- to assess  and  use  the  data in  these 
reports; 
- to  study  and establish the  causes  of  acci-
dents; 
(1)  cannot  be  laid down  in the  form  of a  regulation. 
(2)  for  the  shotfirer. 
VIII,  35 
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1. l.  1.1. 
1970  1972 
C'  C' 
C'  C' 
C'  C' 
c  c 
c  c 
c  c 
c  c 
C'  C' 
C'  C' 
C'  C' 
c'  C' 
c'  C' 
c  c 
c  c 
C'  C' 
c'  C' 
Saar  Belgium  France  Italy  Nether-
lands 
1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1. 
1970  1972  1970  1972  1970  1972  1970  1972  1970  1972 
(1) 
A  C'  c'  C'  c'  c'  ?  C'  c'  c' 
(2)  (2) 
c  c  C+C'  C+C'  C'  C'  C+C'  C+C'  C'  C' 
(3)  (3) 
c  c  C'  c'  c'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
c  c  C'  C'  c  c  C'  C'  c  c 
c  c  C'  C'  c  c  C'  C'  c  c 
c  c  C'  C'  c  c  c  t  C'  c  c 
c  c  c'  c'  c  c  C'  c'  c  c 
c  c  c'  C'  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C' 
c  c  C'  C'  C'  c'  c'  C'  c'  C' 
(4)  (4)  (5)  (5) 
C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  c'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  c'  c'  C'  c  t  C' 
c'  c'  c'  C'  C'  C'  c  c  c  t  C' 
( 6)  (6) 
c'  c'  c'  c'  c'  c'  c'  c'  c'  c' 
(6)  (6} 
C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
(6)  (6) 
C'  C'  c'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
(3)  by  limited competition in the  E.N.E.L.  (Ente  Nazionale  per  l'Energia Elettrica) 
(4)  for  the management  staff.  No  systematic training in management  for other grades. 
(5)  this is not considered as  a  subject for training.  Preference is given  to constant supervision of the staff. 
(6)  for  the management  staff.  For  supervision staff in certain cases  only. VIII,  36 
N.R./Wph.  Saar  Belgium  France  Italy  Nether-
lands 
Recommendations  by  the  Conuniss ion 
1. l.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1. 1.  1.1.  1.1. 
1970  1972  1970  1972  1970  1972  1970  1972  1970  1972  1970  1972 
(1)  ( 1) 
- to work  out  means  to  avoid  accidents;  c'  c'  c'  c'  c'  C'  c'  c'  c'  C'  C'  C' 
- to receive  the training necessary  to this  (1)  (1) 
end.  c  c  c'  c'  c'  C'  C'  C'  c'  C'  C'  C  I 
2.3  Staff resEonsible  for  training 
2.3.1  The  staff responsible  for  the training 
activities set  out  in paragraphs  1.3  and  2 
must  be  numerous  enough  and  must  have  avai-
lable the necessary means  and  time  to  carry 
out  their task properly.  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  (2)  (2)  C'  C' 
2.4  Drawing  up  of  an  accident  reEort;  training 
of  staff resEonsible  for  fillin~ in such 
reports 
2.4.1  The  accident  report  must,  taking  into  account 
all the  appropriate human  and  technical 
factors,  give  all necessary  information  and 
in particular  : 
- the  circumstances,  the  consequences  of  the 
accedent,  the  causes,  c  c  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
- the precautions  proposed to  avoid  similar 
accidents  c  c  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
2.4.2  Each  of  these  items  of  information referred 
to  in  point  2.4.1 must  be  capable  of  formu-
lation  as  an  answer  to  a  clear  and  precise 
question.  c  c  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
1----- -·--- --
2.4.3  The breakdown and  layout  of  the  form used  for 
accident  reports  must  clearly  show  which  ques-
tions  have  to be  answered by  each  of  the 
members  of  the staff contributing to  the  (3) 
preparation of  the  reports.  c'  c'  c  c'  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  --1---f---1------t---·-
2.4.4  There  must  be  sufficient  room  on  the  form  for 
supplementary  remarks  or  sketches  which may  be  (3) 
provided by  the  person  or  persons  concerned.  C'  C'  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  c' 
2.4.5  Each  of  the  persons  contributing  to  the  prepa-
ration  of  the  report  must  be  informed with 
regard  to  : 
- the  importance  of  each question,  c  c  c'  c'  c'  C'  c'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
- the way  to provide  correct  answers  to  the 
questions.  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
--t---- ---
2.4.6  Practical  instruction  should  be  provided  to 
draw  the  attention of  the  employees  concerned 
to  the  consequences  of  omissions,  neglectful 
or unclear  answers  to  the questions.  C'  C'  C'  C'  (4)  (4)  C'  C'  (2)  (2)  C'  C' 
----- ---------
2.4.7  Systematic attention should  be  paid  to ensure 
that  the  answers  are  complete,  accurate  and 
precise.  c  c  C'  c'  c  c  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
2.4.8  The  accidents  reports  referred to  in  this 
chapter  are  to be  drawn  up  for  the sole pur-
pose  of  accident  prevention.  c'  c'  c'  c'  c'  c'  C'  C'  c'  C'  C'  C' 
2.5  AEEointment  and  Eromotion  of management  or 
supervisor~ staff 
2.5.1  Care  should be  taken to ensure  that there is 
available  an  adequate  number  of management  or 
supervisory staff possessed  of  the  requisite 
skills both  in the  technical  and  safety 
fields.  C+C'  c  c  c  C+C'  C+C'  C'  C'  C+C'  C+C'  C'  C'  --- - - - - -- -·  ----- --
__  ,___ 
(1)  for  the  management  staff.  For  supervision staff in certain cases  only. 
(2)  systematic training courses were  given up  to  1963.  After 1963,  no  new  staff were  engaged and  therefore  apprentice-
ship  and  training are  only provided where  new  machinery  and equipment is introduced. 
(3)  the  form  used by  the professional mining organisation does  not  comply  entirely with this provision. 
(4)  does  not exist. Recommendations  by  the  Commission 
2.5.2.  The  selection of this staff is  the  respon-
sibility of  the  employer,  who  must at  least 
inform the  competent  authority  of  the 
persons  entrusted with supervision of work-
ing  operations,  together with  the necessary 
data justifying the  selection. 
2.5.3 
2.5.4 
3. 
3.1 
3.1.1 
3.2 
3.2.1 
3.2.2 
To  ensure  a  selection which  promises  success, 
there  should be  laid down  the minimum  re-
quirements  for  appointment  to  a  post  in  one 
of  these  categories,  either by direct  ap-
pointment  or by  promotion,  together with the 
certificates  and  other documents  which  are 
the necessary  requisite  for  such  an  ap-
pointment. 
The  competent  authority should be in a  pos-
it  ion  to check  the knowlegde  and  skills of  thE 
management  or supervisory staff - both  from 
the human  and  technical points  of  view  -
should  this  authority  consider it necessary, 
at  least  in  the  case  of  a  major  failure  or 
of  repeated  failures  in  the  performance  of 
duties. 
Usefulness  of  psycho-technical  examinations 
On  assignment 
It is  recommended  that  the  application of  a 
relatively simple psycho-technical examination 
upon  assignment  should be  developed  as  far  as 
possible,  in order to  : 
- determine  the  general intellectual level 
of  the  candidate; 
- to exclude  those  candidates  whose  intel-
lectual  level  lies below  a  pre-determined 
minimum. 
Before the exercise of specific duties 
In  every  instance,  the workmen  who  are to  b~ 
made  responsible  for  the execution  of par-
ticular working  operations. 
- with which  there  is  associated  a  particular 
responsibility in respect  of  collective 
safety or 
- which  call for particular intellectual or 
personality characteristics 
should be  subjected to  a  special  psycho-
technical examination to determine whether 
they  have  the  capacities  required  for this 
activity. 
The  competent  authority must,  in  co-operation 
with  the  representatives  of  the employers  and 
employers,  keep  up  to date  the  list of work 
for which  those special examinations  are  to 
VIII,  37 
N.R. /Wph. 
1.1.  1.1. 
1970  1972 
c  c 
C'  c' 
Saar  Belgium 
1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1. 
1970  1972  1970  1972 
c  c  c  c 
c  c  (3)  (3) 
(5)  (6) 
France 
1.1.  1.1. 
1970  1972 
Italy 
1.1.  1.1. 
1970  1972 
C+C' 
(1) 
c 
(1)  (2) 
C+C' 
(2) 
A  C  A 
(4)  (4) 
C'  C'  c  c 
Nether-
lands 
1.1.  1.1. 
1970  1972 
c  c 
c  c 
1  __  c  __ -r  __  c  __  r-c---r~c~r-c--;-_c  __  ~~A~~A  ____ _A__- _A  - __  c _______ _g_ ___ 
{6) 
c  C'  c 
(?)  {8)  (8)  {?) 
c'  C'  C'  C+C'  C+C'  1-----+--+--t---t---+---t-----r·--- ---- - -- --- C'  c 
(?)  (?)  (8)  (8) 
c  C'  c  c  C' 
C' 
c'  c'  c'  1---+---+---l----+----+-----+----------- --- --- ---------------- C'  c'  C' 
(10)  (10) 
C' 
C' 
---------
(6) 
c 
(6) 
c 
(9) 
C+E  C'  C'  C'  1-----+--+--t---t---- ~-----r----
(9) 
C+E  C' 
------+---+---r---r---~ 
E  E  c  c 
be  prescribed  and,  to  this  end,  should __  l_i~s_t_4--~~--+--4---~--+--4---4---+---4----~-~----' 
(1)  the managing  director of the  mine  informs his chief engineer of the  name  ~f the departmental  head in charge  of 
technical matters. 
(2)  as  regardS  the reasons  for the  choice. 
(3)  does  not exist in practice. 
(4)  the  law  lays  down  a provision concerning  the  academic qualifications of directors  and  departmental  headS. 
(5)  for the shotfirers. 
(6)  psycho-technical examinations  are  required for certain duties only  (winding-enginemen~  locomotive  drivers).  Other 
enterprises have  these types of examination  for other duties. 
(?)  this ceased when  recruitment was  discontinued. 
(8)  cf.  2)  on  previous page. 
(9)  for winding-enginemen  and  locomotive  drivers. 
(10)  eeased when  recruitment was  discontinued. VIII,  38 
N.R./Wph. 
Recommendations  by  the  Commission 
1. l.  1.1. 
1970  1972 
the duties  which  have  beenshown by  experience 
to call  for  such  tests  and  for which  such  (1)  (1) 
tests  can  in practice be  carried out.  c  c 
3.3  Before  anx  £romotion  of  a  worker  to  a 
su£erviso!X £OSt 
3.3.1  Before  the  promotion  of  any  workman  to  a 
supervisory post,  a  suitable psycho-technical  (3)  (3) 
examination must  be  carried out.  A  A 
3.4  Princi£les  underlxin~ the 
technical  examinations 
various  Esxcho-
3.4.1  The  psycho-technical  examinations  listed under 
3.2  and  3.3 should,  as  far  as  possible,  aid 
the vocational specialisation of  the worker 
in question.  c  c 
3.4.2  The  management  must  lay  down  the  criteria 
which  have  to be  met  by  the  candidate  on  as-
signment,  or  later, when  directed to special  (6)  (6) 
tasks,  c  C' 
and  must  seek  the  advice  of  psychologists  (6)  (6) 
when  so  doing.  c'  C' 
3.4.3  The  psychologist's  assessment will be valid 
only  for  a  restricted period  and  must  be  com-
pared with the  assessments  of  the vocational  (6)  (6) 
behaviour of  the  person  in question.  A  C' 
----~--~~  ...... -- .... ____  -~·- ... - ~-· 
(1)  cf.  6)  on  previous  page. 
(2)  does  not exist. 
Saar  Belgium  France  Italy  Nether-
lands 
1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1. 
1970  1972  1970  1972  1970  1972  1970  1972  1970  1972 
E  E  (2)  (2)  A  A  E  E  C'  C' 
(3)  (3)  (4)  (4) 
A  A  c  c  C'  C'  E  E  C'  C' 
c  c  C'  c'  C'  C'  {5)  c'  C'  C' 
C+ 
E  E  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  c' 
C+ 
E  E  C'  c'  c'  C'  C'  C'  C'  c' 
C+  (4)  ( 4) 
E  E  C'  C'  c'  C'  E  E  C'  C' 
(3)  eligibility for promotion within  the  supervisor grade  is determined during  the  vocational  training  laid-down  by 
the responsible  authorities. 
(4)  when  there was  in fact  a  psychological department. 
(5)  systematic training courses  were  given up  to  1963.  After  1963~  no  new  staff were  engaged  and  therefore  apprentice-
ship and  training are  only  provided when  new  machinery  and  equipment  is introduced. 
(6)  psycho-technical  examinations  are  required for certain duties  only  (winding-enginemen~  locomotive  drivers).  Other 
enterprises  have  these  types of examination  for other duties. VIII,  39 
GENERAL  REMARKS  ON  IMPLEMENTATION  BY  ITALY 
It should be  noted  that,  pursuant  to Article  23  of  the Mining  Regulations  in 
force,  the  subject  referred to  above  has  been  included  in  the  collective  agreements. 
The  Italien coalmines,  which  as  is well  known,  are  only worked  in the  Sulcis 
(Sardinia)  coalfield,  have  been  for  some  time  placed under  the  control  of  the  "Ente 
Nazionale per  l'Energia Elettrica (E.N.E.L.)",  since  their total production  is  intended 
for  the Porto Vesme  (Cagliari)  thermal plants.  The  staff in these mines  benefit  from  the 
guarantees  given  by  the  collective  agreement  apllicable to workers  in  the  electricity 
sector,  which  is  among  the most  favourable  collective  agreements  at present  in  force  in 
Italy.  In particular,  this  agreement  excludes  piecework  and,  consequently  a  negative 
answer  should be  given  to  the questionnaire  as  regard  the  application of  the  recommen-
dation  concerned or,  in any  case,  the  latter should  be  considered  as  not  complying with  the 
de  facto  situation. 
For the  sake  of  covering  all contingencies,  however,  it was  considered  advisable 
to  include  the  rather  improbable possibility of  new  coalmines  being  opened,  which  are not 
directly  linked with  the  production  of electrical energy,  and  to  answer  the questionnaire 
on  the basis  of  the  collective  agreement  of  13  May  1967  which  is  applicable in the  mining 
industry. 
It should  also be  noted that,  from  page  VIII,  41  onwards  of  the  questionnaire  con-
cerned,  the  symbol  "C"  and  other  symbols  used  in the  answer  refer  to  clauses  of  the  collective 
agreement mentioned  above  and  not  to  standards  codified in  the  forrr  of legislation or re-
gulations. Recommendations  by  the  Commission 
II.  Recommendations  as  to principles  to be ob-
served  in view  of  the  possible  influence  of 
payment  at piece  rates  on  safety in  coalmines 
(4th  report  of  the Mines  Safety  and  Health 
Commission,  Annex  IV) 
1.  Piecework  arrangements 
1.1  Minimum  age;  medical  examinations 
1.1.1  To  be  assigned  to  piecework,  a  miner  must 
- be  not  less  than  18 years  of  age 
- have  underground  a  medical  examination  to 
establish his  fitness  for  such  work. 
1.1.2  Similar examinations  must  follow  at  regular 
intervals. 
1.2  Make-up  of piece  rates 
1.2.1  Written particulars  of  the  operations  to be 
performed must  be  given  to the  men  concerned, 
including  such  information  as  is needed  to 
calculate  the  amount  payable  therefor. 
1.2.2  In  the  interests  of  safety,  the  piecework  ar-
rangement  employed  must  either 
- provide  that  operations  of  importance  to 
VIII,  41 
N.R. j\.lph. 
1.1. 
1970 
( 1) 
c 
(3) 
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{3) 
C' 
1.1. 
1972 
(1) 
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c 
C' 
( 5)  (5) 
c'  c' 
Saar 
1.1.  1.1. 
1970  1972 
c  c 
c  c 
(4)  {4) 
c  c 
C'  C' 
Belgium 
1.1.  1.1. 
1970  1972 
c  c 
c  c 
c  c 
C'  C' 
France 
1.1. 
1970 
NRP 
c 
c 
c 
1.1. 
1972 
c 
c 
c 
c 
Italy 
1.1.  1.1. 
1970  1972 
(2)  (2) 
c  c 
(2)  (2) 
c  c 
(2)  (2) 
c  c 
C'  C' 
Nether-
lands 
1.1.  1.1. 
1970  1972 
c  c 
c  c 
c  c 
C'  C' 
safety shall be  paid  on  a  separate basis,  or~----~-----+------~-----~~C~'--~C~'--4-----~-----4~=C-'-t--=C-'-r~C~'-t~C~'--l 
- contain equivalent  financial  safeguards  for 
the  proper execution  of  such  operations. 
(5) 
C' 
(5) 
C' 
1.2.3  In  the  event  of  its being  found  necessary  to 
carry  out  safety  operations not  expressly pro-
vided  for,  this must  not  be  allowed  to  affect  (5)  (5) 
C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
the  pay  of  the  man  or men  concerned.  ~C~'-4--~c_'-+~c_'~~-c_'-4~c_'  __  ~c_'  __  4-_c~~-C--~~c---+  __  c  __  ~  __  c  __  +-_c __  ~ 
1.3  Fixing  of norms  and  of  rates  payable  therefor 
1.3.1  The  men  must  have  the  right  to discuss  the 
fixing  of  piecework norms  and  rates with  the 
employer. 
1.3.2  If agreement  is not  reached,  the  men  or  their 
representat1ves  must  have  the  right  to start 
conciliation proceedings  under  4  below. 
1.4  Forms  of  piecework 
1.4.1  One-man  piecework  should preferably be  permit-
ted  only where  the  operations  concerned  are 
(5)  (5) 
C'  C'  C'  C'  c' 
{5)  (5) 
C'  C'  C'  C'  C' 
C'  c  c  c  c  c  c 
C'  c  c  (?)  (?)  c  c 
not  of  a  nature  to  allow  any  other  form  of  (6)  (6) 
piecework.  ~A~-4~A~-+~c~'~--C~'-+~?--~~?---+~c~'-4~C~'--4-~c~'--t-~c~'--~c~-t~c~_, 
1.5  Determination  of the  norm 
1.5.1  The  norm  must  be  determined  in  accordance with: 
the  amount  of  time  actually available  during  a  (5)  (5) 
normal  shift;  c'  c'  C'  C'  C'  C'  c  c  C'  c'  c  c 
the  amount  of work  the  men  can  fairly be  ex-
pected to perform during  this  time,  having  (5)  (5) 
regard  to  the working  conditions;  C'  c'  C'  C'  c'  C'  C  C  E  E  C  C 
L___  _____________________________________  _jt:::==±=-=-±=:=::±==±:::=:::±==t~::::l:::~=t'=±===t=~::b~d 
(1)  Questions  relating to pay  cannot  be  dealt with by  the responsible authorities.  Such  questions  are settled by  means 
of collective  agreements. 
(2)  pursuant to the  Mining  Regulation and  to  the provisions relating to  young workers. 
(3)  all workers  are  subjected to medical  examinations when  taken  on  and  to similar examinations  at regular intervals. 
(4)  periodic X-ray  examinations  (every  15  months  at most).  Periodic clinical examination only where  signs of 
pneumoconiosis  are  detected or on  medical  advice. 
(5)  settled by  collective agreement. 
(6)  for  certain operations3  one-man  piecework is considered by both sides  to the  agreement  as  the most  appropriate 
type of remuneration. 
{?)  the collective  agreement  does  not provide  for conciliation procedures,  although  such  procedure exists and  the 
Ministry  of Labour  and Social  Security acts  as  an  arbitrator  (whose  decisions  are  not binding). VIII,  42 
N.R./Wph.  Saar  Belgium  France  Italy  Nether-
lands 
Recommendations  by  the  Commission 
l.l.  1.1.  1.1.  l.l.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  l.l.  l.l.  l.l. 
1970  1972  1970  1972  1970  1972  1970  1972  1970  1972  1970  1972 
the  amount  of  time  required to perform the  (1)  (1) 
operations  properly.  c'  c'  c'  C'  C'  c'  c  c  C'  C'  c  c 
1.6  ~alculation of  the  end  wa~e 
1. 6.1  The  basis  and  mode  of  calculation must  be 
sufficiently simple  for  any  worker  to be  able 
to work  out  for himself  the  sum  due  to him  (1)  (1) 
for  a  given period.  c'  C'  c'  C'  C'  C'  c  c  c'  c'  c'  c 
1.7  Performance  in Eieceworlt 
1. 7.1  Regulations  should be  laid  down  requiring 
that periodic checks  be  carried out  on  the 
amounts  of work  performed  for  the  purpose  of  (1)  (1) 
determining  the wages  payable  therefor,  c'  c'  c'  C'  C'  C'  c  c  c'  c'  c  c 
and  that  the  findings  be  duly notified to  the  (1)  (1) 
men  concerned.  c'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  c  c  C'  c'  c  c 
1. 7. 2  Particulars must  be  supplied to the men  of 
all additions  and  deductions  affecting the 
amount  of the  end wage,  together with details  (1)  (1) 
as  to how  these were  calculated.  c'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  c  c  C'  C'  c  c 
2.  Chan~es in  conditions  at  the work£lace 
2.1  A piecework  arrangement  may  be  terminated or 
amended  if the  employer  and  the  men  are  agreed 
that  genuine difficulties warranting this  (1}  (1) 
course have  been  objectively  found  to exist.  c'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  c  c  C'  C'  C'  c' 
Failing such  agreement,  the  men  must  have  the 
right  to  ask nevertheless  that  the  arrangement  (1)  ( 1) 
be terminated  or  amended  forthwith.  c'  c'  c'  c'  C'  C'  c --- c 
1--·  c'  C'  c  c 
2.1.1  If the  men  cannot  be  paid at piece  rates  for 
so  long  as  the  difficulties persist,  they must 
be  paid  a  proper wage  appropriate  to  their  (1)  (1)  (2)  (2) 
grade.  C'  C'  c'  C'  C'  C'  c  c  c  c  c  c 
----~--- ~---- -·~  ·----------1---
3:  Mana~erial and  suEervisorx staff 
3.1  In  the  interests  of safety,  extra supervision 
must  be provided  in workings  where  men  are 
employed  on  piecework.  C'  c'  C'  C'  ?  ?  C'  C'  C'  C'  C  I  c' 
3.1.1  Since  failure  to  carry out  safety operations 
in  good  time  can  result in particular hazards, 
the  supervisory personnel must  give the  men 
strict and  relevant  instructions  to this  I 
effect,  and  check  regularly  to  see  that  these 
are  carried out.  C'  C'  c'  C'  c  c  c  c  C'  C'  c  c 
3.2  Paxment  of  mana~erial and  SU£erviso!X  staff 
3.2.1  Since managerial  and  supervisory staff are 
responsible  not  only  for  the  organisation  and 
smooth  running  of  operations,  but  also  for  the 
safety of  the  men  engaged  in  them,  they  should 
as  a  rule be paid  out  on  a  basis  independent  (3)  (3) 
of  the  ups  and  downs  of production.  A  A  C'  C'  c  c  c  c  c  c  C'  C' 
They  may  be  granted production  or output 
bonuses  provided they have  at  the  same  time  a 
sufficient financial  incentive  to devote  the  (3)  (3) 
necessary  attention to safety.  A  A  C'  C'  C'  C'  c  c  c  c  C'  C' 
4.  Settlement  of  disEutes 
4.1  There  sould be  a  conciliation  system for  deal-
ing with  anv  disoutes  arising between mana2e-
(1)  settled by  collective agreement. 
(2)  the  collective  agreement  guarantees  m~n~mum pay  and ancillary allowances. 
(3)  cannot be  subject of Mines  Authority prescriptions.  Settled according to area. VIII,  43 
N  .R.  /\~ph.  Saar  Belgium  France  Italy 
Recommendations  by  the  Conunission 
1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1. 1. 
1970  1972  1970  1972  1970  1972  1970  1972  1970  1972 
ment's  and  men's  representatives with  regard 
to piecework  arrangeme11ts  or their  implemen- (1)  (1) 
tat  ion.  c'  C'  c'  C'  C'  c'  c  c  (2)  (2) 
4.1.1  The  conciliation  system should  operate  by 
means  of  a  board  on  which  employers  and  work-
ers  are equally  represented,  and  which  should 
approach  disputes  in  the  light  of  the  present  (1)  (1) 
recommendations.  c'  C'  c'  C'  c'  c'  c  c  (2)  (2) 
4.1. 2  The  fact  that  proceedings  of  this kind  are 
pending must  not  affect  the  terms  of  employ- (1)  (1) 
ment  of  the  men  concerned,  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  c  c  C'  C' 
who  must  continue to be  entitled to  a  fair  (1)  (1) 
wage  appropriate  to their grade.  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  C'  c  c  c  c 
(1)  settled by  collective agreement. 
(2)  systematic training courses were  given  up  to 1963.  After 1963,  no  new  staff were  engaged and therfore 
apprenticeship and  training are  only provided when  new  machinery  and  equipment  are  introduced. 
Nether-
lands 
1.1.  1.1. 
1970  1972 
c  c 
c  c 
c  c 
c  c VIII,  45 
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TECHNICAL  ASPECTS 
Recommendations  by  the  Commission 
V E N T  I  L A T  I  0  N 
Practical  conclusions  on  the  application of  the 
theory of stabilisation of ventilation (sixth  report 
of  the mines  safety  and  health  commission  - Annex 
III) 
1.  Supervision  of ventilation 
The  supervision of ventilation in  a  mining  system 
requires  an  overall view,  and  should  therefore  be 
entrusted  to  a  single man  specially appointed, 
N.R./Wph. 
1.1.  1.1. 
1970  1972 
Saar  Belgium 
1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1. 
1970  1972  1970  1972 
France 
1.1.  1.1. 
1970  1972 
Italy 
1.1.  1.1. 
1970  1972 
Nether-
lands 
1.1.  1.1. 
1970  1972 
having  at his  disposal all the necessary means  (1)  (1) 
for  carrying out  his  task.  t---c_'--+-_c_'--11--c---+ __  c  __ +-c  __  ' __  l-c  __  ' --+-c  _____ £__ __ --~---~  ___  c  __  -+--_c ___  l 
2.  Fundamental  factors  in ventilation 
Apart  from  a  regular  inspection  and  analysis  of 
ventilation  conditions  in mines,  ventilation of-
ficials  require to have  data on 
- the  actual  characteristics  of  the main  and 
auxiliary ventilation fans, 
- the  order of magnitude  of  the  aerodynamic ef-
fect  of natural ventilation  in  summer  and 
winter, 
- the potentials  of  the  intersections  (at  least 
the  main  ones). 
3.  Additional  representations  of  ventilation systems 
In  order to obtain  a  precise picture of  the  over-
all structure of  ventilation systems  and  to re-
veal possible instabilities, it would  be  advis-
able  when  necessary to have,  in  addition  to  the 
regulation  diagrams,  representations  of  other 
types,  such  as,  for  example  : 
c 
C+ 
NRP 
c 
c  c  c 
C+ 
NRP  C  c 
c  c  c 
C'  C' 
C'  C' 
E  E 
(2) 
c'  c  (2)  c'  c' 
r---~-----~----r----,  c 
C'  C'  C'  C'  c  c 
(3)  c' (3)  c'  C'  c  c 
a)  a  representation of  the  whole  of  the mine 
workings  in perspective  (isometric or  any  other 
equivalent  system);  rC  __  77*-C~--I-c  ____  +-c-r.~-E  ____  ~E~--+-(_4~)-+_c_',(~
4 ,)r-c_'  __  +-c  __  '--lrc  __  --lrc  __  __, 
b)  a  diagram without  any  topographical  information C'(5;  C'  C'  C1 ( 5)  C'+E  C'+E  (3)  C'(3)  C'  C'  C  C 
4.  Characteristics  of ventilation 
The  representations mentioned  in  conclusion No.  3 
should  make  available all the  data necessary  for 
the  understanding of  analysis  of ventilation, 
particularly  : 
a)  at  the  measuring points 
- the  air quantities 
- the  direction  of  the  airflow 
- the methane  content 
- the  temperatures 
- the  pressures  (at  least  at  the  principal 
1-----1-~--r---~---
c  c  c  c 
c  c  c  c 
c  c  c  c 
c  c  c  c 
NRC  NRC  c  c  c  c  c  c 
NRC  NRC  c  c  c  c  c  c 
--~----;-----1 
NRC  NRC  c  c  c  c  c  c 
NRC  NRC  (6)  (6)  c  c  c  c 
~-------i_n_t_e_r~!~~?~n~s~,)~--------------------------------lc====~c====fc====±=c====~E====t=E==~==c='~=c='===±E====±=E====~c====~c==~ 
(1)  in every  colliery with over 500  workers  the engineer responsible is also assisted by  a  supervisor who  ensures 
application of the ventilation measures.  In  each  coalfield an  engineer has  been specially entrusted with studying 
the application of the ventilation stabilisation theory  adopted by  the Mines  safety and health commission. 
(2)  applies  to recent  ventilators~ but not to old ones. 
(3)  these  are being carried out. 
(4)  applicable  to some  coalfields~ but not all. 
(5)  carried out by  means  of network  plans in ventilation calculations made  by  electronic computers. 
(6)  headlines  for the evaluation of pressure measurements  are  now  being drafted. Recommendations  by  the  Commission 
b)  in addition 
- the  lengths  and  average  cross-sections  of 
the  roadway 
- the  calculated resistances 
- the  angles  of inclination, particularly at 
VIII,  46 
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1.1.  1.1. 
1970  1972 
c  c 
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the  ends  of  the  inclined  and  vertical  sectiorl-__:C:.__+__::C:.__+-__:C::.__-+-__:C::._-1---'E::.. __ ~L-f-~-+-~  _g~  ___  <;:_'_ _____  c;--+_C=---j 
- the positions of the  air doors  and  control 
doors,  and  of  the barriers 
~~c--~~c~~~c--~~c~--~-~E:  __  +_~E--+-~c~~~c--+-~c~~~c~~c~~c~ 1 
5.  Inspection of ventilation  conditions 
In  each mine,  there  should be  a  systematic ana-
lysis of  the ventilation system,  at  least  once  a 
year  and  after any  major  modification  of  the  (1)  (1) 
I  I 
system,  in order to detect  any  probable  cases  of  C+  C+  (2)  (2) 
instability under  the  normal  operating  conditions  ~N~R~P-1-~N~R=P~~C~+~C~-+~E:.__-+---=E=---+---=E=---+--E=-~--~C_'~~C__:'  __  ~~C~+---=C~~ 
In  addition,  cases  of  in~~ :bility which  may  be 
caused by  the  introductio_.:.  of  additional  aero-
motive  sources,  or  the  changing  or  elimination of  (3)  (3) 
the existing aeromotive  sources,  should  also be  C+  C+  (2)  (2) 
examined.  ~N~RP~+-N~RP~~C~'-+-C~'-4__::E:.__-+-~E:.__-+__::E:.__+-~E~~-__::E:.__+-=E--+__::C~~C~-I 
6.  Informing the personnel 
Taking into  account  the  importance  of ventilation 
for  the whole  of  the  underground workings,  each 
responsible person  should be  informed  of ventila-
tion  conditions within his  own  field.  ~c---+_c.:__+_c_+_c_-+_E_+_E  _____ ,_  ___ c_'---+--c--+_c_'--i-c_'_+--'c-+--_c_i 
Furthermore it is essential that  separate meetings 
should be  held  once  a  year at  least,  as  well  as 
after any  major modification in the ventilation 
system,  at which  the  colliery ventilation engineer 
will explain  the ventilation conditions  obtaining 
at  the pit,  together with  any  modifications  which 
have  recently been made,  in  the  presence  of  : 
a)  the management  officials,  the  technical 
departments,  the  chief of the  rescue  team  and 
the officials  responsible  for ventilation; 
b)  the  local officials,  each  in respect  of his 
own  speciality 
On  these  occasions,  attention should be  drawn  to 
districts where instabilities are  already  likely  in 
normal  conditions  and,  in particular cases  of 
instability which  make  the  occurrence  of  a  fire 
c' 
c' 
c'  c  c  E 
c'  E 
E  c'  c'  E  E  c  c 
E  c  c  E  E  c  c 
likely.  ~c~'--+-__:c~'--+-c:.__'-4-c~·--+-E=-~~E---1-__::c_'~__::c_'_+~E.:__~-E----~c.:__~-c  ____ _ 
7.  Exercises  on  plans 
Once  a  year at  least,  the management  or the 
competent  mining  authority  should  organise  an 
exercise  on  plans  covering measures  to be  taken 
in the event  of  an  underground  fire.  This  should 
be  attended by  the mine  owner  or his  represent-
ative,  the ventilation engineer  and  the  competent 
officials  responsible  for  the  organisation  of 
fire  fighting  and  rescue  operations. 
(1)  not systematically reaorded. 
(2)  now  being studied by  the  users. 
(5) 
c' 
(5) 
C'  E  E  E 
(3)  headlines  for the evalution of pressure measurements  are  now  being drafted. 
(4)  this instruction is not usually given at separate meetings. 
(5)  will be regulated by  the  fire-fighting plan. 
E  (6)  (6)  E  E  c 
(6)  these will be  organised after implementation of the  Budryk  plan,  but the  ventilation officials and  the  rescue 
centres  already  contact eaah  other from  time  to  time. 
c 
i Recommendations  by  the  Corrunission 
8.  Position  of  regulation doors 
When  doors  are  necessary  for  regulating venti-
lation  they  should be  placed  as  near  as  possible 
to  roadway  junctions,  taking into account  other 
requirements,  in order  to  facilitate  access  in 
smoky  conditions. 
9.  Measures  and  equipment  for  slowing-down 
ventilation 
In all collieries,  devices  for  rapidly  slowing-
down  ventilation in  order to stabilise it shall be 
installed in all intake  airways,  subject  to 
exceptions  to be  previously determined,  after each 
VIII,  47 
N.R./Hph. 
1.1.  1.1. 
1970  1972 
Saar  Belgium 
1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1. 
1970  1972  1970  1972 
(1) 
A 
(1)  (2)  (2) 
A  A  A  E  E 
roadway  junction or branch,  and  as  near  as  pos- (4)  (4) 
France 
1.1.  1.1. 
1970  1972 
(3)  (3) 
Italy  Nether-
lands 
1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1. 
1970  1972  1970  1972 
C'  C'  c  c 
sib  le to it.  ~A:.;:_-+----=:A=----+-...:.c_+-c-=----t----=:E_+-_E_+-;__(  5.:....:)---i-----'(_5-'-J-+_c_'-+-c_' --t-c-r--_c_____, 
10.  Instructions  to officials in  the event  of 
underground  fire 
Apart  from  the  usual  provisions  regarding  the 
obligation  to attack  any  seat  of  a  fire  in  order 
to extinguish it as  soon  as  possible,  and  to  in-
form  the  officials  and  management  without  delay, 
there  should be  instructions  to officials  laying 
down  the  other measures  to be  taken  in  the  event 
of  a  mine  fire  in  order to  slow  down  ventilation 
so  as  to  avoid  an  increase  in the  air supply  to 
the  seat  of  the  fire. 
11.  Instructions  to management  officials  in  the event 
of  underground  fire 
No  decision  to modify  the  ventilation is to be 
taken  by  the  management  staff with  a  study being 
made  of  the  consequences,  by  means  of  application 
of  the  theory  of  the  stabilisation of ventilation, 
and  with  the help  of plans  and  ventilation 
schemes  which  have  previously been prepared  in 
respect  of all the possible  causes  result  from 
(6) 
A 
(6)  (?)  (?) 
A  A  A  E  E  (8)  (8) 
the  fire or  from  the  structure of  the mine  (?)  (?)  (9)  (9) 
E  E  c  c 
(ventilation by  multiple  fans  etc.).  _J:=c='==t==c='~==A==j:A====t=E=:=±=E=::jtc='==:ttc='==j:tc=:j:=c===t:=c=:i:~c::j 
-- --1-- 1---
(1)  owing  to the different  local conditions  a  uniform regulation would be  unsuitable. 
(2)  the  decision is to be  taken by  the  head of the  fire-fighting unit. 
(3)  as  soon  as  possible,  but not automatically. 
(4)  experience has  shown  that it is more  convenient to have  a  central store of materials  for  constructing regulation 
doors. 
(5)  now  being studied by  the users. 
(6)  the  ventilation must  be  not modified except  on  the  express  order of the officials in charge. 
(?}  the  decision is to be  taken by  the  leader of the  fire-fighting unit. 
(8)  not supervisors  level but the  chiefs of rescue  teams  and the  rescue  centres. 
(9)  to be  specified after implementation of the  Budryk  plan. I. 
II. 
III. 
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E- Regular  report  on  the  implementation  of  the Mines  Safety  and Health  Commission's 
Recommendations  published in the  7th  and  8th Reports 
I.  TECHNICAL  ASPECTS 
N. R.  /\~ph.  Saar  Belgium  France  Italy 
Recommendations  by  the  Cormnission 
1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  l.l. 
1972  1972  1972  1972  1972 
Use  for  foamed  urethane 
OJ2inion  on  the  use  underground  of  foamed 
urethane  in  coal mines  (7th ReEort  of  the Mines 
Safetl  and  Health  Commission,  annex  VI) 
The  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  consid-
ers  it desirable that  the  producers  of  the 
foamed  urethane plastic should further  develop 
the  compound  at present  available  in such  a  way 
that,  while  retaining unchanged  the positive 
properties which it now  has,  it satisfies  the 
requirement  set out  in the  Commission's 
opinion. 
Are  there  any  regulations  governing  the  use  (1) 
underground  of  foamed  urethane  ?  yes  E  NRP  no  no 
Plaster stoEEings 
OEinion  on  the  construction  of Elaster stoE-
pings  using  the  hydromechanical  process  (doc. 
34Bf7  3/69) ;  instructions  for  construction 
(8th  ReEort  of  the Mines  Safetl  and  Health 
Commission,  annex  V) 
(3) 
Is  this  recently developed  process  in use  ?  yes  c  C'  yes  E 
Is its use  governed  by  any  regulation?  yes 
( 4) 
c  no  no  no 
Cables  SUJ2J2lling  mobile  machines  and  their 
electrical Erotection 
Recommendations  arising out  of  the  "Re12ort 
adoEted bl the Mines  Safetl and  Health  Commis-
sion  on  20  June  1969  on  the  characteristics  and 
electrical Erotection  of  cables  SUJ2Ellin~ mobile 
machines  (coal  cutters 2  loading machines,  etc.) 
used  underground  in  coal mines  in the various 
Communitl  countries"  (5) 
(8th Re12ort  of  the Mines  Safet;:t  and  Health  Com-
mission,  Annex  IX) 
(*)  See  7th Report  of  the Mines  Safety  and 
Health  Commission,  Annex  V. 
The  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  recom-
mends  that electrical equipment  supplying  cur-
rent  to mobile  machines  should  meet  the  follow-
ing minimum  requirements  : 
A.  Power  should  automatically be  cut  off  cables 
supplying mobile  machines  in  the  following 
cases  :  C'+ 
a)  phase  to  phase  faults  c  C'  c  NRP  C' 
b)  faults  between phase  and  earth  c  C'  c  C+NRI  C' 
c)  faults  between  phase  and  polarised  C'+ 
screen  C'  c'  c  NRP  C' 
--!-------
d)  faults  between  conductor  or polarised  C'+ 
screen  and  earth;  ~  C'  c  NRP  C' 
e)  breaking of  the monitoring  C'+ 
circuit  c  C'  c  NRP  C' 
Nether-
lands 
1.1. 
1972 
(2) 
no 
no 
-
yes 
yes 
(5) 
(5) 
yes 
(1)  the  use  underground of liquid plastic products requires  the approval of the Oberbergamt.  Approval  has  so  far only 
been  granted for its use in rock  consolidation.  Its use  for coating surfaces is not permitted. 
(2)  for  use  only after prior study. 
( 3)  under trial. 
(4)  directives  for the  construction of stoppings of 21.4.?1- 18.13.1 II- 1. 
(5)  there is no  polarised screen. Recommendations  by  the  Commission 
B.  The  electrical installations defined  above 
should be  designed  in such  a  way  that  any 
fault  arising  in  the  cable  cannot  result 
in unintentional starting of machines 
connected  to  the  supply. 
C.  CI  or  CB  insulation monitors  and  BS  safety 
blocks  not  automatically monitored  should 
incorporate  a  device which  monitors  their 
operation  and  integrity,  They  should  also 
have  a  fault-indicating device. 
D.  The  BS  safety block  should be  arranged  so 
that  the  supply  cable  cannot  become  live 
again  after power  has  been  cut  off  due  to  a 
fault. 
Vlii,  50 
N.R./\~ph. 
1.1. 
1972 
C' 
C' 
c' 
Saar 
1.1. 
1972 
C' 
C' 
C' 
Belgium 
1.1. 
1972 
c 
c 
c 
France 
1.1. 
1972 
C'+ 
NRP 
C'+ 
NRP 
C'+ 
NRP 
C'+ 
Italy  Nether-
lands 
1.1.  1.1. 
1972  1972 
c'  yes 
E  yes 
E  yes 
E.  The  monitoring  circuit  should not  give  rise 
to  any  risk of  igniting  firedamp.  ~~------~---c_'-r-----+--c--1-----·rN_RP  ___ r-__ _,  ___  c  __  r----+~y_e_s-+----~ 
F.  The  earth  conductors  should  be  symmetrically 
arranged. 
G.  Finally,  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commis-
sion  recommends  that  : 
1.  The  power  to  a  cable  supplying  a  mobile 
machine  should  be  cut  off when  the  first 
c  C' 
(1) 
A 
C'+ 
NRP 
fault between  phase  and  screen  (polarised  C'+ 
E 
(2) 
yes 
~o(3) 
screen  or earth  conductor)  appears  and, 
1 
__  c  __  -4-----+--c  __  ·~----+--C--~----+-N_R_P~~--~---c_'-+-----ry~e_s  __  t---~ 
2.  In  view  of  the  present state of  the  art it 
suggests  the  use  of  cables  provided with 
screens  (polarised screens  or earth 
conductors)  of  one  of the  types  described 
E 
C'+ 
NRP 
in  annex  V,  page  13  of  the  7th  Report  of 
the Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission 
except  types  A2,  B2,  n2.  C  yes 
~--~----+----+----~--~----,_--~----~----~---+~--r---~ 
C'  c 
3.  These  cables  should be  used  in  conjunction 
with  the  following  devices  : 
- protection by  means  of  current  intensity 
appropriate  to  the  length  and  cross-
section of  the  cables;  C  c'  c 
C'+ 
NRP  E  r----r----+----+----,_  __ _,  ____ ,_  __ _,  ____  -r----r----+----T----1 
- a  permanent  insulation monitor  (CI  or  C'+ 
yes 
CB);  r-c---+  ____  ,__c  __  '-r----+-c--~-----rN_RP  __  -r  ____ ,_  __  E  __  ~---+y~e_s-+----~ 
- a  safety block  incorporated  in  the 
gate-end  box.  C  C'  c 
C'+ 
NRP  E  yes 
(1)  yes,  but  on  condition  that this measure is extended to the whole  network u)hich  is practically impossible. 
(2)  before  the  screens 
(3)  before  the additional mass  conductors. Recommendations  by  the  Commission 
I.  DUST  CONTROL 
Recommendation  embodying  directives  of  suppres-
sing dust  concentrations  in  underground workings 
(8th  Report  of  the Mines  Safety  and  Health  Com-
mission  (Annex  VI) 
With  due  regard  to  the basic principles  set  out 
and,  in particular,  to  the need  for  the differ-
ent  dust  control processes  to be  combined  to 
suit  locally prevailing conditions,  the  dust 
control methods  should be  applied  in  accordance 
with  the directives  of  the  recommendation, 
namely  : 
I.  FACES 
1)  Coal winning 
1.1.  -Seam injection 
- Is  any  attention paid to the degree 
of  efficiency  of  the different  pro-
cesses  suggested  ? 
1. 2.  Spraying 
2)  Stowing 
a)  in  general  : 
2.1.  Prior sprinkling of  the soil 
2.2.  Prior sprinkling of  the site to be 
stowed 
b)  when  hydraulic  stowing is  employed 
2.3.  specific consumption  of ventilated 
air maintained  at  the  lowest  possible 
level 
2.4.  use  of  soil of  fine  mechanical 
composition  and  sufficiently humid  to 
prevent  subsequent  fissuring during 
transport  and  forced ventilation 
2.5.  prevention  of  air stagnation in the 
stowage  zone when  tipping  the  goaf 
3)  Caving 
3.1.  Seam  injection 
3.2.  Spraying 
II.  SHAFTS  AND  ROADWAYS 
4)  Drilling of  mine  chambers 
(shot holes) 
4.1.  Wet  drilling,  dry  dust  extraction 
5)  Shotfi  ring 
5.1.  Use  of wet  tamps  or  gelatine  pastes, 
supplemented by  previous  sprinkling 
of  the  floor  and  sides  of  the  road-
ways  and  the dirt  resulting  from 
previous  shots. 
5.2.  Use  of water  screen where  wet  tamps 
cannot  be  used 
6)  Loading  of  excavated material 
6.1.  Abundant  and  systematic sprinkling of 
excaveted material 
7)  Machine  drivers 
{1)  onZy  wet  tamps  are  used. 
(2)  water screen  are  aZways  used. 
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N.R./Wph. 
1.1. 
1972 
c 
c 
c 
C' 
c' 
C' 
C' 
C' 
c 
c 
c 
(1) 
c 
(1) 
c 
C' 
Saar 
1.1. 
1972 
c 
C' 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
C' 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
Belgium  France 
1.1.  1.1. 
1972  1972 
C'  c 
c'  C' 
C'  c 
c 
c 
c'  C' 
C'  c' 
c'  c' 
C'  c 
c 
C'  c 
C'  c 
E  c 
C'  c 
Italy 
1.1. 
1972 
E 
c 
c 
C' 
C' 
C' 
C' 
E 
C' 
C'+C 
c 
E 
c 
Nether-
lands 
1.1. 
1972 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
(2) 
yes 
yes Recommendations  by  the  Commission 
7.1.  Suitable distribution  of  the  dust 
extraction  and  ventilation flow 
rates  so  as  to keep  the  dust 
against  the  drivage  front  at  the 
maximum  distance  away  from  the 
machine  operators 
7.2.  Purification of  the  dusty air before 
it is  diluted in the  general venti-
lation system 
8)  Various  rock working  operations 
8.1.  Use  of wet  mechanical  picks 
9)  Various  material handling operations 
9.1.  Arrangements  for withdrawal, 
transfer,  tipping  and  loading  (e.g. 
determining  the  minimum  height  of 
fall,  ensuring that materials  are 
completely tipped  out  at  loading  and 
unloading points). 
9.2.  Use  of  additional products  ensuring 
or maintaining  surface wetting 
II.  ORGANISATION  OF  SERVICES 
Recommendation  on  the  organisation  of special 
services  responsible  for  the  inspection of  dust 
conditions  in underground workings  (8th Report 
of  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health Commission,  Annex 
VII) 
The  Commission  recommends  the  following 
methods  of  operating  : 
1.  The  management  of  each pit shall  appoint  from 
among  its staff a  person who  shall be 
responsible  for dust  control  and  is not 
VIII,  52 
N.R.Ji.lph. 
1.1. 
1972 
C' 
c' 
C' 
c' 
C' 
Saar 
1.1. 
1972 
( 1) 
A 
(1) 
A 
(2) 
A 
c 
(3) 
A 
Belgium  France  Italy  Nether-
lands 
1.1.  1.1.  1.1.  1.1. 
1972  1972  1972  1972 
E  C'  C' 
E  c' 
C'  c'  yes 
E  c  c  yes 
E  c  no 
directly concerned with  production  and  output.r-C---i-----t--C---r----~-C_'  __  r----i--c_'  __  r---~r-C--'-+----~~Y_e_s-+----~ 
2.  The  said person,  and  any  assistants,  shall be 
responsible for  dust  control  operations,  any 
improvements  required,  and  dust  sampling.  r-C---i-----+---c_,  ____ -i  __  c_'~r----i--C-'~r---_,r-c  __  '-+----~Y~  __  es-+--~ 
3.  Dust  is to be  sampled  in all working places. 
The  frequency  and  location of  sampling  or 
measurement will depend  on  the hazards  to 
which  the  men  are  exposed.  The  results  of 
measurements  are  to be  recorded  in  accordance 
with  the  standards  laid  down  in the various 
countries  and  made  available to  the  appro-
priate  administrations  and  the  mine's  medical 
department. 
4.  A department  belonging the  company  coalfield 
shall assemble  the  results  of measurements, 
be  responsible  for  training persons  in  charge 
of  dust  control  operations  in each mine,  and 
work  out  and  co-ordinate instructions  for 
use  by  the  latter. 
5.  The  special services  belonging  to the  company 
or  coalfield shall keep  in  touch with  the 
relevant  technical  and  medical  departments  so 
as  to take  any  precautions  needed  for 
reducing  inadmissible dust  concentrations  or 
moving  staff following  the results  obtained 
during  the periodical medical examinations. 
c  c  c 
c  c  C' 
c  c  c 
(1)  appropriate measures  aannot  be  taken in view of the  type of maahine  used hitherto. 
(2)  the  pneumatia piaks  did not stand the test. 
(3)  spraying is suffiaient,  the  use of additives is not neaessary. 
C'  c  yes 
C'  C'  yes 
c'  C'  yes ANNEX  IX 
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I  - Introductory  remarks 
After  the  Luisenthal disaster which  occurred  in  1962,  the  competent  authorities 
of  the  German  Federal  Republic  once  again began  to  study  the neutralization or 
binding  of  coal  dust  deposits  using  solutions  of hygroscopic salts,  to be  applied 
in  conjunction with  explosion barriers,  as  a  means  of halting the  propagation  of 
coal  dust  explosions  as  quickly  as  possible. 
The  salts  used  are  calcium or magnesium  chlorides,  the  solution of which  is 
dependent  on  the  temperature  and  moisture  content  of  the  air,  the  type  of  coal 
concerned,  etc. 
The  salt solutions,  to which  agents  are  added,  are  made  into  a  paste with  a 
gelatinous  base.  The  paste is  spread  to  a  thickness  of  3  to  4  mm  onto  the walls, 
roofs  and  floors  of  roadways  (saline paste process).  This  adhesive paste  can  bind 
approximately  its  own  weight  of  dust  before being  exhausted.  Its effectivness  can 
be  prolonged either by  spreading  a  new  layer of  paste  or by  spraying  on  a  lye  con-
taining a  wetting agent  or  by  spreading onto  the  paste  a  calcium chloride  powder 
containing  a  wetting  agent  (1). 
Powders  of  this kind  can,  under  certain  conditions,  be  used without  a  paste 
base  layer  (saline  powder  process). 
The  effectiveness  of hygroscopic salts  as  dust  binders  in preventing  the  propa-
gation  of  coal  dust  explosions  was  demonstrated  at  the  Tremonia  experimental pit  in 
Dortmund.  In  1969  the  use  of  dust  binders  was  made  compulsory  for  coalmines  in the 
Federal  Republic,  but  this  regulation  only  applies  to  gateroads  located  60  metres 
in  front  of,  or behind  the  face.  Twenty  metres  may  remain  untreated at material 
loading  and  transfer points  (2).  Roadways  in which  coal  dust  deposits  are  not  liable 
to  be  blown  up  into  the  air  (wet  workings)  are  also  exempted. 
It was  found  in practice  that  the  application of  these  dust  binders  in  German 
mines  (3)  caused  trouble  in electrical plant,  and  this  prompted  the  Mines  Safety 
and  Health  Commission,  at  its meeting  on  14-15  February  1966,  to  instruct  the 
Working  Party  on  Electrification to  study  the  deleterious  effects  of  saline moisture 
and  dust  binding processes  using saline pastes  and  powders  on  electrical equipment 
used  underground. 
The  Working  Party  on  Electrification has  evaluated  the  results  of  the  tests  and 
service trials  described below,  after  a  number  of  consultations,  particularly at  the 
test  laboratories  and  service trial locations. 
An  interim report was  submitted  to  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  on 
17  November  1967. 
The  present  document  is  the  final  report  on  the  investigations  which  the 
Working  Party was  instructed  to  carry out.  It is based  on  the  final  results  of  the 
tests  and  service trials described  below;  it also  contains  additional  information 
supplied by  the  German  Delegation. 
(1)  See  References~  item 1. 
(2)  See  References~  items  4  and  5. 
(3)  See  References~  item  3. IX,  6 
II - Short description  of tests  and  service trials 
1.  Laboratory  tests  carried out  by  SILEC  at  Montereau  (France) 
Samples  of various  types  of  sheathing  for electrical cables  supplying mobile 
machines  were  immersed  fur  six months  in saline solutions  and  saline pastes  of 
varying  concentrations,  and  changes  in the most  important  properties  of  the 
sheathings  were  measured  (1). 
2.  Tests  carried out  at  the  Tremonia  experimental pit in Dortmund 
These  tests were  conducted with financial  assistance  from  the  Commission  of  the 
European  Communities. 
Electrical plant  comprising various  types  of  equipment  and  power  supply 
arrangements  was  exposed  to  the  effects  of  saline pastes  and  powders  for  27  months 
under varying stress  and  maintenance  conditions,  simulating  those  applying  in 
operational  service.  The  condition  of  the  insulation of  the entire equipment  was 
automatically monitored  and  recorded,  and  functional  tests were  made  daily  on 
individual  pieces  of  apparatus  (2). 
3.  Report  on  hygroscopic salts  in service trials at  collieries  in North-Rhine-
Westphalia 
The  Technischer  tlberwachungsverein Essen has  prepared  a  short  report  in  the 
effects  of hygroscopic salts  as  coal  dust  binders  on  electrical plant  under-
ground  (3),  which  demonstrates  the dangers  arising  and  possible  means  of  over-
coming  them. 
III - Results  of  tests  and  service trials  and  a  general  survey  of  the effects  of hygrosco-
pic salts  on  electrical plant 
1.  Results  of  tests  and  service trials 
The  tests  conducted by  SILEC  in Montereau  have  shown  that  the  mechanical  proper-
ties  of  sheathings  for  cables  supplying mobile  machines  do  not  suffer  any  delete-
rious  effects  from  immersion  in  certain saline solutions.  The  same  is not  true  of 
their electrical resistivity.  Low  conductivity  sheathings  made  of  a  material based 
on  synthetic  rubber  are  an  exception.  They  are  used  internally in  leads  and  would 
only  occasionally  come  into  contact with  saline solutions,  if the  outer sheating 
was  damaged. 
In  the  Tremonia trials only  two  failures  occurred  as  a  result  of  insulation 
defects.  These  trials  showed  that  the  deleterious  effects  of processes  based  on 
hygroscopic salts  are  largely  dependent  on  the  penetration of  saline moisture 
even  into  the  tiniest  tears  and  cracks.  The  presence  of wetting  agents  favours 
this penetration  and  the  conductivity  of  the saline moisture  itself is  enhanced 
by  the  presence  of  chlorides.  The  flame-proofing  of  the electrical power  plant  is 
not  affected under  normal  maintenance  conditions. 
The  use  of hygroscopic salts underground  did not  cause  any  major  damage  to electri-
cal plant,  but  certain difficulties  arose,  especially  in  connection with defective 
cables  and  leads.  The  pits  endeavoured  to  remedy  this  by  improving  the electrical 
equipment  and  by  adopting  a  number  of  operational measures. 
(1)  See  References,  item 2. 
(2)  See  References,  item 1. 
(3}  See  References,  item 3. IX,  7 
2.  General  survey  of  the  effect of hygroscopic salts  on  electrical plant 
The  Working  Party sets  out  below  the  effects  recorded  on  different parts  of 
electrical  appliances. 
(a)  Effects  on  casings 
The  most  noticeable effect was  on  gaskets  and  clearances,  shaft bearings  and, 
in particular,  fastenings  (bolts, etc.).  The  saline solution penetrate by 
capillary  action  and  promotes  the  formation  of  rust,  particularly on  nut  and 
bolt  threads. 
(b)  Effect  on  components  housed  inside  casings 
No  deleterious  effects were  observed during  the  tests  and  service trials  on 
components.  It should be  pointed  out,  however,  that  the  addition of wetting 
agents  favours  the  penetration of  conductive moisture. 
(c)  Effect  on  cables  and  leads 
Outer sheathings,  screens  and  the  insulating sheathings  of  conductors  remain 
practically unaffected by  saline solutions.  The  saline solution  cannot  pene-
trate undamaged  cables  and  leads.  But  even  the  tiniest  cracks  facilitate pene-
tration by  saline moistures  and  this,  depending  on  the  design  of  the  cable, 
can  cause  faults  between  conductors,  earth  leakage  and  hence  power  failures 
or short  circuits. 
IV  - Measures  to  control deleterious  effects 
The  Working  Party sets  out  below measures  which  may  reduce  these  effects  to  an 
acceptable  minimum. 
Electrical  appliances  should,  as  far  as  possible,  be  installed in  areas  which 
are  not  treated with hygroscopic  salts  (1). 
1.  Measures  concerning.electrical  appliances 
Casings  and  marker plates  on  them  should  be  made  of  corrosion  resisting material 
or alternatively,  the  surfaces  of  the  casings  should  be well  protected by  galvan-
izing phosphate  coating or primer. 
Threads  and  gaskets,  and  the  surfaces  of  flame-proofed  appliances,  should be 
protected by  a  non-corrosive  grease with  a  low  vapour  pressure,  for  exemple  a 
fluorinated  reasin-based  grease.  Inlets  for  cables  and  lines  should be  effective-
ly  sealed using  some  impermeable  material. 
2.  Measures  concerning  cables  and  leads 
Armouring  should  be  protected by  galvanizing  and  a  suitable plastic should  be 
used  to  protect  sheathings.  If the  leads  to  mobile  machines  are  exposed  to  the 
effects  of hygroscopic salts, it should  be remembered  that  the  Recommendation  of 
the Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  of  26th  June  1970  is  applicable  (2). 
Auton1atic  tripping in  the  event  of  insulation failures  should  be  guarenteed  imme-
diately  a  fault  occurs. 
(1)  See  page  5~  fifth paragraph  and  footnote  (2). 
(2)  Comments  and  Recommendations  arising out of the  Report  adopted by  the Mines  Safety 
and  Health  Commission  on  20  June  1969  on  "the  Characteristics  and Electrical Protec-
tion of cables  supplying mobile machines  (coal-cutters~  loading  machines~ etc.)  used 
underground in coalmines  in the  various  Community  countries"  (Doc.  No.  1145/3/70). IX,  8 
3.  Measures  concerning  the  use  of  dust  binders  and  the maintenance  and  inspection 
of electrical plant 
It is  advisable  to provide protective  casings  for electrical  appliances,  apart 
from  cables  and  leads,  used  in  areas  to be  treated with hygroscopic salts.  The 
direct spraying of electrical appliances  with hygroscopic salts  should  be  avoided. 
Effective  cooperation between  the electrical engineering  department  and  the 
department  concerned with  the  use  of dust binding processes  is essentiel Electri-
cal plant  inspection should be  intensified. 
V - Conclusions 
The  use  of hygroscopic salts certainly has  deleterious  effects  on  electrical 
equipment but  these effects  should not  be  exaggerated.  They  can be  controlled by 
the  following  means  : 
(1)  use  of electrical equipment  in perfect  condition, 
(2)  special measures  to protect electrical equipment, 
(3)  precautions  to be  taken during  the  application of hygroscopic salts, 
(4)  effective inspection procedures, 
(5)  general  use  of  insulation monitors,  which  ensure  automatic  tripping  immediately 
a  fault  occurs, 
(6)  good  cooperation between  the  electrical engineering department  and  the  department 
concerned with  the  use  of  dust binding processes. 
The  benefits  of  using hygroscopic salts  to prevent  the  propagation of  coal  dust 
explosions  outweigh  the  disadvantages  of  these  processes with  regard  to electrical 
equipment,  and  the  disadvantages  should not be  regarded  as  an  obstacle  to  their use. IX,  9 
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Comparison  of safety prov1s1ons  concerning electric trolley locomotives  under-
ground  and,  in particular,  possibilities  of  reducing  the  incidence  of trolley sparks. 
The  Working  Party  on  Electrification was given a  mandate  by  the Safety  and Health 
Commission  to  study  the  above  subject  following  a  firedamp  explosion  on  14  December  1962 
in  the  Adolf Pit  at Merkstein  in  the  Aachen  coalfield.  The  firedamp  originated in  a  sec-
ondary ventilation  roadway  in which  the ventilator had  been  out of service for  some  time, 
and  had  seeped  through  into  a  haulage  roadway  in which electric trolley  locomotives  are 
used  (1). 
The  following  documentation was  obtained in order  to  carry  out  these  instruc-
tions 
(1)  Laws  and  regulations  concerning trolley  locomotives,  compiled by  the International 
Labour Office,  Geneva  1955  (Doc.  3707/68). 
(2)  Conditions  under which  exemptions  may  be  granted  to  the prohibition on  the  operation 
of electric trolley  l~comotives in  coal mines  in  the Netherlands  (Doc.  58/69)  and  in 
France  (Doc.  2048/69). 
(3)  Provisions  concerning  the  operation  of electric trolley  locomotives  in coal mines  in 
the  Federal Republic  of  Germany  (Doc.  131/69). 
(4)  Regulations  governing  the  operation  of electric trolley  locomotives  in coal mines  in 
Italy  (Doc.  134/69). 
(5)  Luxembourg  mine  regulation  concerning  locomotive  haulage  (Doc.  402/69). 
(6)  Belgian  regulations  on  the  operation  of  electric trolley  locomotives  (Doc.  2285/69 
and  A.R.  5.9.1969;  Moniteur belge  30.12.1969). 
Comparison  of  the  above  regulations  in  application  in  the various  countries will 
show  that  the  main  hazards  they  seek to  control, where  the  operation of electric trolley 
locomotives  is  concerned,  are  : 
(1)  the  firedamp  explosion hazard, 
(2)  the  fire hazard, 
(3)  the  electrocution hazard. 
Devices  or regulations  are  applied  in  the  Community  countries  and  Great Britain 
to prevent  the electrocution hazard.  These  consist  of making  the  trolley wire inaccessi-
ble to personnel either by  placing it out  of their reach  or by  providing some  form of 
contact  guard  (2). 
With  regard  to  the  risk of  firedamp  explosions,  the  measures  provided in the 
documents  mentioned  above  show  that  the  prevention  of  this  risk is mainly based  on  the 
prevention  of  firedamp  and  its accumulation  along haulage  roadways  where  trolley  locomo-
tives  are  used. 
The  measures  mentioned  above  are  also  applicable  to  the  reduction of the  fire 
hazard.  In  addition, fire-resistant materials  are  used  for  supports  in haulage  roadways 
for  trolley  locomotives  and  special measures  are  taken  in installing the  overhead wires. 
The  working party has  also  studied  a  new  curreat  collection-system- (Kindermann) 
designed  to eliminate  sparking  (3).  In  this  system,  the  overhead  lines  are  almost  complete-
(1)  See  item 1  in the  RefePenaes; 
(2)  See  item 2  in the RefePenaes; 
(3)  See  items  3  and  4  in  the  RefePenaes. X,  4 
ly enclosed by  PVC-"channels"  (PVC-tubing with  a  slit along  the  underside).  Current  is 
collected by  spiral  collectors which  slide  along  these  channels.  This  increases  the  contact 
area  and  reduces  sparking. 
This  system has  not  yet been  tried out  in practice.  The  Working  Party  is  of  the 
opinion  that no  method  exists  to  date which  ensures  that  there will be  no  sparking. 
After  comparing  the  measures  applied  in  the  individual  countries  of  the  Community 
and  in Great Britain,  the  Working  Party  considers  the  following  to  be  especially worthy  of 
note  : 
(i)  ventilation stability in trolley  locomotive  roadways; 
(ii)  imposition  of  a  minimum  ventilation  speed; 
(iii)  keeping  the  CH4  content within  the  regulation  limit  (0,25%  in Great Britain,  0,3%  in 
Germany  and  Italy,  0,5%  in Belgium,  France  and  the  Netherlands); 
(iv)  maintaining  a  protection  zone  around  trolley  locomotive  roadways  in which  no  winning 
operations  should be  carried out; 
(v)  prohibiting the  connection  of  air  outlets,  especially  from  secondary ventilation 
circuits, with trolley  locomotive  roadways  unless  effective measures  are  adopted  to 
prevent  the  maximum  firedamp  content  from  being  exceeded  or  unless  the  power  supply 
is  automatically  cut  off when  this  limit  is  exceeded. 
These  measures  are not  all apllied in all of  the  countries.  Since  they  fall 
mainly within  the  field  of ventilation  and  winning  the Working  Party  does  not  feel  compe-
tent  to determine  the  extent  to which  they  should be  standardized. X,  5 
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On  the  25th January  1972  the  Mines  Safety  and Health  Commission  adopted  the 
present  document  with  the  following  remarks  : 
The  Mines  Safety  and Health  Commission  considers  that  this  report  and  conclu-
sions  cannot  take  the  form  of  a  recommendation,  because  implementation of  the  proposals 
depends  to  a  large extent  on  local  conditions.  For this  reason  these  proposals  cannot  as 
they  stand be  embodied  into  the national  regulations. Moreover,  examination  of this  problem 
has  made  it clear that it is  less  important  for  the  deep  coal-mines  of Western Europe, 
than  for  iron-ore mines  or other metalliferous  mines  and  opencast  quarries  or drift mines 
at  least  as  far  as  the  danger  of spontaneous  detonation  is  concerned. 
The  measures  outlined for  protecting  the electrical circuits  are  generally 
applicable  to all underground workings. 
The  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission  decided when  adopting  this  document  to 
send it - for  appropriate  action  according  to  the  circumstances  - to  the  various  national 
mining  authorities  to all interested parties  in  the  coal-mining  industry  and  to all other 
sectors  of  the  extractive industries,  who  also  come  under  the  aegis  of  these  same  nation-
al mining  authorities. 
1.  Introduction 
The  authority  for this  study  emanates  from  the  firedamp  and  dust  explosion which 
occurred at Mainsforth Colliery,  (Durham,  Great  Britain)  on  the  30th August  1963  (1). 
This  explosion  fortunately  did not  cause  any  injuries,  but  resulted in various  cases  of 
damage  in  the  underground workings  as  well  as  to electrical and  other equipment  (con-
veyors,  etc.). 
The  explosion  occurred in  a  development  heading which  formed  an  extension of  the 
main  intake  airway  in the East Winning District,  at  a  depth  of  some  170  metres,  and 
2,200  metres  from  the pit bottom.  The  auxiliary  fan  which  normally  ventilated this 
heading had been  stopped during  the holiday period,  i.e.  for  about  one  week  before  the 
incident.  Although  the  emission  of methane  was  normally  low,  it would  seem  that  suf-
ficient  gas  had been  able  to  accumulate  during  this  period to  form  an  explosive mixture. 
Those  charged with  carrying  out  the  enquiry  into  the  causes  of this  explosion  concluded 
that  the  lightning had probably  struck the  overhead  20  kV  lines  supplying  the  colliery 
and  that  the  overvoltage had been  transmitted  from  this  line  down  to  the  underground 
equipment. 
The  explosive  methane  mixture  had  become  ignited simultaneously  in several 
places,  very probably  by  the electrical discharges  emanating  from  the metallic sheathing 
of the  cables  and  other metal  objects  forming  part  of  the  main  earthing  system of  the 
colliery which,  as  a  result of  the  lightning stroke,  had  become  charged with  respect 
to earth  and  other conductors  such  as  pipe  ranges  and  tub  tracks. 
The  electrical installations were  ~ubjected,  as  a  result  of  the  lightning,  to 
the  following  failure  or damage  conditions.  : 
1)  at  the  surface,  the electrical supply  to  the  colliery failed  immediately  after the 
lightning stroke,  and  electrical gear  a  long way  away  from  the  mine  was  damaged; 
2)  underground,  electrical equipment  (apparatus,  transformers,  earthing circuits)  had 
undergone  arcing  and  suffered damage  which  indicated that high  overvoltages  had 
occurred. 
In  the  execution  of its task,  the Working  Party  on  Electricity has  assembled  a 
series  of  documents  listed in the  annexed list of  references. 
(1)  See  item 1 in  the  references. XI,  6 
Documents  3  and  4  mentioned  in  these  references  deal with  the  transmission  of 
current  due  to  the  energy  of lightning transferred through  the  ground.  Documents  1 
and  5  cover the  transmission of  the  currents  due  to  the  energy  of  lightning  carried by 
the  conductors  in the electric mains  system.  Document  2  deals with  the  transmission of 
the  energy  of  the  lightning by  standing electromagnetic waves  in  the  free  spaces  in  the 
underground workings  or in  the  drifts. 
In  the  light  of  the  preceding  remarks,  one  can  draw  up  the  following  classifi-
cation of  the  possible effects of  atmospheric  discharges  in the  underground workings 
(see  also  diagram  1  annexed)  : 
A.  Lightning  striking the  surface electrical installations  and  transmission  via the 
electric supply  lines  to  the  underground  equipment; 
B.  Lightning striking  any  point  at  the  surface of  the mine  and  transmission  through 
the  ground  or by  metallic masses; 
C.  Lightning striking in the  immediate  vicinity of  the  surface  opening of  a  shaft  or 
drift  and  transmission by  electromagnetic waves  in  the  underground  roadways. 
Protective measures  against  these  effects  are  enumerated in  the  follo~ving chap-
ters. 
2.  Lightning striking surface electrical installations  and  transmission  along  the electric 
supply  lines  to  underground  installations 
2.1  General  remarks 
A direct  lightning stroke  on  the  surface electrical installations  or  an  indirect 
transmission by  induction  can  result in  the  following  phenomena  resulting  from 
the  overvoltage  caused  in  the  mains  system 
failures  in  the  electrical  supply  system of  the mine; 
- damage  to  the electrical equipment; 
- overvoltages  and  shock waves  in  the  ground via  the  earthing points  of  the 
equipment. 
The  known  protective measures  do  not  completely eliminate  these  risks,  but  do 
to  a  large  extent make  it possible: 
- to prevent  the  lightning  from  directly striking the electrical  supply  system 
or electrical equipment  at  the  colliery surface; 
- to  guard  against its effects. 
2.2  Protective measures 
The  possible protective measures  to be  applied  at  the  surface  (1),  which  are 
enumerated hereafter,  are  not exhaustive  and  others  could  no  doubt  be  envi-
saged 
2.2.1 The  lines  connecting  the  distribution transformers  to  the  underground 
electric mains  system  should  be  by means  of buried  cables.  This  method 
should  also be  used if possible  for  the  lines which  connect  the distri-
bution  transformers  to  the  sub-stations; 
2.2.2  The  distribution  transformers  and  the  substations  should be  installed in 
Faraday  cages  or,  if this  is not  possible,  protection  should be  provided 
(1)  These  proteative measures  should for  the  most  part already be  prescribed in the 
regulations~  standards  and  airaulars with respeat  to proteative measures  against 
lightning at the  surfaae. XI,  7 
against  overvoltages  in primary  and  secondary  circuits  and,  if necessary, 
at  the  neural  points. 
2.2.3 Protection should be  provided  against  overvoltages· at  the  connections  bet-
ween  overhead  lines  and  buried  cables. 
2.2.4 Use  should be  made  of  safety earth  conductors  (connected  to  the  earth 
electrode of  the  lightning  conductor)  in  the  overhead  sections  of  the 
distribution  system. 
2.2.5  The  earth electrode(s)  for  the  lightning  conductors  should  be  separate 
from  the  earth electrode(s)  of  the  underground masses,  unless  there  is no 
reason  to  fear  a  dangerous  rise  in potential  in  the  system.  (Case  where 
the  earth electrodes  exhibit  a  resistance with  respect  to  the  ground  such 
that  currents  of  an  intensity of  the  order of  105A  do  not  give  rise  to 
high  current densities.) 
3.  Lightning striking any  point  at  the  surface  and  transmission  through  the  ground  by 
metallic bodies 
3.1  General  remarks 
The  currents which  are  transmitted  through  the  ground  and  through  the metallic 
masses  and  which  result either  from  a  lightning stroke, hitting the  ground,  or 
which  goes  to  ground  after striking the  electrical installations,  (see  Chapter 
2.1)  generally  constitute  a  danger  to  the  underground \vorkings  which  is  greater 
the  shallower  these workings  lie.  In  consequence,  the  risk is  very much  greater 
for  drift mines  and  for  shallow mines  than for  the  great majority  of  the 
'vestern European  Coal-mines,  where  the workings  are  fairly  deep. 
Moreover,  the  surface  ground  is generally  a  good  conductor,  at  least  in  the 
plains,  where  most  of  the  coal-mines  of  Western  Europe  are  located,  and  general-
ly  the  conductivity  is  further  increased  by  the  networks  of  piping  and  rail  tracks. 
In  consequence,  the  depth  of  penetration of  the  currents  due  to  lightning  into 
these  zones  is  generally slight.  These  currents  mentioned  above  can  cause  explo-
sions  of  firedamp,  fires  or  premature  discharge  of  detonators.  The  first  two 
dangers  are  less  marked  than  the  latter,  since  a  methane  explosion or  a  fire 
presupposes  the  formation  in  the  underground  workings  of  sparks  of  sufficient 
energy  to  cause  ignition,  whereas  the  premature  discharge  of  detonators,  although 
requiring fairly high  local  potential differences  or  a  sufficiently high  induction 
current  in  the  shotfiring line,  can  occur without  sparks  being  formed. 
The  high  potential differences  caused by  the energy  liberated by  lightning oc-
cur  at  discontinuities  in the  lines  of  current  in  the  ground,  e.g.  at  the  heading 
face  in drifts  or in  underground  roadways,  precisely at  the  point where  detona-
tors  connected  by  a  shotfiring line  are  generally used.  The  low  energy  required 
to  set off  these  detonators  and  the  possibility of  an  earth fault  in  the  shot-
firing line  constitute  the  conditions  which  favour  the premature  discharge  of 
the  detonators  by  reason  of  the  local potential differences,  but  the  necessary 
energy can  also  be  induced  into  the  shotfiring line by  the  intermediary of  the 
metallic structures which  are  conducting  the  current  caused by  the  lightning 
stroke. 
The  lvorking Party  on  Electricity has  been  informed of  a  certain number  of  cases 
of premature  discharge  of  detonators,  but  does  not  kno~v of  any  case  of  a  methane 
explosion  caused by  currents  due  to  lightning passing  through  the  ground;  the 
lvorking Party therefore  concluded  that it could  here  restrict itself to  the  in-
vestigation only  of  the  risk of premature  discharge  of detonators. XI,  8 
In order  for  current  from  lightning  to  penetrate  the  ground  the  following  factors 
are  important  (1). 
1)  the nature  of the  ground; 
2)  the  nature  of  the  lightning current; 
3)  the  situation of  the  underground workings  and  of  the drifts with  respect  to 
the  point of  the  lightning stroke  and  the path which  the  current  due  to  the 
lightning may  be  expected  to  follow. 
3.2  Nature  of  the  ground 
In  mountainous  regions  (hard  rocks  with  relatively high  specific resistances) 
the  depth  of penetration of  the  lightning energy  and  the  intensities  of  the 
field  to be  expected  are  much  greater than in the  plains  (softer rocks  exhibiting 
a  relatively  low  specific resistance,  lower  level  of  the water  table)  and  in  the 
extreme  case,  for  the  same  frequency  of  lightning  strokes,  the  depth  of penetra-
tion  can  be  ten  times  greater and  the  intensities  of  field even  one  hundred 
times  greater  (2). 
In  industrial areas,  the  conductivity  of  the  surface  layers  is  increased by  the 
presence  of various  systems  of piping  and  by  rail tracks,  and  as  a  result  the 
depth  of penetration is  reduced. 
The  possible effect of  the  stratification of  a  mass  of  ground,  containing strata 
of differing conductivity,  on  the  distribution in depth  of  the  currents  due  to 
the  lightning stroke  has  been  touched  upon  only  incidentally in item  3  of  the 
references,  page  2.  Some  study has  been made  in detail of  the possible effect  of 
discontinuities  in  the  stratification  (3),  but it would  seem  that  a  detailed 
examination  of  this  question falls  outside  the  scope  of  this  report. 
3.3  Nature  of  the  currents 
The  lightning current  is  an  impulse which  can be  broken  down  into  a  series  of 
superimposed  frequencies,  i.e.  into  a  carrier  frequency  of high  amplitude  and  a 
number  of other frequencies  of  lmver  amplitude. 
In order  to  analyse  the  consequences  of  a  lightning  stroke,  the  values  of  the 
various  frequencies  and  their share  in the  amplitude  must  be  taken into  account. 
Berger,  Fourestier  and  Schwenkhagen  (4)  refer to  an  "equivalent  frequency"  of 
lightning of  the  order of  104  Hz.  For  this  frequency  they  indicate  depths  of 
penetration which  are  almost  identical  to  the  values  quoted by  Pavelka  (5)  for 
the  same  frequency. 
3.4  Situation of  underground workings  and  drifts with  respect  to  the  ooint  at Hhich 
the  lightning strikes  and  to  the  exnected path  of  the  current  caused by  the 
lightning 
The  symmetrical  and  spherical distribution of  the  charge  starting from  the  point 
of  impact  of  the  lightning stroke,  which  can be  expected  in  a  homogeneous 
(1)  RefePences  items  3  and  4. 
(2)  References  item  3~  page  2  and item  4~  page  8. 
(3)  RefePences  item 3,  page  20. 
(4)  References  item  3~  pages  5,  9  and  20. 
(5)  PaveLka  (references  item 4,  page  5)  does  not seem  to make  this  ass~tion~ and the 
penetration  vaLues  which  he  indicates  for  frequencies  of 102  and  103  Hz  - which  are 
considePabZy  greater than  the  vaLues  mentioned for  the  frequency  104  Hz  - wouLd 
therefore~  according to Berger,  Fourestier and  Schwenkhagen  (4)  be  of onLy 
theoretical significance. XI,  9 
medium,  may  be  appreciably modified by  the  shape  and  situation of  the  underground 
workings  or drifts within the  region  of  flow  of  the  currents  caused by  the 
lightning stroke. 
A lightning stroke  at  the  entry of  a  drift is  particularly dangerous  (1).  In this 
case,  practically all the  current  due  to  lightning penetrates  into  the drift, 
which  determines  the path of  the  current  (needle effect),  and  is  conducted  along 
the drift.  The  percentage  of  current  due  to  the  lightning which  reaches  the  face 
in the  roadway  then  denends  particularly on  the  extent  to which  the  current is 
diverted  to  earth by  the  metallic structures  along  the  length  the  roadway.  Set-
ting up  a  screen at  the  entry  to  the drift makes  it possible  to divert  the 
major part of  the  lightning  ~urrent before it even enters  the drift itself. 
3.5  Summary  of  observed phenomena 
To  sum  up,  lightning constitutes  a  danger  during  shotfiring operations  in un-
derground workings  at  relatively shallow depths  where  the  overlying strata are 
bad  conductors  and  primarily where  the  surface  conductivity is  low;  a  high 
degree  of  conductivity  at  the  surface  reduces  this  risk,  According  to  the 
documents  which  have  been assembled,  it would  seem  that  in  the worst  case,  the 
depth  of penetration  can  be  as  much  as  500  metres  assuming  an  equivalent  fre-
quency  of  104  Hz.  This  value  is  indicated  for  ground  consisting entirely of 
granite.  For entirely calcareous  ground,  the  value  is  150  metres  and  for humus 
ground  the  value  quoted  is  50  metres  (2)  •  Drift  coal-mines  and  underground 
mines  at  a  depth  of  only  a  few  hundred metres  can  therefore be  endangered.  The 
protective measures  set out  in paragraph  3.6  should  therefore be  applied in 
their totality.  The  geological  conditions  of  the  coal-mines  of  ~vestern Europe 
make  it seem  unlikely that  a  greater depth of penetration  could  occur. 
3.6  Protective measures 
The  follo~ving list of protective methods  which  may  be  applied is not  exhaustive 
(3). 
3.6.1  In  respect  of  the  construction of  the  colliery installations 
a)  Lightning  conductors  should be  mounted  on  high buildings;  surface  me-
tallic structures  and  earth  connection(s)  should be  bonded  to all the 
metallic masses  other  than  those  of  the electrical installations  (4) 
over  as  wide  an  area as  possible. 
b)  The  earth electrodes  should  be  of  a  nature  such  that  the  surface 
conductivity is  increased,  that  the  current  density of  the  earth 
electrode is  reduced  and,  as  a  consequence,  the  possible  intensities 
of field  are  kept  low. 
c)  Screens  should  be  set  up  at  the  surface entrances  to  underground 
workings  and  these  screens  should be  connected  to  the  earth bonding of 
(a)  above. 
d)  In drift workings  and  where  there  is  a  particular danger  (difficult 
earthing conditions  at  the  surface,  shotfiring at  shallow depth),  the 
metallic parts  (5)  of  the  underground  installations  should be  insulated 
(1)  References  item  3~  page  2. 
(2)  References  item  3~  page  2. 
(3)  These  protective measures  shouZd  for  the most  part already  be  prescribed in the 
regulations~  standards  and  circuZars with  respect  to protective measures  against 
lightning at  the  surface. 
(4)  References  item  4~  page  12~  point a). 
(5)  References  item  4~  page  13~  point b). XI,  10 
from  those  at  the  surface.  (The  interposed insulating elements  should be 
installed at  surface  openings  as  well  as  at  the shaft  insets  at  various 
levels.) 
e)  The  metallic parts  of  the  underground  installations  should be  intercon-
nected  (equipotential  connections)  and  multiple earth  connections  should 
be made  (1).  Thus,  e.g.  the  track rails  should be  interconnected  and 
connected  to  the  other conducting objects  parallel  to  the  tracks  such  as 
metal  nipes,  etc. 
f)  All metallic structures  of  supports:  rail  tracks,  ranges  of  piping  and 
tubing  should be  interconnected  over  a  certain distance before  they  reach 
the  working;  this  is  a  means  of  reducing  the  density of  the  lines  of  force 
in the  discontinuities  in  the  ground  constituted,  e.g.  by  underground 
roadways  or by  drifts,  since  a  preferred path  for  the  current is set  up  in 
in this way  (2). 
g)  It is  true  that  removing  the  rails  in the  v1c1n1 ty  of  the  ~vorking before 
shotfiring 'vould  be  a  very effective protective measure,  but  the practical 
difficulties  of  applying  this  technique  make  it of  only  slight interest. 
3.6.2 Protection of  shotfiring lines 
The  various  measures  to  be  applied  can  be  grouped  under  two  headings  (3) 
a)  for  gassy  or non-gassy mines  with  a  depth  less  than  100 metres  : 
very  careful  insulation of  shotfiring lines,  detonator wires  and  all  con-
nections,  with  respect  to  the  ground  and metallic masses; 
b)  for  non-gassy  mines  at  a  depth  less  than  100  metres,  as  a  precaution  ad-
ditional  to  that mentioned  under  a)  : 
use  of  detonators  of very  low  sensitivity  (HI). 
3.6.3 Storm warning 
This  precaution is very  effective  for drift mines  and  for  shallow mines  (4), 
but it is  to be  considered  only  as  an  additional precaution,  supplementing 
the protective  measures  already  described. 
4.  Lightning striking in the  immediate  vicinity of  the  surface outletof  a  shaft  or drift 
and  transmission by  electromagnetic waves  in the  underground  roadways 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
This  mode  of propagation  of  the  energy  of  the  lightning stroke was  indicated by 
MARINOVIC  (5)  as  being  a  possible  explanation  of  the  premature  discharge  of  detonators 
which  had  caused  an  accident  in  a  mine  in Yugoslavia. 
This  is  a  hypothesis  which  in the  opinion of  the  Horking Party had not  previously 
been put  forward  to explain the  propagation of  the  energy  due  to  a  lightning stroke 
in underground workings  (6). 
The  Horking Party  on Electricity considered  that it ,.;as  not  necessary  to  examine 
this hypothesis  in particular detail,  since  the  precautions  envisaged  for  the  first  two 
cases  (Chapters  2  and  3),  and  particularly  the  installation of  screens  at  the  surface 
outlets  of  underground workings,  are  equally effective  against  the  risk  of  a  lightning 
stroke  in  the  immediate  vicinity of  the  outlet. 
See  referenaes  item 4,  page  13,  point a). 
See  referenaes  item 3,  page  3. 
See  referenaes  item  3,  page  10  et seq. 
See  referenaes  item 3,  page  22. 
See  referenaes  item 2. 
Marinovia  expressly states in his  paper  (footnote  1  on  page  4,  paragraph  4,  that he 
had not been  abZe  to find any  similar explanation in teahniaal  literature on  the 
subjeot. XI,  11 
5.  Conclusions 
The  explosion which  occurred  on  the  30th  August  1963  at  ~ainsforth Colliery was 
attributed lo  lightning;  this  explosion  gave  rise  to  the  present  study. 
The  ignition which  occurred  there  was  probably  due  to  electrical discharges  bet-
ween  the  conducting bodies  connected  to  the  main  earthing system  and  the  various  mas-
ses  at earth potential. 
According  to  the  point  of  impact  of  the  lightning stroke  and  the  mode  of propa-
gation of  the  energy,  the  lvorking Party  on  Electricity envisaged  three  types  of 
lightning stroke  : 
1.  lightning striking surface electrical installations  and  transmission  along  the 
electric supply  lines  for  underground  equipment; 
2.  lightning striking any  point at  the  surface  and  transmission  through  the  ground  and 
by metallic bodies; 
3.  lightning striking in  the  immediate vicinity of  the  surface  opening of  a  shaft or 
drift  and  transmission by  electromagentic waves  in the  underground  roadways. 
In  the  three  cases,  there  is  at  least theoretically a  risk of  a  methane  explo-
sion,  of fire  or of  premature  discharge  of  detonators  and  interruptions  of  service. 
In  the  first  case,  all the  risks  mentioned  above  can  to  a  large  extent be 
eliminated by  a  series  of precautions  to be  taken at  the  surface of  the  mine  - adapting 
them  to  the  conditions  of  each particular case  - consisting in particular of  the  use  of 
buried  supply  lines;  surrounding  the  sub-stations  by  Faraday  cages  or protecting  them 
against  overvoltages  at  the  inlet  and  outlet points;  safety  cables  on  the  overhead 
lines;  protections  at  the  connections  of  these  lines  to  the  buried  sections;  separating 
the  earth  conductor  lines  of  the  lightning conductors  from  the  earthing conductors 
for  the  underground masses. 
In  the  second  case, there  is a  theoretical  presence  of  a  risk of  firedamp  explo-
sion,  fire  and  premature  discharge  of  detonators.  But  the  tvorking  Party considers  that 
in this  case  only  the  risk mentioned  last is  of practical  significance,  and  this  is 
the  case  solely  in shallow underground workings  where  the  overlying ground  is  a  bad 
conductor.  This  is particularly true  of drift mines  and  mines  at  a  depth  less  than 
100  metres.  The  preventive  measures  listed below  are therefore intended  to  guard  against 
this  danger  (premature  discharge  of detonators).  It must,  however,  be  pointed out  that 
the  preventive measures  required  to  do  this  comprise  those which  are  indispensable  for 
dealing with  the  other  two  dangers. 
The  tvorking Party  on Electricity underlines  that,  among  the  measures  which must 
be  applied in this  case,  as  may  be  necessary,  are  : 
a)  At  the  surface  : 
- careful  siting of  the  lightning  conductors,  with earthing electrodes  which  reduce 
the  current  densities; 
- setting up  at  the  outlets  of  underground workings  screens  which  are  connected  to 
earthing electrodes; 
- further,  where  there  is  a  particular risk  in drift mines,  the metallic masses  of 
underground  equipment  must  be  insulated  from  those  installed at  the  surface. 
b)  Underground  : 
- installation of equipotential  connections  between  the  metallic masses,  principally 
between  the  rail tracks  and  the  adjacent  ranges  of piping,  with multiple 
earthing points; 
- this  precaution should  also be  extended,  before  the  entry to  the working,  to  the 
elements  of  the  powered  supports,  in order  to  create preferred paths  for  the  cur-
rent; XI,  12 
- if possible  (this measure  is difficult  to  apply)  the  rail track  should be  removed 
in the vicinity of  the working itself before  shotfiring. 
c)  In respect  of  shotfiring technique  : 
- for all workings  less  than  100  metres  depth,  there  should be  very  careful 
insulation of  the shotfiring lines,  detonator wires  and  connections,  with  rescpect 
to  the  ground  and  the metallic masses; 
- in addition,  solely for  non-gassy  mines,  use  should be  made  of  detonators  of  very 
low  sensitivity  (also known  as  "high intensity"  detonators); 
- finally,  as  a  supplementary but effective precaution,  arrangements  should be  made 
for  a  storm warning. 
In  the  third case,  it should be  pointed out  that  the  mode  of propagation by 
electromagnetic waves  is hypothetical  and,  in the  opinion  of  the  lvorking  Party,  has 
never before  been put  forward  in technical  journals  to  explain  the  transmission  of  the 
energy  from  a  lightning  stroke  into underground workings. 
l.Jith  this  reservation in mind,  the Harking Party  on Electricity emphasizes  that 
the precautionary measures  envisaged  above  for  the  two  first-named  cases  still hold 
good  for  the  risks  associated with  a  lightning stroke  in the  vicinity of  the  outlet 
of  a  mine. XI,  13 
DIAGRAM  1 
OVERVOLTAGES  AND  STRAY  CURRENTS 
CONSEQUENT  UPON  ATMOSPHERIG  DISCHARGES 
Lightning  striking surface 
electrical installations  and 
propagating  along  the  elec-
tric supply  lines  for  under-
ground  equipment 
~'--~--...__ 
Direct  light-
ning  stroke 
on  the  surface 
electrical 
installations 
Indirect 
transmis-
missions  by 
induction 
effect 
Possible effects  : 
- interruption in  the  sup-
plies  of electrical  cur-
rent  to  the  mines; 
- overvoltages  and  shock 
waves  in the  ground  via 
the  earthing  connections 
of  the electrical instal-
lations. 
Protective measures  : 
As  set out in Chapter  2.2. 
I  LIGHTNING 
B  ~c 
Lightning  striking any 
point  at  the  surface  and 
propagating  through  the 
ground  and  by metallic 
bodies 
Possible effects 
- high potential dif-
ferences  occurring at 
the  points  of dis-
continuity of  the 
current  paths  in the 
ground,  e.g.  at  the 
heading  face  of 
drifts  or underground 
roadways. 
Protective measures  : 
As  set out  in Chapter 
3.6. 
Lightning striking in the 
immediate  vicinity of  the 
mouth  of  the  shaft at  the 
surface or at  the  outlet of 
a  drift and  propagating by 
electromagnetic '"aves  in  the 
underground  roadways 
Possible effects  : 
- induction of voltages. 
Protective measures  : 
As  set out  in Chapters  2.2 
and  3.6.,  and  in particular 
the  use  of  screens  at  the 
outlets. XI,  14 
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"The  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission,  meeting  in plenary session  on  26  March 
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- Report  on  tour  of  central  rescue  stations  in  the  Community  countries  and  Great 
Britain  (First  Report  on  the  organisation  of mine  rescue  services  1958/59) 
(2nd  Report  of  the  Mines  Safety  and  Health  Commission,  Annex  B,  June  1961); 
- Second  Report  on  the  organisation of mine  rescue  services  1960  (3rd  Report  of 
the  MSHC,  Annex  V a,  November  1966); 
Third  Report  on  the  organisation of mine  rescue  services  1961  (3rd  Report  of  the 
MSHC,  Annex  VI  a,  November  1966); 
- Fourth  Report  on  the  organisation of  mine  rescue  services  1962  (3rd  Report  of  the 
MSHC,  Annex  VII  a,  November  1966); 
Fifth Report  on  the  organisation of  mine  rescue  services  1963  and  1964 
(3rd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  VIII  a,  November  1966); 
Sixth Report  on  the  organisation of mine  rescue  services,  1965/66  (5th Report 
of  the  MSHC,  Annex  V,  October  1968); 
- Seventh  Report  on  the  organisation of mine  rescue  services,  1967/68, 
(7th  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  IV,  September  1970). 
- Recommendations  regarding  the  provision  of  advice  from  foreign  experts  in  the 
case  of  major  accidents  (3rd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  III,  November  1966); 
- Communication  links  between  the  rescue  base  and  the  rescue  team  (3rd  Report  of 
the  MSHC,  Annex  IV,  November  1966); 
List  of  regulations  and  directives  concerning  the  organisation of mine  rescue 
services  in  the  countries  of  the  Community  and  the  United Kingdom  (Doc.  3845/1/70; 
to be  published  in  the  9th  Report  of  the  MSHC). 
2.  Rescue  equipment 
- Interim report  on  the  continued  development  of  the  CO-filter self-recuer  (Doc. 
1872/68/1,  lOth  October  1968); 
- Results  of  the  research  carried out  with  financiel  assistance  from  the  Commission 
of  the  European  Communities  into  the  improvement  of  the  physiological  conditions 
for  the wearing  of breathing apparatus  (8th  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  IV, 
June  1971); 
3.  Research  work  at high  temperatures 
Final  report  on  research  into  the  establishment  of  simple  criteria for  the 
selection of  rescue  team  personnel  for  heavy  work  in high  temperatures  (3rd  Report 
of  the  MSHC,  Annex  IXa,  November  1966). XIII,  4 
4.  Rescue with borehole 
List  of  specialists  for borehole  rescue work  and  equipment  available  in 
Community  countries  (8th Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  III, June  1971) 
B - Fires  and  underground  combustion 
1.  Shaft  fires  at  great  depth 
- Recommendations  on  the  equipment  having  regard  to  the  prevention  of  open  fires 
(1st Report  of  the MSHC,  April  1959); 
Fighting of  fires  in shafts by  bringing in water  (2nd  Report  of  the  MSHC, 
page  24,  June  1961); 
- Final  report  on  experiments with shaft  fires  carried out  by  the  Experimental 
Roadway  Association  in Dortmund,  with  the  financial  aid  of  the High  Authority, 
at  Dorstfeld Colliery,  Dortmund  (3rd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  III a,  November 
1966); 
- Explanatory notes  and  views  of  the Working  Parties  on  Underground  Combustion  and 
Fires  and  Mine  Rescue  Organisation,  and  their expert  sub-committees,  concerning 
the  final  report  of  the Experimental  Roadway  Association,  Dortmund,  on  the  shaft 
fire  experiment  at Dorstfeld Colliery  (3rd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  III b, 
November  1966). 
2.  Ventilation 
- Study  of  the  Group  of Experts  on  Ventilation:  Stabilisation of Ventilation  in 
Pit Fires  - investigation in  the  light  of  Prof.  Budryk's  theory  (this  study 
consists  of  two  separate parts:  the  Report  itself and  Annex  III to  the  6th  Report 
of  the  MSHC,  September  1966); 
Practical  conclusions  of  the  application  of  the  theory  of stabilisation of venti-
lation  (6th Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  III,  September  1969); 
3.  Fire  stoppings  (dams) 
Sealing-off  of  mine  fires  and  underground  combustion  by  dams  (2nd  Report  of  the 
MSHC,  page  51,  June  1961); 
- Report  on  trials with  explosion-proof  dams  carried out  by  the Experimental  Road 
way  Association  in Dortmund  at  the  request  of  the  Safety  Commission  and  with 
financial  aid  of  the High  Authority - Statement  of  policy  regarding  the  erection 
of  advance  dams  of plaster  as  a  fire  fighting measure  (3rd  Report  of  the MSHC, 
Annex  I,  November  1966); 
- Final  Report  on  trials with  explosion-proof  dams,  carried  out  by  the  Experimental 
Roadway  Association  in  Dortmund  with  the  financial  aid  of  the  High  Authority 
(3rd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  I  a,  November  1966); 
- Instructions  for  the  construction  of plaster stoppings  by  the  method  developed 
by  the  Essen-Kray Main  Rescue  Station  (3rd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  X a, 
November  1966); 
- Instructions  for  the  hydro-mechanical method  of  constructing plaster stoppings 
developed  from  the  Central  rescue station of  the  Saarbergwerke  AG  (8th  Report  of 
the  MSHC,  Annex  V,  June  1971). XIII,  5 
4.  Fire-resistant fluids 
- Report  on  the  establishment  of  criteria for  fire-resistant  fluids  used  for  power 
transmission  (hydraulic fluids)  and  on  the  tests  to be  carried out  for  that 
purpose  (2nd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  A,  June  1971); 
- Second  Report  on  specifications  and  testing conditions  relating to fire-resistant 
fluids  used  for  power  transmission  (3rd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  IV  a,  Novem-
ber  1966); 
- Third  Report  on  specifications  and  testing  conditions  relating to  fire-resistant 
fluids  for  power  transrrtission  (pamphlet  10  October  1967); 
- Fourth Report  on  specifications  and  testing  conditions  relating to  fire-resistant 
fluids  for  power  transmission  (pamphlet  26th  March  1971). 
5.  The  reopening  of  fire  areas 
- Report  on  the  opening  of  sealed-off fire  areas  and  the  rules  applicable  thereto 
(3rd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  II,  November  1966); 
- Study  on  the  reopening  of  sealed-off fire  areas  by  Bergassessor  a.D.G.  Lehmann 
(3rd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  II a,  November  1966). 
6.  Use  of  urethane  foam  for  sealing 
Opinion  on  the  use  underground  of  polyurethane  foam  in  the  coal mining  industry 
(7th  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  VI,  September  1970). 
C - Electricity 
Decision  on  the  removal  of  oil  from  resistors,  condensers,  transformers,  switches 
and relaysused  underground  (1st  Report  of  the  MSHC,  April  1959); 
- The  use  of non-flammable materials  for  the manufacture  of electric cables  and 
leads  for  underground  use  (2nd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  page  5,  June  1961); 
- Requirements  which  must  be  met  by  electrical  shotfiring leads  (2nd  Report  of 
the  MSHC,  page  8,  June  1961); 
Protection of  the  underground  electrical network  against  the  danger  of electric 
shocks  (2nd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  page  11,  June  1961); 
- Report  on  investigations  into  the  protection  of  underground electrical network 
against  dangers  arising  from  fires  or  from  firedamp  explosions  (3rd  Report  MSHC, 
Annex  VII,  November  1966); 
- Report  on  firedamp-proof  electrical switchgear  for  nominal  voltages  above  1100  volts 
(3rd  Report  of  the  ~1SHC,  Annex  VIII,  November  1966); 
- Notes  on  the  problem  of heat  transmission  in  an  insulated  conductor  (3rd  Report  of 
the  MSHC,  Annex  IX,  November  1966); 
- Report  on  characteristics  and  the  electrical protection  of  power  feed  cables  for 
mobile  machines  (cutters,  loaders,  etc.)  used  underground  in  the  coalmines  of  the 
countries  of  the  Community  (7th  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  V,  September  1970); 
- Comments  and  recommendations  arising out  of  the  report  adopted  by  the  Mines  Health 
and  Safety  Commission  on  20  June  1969  on  the  characteristics  and  electrical protec-
tion  of  cables  supplying mobile  machines  (coal  cutters,  loading machines  etc.)  used 
underground  in  coalmines  in  the  Community  countries  (8th  Report  of  the  MSHC, 
Annex  IX,  June  1971). XIII,  6 
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- Policy  statement  on  the  deleterious  effects  of  dust-binding processes  using saline 
pastes  and  powders  upon  electrical plant  underground  (9th  Report  of  the MSHC,  Annex 
IX,  July  1972) 
- Comparison  of  safety prov1s1ons  concerning electric trolley  locomotives  underground 
and.  in particular,  possibilities  of  reducing  the  incidence  of  trolley sparks 
(9th  Report  of  MSHC,  Annex  X,  July  1972) 
- Report  and  conclusions  on  overvoltages  caused by  lightning  (9th  Report  of  the  MSHC, 
Annex  XI,  July  1972) 
D - Winding  ropes  and  shaft  guides 
- Report  on  the  electro-magnetic examination  of winding  ropes  (3rd  Report  of  the  MSHC, 
Annex  VI,  November  1966); 
- Final  report  on  electro-magnetic tests  carried out with  the  financial  aid  of  the 
HighAuthority in  the  Bochum  Rope-testing Station  (3rd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  XI  a, 
November  1966); 
- Report  on  the  use  of  accelerometers  for  testing winding  installations  (3rd  Report  of 
the MSHC,  Annex  V,  November  1966); 
- Report  on  measurement  and  testing procedures  for  shaft- and  roadway  winding  ropes 
and  for  guides  for  shaft- and  roadway  haulage  installations  (7th  Report  of  the  MSHC, 
Annex  VII,  September  1970). 
E  - Combustible  dusts 
- Report  on  work  done  on  the neutralization of  combustible  dusts  and  dusts  barriers 
(7th  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  VIII,  September  1970). 
F  - Mechanization 
Recommendations  concerning  the  equipment  of  locomotives  (1st  Report  of  the  MSHC, 
April  1959); 
- Recommendations  concerning  the neutralization of  exhaust  gases  from  diesel  engines 
(1st  Report  of  the  MSHC,  April  1959). 
II.  HEALTH  PROTECTION  AND  ENVIRONMENTAL  FACTORS 
- Explanatory notes  to  the  recommendation  on  "Fixing of  climatic  limits" 
(3rd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  X,  November  1966); 
- Recommendation  on  "Fixing  of  climatic  limits"  (3rd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  XI, 
November  1966); 
Recommendation  embodying  directives  on  means  of  suppressing  dust  concentrations  in 
underground workings  (8th  Report  of  the  MSHC,,  Annex  VI,  June  1971); 
- Recommendation  on  the  organisation of  special services  responsible  for  the  inspection 
of  dust  conditions  in underground working  (8th  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  VII,  June 
1971); XIII,  7 
- Statement  on  the  need  to  reduce  the  dust  concentration resulting  from  the  use  of 
coal-cutting  and  getting machinery  and  roadway  drivage  (8th  Report  of  the  MSHC, 
Annex  VIII,  June  1971); 
III.  HUMAN  FACTORS 
A - Medical  problems 
- Report  on  pre-entry  and  routine medical  examinations  and  recommendations 
(2nd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  page  74,  June  1961); 
- Colliery medical  services  in the  countries  of  the  Community  and  the  United 
Kingdom  (2nd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  C,  June  1961). 
B - Psychological  and  sociological  factors  in mine  safety 
- Report  on  the  psychological  and  sociological  factors  affecting safety  (3rd  Report 
of  the  MSHC,  Annex  XII,  November  1966); 
- Recommendations  on  the  psychological  and  sociological  factors  affecting safety 
(3rd  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  XIII,  November  1966). 
C - Effects  of  remuneration methods  on  safety 
Report  on  the  implications  of  payn1ent  at  piece rates  for  mine  safety 
(4th  Report  of  the  MSHC,  Annex  III,  December  1967); 
- Recommendations  as  to principles  to be  observed  in view  of  the  possible  influence 
of  payment  at piece  rates  on  safety in  coal mines  (4th Report  of  the  MSHC, 
Annex  IV,  December  1967). OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
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